Lead Opinion
announced the conclusions reached by the- court as follows: ■ — ■
1. Property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves, landing-places, fire-engines, hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses, engineering instruments, and. generally everything held for governmental purposes, cannot be subjected to the payment.of the debts of the city. Its public character forbids' such an appropriation-. Upon the repeal of the charter of the city, such property passed under the immediate control of the State, the power once delegated to the city in that,behalf having been withdrawn.
. 2. The private property .of individuals with.in the limits of the territory of' the city cannot be Subjected to the payment-of the debts of the city, except through taxation. The doctrine of some of the States, that such property can ‘be reached directly on execution against the municipality, has-not-been generally accepted.
3. The power of taxation is legislative, and cannot be exercised otherwise than under the authority of the legislature.
4. Taxes levied according to law before the repeal of the charter, other than such as were levied in obedience to. the special requirement of contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such as were levied under judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against the city, cannot be collected through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at the instance of the creditors of the city. Such taxes can only be collected under authority from the legislature. If no such authority exists, the remedy is by' appeal to the legislature, which alone can grant relief. Whether taxes levied in .obedience to contract obligations, or under judicial direction, can be collected through a receiver appointed "hy a court of chancery, if there be no public- officer charged with, authority from the legislature to perform that duty, is not decided, as the case does not require it.
5. The receiver and back-tax collector appointed under the authority of the act of March 13, 1879- is a public officer, clothed with authority from the legislature 'for the collection of the taxes levied before the repeal of the charter. The funds
6. The bills in this case cannot be amended so as to obtain relief against the receiver and back-tax collector, withoht making an entirely new suit. They were not framed with a view to'any such purpose.
7. The decree of the court below is reversed.
8. The cituse is remanded, with instructions to dismiss.the bills, without prejudice. If, on the settlement of the accounts of the receiver herein, it shall be.found he has any money in his. hands collected on taxes levied under judicial direction to pay judgments in favor of any, persons who have become parties to this suit, an order may-be made directing its appropriation to the'payment of such judgment. , ’
Upon the first, second, third, and fifth of these propositions' the judgment of the court is unanimous". Upon-the fourth, .sixth, seventh, and eighth it is, by a majority only.
delivered the following opinion for himself, Mr. Justice Miller, and Mr. Justice Bradley.
Mr.. Justice Miller, Mr. Justice Bradley, and myself concur in the judgment rendered, but, as tbe judgment is not accompanied by a, statement, of the reasons on which it is founded, I proceed to state those which have controlled us.
In January, 1879, the city of Memphis, in the State .of Tennessee, was financially, in a bad condition. She had been for many years a municipal corporation,' and was invested with the ordinary powers of such, bodies to make contracts and' incur obligations for municipal purposes, and to ■ levy and collect taxes to meet-her expenditures. Her authorities were' also at. different times specially 'empowered by tbe legislature of the State to subscribe" for stock in railroad corporations, to. aid in the construction of linés of railway leading to and" from
The record shows that for several, years preceding 1879 not more than three-fifths of the annual taxes were collected. Whether this arose from the viciousness of the system of .taxation' adopted, or- the inefficiency of the officers of collection,- is immaterial. Probably it arose partly from both causes. The natural-result followed: the revenues received became insufficient to meet the just claims of creditors; obligations were not paid as they matured ; coupons for interest on bonds were not provided for; the city was in default for much of the princi-pal and all of the interest'of her indebtedness.: she was insob, v.ent. Suits were soon commenced against her by creditors : some in the Federal courts, some in the State courts; and from the Federal courts in several cases a mandamus was issued to the authorities of the city, to levy a special tax for the payment of judgments recovered. With t.axes uncollected, debts maturing, and both principal and interest unprovided for; with numerous suits commenced and more threatened; with credit gone and the property of her citizens already subjected to burdens difficult to be borne, =— the city was, in., a condition out of which she was almost helpless, to extricate herself.
While the city was thus burdened with debts and pursued, by creditors, the State interfered; and on the 29th of January, 1879, repealed the charter of the city, took the immediate con
The repealing act was in terms general, and applied to all municipal corporations in the State having thirty-five thousand inhabitants at the date of its passage, to be ascertained by the' governor, and declared by his proclamation. The city of Memphis had that number of inhabitants ; and it was so proclaimed by the governor. The act not only repealed the charters of all such corporations, with their amendments, but declared that all municipal offices, held under them, were abolished; that the population within their territorial limits were resolved back into the body of the State; that all power of taxation in any form previously invested in- their authorities was withdrawn and reserved to the legislature; and that the public buildings, squares, promenades, -wharves, streets, alleys, parks, fire-engines, -hose and carriages, engine-houses, engineer instruments, and all other property, real and personal, previously used for municipal purposes, were transferred to the custody and control of the State, to remain public property as previously it always had been.
. On the same day- with the passage of the repealing act, the legislature passed another act to 'establish taxing districts in the State, and to provide the means for-their local government. . It declared that the several communities embraced in the territorial limits of the- repealed corporations, and of -such other corporations as might surrender their charters under the act, were created taxing districts in order to. provide the means of local government for theii; peace, safety, and general welfare; that the necessary taxes for the support of the governments thus established should be imposed directly by the General Assembly, and-not otherwise; that in administering the affairs and providing the means of local government the following agencies and instrumentalities were established,— namely, a board of fire and police commissioners; a committee on ordinances or local laws, to be known as the legislative council of the taxing district; a board of health, and a board of public works ; .and it prescribed in detail the duties and powers of these local agencies. The act prohibited the
On the 13th of March following such provision was made. By an act passed by the legislature on' that day, the governor was directed to appoint an officer for municipal corporations, whose charters had been repealed under the first act mentioned, or might be subsequently surrendered, to be known as a receiver and back-tax collector. It required him to take possession of all books, papers, and documents pertaining to-the assessment and collection of taxes, which had been levied at the time of the repeal of the -charters. It ordered him to file a bill.in the Chancery Court of the county in which the-corporation was situated, in the name of the State, in behalf of all creditors against all its delinquent tax-payers, and provided that taxes assessed prior to 1875 might be settled in the valid indebtedness of the extinct municipality, whether due or.
The day 'previous to the passage of the act repealing the. charter of Memphis, and probably in anticipation of the contemplated legislation of the State, Robert Garrett and others, creditors of the corporation, filed a bill against the city, al
It also set up that the legislature, by an act of the 19th of March, 1877, had authorized the Chancery Court of the State to appoint a receiver to take charge of the affairs of the city, upon application of creditors owning demands against her exceeding $100,000, when it was made to appear that writs of mandamus had been issued against her to enforce debts against the city amounting to over $850,000; and averring that the court had jurisdiction, both upon general principles of jurisprudence and by authority of that act, the bill prayed the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assets of the city, including its tax-books and bills for unpaid .taxes, and to collect the taxes levied, for the purpose of paying the judgments.
After the repealing act was passed, the complainants filed a supplementary bill setting up the passage of- the act, alleging its invalidity, and repeating its prayer for the appointment of a receiver.
Subsequently several other parties instituted like suits against the city. All the suits were, in February, 1879, consolidated into one without objection, and by amendment to it, in April following, Meriwether, the receiver appointed by the governor, was made a defendant, as also sundry parties upon whose property taxes had been levied. With the consolidation a receiver of the assets and property of the city was appointed
To the bill as consolidated and amended a demurrer was interposed by the defendants, upon which several questions arose, on which the'judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion. The prevailing opinion of the presiding judge being against the demurrer, it was overruled, and the defendants electing to stand upon it, judgment final was rendered in favor of the complainants, from which the-defendants have appealed to this court.
The receiver appointed by the court was invested with larger powers than probably any officer of a court was ever before intrusted with. He was required to demand, receive, and take possession of all the assets and property of the city of Memphis, including real and personal property, and debts due to it and taxes which had been previously levied, except the taxes appearing on the tax-books for the year 1878, for which special provision was made; and except, also, the public highways of the city, the public squares, the public landings and wharves, the- hospital, and certain property used in connection with it, and property of the fire,-engineer, and police-departments, and the taxes, levied for the support of the public. schools, which excepted articles he was not to take possession of or interfere with until the further order of the court. It does not appear that the court entertained any doubt that it could at some future time place all this public property in the hands of its- receiver, as its subsequent decree shows. The receiver was also required to-take possession of all the-tax-books of the city on which unpaid taxes were charged, except the tax-books for the year 1878; and also all the safes, books, papers, desks; office furniture, and other property belonging to the offices of mayor, comptroller, register, treasurer, tax-collector, inspector, and city attorney, necessary to the discharge of his duties as receiver, and of the buildings in which the general council of the city had previously assembled, and the property in and belonging to such buildings not; previously excepted, and keep them subject to the order of the court; and parties
By the order appointing the receiver, the trustee of Shelby County, within which the city of Memphis is situated, was required to pay over to him all the moneys he had on hand collected for taxes levied by the city for the year 1878, except such as were levied for the' support of public schools. The former treasurer of the city was also required, with the like exception, to turn .over to the receiver, on demand, all the money in his hands or on deposit in the German National Bank, received for the city. The mayor of the city was also to pay over to him any money, and deliver to him any property, belonging to the city, and the papers and-vouchers necessary for the discharge of the receiver’s duties; and the clerk of the county of Shelby was also to pay over any moneys received by him on account of the redemption of property sold for taxes due the city. The' receiver was also required to lease, the property of which he might have possession from • month to month, and to collect the rents and hold the same subject to the order of the court; and, if he found it necessary, he was authorized to bring actions at law or suits in equity against' parties indebted to the city, or for any tax or taxes appearing on the tax-books, and to enforce any specific liens on the property, real or personal, for the payment of such' taxes; and to employ as many clerks and assistants as he might deem necessary; to make use of the buildings and offices- in the city hall, and of such safes, desks, tables, chairs, and other furniture and property of the city he might need; to buy and pay for necessai'y books, stationery, fuel, and lights, and whatever else might be necessary to fit his office or offices for use to enable him to discharge his duties; to insure any property, real or personal, which might come into his hands, when he thought prudent to do so; to employ one or more attorneys, if necessary, to conduct the prosecution or defence of suits that he might find necessary to bring or defend under the authority conferred by him. Other powers were also vested in the receiver, but what has already been" said is enough to show the extraordinary character of those conferred and of the duties iipposed upon him. He ■ was, in fact, in
The decree adjudged that the Complainants in the several suits, and other creditors who had made themselves parties by leave of the court, or who might thereafter make themselves parties, should recover from the city the several debts due them respectively, the amounts to be thereafter fixed by the court, and that all the assets and property of the city, “ of every description,” or so much thereof as might be necessary for that purpose, including- taxes previously assessed and remaining unpaid and due the city, should be applied to the payment of their debts.. The decree also adjudged that the receiver should retain possession of- all the assets and property, books, papers, and writings previously placed in his 'hands to be disposed of' as the court might order in the progress of the suit, and that he proceed to collect the assets and property m the manner directed by previous orders for the payment of the debts. It also enjoined the defendant, Minor Meriwether, the receiver and back-tax collector appointed by the governor of the State, from taking possession of, collecting, or. attempting to collect, suing for, or in any way interfering with, the assets and property, books, papers, and writings in the possession of the receiver of the court. And the decree further adjudged that all the property within the limits of the territory of the city of Memphis was liable and might be subjected to the payment of all the debts 'of the city,'and-that such liability would be enforced thereafter, from time to time, in such manner as the court might direct.
This decree is manifestly erroneous in its main provisions. It proceeds upon the theory that the property of every description held by the municipality at the time of its extinction, whether held in its own right or for public uses, .including also in that designation its uncollected taxes, were chargeable with the payment of its debts, and constituted a trust fund, of which
The right of the- State to repeal the chárter of Memphis cannot be questioned. .Municipal corporations are mere instrumentalities of the State for the more convenient administration of local government. Their powers are such as the legislature may confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged, or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure. This is common learning, found in all adjudications on the subject of municipal bodies and repeated by text-writers. There is no contract .between the State and' the public that the charter of a city shall not be at all times subject to legislative control. All persons' who deal with such bodies are conclusively presumed to act upon knowledge of the power of the legislature. . There is no such thing as. a vested right held by any individual in the grant of legislative power to them. United States v. Railroad Co.,
But while the charter of a municipal corporation may be
“ The ancient doctrine that, upon the repeal of a private' corporation, its debts were extinguished, and its real property reverted to its grantors, and its personal property vested in the State, has been so far modified by modern adjudications that a court of equity will npw lay hold of the property of a dissolved corporation, and administer it for the benefit of its creditors and stockholders. The obligation of contracts, made whilst the corporation was in existence, survives its dissolution, and the • contracts may be enforced by a court of equity, so far as to subject, for-their satisfaction, any property possessed by the corporation at the time. In the view of equity, its property constitutes a trust fund, pledged to the payment of the debts of creditors and stockholders ; and if a municipal corporation, upon the surrender or extinction in other ways of its charter, is possessed of any property, a court of equity will equally take possession- of it for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation.”
,We approve of the doctrine stated in this citation. It expresses what we believe to be sound law. It means that whatever property a municipal corporation holds subject to the payment of its debts, will, alter its dissolution, be so administered and applied by a court of equity. It does not undertake to determine what is to be deemed the property of a municipal corporation, which, after the extinction of its charter,- is thus applicable. In the case from which it is taken, the bill alleged that the city of Pensacola, upon the surrender of its
What, then, is tibe property'of a municipal corporation, which, upon its dissolution, a court of equity will lay hold of and apply to the payment of its debts? We answer, first, that it is not property held by the corporation in trust for a private charity, for in such property the corporation possesses no' interest for its own uses ; and, secondly, that it is not property held in trust for the public, for of such property the corporation is the mere ;agent of the State. In its streets, wharves, cemeteries, hospitals, court-houses, and other public buildings, the corporation has no proprietary -rights distinct from the trust for the public. It holds them for public use, and to no other use can they be appropriated without special legislative sanction. It Avould be a perversion of that trust to apply them to other uses. The courts can have nothing to do with them, unless ’ appealed to on behalf of the public to prevent their diversion from .the public use. The dissolution of the charter does not divest the trust so as to subject property of this kind to a liability from which it was previously exempt. Upon the dissolution, the property passes under the immediate control of the State, the agency 'of the corporation then ceasing. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., sects. 445, 446; Schaffer v. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 126; City of Davenport v. Peoria Marine Fire Insurance Co.,
In the third place, we say that' taxes previously levied, but not collected on the dissolution of the corporation, do not constitute its property; and in the absence of statutory authority they- cannot' be subsequently collected by a court of equity through officers of its own appointment, and applied to the payment of the creditors of' the corporation. Taxes are not debts. It Avas so held by this court in the case of Oregon v. Lane County, reported- in 7th Wallace. Debts are obligations for the payment of money founded upon contract, express or implied. Taxes are imposts levied for the support of the gov
It is the province of the- courts to decide causes between parties,-and, in so doing, to-construe the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, aijd of the several States, and to declare the law, and, when their judgments áre rendered, to enforce them by such remedies as legislation has prescribed, or as are allowéd’ by the established practice. When they go beyond this, they go outside of their legitímate domain, and encroach upon the other departments of the government; and all will admit that a strict confinement of each department within its own proper sphere was designed by the founders of o.ur government, and is essential to its successful administration.
In the case of Heine v. The Levee Commissioners of New Orleans, the question again arose whether it was competent
In the Circuit Court, over which Mr. Justice Bradley then presided, the possession of the power of taxation had been denied. “ The judicial department,” said the Justice, “has no power over the subject. If the officers who are charged with the duty óf ,laying or collecting taxes refuse to perform 'their functions, the court,, in a clear case of failure, a,nd at the instance of a party directly interested, can, by the prerogative writ of mandamus, compel them to perform acts which are ministerial, as distinguished- from those which are judicial or discretionary. This, is all that the judicial department can do on the subject, unless the legislature has expressly conferred upon it further powers.”
And -when- the case came before this court, .we here said, Mr. Justice Miller delivering the opinion : “ The power we are here .asked to exercise is the very delicate one of taxation. This power belongs,- in this country, to the legislative sovereignty, State or National. In the case before us .the national sovereignty has nothing to do with it. The power must be derived from the legislature of the State. So far as the present case is concerned, the State has delegated the power to the levee commissioners. If that body has ceased to exist, the remedy is in the legislature, either to assess the tax by special statute, or to- vest the power in some' other tribunal. It certainly is not vested, as in the. exercise of an original jurisdiction, in any Federal court. It is unreasonable to suppose that the legislature would ever sélect a Federal court for that purpose. ■ It is not only not one of the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the Federal government of the legislative functions of the State government. It is a'most extraordinary request, and -a com-: pliance with it- would involve consequences no less out of the way of judicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee.”
These authorities.— and many others to the same purport
When creditors are unable to obtain payment of their judgments against municipal bodies by execution, they can proceed by mandamus against the municipal authorities to compel them to levy the necessary tax for that purpose, if such authorities are clothed by the legislature with the taxing, power, and such tax, when collected, cannot be diverted to other uses; but if those authorities possess no' such power, or their offices have been- abolished and the power withdrawn, the remedy of the creditors is by an appeal to the legislature, which alone can give them relief. No Federal court, either on its law or equity side, has any inherent jurisdiction to lay á tax for any purpose, or to enforce a tax already levied, except through the agencies provided by law. However urgent the appeal of creditors and the apparent hopelessness . of thejr position without the aid of the Federal court, it cannot seize the'power which belongs to the legislative department of the State and wield it in their behalf.
To return to the question propounded: what is the property of a municipal corporation which, on its dissolution, the courts can reach and apply to the payment of its debts ?
We answer, it-is the private property of the corporation, that is, such as-it held in its own right for profit or as a source of revenue, not charged with any public trust or use, and funds in its possession unappropriated to any specific purpose. In this respect the position of the extinct corporation is not dissimilar to that of a deceased individual.; it is only such property as is possessed, freed from ■ any trust, general or special, which can go in liquidation of debts.'
The decree of the -Circuit Court proceeding upon a different theory of its control over the uncollected taxes of the repealed corporation, and of the property which could be applied to the payment of its debts, cannot be maintained.
. On another ground, also, the decree is equally untenable. It adjudges that “ all the property within the- limits of the
In no State of the Union, outside of New England, does the' doctrine obtain that the-private property of individuals within the limits of a municipal corporation can be reached by its creditors; and subjected to the payment of their demands. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, and perhaps in other States in New England, the individual liability of the inhabitants of towns, parishes, and cities, for the debts of the latter, is maintained, and executions upon judgments issued against them-can be enforced against the private property of the inhabitants. But this doctrine is admitted by the courts of those States to be peculiar to their jurisprudence, and an exception to the rule elsewhere prevailing. Elsewhere the private property of the inhabitants of a municipal body cannot be subjected to the payment of its debts, except by way of taxation; but taxes, as we have already said, can only be levied by legislative authority. 'The power-of taxation is not.one of the functions of the judiciary; and whatever authority the States may, under their constitutions, confer upon special tribunals of their own, the Federal courts cannot by reason of it take any additional powers which are not judicial.
In Rees v. City of Watertown, from which we have already quoted, the power asserted by the decree was claimed by counsel, but was rejected by the court. “ Assume,” said the court, .“that the plaintiff is entitled to the payment of his judgment, and that the defendant neglects its duty in refusing to raise the amount by taxation, it does not follow that this court may order the amount to be made from- the private estate of one of its citizens. This summary proceeding would involve a violation of the. rights of the latter. He has never been heard in court. . He has had no opportunity to. establish a defence tn the .debt itself, or, if the judgment is valid, to show that his property is not liable -to its payment. It is well settled that .legislative exemptions from taxation are valid, that such exemptions may be perpetual in their duration, and that .they are, in some cases, beyond legislative interference. The pro
It is pressed upon us with great earnestness by counsel, that unless' the Federal courts come to the aid of the creditors of Memphis, and enforce, through their own officers, the taxes levied before the repeal of its charter, they will be remediless. But the conclusion does not follow. The taxes levied pursuant to writs of mandamus issued by the Circuit Court are still to be collected, the agency ohly for their collection being changed. The receiver appointed by the governor has taken the place of the collecting officers of the city. ' The funds received by him upon the special taxes thus levied cannot be appropriated to any other uses. . The receiver, and any other agent of the State for the collection, can be compelled by the court, equally as the former collecting officers of the city, to proceed with the collection of such taxes by the sale of property or by suit, or in any other way authorized by law, and to apply the proceeds upon the judgments. If relief is not thus ■afforded to the creditors, they'must appeal to the legislature. We cannot presume that the appeal will be in vain. We cannot say that on a proper representation they will not receive favorable action.
It is certainly of the highest importance to the people of every State that it should make provision, not merely for the, payment of its own indebtedness, but for the payment of the indebtedness of its different municipalities. Hesitation to do this is weakness; refusal to do it is dishonor. Infidelity to engagements causes loss of character to the individual; it entails reproach upon the State.
The Federal judiciary has never failed, so far as it was in its power; to compel the performance of all lawful contracts, Avhether of the' individual, or of the municipality, or of the State; It has unhesitatingly brushed aside all legislation of the State impairing their obligation. When a tax has been authorized by law to meet them, it has compelled the officers of. assess
Concurrence Opinion
with whom óoncurred Mr. Justice Swayne and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting.
The several bills of the 'complainants ^vere consolidated in the Circuit Court, and, so far as it appears, yithout objection. They are, therefore, to be considered as one1' ¿ase. - The important facts averred in the bills and- confessed T>y the demurrer are the following: —
The complainants are creditors of the city of -Memphis. For a part of - their claims they had- recovered judgments against the city before the bills were filed, and had obtained writs of mandamus to. enforce the levy' of taxes to satisfy the judgments. In. obedience to these writs the proper city authorities had levied the taxes required, but had neglected to collect them, in large measure, and, even when a portion of the taxes had been collected, had failed to appropriate the money collected'to the payment of the judgments for which it had been specially levied, and to which alone it' could be lawfully applied. Some of. the money thus collected remained on deposit. These- levies were made during the years 1875, 18-76, 1877, and 1878, the city ordinances by which they were ordered specifying the amounts and the.parties for-whom the
Besides the special levies, made as above stated, the city authorities had made others for the purpose o'f paying interest on the city debt and for general uses. These taxes also remained uncollected. Meanwhile the city had nothing liable to-execution at. law, and no. property except what it held for public uses (in distinction from private), such as public municipal buildings, parks, streets, fire apparatus, &c. It was insolvent.
Such was the situation when these bills were filed. Their object was to obtain the appointment of a receiver to take pos-' session of the assets of the city (including the collected but not appropriated taxes, as well as thé -claims and bills for past-due and uncollected taxes), and to collect the same with a view to their being applied according to equity and legal right.
. The principal one of the consolidated bills was filed on the twenty-eighth day of January, 1879, by Garrett et al. Almost immediately after it was filed, — 'the next day, indeed, — an act of the legislature of the State was passed, approved Jan. 31, 1879, by which the charter of the city was repealed, all power of taxation in any form was withdrawn from its authorities, and all persons holding office under the repealed acts, which constituted the charter arid endowed it with power, were prohibited from attempting to exercise any of the functions of' their 'offices. The public buildings, squares, promenades, wharves, streets, alleys, parks, fire-engines, hose and carriages, engineer instruments, and all other property,- real and personal, theretofor£..used for municipal purposes, were declared to be transferred to the control and custody of the State, to remain'public property, as it always had'been, for the uses to which it had theretofore béen applied. The act contained no reservation of the rights of creditors, and said nothing of any outstanding taxes which had been levied but not collected,'and it was declared to take effect from and after its-passage.
On the same day,. Jan. 29, 1879, another act of the legislature was passed, approved Jan. 31, 1879, by which the identical territory that had been-embraced in the territorial
These two acts were passed,, as has been noticed, on the 29th of January, 1879, and approved, two. days thereafter.
Oh the 7th of February, 1879, the complainants, Garrett et al., filed, by leave of the court, an amended and supplemental bill, avérring what had been charged in the original, and setting forth, inter alia, these acts of the legislature, denying their constitutionality, and. praying, as in the original bill, for
The other bills were filed severally on Jan, 30, 1879, Feb. 3, 8, and 10, next following, and on the 12th of February the cases were consolidated, and T. J. Latham was appointed a receiver in accordance with the .prayer of the complainants. He gave the required bond on the same day, and took immediate possession of the-tax-books, bills, &c., of the city.
Subsequently, on the 13th of March,'1879, the legislature of the State passed another act, the first section whereof directed the governor • to appoint an officer for municipal corporations whose charters had been repealed (the city of Memphis being the only one),- to be known as a receiver and back-tax — collector. Subsequent sections required such receiver and collector to take possession of all books; papers, and documents pertaining to.the assessment and collection of the taxes embraced by the act; namely, the taxes due at the time of the repeal of the ‘charter. It further directed that the receiver should- file in the Chancery Court of the State an original creditors’-bill, in the name'of the State, on behalf of all the creditors, against all the delinquent tax-payers and it provided that taxes- assessed prior to 1875 might be settled in the valid indebtedness of the extinct municipality, to wit, in valid bonds, whether due or not, due' coupons, and any other valid debts of such municipality, with accrued interest, whether in -the shape of scrip, warrants, judgments, ledger balances, paving certificates, or receipts for money paid by tax-payers to' paving contractors. It directed the receiver and back-: tax .collector to receive such evidences of debt at the follow-' ing rates, namely: compromise- bonds, at their, face value; all other .indebtedness at fifty cents on the dollar, except judgments, which shguld he receivedNat fifty-five -per cent of- their lace value. ’
The - act also directed that the receiver shguld receive in payment of taxes levied after 1874 the indebtedness of the municipality, -vyhen there was. no lien or equity requiring payment thereof in current jnoney.'. It' also prohibited the collector or receiver from coercing payment of a greater sum than
Under the provisions of this act, Minor Meriwether,- the principal appellant, was appointed receiver and back-tax collector by the governor of the State. He accepted the appointment, and proceeded to demand the payment to him of the taxes in arrears, interfering with, the receiver previously appointed by the Circuit Court, and impeding that receiver in the discharge of his duties. The complainants then filed a supplemental bill, making Meriwether a party defendant, together with some defaulting tax-payers, and praying, among other things, for an injunction against such interference.
To the consolidated bill thus amended and supplemented a general demurrer was filed,- which was not sustained by the Circuit Court, and, the defendants electing to stand upon it: a final decree was entered in favor of’ the complainants. From that decree this appeal has been taken.
.Whatever may be said of the equities of the complainants and. of their power to enforce those rights in a court of equity, I agree that the decree as entered was too broad. It declared and adjudged that all the assets and property of every description theretofore belonging to the. city of Memphis, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purpose, including taxes theretofore assessed (and remaining unpaid and due the city, should be applied to the payment of .the debts due to the complainants and other creditors who had made, or might thereafter make, themselves parties to the suit. This included not only the private property of the city, but also that which it had held for public uses; namely, for governmental purposes and as a trustee for the State, such as the public buildings, streets, squares, parks, school-houses, promenades, fire-engines, hose and hose-carriages, engine-houses, engineer-instruments, and generally everything held by the city for merely municipal, purposes. To this extent, I think, the decree cannot be sus
I think, also,, that part of the decree which adjudges that all the property within the limits of the territory of the city of Memphis is liable and may be-subjected to the payment of all the debts owing by. the city, and that such liability shall be enforced hereafter, from time tó time, in such manner as ■ the Circuit Court might-order and direct, is erroneous. Notwithstanding what has been held in some of the New England States, I think the doctrine is generally accepted, that the private property of individuals within the territorial limits of a municipal corporation cannot be reached • by its creditors directly, any more than the private property of stockholders in other corporations can be thus reached. It may, it is true, be subjected to taxation-for the. payment of the corporate debts, but the levy of taxes must be made.by the.corporation itself, or by the State. It is not a judicial act, and courts of equity, at least the circuit courts of the. United States, cannot by their own officers levy a tax. Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall 107.
' They certainly have no power to compel the levy of a tax by a corporation which is without officers and which has ceased to exist.
But while, in these particulars and for these reasons, the decree entered by the Circuit Court cannot be sustained in its full extent, I am of opinion that the complainants are entitled to some of the relief granted them by the decree. If they are not, then a new way has been -discovered to pay old debts. It cannot be that a corporation, whether municipal or not, can be dissolved, and that by its dissolution its property can be withdrawn from, the reach of its just creditors by any pi-ocess of law or equity.. No doubt there are technical difficulties in the way of maintaining proceedings at. law against a corpora
A case, I think, was made by the. bill for the appointment of a receiver to take into the possession, of the court those taxes which had been levied by judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered ■ against the' city, — taxes which had been only partially collected. Those taxes were in a most legitimate sensé charged with a trust and, a trust for the complainants.- The fund to be raised by the levies was set apart for a special purpose. . It could be .used lawfully for no other. The ordinances which directed the levies .specified the amounts to be raised, and the judgment creditors for whose use the levies wei’e made.- Those creditors were, therefore, cestuis que •trust in the fullest sense of the term; the legal' interest alone being in the city. The. cáse shows that this trust had been •neglected and abused by the trustee. The taxes which it was the duty of the city as trustee to collect had been suffered to remain uncollected in .great measure, and for an unreasonable time, and even the portions which were collected had not been paid over, as the writs of mandamus required. This breach of duty by the'trustee had continued from 1875 to 187-9. Had. the trustee been a natural person, or a private corporation, no one would doubt the power of a' court of equity to interfere and. take the trust out of the hands of the faithless trustee, either by removing' him ánd appointing another trustee, or by administering the trust by its own officers. It can make mo difference that the city of’ Memphis was a municipal corporation. Its character. as such does not affect the nature of its obligations to its creditors, or its eestuis que trust, or impair the remedies they would have if the city was a common debtor or trustee. While as a municipal corporation the city liad public duties to perform, yet in contracting-debts authorized by the law of its organization, or in -performing a private trust, it is regarded by the law as standing on the same footing as a private individual, with the same rights and duties, and with the same liabilities,-as attend such persons. Over its public duties, .it may be admitted, the legislature has plenary authority.' Over its private obligations it has not. Bailey v.
Moreover, if, as contended by the appellants, the city of Memphis ceased to have any legal existence' on the thirty-first day of January, 1879, when the-legislative act repealing the charter was ’ approved, the case then became one of a trust without a trustee, pre-eminently fit for equitable interference. A court of .equity wifi not permit a private trust to fail for want of a trustee. And this, rule is applicable to cases in which a municipal corporation has been nominated the trustee. Girard v. Philadelphia,
So in Batesville Institute v. Kauffman (
Without further citations, which might' - éasily be made, enough has been said to show -that in the present case the Circuit Court was authorized to seize by the hands of its own receiver,, for administration,- those taxes which had been levied
Much -of what I have said is equally applicable to- the taxes which the city during its corporate existence had levied , for the payment of interest on its debt, or for other purposes, and had not collected, and generally to all the assets of the city of every character, except such ás I have heretofore mentioned, held for strictly public uses, such as public buildings, parks, fire-apparatus, &c. These general assets, though not held specially in trust for any particular creditors, were held by the corporation, in a very just sense, for the benefit of its creditors. The corporation having ceased to exist, it-was perfectly within, the power of the Circuit Court, sitting as a court of equity, to seize all its assets to which its creditors have an equitable or legal claim, and hold them for administration. Such assets cannot, be appropriated to any other use until, the creditors are satisfied. Even legislative action cannot divert them to other uses. These principles have been fully recognized, arid, particularly in. the code -of Tennessee. Referring to dissolved corporations, that code enacts (sect. 3426)': “The court shall appoint a receiver, with full- power to'take possession of all the debts and property, and sell and dispose of, collect and distribute; the same among the creditors and other persons interested, under the orders. of the eourf.” This statute is only- an affirmance of- equitable remedies before acknowledged and found in textbooks. Thus, in Potter- on Corporations (sects. 714, 715), the rule is. thus stated: “Whatever technical difficulties exist' in maintaining • an action at law against a corporation after its charter has been repealed, in the apprehension, of a court of equity there is no difficulty in a creditor’s following the property of the corporation into the hands of one not a Iona fide creditor or purchaser, asserting his lien thereon, and obtaining satisfaction of his debt.” In Broughton v. Pensacola (
So in Curran v. Arkansas (
In Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sect. 37, the rule is stated thus: “ Wjhere the legal existence- of a municipal trustee is destroyed by legislative act, a court of chancery will assume the execution of the trust, ; . . take charge of the property, and carry into effect the trust.”
In Beckwith v. Racine (
' It is hardly necessary to say that the private property of a municipal corporation is so-decidedly stamped with a trust in favor, of its creditors, that it is incapable of being diverted to other uses by the legislation of the State. This law has again and again been declared. Grogan v. San Francisco,
The citations I have made (many others might be added) are- sufficient to maintain the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in this case, and its power to lay hold, by its receiver, of all the property and assets belonging to the city of Memphis, when its charter was repealed, including all taxes levied and
I do not contend that a court of equity can itself levy a tax. I agree it cannot, and so this court has decided. Rees v. City of Watertown,
I have said, and I earnestly maintain, that the taxes which the city of Memphis had levied before the repeal of its charter, some of which were collected, but remained on deposit or undisposed of, and some of which are not collected, are assets of the corporation, which its creditors have an equitable right to have seized and appropriated to'the payment of the corporate debts.' By the'lawful'assessment and levy of a tax the taxpayer becomes a debtor to the municipality, and the debt may be recovered, like other debts, by a suit at law; qr, when-it is a lien, by a bill of equity. Such certainly is the law of Tennessee. Mayor & Aldermen of Jonesboro v. McKee, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 167; Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 554; Marr v. The Bank of West Tennessee, 4 id. 487. The imposition of a tax creates a legal obligation to pay. In Savings Bank v. United States (
Thus far I have considered the merits of the case as unaffected by the legislation of the State, heretofore spoken of, except so far as that legislation repealed the charter of the city." That legislation, was certainly very extraordinary, and quite unprecedented in the history of the country since the Federal Constitution was adopted. Whatever . may have been its purpose, and however carefully that purpose may have been disguised, if it can be sustained, its effect is to obstruct, if not totally destroy, all the power of the creditors of the city to enforce payment of thé debts due them. They are remanded to the mere grace and favor of. the legislature. If ever legislation impaired the obligation of contracts, this did. .If it • had been simply the repeal of' the'municipal charter, no one could have called it in question'. Undoubtedly the legislature of a State may amend or dissolve the organization of a municipal corporation, so far as its governmental powers are concerned. But no legislature can so dissolve a corporation, municipal or private, as to destroy or impair the obligation, of any contracts the corporation may have made. Dillon, Mun. Corp., sect. 114; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,
In the view I take of the case, however, it is unnecessary to decide how far the legislation of the State is constitutional, or how far it is in conflict, if at all, with the paramount law which controls alike State and natural persons. Certainly the appointment by the governor of Meriwether as a receiver and back-tax collector can have no effect upon the prior appointment of Latham by the Circuit Court. It cannot confer upon Meriwether any right to interfere with the performance of the diities which the court had imposed upon its receiver. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court had fully attached, and, by the action of its receiver, the assets of the city, the' tax-bills and books, had come into the possession of the court before Meriwether’s appointment. That jurisdiction and possession cannot be divested by any State action. The injunction decreed against Meriwether wa,s, therefore, I think, properly adjudged.
I have thus stated, as briefly as possible, my reasons for dissenting from the action of the majority of the court, reversing the decree of the court below and ordering a dismissal of the complainants’ bill.
I think the decree should be modified by striking out so much of it as subjects to the payment of the debts of the city the property held exclusively for public uses, and sd much as subjects to such payment the private property of all persons within fhe city’s territorial limits.
Thus modified, I think the decree should be affirmed.