MEREDITH CORPORATION V CITY OF FLINT
Docket No. 232310
Michigan Court of Appeals
June 3, 2003
256 MICH APP 703
Submitted January 14, 2003, at Detroit. Decided June 3, 2003, at 9:10 A.M.
The Court of Appeals héld:
1.
2. The circuit court did not err in awarding the plaintiff attornеy fees and costs incurred in opposing the city‘s motion for a protective order in the family-division proceeding because the plaintiff‘s suit was initiated pursuant to the FOIA, and the plaintiff was entitled to all fees related to achieving production of the audiotape. The fact that a portion of the requested attorney fees were incurred in a separate, related matter does not preclude recovery of that portion of the fees. Moreover, the plaintiff‘s participation in the family-division proceeding was nеcessary given the city‘s decision to pursue a protective order.
3. The circuit court erred by refusing to award costs and attorney fees the plaintiff incurred before the date the affidavits were signed by the prosecutor and defense counsel, because
4. The circuit court erred by refusing to award punitive damages under
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further prоceedings.
SMOLENSKI, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that he would not award punitive damages because, under the circumstances, the city did not act arbitrarily and capriciously.
For purposes of awarding attorney fees, costs, and disbursements to a prevailing party in action brought under the Freedom of Information Act, the prevailing party is entitled to all fees related to achieving production of the materials, and the fact that a portion of the requested fees were incurred in a separate, related matter does not preclude recovery of that portion of the fees (
Braun Kendrick Finkbeiner, P.L.C. (by Scott C. Strattard and Craig W. Horn), for the plaintiff.
Joliat, Tosto, Mccormich & Bade, PLC (by John A. Tosto), for the defendant.
Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., and WILDER and SCHUETTE, JJ.
WILDER, J. In this action filed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In early July 2000,1 a minor called defendant‘s 911 center for assistance and, immediately following the call, shot and killed his uncle. The prosecutor charged the minor in the family division of circuit court with voluntary manslaughter and possession of
On July 12, defendant‘s assistant city attorney informed plaintiff by letter that it could not provide the requested information within five business days as required by the act and that defendant was claiming the ten-business-day extension for disclosure permitted by
On August 17, 2000, plaintiff filed its complaint in the instant matter, asserting that the information was subject to disclosure and that the attorneys in the underlying juvenile proceeding had сonsented to disclosure of the information. According to plaintiff‘s complaint, the minor had been bound over for trial on charges of manslaughter, and the law-enforcement investigation was not ongoing.3
On August 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion in the circuit court to compel disclosure of the information it requested pursuant to the FOIA, which the circuit court heard on August 28, 2000. At the hearing, plaintiff contended that because the minor had been charged and bound over, any law-enforcement investigation had concluded. Plaintiff also noted that both the minor‘s attorney and the prosecutor assigned to the case had signed affidavits supporting release of the tape. Plaintiff requested immediate disclosure of the 911 tape and an award of $500 in punitive damages for defendant‘s arbitrary and capricious denial of plaintiff‘s request.
In response, defendant acknowledged that because the police had completed their investigation and the prosecution had acted on the investigation, any further investigation would be conducted by the prosecutor‘s office, not law enforcement. Defendant claimed, however, that because of the “exciting” nature of the tape, release of the contents of the tape
The circuit court found that there was no “justification on the evidence and documents submitted to me that would allow the City of Flint not to disclose the 911 tape that was requested.” The circuit court specifically found no evidence of an ongoing law-enforcement investigation. Regarding defendant‘s claim that by refusing to disclose the tape it sought to preserve the fairness of the minor‘s trial, the circuit court stated:
I think that is a noble concern, and certainly one that [the family division] might want to address, but I think in terms of the right of the [p]laintiff to seek this information through the Freedom [of] Information Act, that that is not something that should be addressed by me here.
Although the circuit court held that “the reasons for nondisclosure offered by the [c]ity are without merit and that the 911 tape should be disclosed,” the circuit court chose to delay the effect of its ruling until after the hearing on defendant‘s motion for a protective order and directed that “release [of the tape] was subject tо [the family division‘s] concept of what is needed to protect his trial.”
Plaintiff oрposed the motion and advised the family division that the circuit court had found no valid reasons for nondisclosure of the tape. Plaintiff argued that the order sought by defendant violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint on publication and that defendant lacked standing to raise the fair-trial issue. The prosecution argued in support of defendant‘s motion as a prophylactic measure to prevent a change of venue or a protracted jury-selection process, but admitted that there was no legal basis for prohibiting release оf the tape. Counsel for the minor concurred with plaintiff that defendant lacked standing to assert the minor‘s right to a fair trial, and asserted that defendant‘s true reason for wanting to shield the tape from public exposure was the resulting criticism defendant‘s 911 system could face after release of the tape.
The family division denied defendant‘s motion, finding that defendant failed to sustain its burden of showing that disclosure of the evidence would interfere with the parties’ rights to a fair trial, and that the
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for costs, attorney fees, and punitive damages stemming from defendant‘s denial of its FOIA request. Defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees. First, defendant claimed that plaintiff was not the “prevailing party” because the FOIA suit was not reasonably necessary to obtain disclosure of the tape, and the suit was not a substantial cause of the tape‘s disclosure. Second, defendant argued that plaintiff was not “forced” into litigation and could have opted for a less expensive administrative appeal of defendant‘s denial. Defendant also claimed that because its reasons for denying plaintiff‘s FOIA request were based in law, it had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying the request and thus plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages. Defendant also objected to the amount of attorney fees plaintiff requested, noting that plаintiff had requested attorney fees related to intervening in the family-division proceeding to oppose defendant‘s motion for a protective order.
At the hearing on plaintiff‘s motion, the circuit court found that plaintiff was a prevailing party and that it was necessary for the suit to be filed to achieve production of the tape. The circuit court also found that defendant “probably” had a reasonable belief that the minor‘s rights could be affected by release of the tape, but that once the minor‘s attorney and the proseсutor indicated in affidavits that they did not oppose release of the tape, “at that point in
On appeal, defendant claims that the circuit court erred by finding that plaintiff was а prevailing party and by permitting plaintiff to recover attorney fees incurred when plaintiff intervened in the family-division proceeding to oppose defendant‘s motion for a protective order. Plaintiff argues on cross-appeal that the circuit court erred by limiting its recovery of attorney fees to those incurred after the attorneys in the family-division proceeding approved by affidavit the release of the tape. Plaintiff also argues that the circuit court erroneously concluded that it was not entitled to punitive damagеs.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo questions of law such as statutory interpretation. Thomas v. New Baltimore, 254 Mich. App. 196, 200; 657 NW2d 530 (2002). We review for clear error the circuit court‘s findings of fact. Id.
Defendant first claims that plaintiff was not a prevailing party in the present action because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the suit was reasonably necessary to compel disclosure of the requested information. We disagree.
Consistent with the “prodisclosure” intent of the FOIA, a public body must provide the public with access to all government information that is not specifically exempt from disclosure. Thomas, supra at 201. To efficiently accomplish disclosure, the FOIA places specific requirements on public bodies that receive requests for public records. A public body must respond to a request for public records within five business days of receipt of the request by either granting the request in whole or in part, denying the request in whole or in part, or notifying the requesting party that it will respond to the request in ten business days.
If a person asserting the right to inspect, copy, or receive a copy of all or a portion of a public record prevails in an
Additionally, the circuit court must award the requesting party $500 in punitive damages if it determines that the public body “arbitrarily and capriciously violated [the FOIA] by refusal or delay in disclosing or providing copies of a public record.”
“A party prevails in the context of an FOIA action when the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure, and the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information to the plaintiff.” Scharret v. Berkley, 249 Mich. App. 405, 414; 642 NW2d 685 (2002).
The circuit court specifically found that plaintiff was the prevailing party and that “it was necessary for the lawsuit to be filed to produce the tape.” Defendant fails to show that this finding is clearly erroneous, because it is undisputed that defendant did not release the tape until ordered to do so by the circuit court. The circuit court plainly considered the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff was the prevailing party.
Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that plaintiff was the prevailing party because the decision in the family-division proceeding, rather than the circuit court‘s order in this action, compelled release of the tape. We disagree. Defendant‘s denial of plaintiff‘s FOIA request constituted a final decision to deny the request.
Similarly, the circuit court‘s deferral to the family division concerning the minor‘s right to a fair trial does not prevent a finding that the instant action had a “substantial causative effect” on the release of the tape. Although the circuit court stayed the effect of its order until after the hearing in the family division, it specifically held that defendant‘s “reasons ... for nondisclosure” lacked merit. Moreover, at the hearing on plaintiff‘s motion for attorney fees, the circuit court noted that the family division “in effect, ... agreed with the decision that was made earlier....” Accordingly, it is clear that the circuit court ruled on both of the exemptions claimed by defendant, not just the minor‘s right to a fair trial. For all of these reasons, we find that the circuit court properly concluded that plaintiff prevailed in the instant action.
Defendant next asserts that the circuit court erred in awarding plaintiff costs and attorney fees incurred in opposing defendant‘s motion for a protective ordеr in the family division because the costs and fees were not incurred in the FOIA action. We disagree. Defen-
Moreover, we find that the circuit court did not clearly err by finding that plaintiff‘s participation in the family-division hearing was necessary in light of
On cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by refusing to award the costs and attorney fees it incurred before August 21, 2000, the date when counsel in the family-division proceeding signed affidavits stating that they did not object to the release of the tape. We agree. In its ruling on plaintiff‘s motion for attorney fees, the circuit court limited its award to fees plaintiff incurred on or after August 21, 2000, because defendant “probably had a belief that [wa]s reasonable that the release of the tape may imрact” the minor‘s trial. The circuit court erred, however, by limiting the award in this manner. The language of
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in denying its request for punitive damages under
Here, the circuit court found that defendant had a reasonable belief (at least for a period) that release of the tape could compromise the minor‘s right to a fair trial, and that defendant‘s decision to withhold the tape was not arbitrary and capriciоus. This finding was clearly erroneous. Throughout the proceedings, defendant consistently failed to articulate any specific reasons why disclosure of the tape would deprive the minor of a fair trial, other than that the tape would receive extensive media attention. In particular, while admitting in both proceedings that plaintiff, and therefore the public, was entitled to release of the tape, defendant offered no basis for concluding that the minor‘s right to a fair trial would not be adequately protected by the prosecutor and the minor‘s attorney, each of whom had the direct responsibility
Despite knowing that the tape was subject to disclosure, defendant pursued a strategy that delayed release of the tape for weeks after plaintiff submitted its FOIA request. Even after the prosecution and the minor‘s attorney approved release of the tape, defendant refused to release it until ordered to do so by the circuit court. Under these circumstances, we conclude that thе circuit court clearly erred in finding that defendant did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in withholding the tape. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court‘s denial of plaintiff‘s request for punitive damages. On remand, the circuit court must award plaintiff punitive damages in accordance with
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
SCHUETTE, J., concurred.
SMOLENSKI, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in part and dissent in part. I would not award punitive damages because I believe that under the circumstances, the defendant did not act arbitrаrily and capriciously.