82 Miss. 758 | Miss. | 1903
delivered the opinion of the court.
On December 17, 1901, a fire occurred in the city of Meridian, which, among much other property, destroyed the entire stock of goods of the Ormond Grocery Company, which at that time was covered by a fire insurance policy for $2,000 in the Queen Insurance Company. On December 20, 1901, appellant had issued an execution against James B. Ormond on a judgment in its favor obtained some three years before,' and suggested the probable indebtedness to said James B. Ormond of the Queen Insurance Company, and prayed for garnishment. The insurance company first answered denying any indebtedness, but afterwards, on 15th October, 1902, filed another answer, and paid into court the sum of $500, the amount for which its policy of insurance on the stock of the Ormond Grocery Company had been compromised by agreement between its
•We cannot concur with the court below in-the conclusion arrived at, as evidenced by the peremptory instruction given for appellee. It is manifest that the garnishment of the insurance company after loss incurred was perfectly 'proper. This very point was expressly decided by Crescent Insurance Co. v. Moore, 63 Miss., 419, and the case at bar is a plainer and stronger case than that. In’ the Moore Case the judgment was rendered against the garnishee before the loss under the insurance policy had been adjusted, and while the liability of the insurance company was still unfixed. In the case at bar the loss 'had not only been adjusted, but the money due by the insurance company actually paid into court to abide the result' of the litigation be-' tween those claiming the fund.
The other and' vital question here involved is whether the money paid into the court by the insurance company comes within the scope and meaning of section 4234, Ann. Code 1892 (section 1300, Code 1880). There can bé no question,'in the light of this record, that appellant’s execution could lawfully have been levied upon the stock of goods in question prior to its destruction by fire, and a bald statement of the salient facts will show that it was liable for the debts of J ames B. Ormond.
With this in mind, we pass to the consideration of the other branch of the question: Can the money now in court in settlement of the loss of the stock be held ? The language of' section 4234, Code 1892, bearing upon the special point now under discussion is, “All the property, stock, money, choses in action, used or acquired in such business,” shall be liable, etc. The word “acquire,” as used in this statute, has no technical meaning. It means “obtain,” “procure,” “to get as one’s own.” Was not the money in controversy “obtained and procured” by and in this business ? Did not James H Ormond “get it as his own” through this business ? A remedial statute must be liberally construed. Whore its meaning and intent are plain, courts will not permit its force to be weakened — its scope limited — on account of possible verbal inaccuracies. In Pollard v. Insurance Co., 63 Miss., 244, 56 Am. Rep., 805, speaking through Justice Campbell, this court held that an insurance policy covering a stock of goods was a contract in reference to the business — growing out of it, pertaining to it, concerning it. And the logical and luminous opinion in that case assists greatly in discerning the true legal .principle controlling the question here involved. It is correctly stated by counsel for appellee that before loss an insurance policy against loss by fire is not a chose
Reversed and remanded.