92 Ind. 343 | Ind. | 1883
The appellant brought this action, alleging in her complaint that for the last twenty years she has been the
An answer of three paragraphs was filed. The first was a general denial, and the others were special. A counter-claim was also filed against the appellant and Henry H. Meredith, her husband, alleging that the land belonged to him, and that he had conveyed it to the appellant, without consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding the appellees, who are creditors of said Henry H. Meredith. Prayer that said conveyance be set aside, and the land be subjected to the payment of their respective claims.
An answer in denial of the counter-claim, and a reply in denial of the special paragraphs of the answer were filed. The issues thus formed were referred to a master commissioner with directions to report the evidence and the facts, with his. conclusions of law thereon. At the ensuing term of the court the master commissioner made a report of the facts, in substance, as follows: “ That in the latter part of the year 1847 Henry H. Meredith purchased from Abraham Jordan 133 acres of land, the tract in dispute here, and on the 18th day of February, 1848, the same was conveyed by Jordan to him; that he paid Jordan a horse and wagon, estimated at $100, and paid upon a mortgage one Wallace then had upon the land $414; that about Christmas, 1847, Henry H. Meredith received from Nathan Berne, the father of his wife, $425, and gave his note to him for the same, and with this money paid the $414 to Wallace; that about two years after-wards said Nathan Berne sent the note of Meredith to appellant and made her a present of it; that she tore the name of Meredith from the note; kept the note as a relic until it
On the facts thus found, the master commissioner concluded that the conveyance of the forty acre tract of land was valid, and the conveyance of the one hundred and thirty-three acre tract and the one acre tract was fraudulent and void as against the creditors of Henry H. Meredith, and stated conclusions ■of law accordingly. The appellant filed various exceptions to the conclusions of law and fact, but these were all overruled as to the one hundred and thirty-three acre tract. The
These rulings are assigned as error in this court.
The first question presented is whether the appellant has been the equitable owner of the parcel in dispute from the time her husband purchased and paid for it until his conveyance on October 2d, 1880? The appellant maintains that she was, and upon this theory sought to quiet her title against the claims of the appellees. This position can not be maintained. The law in force at the time the deed was made to Henry H. Meredith provided that where a conveyance, for .a valuable consideration, shall be made to one person, and the ■consideration therefor shall be paid by another, no trust shall ■arise unless the alienee takes an absolute conveyance in his ■own name without the consent or knowledge of the person with whose money the consideration was paid. R. S. 1843, p. 445, sections 170-172. The facts found do not bring the appellant within this rule of law. She did not furnish the consideration, and hence a trust did not arise. Her husband paid $100 in property and the balance in money, which he •obtained from the appellant’s father. It was not found that the money so procured was the appellant’s, and in the absence of such finding it must be regarded as the money of the husband. Thus regarded no trust could arise. If the money procured from the father-in-law is to be regarded as the money of appellant, the result is the same. The husband having paid a portion of the consideration, no trust can arise in such case in the absence of an agreement or understanding to the contrary. Brookville Nat’l Bank v. Kimble, 76 Ind. 195. Again, if the money is regarded as belonging to appellant, it became the husband’s as soon as received, by virtue of
It is not found, however, that this money belonged to the appellant, and hence there is no ground upon which it can be insisted that she was the equitable owner of said land. We are of opinion, upon the facts found, that Henry H. Meredith was the owner of said land until his conveyance as aforesaid.
It is next insisted that Henry H. Meredith was indebted to the appellant for the money furnished him by her father, and that such conveyance was made in consideration of such indebtedness. If so, and such conveyance was accepted for such purchase alone, the same can not be assailed by his creditors. Brookville Nat’l Bank v. Kimble, supra, and authorities cited.
The facts found, however, do not show any indebtedness. It is found that the father, about two years after he furnished the money, sent the note to the appellant, but she destroyed it without treating or regarding it, or the money which it represented, as a claim against her husband. This is not a finding that the husband was indebted to the appellant, nor was it found that such conveyance was made in consideration of such indebtedness or of any indebtedness. The facts found, we think, show that the appellant was a volunteer, and that the land in question was conveyed to her without consideration. It is true that the note was sent her, and that it represented $425, but she did not hold it as a claim against her husband, and the disposition that was made of it evinced no-intention to treat it as a subsisting obligation upon the part of the husband. Some money was used in the family and some on building the house and barn, but no debt existed against him for this money, because it was not so intended— at least it is not so found. The facts found, as before stated, do not show a conveyance for value, and therefore this conveyance is void as'against creditors.
The appellant also insists that the conveyance can not be set aside until it is shown that she participated in the alleged fraudulent intent of her husband. This is not necessary where the conveyance is made without consideration. Spaulding v. Blythe, 73 Ind. 93, and authorities cited.
Various other propositions are discussed, but as all of them are based upon the assumption that the facts found show that the appellant is a purchaser for value, the conclusion we have reached upon that question renders it unnecessary for us to notice them. For these reasons we think the court did not err in overruling the appellant’s exceptions to the report of the master commissioner.
The appellant also insists that the facts found are contrary to the evidence; but we think the evidence justified the finding, and there was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial. There is no error in the record, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Per Curiam. — It is therefore ordered, upon the foregoing opinion, that the judgment be affirmed, at the appellant’s costs.