Meredith Coleman v. Nyal Frantz, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana

cut, spurred by price the fact Dennis sales were Moore testified that he had over ten years experience running plaintiffs is that the were not able to make his business. Thus, certainly he was to the the defendants’ con estimate sales because of the amount of lost unit sales in the after- opportunity duct and was lost.32 thus the market caused the Association’s con- Simply plaintiffs because the did cut their figures presented duct. the Because prices during period does the 1979 to 1981 plaintiffs the were neither remote nor un- markets were not convince us that the reasonable, hold proper we that it was preclude any comparison. similar so as to the district court to allow Dennis Moore to challenge The defendants also Dennis testify as to the lost unit sales in the after- regarding Moore’s the after-mar- testimony market. profit margin ket unit sales and the on We thus hold that the Dennis equally incompetent those sales and un- as testimony regarding profit Moore’s his persuasive. Certainly, Dennis Moore was margin and lost unit sales was admissible competent testify regarding the calcula- competent $167,202 in establishing the profit margin, especially tion of the since damages. essentially “management he was a one-man and, thus, only possible team” was the IV. testify who could as to this matter. The decision of the district court is aff See, Co., e.g., Malcolm v. Marathon Oil irmed.33 (5th Cir.1981) (Malcolm, 642 F.2d 845 station, proprietor gas of a retail was al- testify concerning damages

lowed

caused the defendants’ unlawful con-

duct). claim that As to defendants’ testimony regarding

Dennis Moore’s after- lights

market sales of the Model was COLEMAN, speculative, plaintiffs may we note that the Meredith Plaintiff-Appellant, rely probability and inference estab- damages in- lishing their estimate of the Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson curred. FRANTZ, Nyal County, Sheriff of Wells Co., 555, 564, Paper Parchment U.S. Indiana, Defendant-Appellee. (1931); 75 L.Ed. 544 see No. 84-1248. Bigelow, also (“[t]he elementary conceptions most Appeals, United States Court of public policy require that the justice and Seventh Circuit. wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncer- Argued Sept. 1984. created”). tainty wrong his has which own Decided Jan. 1985. certainly logical It is to assume that addi- unit sales to dealers were lost be- tional members were not

cause Association’s Further, light.

purchasing the Model 701 argue directly lifting also did not of the threat to revoke the members’ 32. The defendants now, they argue price jury, approval, that the nor do certificates of and not the fact profit margin. plaintiffs’ selling reduced the Model 701’s cut also were another model Further, jury free to believe Dennis during peri- that caused the sales increased testimony volume the increased Moore’s od 1979 to 1981. prices reduce his since it de- allowed him to jury production Because we have affirmed the verdict costs. creased judgment and the district court’s denial of a argue any comparison also The defendants liability, n.o.v. on the issue of antitrust we need periods to 1978 and 1979 to between plaintiffs’ not address the assertion that the dis- plaintiffs improper because the were granting judgment trict erred in n.o.v. on court during selling the Model 701 a third version of statutory the common law and Illinois commer- argument unper- period. We find this the later disparagement cial claims. jury free to find that it was suasive. Judge, Cudahy, filed concur-

ring opinion. Gordon,

Myron L. District Senior

Judge, sitting by designation, a dis- filed

senting opinion. below,

sons set forth we affirm the summa- ry judgment.

I noted, As defendant is the Sheriff Indiana, County, of and he occupied Wells post at all times relevant to this case. On June the Wells Circuit Court issued a bench warrant for the arrest of plaintiff, upon based defendant’s affidavit “probable cause” credited county the (p. opinion below, court 8 of first R. Item 30). 31; F.Supp. “legally at suffi (593 F.Supp. and valid arrest warrant” cient 32) instructed the Sheriff to arrest the charge receiving on a stolen Joseph Northrop, Northrop, S. Mills & him property and to take before that court Ind., Huntington, plaintiff-appellant. for Bond “instanter.” was set the court at $10,000. Defendant turned himself in at Fenton, Barrett, James P. Barrett & County the Jail on June Wells McNagny, Ind., Fort Wayne, for defendant- The Sheriff read him the bench warrant appellee. charged,

naming the offense informed him bail, of the amount of his and incarcerated CUMMINGS, Judge, Before Chief CU making day him for want of bail. The next DAHY, GORDON, Judge, Sen the defendant returned service of the war Judge.* ior District through

rant to the Wells Circuit Court its clerk, there, customary notifying is thus as CUMMINGS, Judge. Chief court of Coleman’s status. Plaintiff Plaintiff Meredith Coleman filed custody July this civil in the until remained Sheriff’s Frantz, rights against Nyal action the Sher- he was released the Sheriff at when Indiana, County, iff of Wells prosecuting attorney’s the direction of the then, grant- U.S.C. 1983. The district court prosecutor Until had tak office. summary ed defendant’s motion for judg- despite early knowledge of en no action his F.Supp. appeals ment. 593 28. Plaintiff During plain his detention the the matter. grounds on the that the district court erro- asked the Sheriff several times when tiff neously recognize failed to a violation going protested he to court and rights improperly his constitutional af- repeatedly In turn Sheriff innocence. qualified immunity arrange forded the defendant a prosecutor’s called the office to for liability. from Section 1983 For the rea- appearance,”1 defendant’s “first but did * Gordon, arrestee is then a Myron formal The Honorable L. defendant in Senior Dis- a crimi- prosecution. Wisconsin, nal Judge Although trict vary the Eastern District of elements state, from ly sitting by state to designation. appearance the first normal- judge magistrate (1) consists of a or ensuring require prompt have statutes that 1. Most states person that the before him is the named persons appearance arrested complaint; (2) in the informing the defendant specific impose a time A few statutes officer. charge (3) of the complaint; in the informing produc- the arrestee must be within which limit right the defendant of remain silent and ed, requirement express most a timeliness but warning anything says him that he court or unnecessary utilizing such as "without terms trial; A.L.I., police may against to the be used him at delay” "forthwith." See or Code Model 577-579, (4) Appendix informing ap- I defendant of the Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1975). pointed indigent, determining counsel if he is if indigent, place appropriate the defendant is after the com- and when takes A first initiating providing and reviewed so that least plaint has been filed coun- reply July action until

not receive a favor of the defendant on the Section 1983 18th, prosecutor told him the date first count after reviewing the pleadings, deposi- plaintiff. to release tions and other documentary evidence. Simultaneously pendent state count was upon language Plaintiff relies dismissed with prejudice but is not involved stating form bench warrant that the Sher appeal. The court held that Sheriff iff body “have before the [Mr. Coleman’s] Frantz was shielded from Section 1983 lia- Judge Court, instanter, of Wells Circuit bility by qualified immunity, and alterna- then and there to answer State of Indi tively, that no violation of the United ana, charge on the of Receiving Stolen place. opin- States Constitution took Two * * Property 35-43-4-2(b) I.C. and on issued, ions were the second after consider- § 35-l-8-l(a)2 Indiana placing Code as ing plaintiff’s response to the motion for duty bring on the Sheriff to about a “first summary judgment. Each resulted in sum- appearance.” That Section of the Indiana judgment mary for the Sheriff and in dis- Code an officer arrests states “[w]hen plaintiff’s pendent missal of state claims. accused, an he shall take the accused be issuing fore the court the warrant” for II

docketing by (emphasis supplied). the court particular specified. No time limit is preliminary inquiry in any § 1983 action must Throughout 18-day detention focus on whether the two essential ele- visitors, telephone, had access to a to and § (1) present: ments to a 1983 action are to the Sheriff and his staff. Plaintiff also complained whether the conduct of was spoke attorney an during with his first by person committed a under color of detention, week of did but not retain the law; (2) state and whether this conduct attorney as counsel. He was not mistreat- deprived person rights, privileges, a or necessary ed nor denied items while incar- immunities secured the Constitution F.Supp. cerated. See 593 at 30. There is no or law of the United States. indication from the record that he ever re- quested attorney that an provided be 527, 535, Taylor, Parratt v. him because he could 1908, 1912, afford counsel. 68 L.Ed.2d 420. The first charge against The criminal him was dis- of these elements was not contested 23,1982. August missed on important defendant. It is for us to exam- though holding

ine the second even our complaint sought $10,000 respect qualified immunity The June 1983 to would $10,000 compensatory punitive adequate upon and constitute an dam- basis which to attorney’s judgment ages, fees and costs. The dis- affirm the below. As was stated granted summary judgment this in Egger Phillips, trict court v. indigent; (5) setting sel for the of bail. See W. places requires I.C. § 35-1-8-1 that an ar- 1.4(i) & J. person brought Criminal § "promptly” rested before a Israel, Procedure LaFave (1984). (1982) currently court. § 35-33-2-2 Ind.Code appearance” prescribes "first should be dis- The Indiana the arrest warrant form instructs tinguished "preliminary hearing" arresting bring a which officer to the arrestee before hearing judge unnecessary delay." the court statute, a the ac- "without Another involves a before (Burns 1979) indictment, Ind.Code prior during 18-1-11-8 presence, cused’s to Ann. 1982), (repealed required city police officers to required produce is sufficient which the State bring court, arrested (cid:127) ordi- probable cause. See Fed. evidence establish narily within 24 hours of arrest. Plaintiff 5.1; Alabama, con- Coleman v. R.Crim.P. cedes that apply said statute does not to Sheriff stage L.Ed.2d That had 387. plaintiff's Frantz. See memorandum of law in reached in this case. never been response to summary defendant’s motion for judgment p. R. Item 28. 1979) (re- 35-l-8-l(a) (Burns Ind.Code Ann. (1982) 1982). pealed re- § 35-33-7-4 Ind.Code (7th Cir.1983) banc), “to (593 315 n. 27 was no constitutional violation F.Supp. {en 34).

dispose solely ground on the of the case alleged constitution- that at time plaintiff’s eighteen- We hold that the right question al violation the was not day detention without an before rendering defend- established [thus deprivation judge magistrate or was a immune, p. ant see discussion 725] infra liberty without due of law. State right would leave the status of such action which “shocks the conscience” of the Nahmod, limbo.” Constitutional court, California, Rochin v. Remedies: Executive Wrongs Without 205, 209, Of- 96 L.Ed. U.L.Q. Immunity, 62 Wash highly “concept ficial offensive to the which (1984). liberty,” Connecticut, ordered v. Palko 319, 325, 149, 152, appeal that his U.S. Plaintiff first contends L.Ed. recognized has caused the “nationally Court to find detention violated process. a denial of due brought Gerstein persons for arrested to be 103, 114, Pugh, 420 U.S. magistrate without unreasonable 43 L.Ed.2d the Court ruled that the Fourth Amend- delay” upon based * * * Constitution determina prohibition mant’s of “unreasonable probable tion of prerequisite cause as a seizures” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s an “extended restraint of liberty following prohibition liberty deprivation without arrest,” recognized and process equal protection due of law and its plaintiff’s arguments Despite clause. consequences prolonged detention contrary, the issue of an arrestee’s may be more serious than the interfer- right prompt to a first ence occasioned arrest. Pretrial con- largely judicial officer is one of first im- may imperil suspect’s finement job, pression. authority The notable lack of income, interrupt his source of impair and important question regarding appar- this family relationship. his ently explained by structural limitations on of Mr. Cole incarceration protracted The opportunity litigants afforded to raise is constitution its incident harms man with the issue in federal courts. See Fisher v. wholly in it is ally impermissible because Washington Area Metro. Transit Authori- “fundamental notions of with consistent 1133, (4th Cir.1982) 1139 n. 7 ty, prosecutions of criminal fairness” (the 42 revivification of U.S.C. 1983 cre- Clause, see, e.g., Process the Due under contesting issue). ated a means of — —, Trombetta, U.S. v. California Only posi- the Fifth has taken the 413 and 81 L.Ed.2d 104 S.Ct. prompt appear- tion that the lack of a first liberty.” See concept of “ordered ance officer can never Palko, supra. Perry violate the v. Constitution. McCollan, 137, In Baker v. 443 U.S. 99 778, (5th Cir.1975); Jones, 506 F.2d 780-781 2689, 433, 61 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Nosser, 183, F.2d Anderson v. Court reiterated its concern with “extended Cir.1971), banc, 456 F.2d modified en arrest,” restraints of liberty following (1972). However, Ger- preceded these cases stein, 137, supra, in the McCollan, context of arrests 443 U.S. Baker v. 433, pursuant made 2689, to a valid warrant and fol- 61 L.Ed.2d v. Gerstein 854, 103, lowing judicial probable 95 S.Ct. determination of Pugh, 420 U.S. 54, and therefore infra, L.Ed.2d discussed cause. Baker ruled no unconstitution- The district court deprivation liberty need not detain us. al occurred where the case, specific ruled that on the facts of this was arrested to a valid warrant, has a valid determination jailed where there been days for three and then issued, probable cause and a warrant released when it was determined that the plaintiff had access to and where the an wrong man imprisoned. had been The attorney, telephone visitors, duty and to there sheriff involved had no under the Con- “investígate independently appearance (see stitution ev- supra 1) note and the innocence,” ery “perform claim nor to rights (1) enforced them: inform the investigation

error-free of such a claim.” suspect charge of the Amendment —Sixth * * * 146, 443 U.S. at 99 S.Ct. at 2695. The (“the enjoy right accused shall Court observed that because the Sixth be informed of the nature and the cause of trial, right speedy Amendment ato “one in accusation”); (2) inform the defendant respondent’s position could not be detained right of the to counsel and determine if the indefinitely repeated protests in the face of indigent defendant is and desires the assist- of innocence.” Id. at 99 S.Ct. at 2694. appointed ance of counsel—Sixth Amend- process standard, Then applying a due (“the ment accused shall enjoy right * * * alternatively held that a three-day to have the Assistance of Counsel for detention over a New Year’s weekend did defence”); Zerbst, Johnson v. 304 U.S. deprivation not liberty amount to a with- 458, 1461; 58 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. Gideon process out due of law. Id. at Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 2695. expressly While Baker did not 799; Arizona, 9 L.Ed.2d Miranda v. standard, adopt a due the Court 694; 16 L.Ed.2d apparently relevant, analysis found such an Alabama, Coleman v. why pro- we can discern no reason 387; (3) 26 L.Ed.2d inform the sus- longed detentions of this sort should be pect to remain silent under the exempt scrutiny require- under the privilege against self-incrimination—Fifth process. ments of due * * * (“No Amendment shall be analysis utilized in Baker indicates compelled criminal case to be a that the duration of the detention and the against himself”); witness Miranda v. Ari- placed burden on state in provid- officials zona, (4) supra; set or Eighth review bail— ing procedural safeguards highly are rele- (“Excessive Amendment bail shall vant to a constitutional examination of required”); Boyle, Stack v. post-arrest detentions. The detention in S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 1. An extended detention spanned days Baker three only and could appearance, first whether or not prevented by have been the institution of there has been a valid determination of significant and investigative burdensome probable cause, substantially impinges procedures by the defendant sheriff. upon and threatens rights. all of these case, however, present plaintiff significant The benefit resulting from the nearly weeks, for incarcerated three in the interposition of a neutral officer repeated protests face of of innocence and post-arrest into the detention situation with court, requests go to to prosecu- before the regard protection to the rights of these tor ordered his release. ap- Where first ignored. cannot be Although the absence pearances provided, requirement are of a first appearance may here not have they timely place that would relatively a specific caused a violation of one of small burden on law judi- enforcement and rights they these as interpreted have been light cial officers. In disturbing Supreme Court, the ultimate effect us, unexplained factors sup- before Baker of the omission here must be deemed a ports, requires, if not our conclusion that denial process. of due The tremendous plaintiff’s 18-day detention was a violation placed burden on a presumptively innocent liberty without due of law. person by type prolonged this detention every Almost element of a appear- “first permitted cannot be regard without more ance” under state statutes or the Federal person’s for rights basic under the Rules Criminal Procedure serves to en- Constitution. give meaning important force or individ- rights Ragan, United States v. expressly granted ual that are either 176 F.2d (7th Cir.1949), in the or are preclude Constitution set forth in Su- does not this preme precedent. The following holding. Ragan pre-Baker is a was a case and listing components of traditional of a first considered present whether the failure to (a plaintiff convicted murderer sentenced But the conclusion that defendant suffered death) magistrate a after arrest rights a violation of his constitutional does invol- the defendant’s confession inquiry. rendered not end the Under Beard v. untary and thus inadmissible evidence. O’Neal, (7th Cir.1984), 728 F.2d the confes- concluded that because Ragan plaintiff prove must the defendant “intimidation, product a sion was not caused the claimed constitutional violation. coercion, oppressive and vio- promises or While it is doubtful that Coleman has car- treatment,” present the failure to lent burden, ried that we do not resolve this magistrate did not amount defendant to a ground. qualified case on that immu- to such a denial of fundamental fairness as nity prosecutor to the available prevent fair trial. Whether the Id. liability (infra this situation note appearance a confes- lack of a first renders 9) probably explains bringing of this presents ques- a different involuntary sion solely against despite action Sheriff Frantz from the issue here. While the ab- tion prosecutor’s the fact inaction may timely appearance first sence of plaintiff’s injury. caused supra p. evidence, for the exclusion of its be a basis Nevertheless, prosecutor’s in- eighteen days surely runs here for absence cannot, view, transigence in our be trans- the Four- to the under counter Constitution ferred to the defendant who every made recently We so held teenth Amendment. timely effort to secure a first Fourth Amend- under the Fourteenth and and whose actions were not respect to a 42-hour detention ments with plainly applicable inconsistent with then hearing. probable Llagu- without a cause Jones, E.g., Perry constitutional law. Mingey, no v. supra. banc). Cir.1984) (pending rehearing en hearing probable cause While there was Ill custody, placed before Coleman judg We affirm the district court is at least a forerunner Llaguno decision ment the defendant is because entitled to today. result reach we good immunity. faith Under attempt opinion does not to deli- This the standard set forth Harlow v. Fitz every of a constitutional neate contour gerald, 457 U.S. appearance under the right to a first timely 396, government L.Ed.2d officials To do so would be Due Process Clause. qualified immunity “generally entitled to a Rochin, reliance on inconsistent with our liability damages are shielded from for civil holding today is limited to the supra. Our insofar as their conduct does not violate of this case. To extreme circumstances clearly statutory or established constitu given period of time a specify after what person rights tional of which a reasonable accompanied by ap- a first detention Frantz did not would have known.” Since infirm, constitutionally pearance becomes then consti violate established of the various elements or to outline which a reasonable tutional which minimally appearance are neces- of a first known, justified have he was in as would requirement satisfy the due sary to serting qualified immunity defense. inappropriate judicial leg- to would amount us, proper determining The framework for In the case before none of islation. immunity of an protections afforded a first the existence and nature procedural liability from 1983 granted ever for defendants Section appearance were Supreme recently reiterated nearly of his three-week was over the course — —, Glover, U.S. despite protests his of inno- Court Tower v. incarceration 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758. Justice cence, appearance, for a court and 104 S.Ct. requests unanimous Court3 O’Connor noted for a release. ultimate doctrine; they except re- in a to consider the abstention concurred statement 3. Four Justices no that there was occasion Justice O’Connor 726 by affording government despite the silence Section 1983 on officials some immunities, question of protection personal measure of from liabili consistently 1951 has allowed since Court arising ty out of the exercise of their dis privilege doctrines of “substantive certain performance cretion and the liability limit thereunder. immunity” and to Lash, v. 996, Crowder duties.” 687 F.2d — at-, U.S. 104 S.Ct. at 2825. (7th Cir.1982). v. Brelje, Johnson 1006 reaffirmed the standard first enunci Court 1201, (7th Cir.1983). 701 F.2d 1210 A num Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, ated in Imbler v. cases, relying upon ber relevant Su 128, 984, 47 L.Ed.2d as the basic preme cases that discuss the immuni determining analysis for the existence of issue, ty held have that sheriffs are entitled Glover immunity. repeated 1983 Section qualified immunity. See Cole to assert a the Imbler standard explained Turpen, 1341, (10th man v. 697 F.2d 1344 immunity an official was accorded “[i]f Cir.1982) (qualified immunity available re from tort actions at common law when garding involving claim sheriffs retention 1871, Rights Act was enacted Civil suspect’s money as evidence to considers whether 1983’s his Court next Thomas, statute); Barrett v. Oklahoma purposes nonetheless counsel tory or 1193, (5th Cir.1981), F.2d 1201 649 certiora recognizing immunity in against the same denied, — ri 72 Glover, at-, U.S. 1983 actions.” (sheriff quali L.Ed.2d 440 entitled to claim at 2825.4 immunity regarding firing fied his em general officials as Executive ployees supporting opponent, his but sher protection qualified of a enjoy rule plead immunity timely iff failed to fash See Harlow v. Fitz immunity.5 good faith ion); Taylor Mayone, v. 626 F.2d 254 807, 102

gerald, 457 U.S. at at 2732. S.Ct. (2d Cir.1980) (sheriff quali entitled to claim high may enjoy an level executives Certain immunity regarding involving fied incident immunity particular circum absolute pursuit Norton shooting plaintiff); at stances, always and are afforded a broader Liddel, (10th v. 620 F.2d Cir. “range qualified of discretion” under 1980) (sheriff entitled claim immunity responsi than “officials with less 2732; immunity concerning alleged conspiracy Id. bility.” S.Ct. Rhodes, perpetrate Scheuer prosecution); malicious 1683, 1692, 40 L.Ed.2d 90.6 Jones, Douthit v. 619 F.2d 532-533 Cir.1980) (5th (sheriff entitled to assert recognized qualified has im- This Court qualified immunity respect wrong public acting munity for officials within the Brown, claim); Zook v. ful incarceration responsibilities, noting scope of their (C.D.Ill.1983) (sheriff F.Supp. governmental “principled and conscientious * * * decisionmaking only qualified immunity regarding can be achieved entitled to warrant, that abstention was never even raised. an extension marked of absolute Glover, (see 104 S.Ct. at 2827. to the Sheriff in this situation Shook, Steinpreis v. Cir. denied, 1967), Glover, certiorari public the Court ruled that a state 858; Alexander, 19 L.Ed.2d Fowler v. enjoy any immunity does not defender 168, (M.D.N.C.1972); F.Supp. Haigh 171 v. Sni- liability. Section 1983 The Court based its deci- dow, 324, (S.D.Cal.1964)) F.Supp. might 231 326 immunity no sion on the fact that common law enough not in itself .be to shield the defendant country public existed for defenders in this liability. from Section 1983 (when predecessor the of Section 1871 1983 enacted) public program since the first defender — Glover, begin Supreme here until U.S. did not at-, 1914. 6. The Court on com- elaborated the Scheuer, immunity 104 S.Ct. at 2825. mon law basis for this 238-241, 4, 416 U.S. at n. S.Ct. at 238 94 1687- 1688, 4, statutory n. and concluded that the immuni- light 1688 In of the fact that there was a 5. ty history purposes by did duty imposed I.C. not conflict with the or on the defendant then 243-247, 35-l-8-l(a) plaintiff at the Wells of Section 1983. Id. at to take before by apart any duty created 1690-1692. Circuit Court

727 immunity to Illinois is entitled to no as to this employee Section disciplining of statute). appears argue 1983 action. Plaintiff to public quali that the officials’ basis for the Although Supreme the Court has never fied immunity is the common law ministeri type immunity the of to expressly decided But al-discretionary distinction. there is no sheriffs, recognized it has the be accorded provided plaintiff by evidence the or discov enjoyed good-faith immunit[y] “traditional * ** by indicating ered us that the ministerial- sheriffs,” by City v. Inde Owen of discretionary distinction is the common law 643, 622, pendence, 445 U.S. immunity.7 foundation for Section 1983 logi It 63 L.Ed.2d 673. seems Further, Supreme the has cast Court doubt rele cal and consistent with to this Court upon the of this common relevance law authority on this sub vant immunity doctrine to Section 1983 consider county sheriff as an ject characterize to upon utilizing and of ations the wisdom the complex discretionary re “with less official determining distinction for as a basis the 807, Harlow, 457 sponsibilities,” U.S. at immunity existence of from Section an 1983 2733, required to “make deci 102 at S.Ct. liability.8 decisions,” Scheuer, “implement and sions” 1689, 241-242, 416 94 S.Ct. at who U.S. at This Court that as a also considers mat- good qualified faith to assert or is entitled public policy, it would be unwise to ter. by present immunity. As evidenced engage in a by case case determination of case, commanded or a sheriff is enabled to upon 1983 immunity Section based min- which he no con by act statutes over has discretionary nature of isterial versus require implementation and trol which particular challenged. Not only official act interpretation part. on his degree some analysis require repeated such would Turpen v. and Zook v. See Coleman judicial applications of the unclear ministe- Brown, supra. both distinction, rial-discretionary but more im- qualified portantly it little to asserts that immu would do forward the Plaintiff Qualified nity public purposes immunity. im- only available officials implements mutually depend- “discretionary,” munity are “two when their acts rationales,” Scheuer, 240, 416 at that instance Sheriff Frantz had no ent U.S. in this obligation 1688, viz., fulfilling his 94 the need to discretion in to take S.Ct. “encour- vigorous age the of official the Wells Circuit Court. exercise author- Therefore, good, ity” by public as Butz it is claimed the defendant v. Rather, immunity by process.” appropriate Id. public enforced court It 7. for offi- century sovereign “very upon was not that a based notions until the twentieth cials is immunity "King the same terms can do no different rule” couched in devel- doctrine Scheuer, 4, public oped liability wrong.” 416 U.S. at n. to limit officials 239 tort inaction "involves the 1688 n. 4. where official action or discretion, merely exercise of and is not ministe- * * 29.10, 1639 n. 7 rial Id. at Independence, City See Owen (emphasis original). n. 648 and 648 644 n. and 1414 n. L.Ed.2d 673. Owen, n. plaintiffs rejected the Court ministerial-discretionary law dis- common municipalities attempt to base an developed pre- originally "[i]n order to liability tinction from Section on the ministerial- courts distinction, with action vent direct interference discretionary noting that the doc- government.” 2 F. branches of grounded separa- co-ordinate a “concern for trine 29.10, Harper Of Torts &F. powers" principle upon the James, Jr., The Law tion of and not (1956). provided “in- The doctrine sovereign immunity. also The Court observed prerogative will junction experi- writ issue to difficulty or have in a footnote the courts public officer do an act compel forbid a attempting a clear line enced in to discern be- discretionary, or statute is "discretionary” constitution and “ministerial” func- which tween 1414) way gives (Owen, when the law certain 100 S.Ct. at or to act tions U.S. at viability appeared means. the other question as to the If on of deter- discretion him hand, gives mining muddled commands or forbids basis of and the law immunities on the 26, act, n. 648 then his function with Id. at 644 n. do that unsound distinctions. officer to 26, 31, duty regard and his will be n. 1414 n. 31. is ministerial at 1412 to it 728 478, 506,

Economou, ing 98 bringing appear 438 U.S. S.Ct. officer in about a first 895; Harlow, L.Ed.2d 457 ance; 57 yet attempt it makes no to allocate 2732, 807, at and the need at U.S. responsibility among parties. the concerned subjecting unfairly the official to to avoid Further, the statute contained no time limit liability good faith exercise of dis specific procedures nor for the Sheriff to pursuant legal obligation. to a cretion accomplishing follow the task. The war 240, Scheuer, 94 at 1688. 416 U.S. at S.Ct. itself, requiring presen rant form while ministerial-discretionary dis The use of a “instanter,” of the tation accused did not provide courts would these offi tinction proper instruct the Sheriff as to the mode guidance or no as to the cials with little meeting obligation. his The district protection them.9 afforded concluded, court and defendant contin reasonable, however, It to re does seem argue, duty ues to that the Sheriffs quire public a official such lower level fulfilled in accordance with custom that, as a sheriff demonstrate on based promptly returning the arrest warrant objective circumstances at the time he act court, notifying the clerk of thus the court ed, pursuant his actions were undertaken status, plaintiffs by repeatedly of the performance to the of his duties and within calling prosecutor’s arrange office to a scope authority. of his See Barker v. plaintiff’s time for the court Norman, 1107, (5th 1121 651 F.2d Cir. pursuant to the Wells Circuit Court’s own 1981). We hold that defendant Frantz procedure.10 pre While it would have been adequate showing an made to the district ferable for the Sheriff to have done even court under the above standard. Here the § fulfill duty more to under I.C. 35-1- duty Sheriff was under a to take the ac 8-l(a), it cannot be said that there was an judge cused of the Wells adequately duty upon defined him to under duty Court. The arose either from 10) formally {supra take the futile act n. statutorily prescribed the then arrest war attempting present Coleman to the Wells rant form or from the Indiana statute then conduct, objec Circuit Court. His based on seemingly requiring ap effect a first circumstances, reasonably § tive under (I.C. pearance 35-l-8-l(a), 2) supra, n. performance taken to the of his implicitly placed or That statute both. duty scope duties and within the of his authorit some the officers of the Wells cooperate y.11 subject Circuit Court to the arrest- him liability with To in this degree protection 9. The Fourth Circuit also ruled that the distinc are left unsure as to what discretionary Note, tion between ac they performing duty. ministerial have when a tion is irrelevant to the determination of wheth Supplementing the Functional Test Prosecuto- public enjoys immunity a er official (1982); Immunity, rial 34 Com- Stan.L.Rev. Levine, liability. from 1983 See Withers v. ment, Constitutional Law—Prosecutorial Immu- 1980), F.2d Cir. certiorari de Ga.L.Rev. (1978). nity, 12 378-379 nied, 449 U.S. 66 L.Ed.2d 59. description For a of the multitude of factors testimony 10. Uncontested indicated that distinction, making considered see Re Wells Circuit Court would not schedule a court (1979). (Second) D Of Torts statement part date without some action on the practical problems by basing caused prosecutor and that the court would refuse to immunity on a formalistic distinction have be- see a detainee until a court date was scheduled apparent regard come to the treatment of 14, 16). (Nyal Deposition pp. Frantz The dis- immunity. public prosecutor prosecu- Public capacity trict court noted that the Sheriff had no granted qualified immunity are when tors legal obligation or to schedule court dates or to performing investigatory administrative prosecutor’s force the office to schedule them duties, immunity per- but an absolute when (593 34). F.Supp. forming Pachtman, quasi-judicial role. See Imbler v. 424-427, 96 S.Ct. at 992- Although expressly the district court did not 993; Kissinger, Halperin v. quali- rule that the defendant was entitled to (D.C.Cir.1979), part, affirmed in certiorari dis- objective fied under the circumstanc- part, missed in standard, es there is need to no remand to denied, rehearing L.Ed.2d district court view because our defendant has 69 L.Ed.2d 1024. The conse- prevailed on this issue as a matter of law. quence split immunity prosecutors is that of this Davis, interpretation plaintiff the basis of his here makes no claim instance on that alleged the violation of state duty under statute and war law is itself an unclear of § upon actionable under 1983 or bears the rant, interpretation was consist where his claim of constitutional plaintiff that pro own the Wells Circuit Court’s ent with — § -, asserts under 1983. U.S. at cedures, in penalize him for an error would 104 S.Ct. at 3019. Davis recognized that contrary recognized pur judgment, to the certain circumstances violations of statutes public qualified immunity for pose of the regulations, apart from a violation of officials.12 Constitution, the themselves form a basis alleged sheriff’s violation Defendant — § (see for a 1983 claim U.S. at-n. ability Indiana law does not bar his of (citing Harlow, 12, 104 S.Ct. at 3020 n. 12 under Davis v. immunity qualified claim a 800, 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d — U.S.—, Scherer, Thiboutot, Maine v. 396; L.Ed.2d 139. While Davis holds as a L.Ed.2d, 555), and that the a clear general rule an official’s violation of qualified immunity is unavailable to de- regulation deprive the statute or does statutory right fendants where the in such qualified immunity from official of dam cases is plain- established. Here ages statutory for of other or violation solely tiff’s 1983 claim rests alleged on (— at —, provisions constitutional (UK3, violations of the Constitution 13 of 3019), open 104 S.Ct. at the Court left the Further, Davis does not complaint). indi- possibility a federal or state official unavailability qualified cate that the of the immunity by violating could “lose their the immunity respect with to a 1983 claim regulation— clear command of a statute or based on violation of statute could bar the federal or state that statute of asserting same defendant [if] the immu- law — regulation provides or the basis for the nity against á claim based on the Constitu- — — upon.” cause of action sued U.S. at tion. U.S. at-n. 104 S.Ct. 3020 n. 12. -n. 104 S.Ct. at 3020 As n. 12. pointed arrange

12. As the Fifth Circuit out in Barker v. within 24 hours of arrest to for a first Norman, supra, appearance, circumstances can exist where his failure to fulfill those duties may actions be so far removed "an official’s protected by qualified public would not be duties, ordinary out- from the course of his so immunity. objective official There circum- act, discretionary authority side even his stances would indicate that the Sheriff’s actions the official cannot establish entitlement to a perform- were not undertaken to the instance; immunity even in the first claim of scope ance of his duties and were not within the yet may nexus between the there be sufficient authority. of his position complained and the of con- official’s objective circumstances test allows satisfy duct to Section 1983’s 'under color of immunity qualified official to assert where he Barker, requirement." F.2d at 1121 n. law’ reasonably attempts obligation to fulfill his un- In that situation the official is afforded no which der statute commands him to act but liability. immunity from Section 1983 Barker how, specify particularity which does not when, example Harper offers as an the case obligation or where is to be carried Merckle, Cir.1981), certiorari 638 F.2d 848 sense, qualified immunity out. In this is limited denied, 454 U.S. 70 L.Ed.2d may to instances where the official’s duties judge summary hearing where a state initiated “discretionary,” characterized as consistent with complaining his own volition and served as Scheuer, Harlow, language and Butz witness, judge prosecutor, fact-finder and de- application immunity which limits the termining "contempt” that the required situations where officials "are to exer- judge’s Harper were court. held that actions discretion,” cise their U.S. at "judicial acts taken in the neither acts” nor 2732; range act "within discretion capacity. judge’s there was official Since no permitted under the holders of such office however, judge’s question, that the actions were law.” 416 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at 1693. [state] law, judge undertaken under color of state Thus, availability conditioning of a subject liability with- could be to Section 1983 "objective public officials on an any immunity. Harper, out the benefit of circumstances” standard accommodates 858-859; Barker, F.2d at 651 F.2d at 1121 n. 18. concept "discretion" without re- case, present had Indiana statute upon antiquated confusing minis- liance i.e., spelled clearly, out the Sheriff's duties more terial-discretionary distinction. requiring him to contact the clerk of the court 730 Jones, Perry v. su- Finally, rejected of this loss have it. See Nosser, pra; supra. Anderson v. statutorily

regard to based 1983 claims is a clear limited to instances where command authority by Most of the plaintiff cited as regulation of a statute or has been violat supporting proposition considers supra Nahmod, 5,p. at 252 n. 168. As ed. prolonged constitutionality pre-trial de supra above, 16, p. the Indiana discussed tentions under the Fourth and Fourteenth challenged as of the time of the statutes allegedly Amendments where there has clear present conduct did not such a com probable been no valid determination mand to the Sheriff. v. Gerstein by judicial cause a officer. See

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 854, 95 S.Ct. 43 Washington Fisher v. 54; Metro L.Ed.2d IY politan Authority, Area Transit 690 F.2d Under the standard set forth O’Neal, Patzig (4th Cir.1982); v. 1133 577 Fitzgerald, supra, defendant Harlow v. Pedersen, Daly v. (3d Cir.1978); F.2d 841 Frantz is shielded from Section 1983 liabili Gerstein F.Supp. (D.Minn.1967). ty damages long as his conduct did for so judicial proba holds that a determination of clearly a established constitu violate “prerequisite ble cause is a to extended right tional a which reasonable liberty.” 114, restraint of 420 U.S. at would have known at the time the chal right S.Ct. at 863. The to a valid determi lenged place. conduct took Plaintiffs probable by nation of cause a offi 18-day claim that his detention violates a cer, however, is not at issue here because “nationally recognized” right constitutional right respectéd by was the Wells is untenable.13 This has been unable (593 32). F.Supp. at County Court expressly to discover one case that holds Baker, supra, by that a is caused constitutional violation certainly While relevant afford the accused an failure to “initial issue, specific to this the case lacks discus appearance” after arrest to a val right sion of a to a first only expressly courts id warrant.14 “clearly therefore does not establish” such Nosser, supra, Anderson v. considering plaintiffs type argument right.15 Lash, supported by 13. As we noted in Crowder v. probable 687 F.2d Supreme this case was cause as 996, (1982), neither 1002-1003 found the local court under the relevant Gates, 213, Court nor this Court has settled the issue of standards. See Illinois v. 462 U.S. plaintiff 527; whether in a Section 1983 action the 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d Franks v. Dela prove, must or whether in the ware, alternative the 438 U.S. disprove, defendant must that the constitutional 667; States, Spinelli L.Ed.2d 410, v. United 393 U.S. right question clearly was established at the 637; Aguilar 21 L.Ed.2d v. challenged time of the conduct. It is clear from Texas, 12 L.Ed.2d record, however, accept- that this defendant 723. Therefore, successfully ed and met this burden. agree we with the district court’s conclusion plaintiff possessed 15. The dissent asserts that genuine regarding there is no issue clearly right established constitutional based us) (rejected plain- claim below and that the Baker, solely (Dissent, language supra on the right clearly tiffs established as a matter of 733). p. language We cannot view the cited prop- constitutional law. Hence the defendant accomplishing Baker as this feat. In the in erly pled the affirmative defense of stances where the Court and this Court Toledo, immunity. See v. Gomez attempted have to ascertain whether a constitu 64 L.Ed.2d 572. one, right "clearly tional analysis is a established” utilized has caselaw which affidavit Defendant’s bench warrant consistently recognized the constitu plaintiff shotgun tried to sell a showed type tional rather than the of relevant but previously from Robert Cole a week stolen upon by academic relied discussion dissent. informant Mrs. Arnold Watson and the affidavit — Scherer, U.S.—, See Davis v. 104 S.Ct. at $20,000 (later $10,- requested a bond reduced to (Justice majority), 3018-3019 Powell for the Court). County the Wells Plain (Justice dissenting); S.Ct. at 3023-3026 Brennan deciding tiffs Exhibit 2. Without whether the Egger below, Phillips, v. 710 F.2d 314-315 plaintiff properly raised the issue Cir.1983); Rowe, Chavis v. 643 F.2d affidavit causes us to concur with the district court’s conclusion that the bench warrant (7th Cir.1981); Hayes Thompson, largely depends, sufficiently held that a time no clear and which established plaintiffs to take Frantz, Police Chiefs failure be- duty, known to to release pris- magistrate incarcerating fore days oner within 18 if it impossible only Mississippi a violation of them was present judge him to a magistrate. allegations that their federal fell. laws so light of the court’s today, decision supporting plaintiff, Instead of Anderson course, there should longer no be consequently supports defendant on the aspect doubt this duty. about only count before us. law, summary, In as a matter of we hold GORDON, L. MYRON Senior District plaintiffs that constitutional to a dissenting. Judge, appearance” judicial “first officer agree I majority’s with the conclusion following to a valid war- arrest that a constitutional violation occurs probable rant on a determination of when based cause, presumptively setting person of bond and notification of a innocent is incar- charges “clearly established” with- was cerated the sheriff days for 18 without meaning in the has being judicial taken before a officer for an given e.g., that term. See Procunier v. appearance. initial I accept, cannot how- 555, 562-564, Navarette, 434 U.S. ever, majority’s holding that the sheriff addition, 859-861, In 55 L.Ed.2d 24. civilly cannot be liable for such a serious defendant did what he could to secure an Therefore, constitutional violation. I re- early plaintiff. for He first spectfully dissent. therefore shielded from was Section 1983 In order to hold a state officer liable liability through qualified immunity. § 1983, under U.S.C. he must in some granting order de- The district court’s manner alleged depriva- have caused the summary judgment is fendant’s motion rights. tion of Crawford, Dommer v. affirmed. (7th Cir.1981). F.2d The test for causation under 1983 was set out this CUDAHY, Judge, concurring. Lash, court Crowder v. 687 F.2d was, I Frantz agree that Sheriff on the (7th Cir.1982): case, particular facts of this shielded personal “An respon- official satisfies the qualified immunity. duty question The sibility requirement of section if 1983 she duty prisoner is the either to take the be- or fails to act a acts with deliberate or magistrate fore a or to release him. disregard plaintiff’s reckless constitu- disagree majority opinion I rights, causing tional or if the conduct duty— I there think that was clear deprivation the constitutional occurs at reasonably known to the Sheriff —to take knowledge her direction or with her or promptly before the court. The Coleman consent.” theory liability only problem with this apparently did all that the Sheriff he could majority suggests, although it The does but, duty, support to fulfill this without holding ground, that not base its on this it prosecutor acquiescence of a of a prosecutor was the rather than the sheriff officer, nothing judicial there was he could who caused the constitutional violation do. Dommer, disagree. supra, I this case. recognized that 653 F.2d at the court plausible theory may

A more much city police prosecutor have and not duty based on Frantz’s alternative to re- custody sole of arrestees and alone have prisoner if he lease the could not be Here, responsibility Indiana brought judicial officer. I under law disagree bring with the dissent: there was at the court. Id. arrestees before the (7th Cir.1980); Cir.1977); Chapman Bensinger, 490-493 v. Pick- Knell v. 725- 25-26, ett, (7th Cir.1978); Nahmod, (7th Cir.1975); supra p. F.2d 28-29 Walker, 251,252, F.2d

Little v. 196-197 252 n. 168. completely objective case, similarly, I of mind in favor of a believe present

In the Harlow, standard. Under Frantz and not it Sheriff responsible personally prosecutor who performing discretionary “... officials detention. prolonged for Mr. Coleman’s lia- generally functions are shielded from authority under In- had no prosecutor damages insofar as their bility for civil the sheriff to detain diana law to direct does not violate estab- conduct period time with- prolonged individual for statutory rights lished constitutional officer. being taken before out a reasonable would have of which applicable to the sheriff The Indiana law known.” pro- Mr. arrest did the time of Coleman’s 818, 102 at 2738. The test thus Id. at however, arresting vide, officer “objective legal reasonable- focuses on the the court. Ind. the accused before take ness” of the official’s conduct. Id. at §§ (Burns 35-l-8-l(a), 35-1-17-4 Code 102 S.Ct. 1982). 1979) (repealed recognition qualified immunity The of a prosecutor and not the It the sheriff was attempt defense reflects an to balance the cell; jail it was keys the to the who held importance damage remedy protect of a custody had sole of Mr. sheriff who the rights citizens’ and to deter unconstitution- prosecutor’s inaction That the Coleman. public against al conduct the need-to allow Mr. contributed to Cole- may have also margin exercising error officials a of when negate does not prolonged detention man’s public in- their discretion “and the related responsibility for the personal the sheriff’s vigorous encouraging in the exercise terest must be held ac- The sheriff detention. Economou, authority.” v. of official Butz securing ap- either a court countable 478, 504-06, 438 U.S. 2909- or, the arrestee at some rea- pearance for (1978); 57 L.Ed.2d 895 see also Pierson point, releasing him. sonable Ray, v. 386 U.S. (1967). range personally respon- L.Ed.2d 288 The broader the By holding the sheriff duties, responsibilities and prolonged detention of Mr. of an official’s for the sible Coleman, necessarily range provid- the of discretion it does not follow that the broader qualified immunity. by come out of the ed the doctrine of any damage award would 232, 247, Rhodes, law, v. pocket. Under Indiana a sheriff’s own Scheuer 1683, 1692, (1973). entity may pay any judg- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 90 governmental arising regarding his functions this against public a official out While ment ministerial, the sheriff did rights by the offi- were more than a federal violation civil em- not act as an endowed with broad scope the of his executive cial committed within (Burns exercising responsibil- discretion those ployment. Ind.Code 34-4-16.7-1 therefore, is,He not entitled to as governmental entity The must ities. Supp.1984). range of by comprehensive the a discretion under pay all costs and fees incurred also high qualified immunity doctrine as ex- employee in of the suit. Id. public defense scope ecutive officials. the sheriff acts within When case, it employment, as in this seems immunity, Applying qualified the test for damages against him would likely sheriff did majority concludes that the county rather than paid clearly constitu- not violate a established personally. sheriff finding right; my view that is tional majority is The observes that majority holds that the sheriff untenable. The were taken in accord with liability under doctrine sheriff’s actions protected county and that quali- custom the qualified immunity. The test for unofficial language interpretation of the the sheriff’s immunity fied was enunciated the Su- and Indiana statutes 457 of the warrant preme Fitzgerald, Court Harlow v. Harlow, validity 818-19, 2727, 2739, 73 reasonable. Under U.S. immunity defense de- (1982), qualified sheriff’s the Court re- L.Ed.2d 396 wherein whether his conduct violated public pends state jected inquiring into a official’s constitutional which was es tees normally takes less than one half alleged tablished at the time of the consti addition, hour. County jail Wells so, tutional If violation. the sheriff is not just over one block courthouse, from the qualified entitled to the shield hardly day trip. an 18 Requiring the sher- irrespective subjective of his belief he recognize iff to Mr. Coleman’s due acting properly. McKinley rights under the circumstances of this case Trattles, (7th Cir.1984). F.2d “imposes neither an unfair upon burden The heart qualified immunity of the test is person assuming responsible office ... whether a reasonable would have nor an light unwarranted burden in challenged known that the conduct violated value rights which civil have in our legal right recognized constitutional system.” Strickland, Wood v. alleged time of the violation. Davis v. 308, 322, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 — Scherer, —, (1975). 3019-20, 82 L.Ed.2d 139. recently held that I reading believe that the reasonable officials sued under 1983 do not lose Baker, supra, years prior decided two their immunity solely because incarceration, Mr. Coleman’s leads to the their conduct violates some federal or state inescapable conclusion that the sheriff vio- regulation statute or unless the statute or lated Mr. clear Coleman’s constitutional regulation provides the basis for the cause brought judicial either to be before a : upon. Davis, of action sued supra, 104 appearance officer for a first within a rea- S.Ct., Thus, at 3020. the sheriff is not sonably prompt period following of time foreclosed from attempting to assert a arrest and confinement or to be released qualified immunity defense because of the appearance from confinement if an such provisions of However, Indiana law. the arranged. could not be It is clear to me requirements of the warrant and the Indi- day that Mr. Coleman’s 18 detention ana obviously statutes are designed part in squarely qualifies under the safeguard to person’s an arrested pro- due lapse Court’s determination that “after the rights; cess accordingly, the sheriff should of a certain amount of time” an arrestee have been alerted to the fact that he was will deemed to deprived have been depriving Mr. protected Coleman of his Baker, liberty without due of law. rights. Davis, supra, 104 S.Ct. 3025 n. supra, 443 U.S. at 99 S.Ct. (Brennan, J., in concurring part, dissent- Jailing presumably person innocent with- ing part). in affording hearing out him an initial for a period days language warrant, of 18 in the face of The his re- of the substan- peated protests tially of innocence following offends the the forms set forth in Ind. § Baker condemnation of an “indefinite” de- Code (repealed 35-1-17-4 in 1982 and § tention. replaced 35-33-2-2), by Ind.Code re- quired that the “have Cole- [Mr. implication I cannot sheriff subscribe to the body before Judge the of the Wells man’s] majority opinion the that a law enforce- Court, instanter, then and there to reasonably ment officer could have be- Indiana, answer the charge State of on a holding person jail lieved that for 18 Receiving Property____” Stolen The war- days bringing judicial him without sheriff, rant directed prosecutor not the officer for an initial is constitu- court, or the bring to the defendant tionally acceptable. lengthy The incarcera- person court, merely before the to Coleman, call majority tion of Mr. as the ob- prosecutor attempt the court or the serves, completely is inconsistent with no- arrange Returning a court date. war- tions of “fundamental fairness” and “or- rant filing it liberty.” outrageousness dered The clerk court as well exemplified calling prosecutor inquire sheriff’s conduct in this case as that, by the according fact to the sheriff about a court date for an arrestee are himself, processing separate administrative of arres- actually taking acts from the ar- fied if he can officer and do not demonstrate

restee before “extraordinary circumstances” latter. existed un- substitute for the prove der which he can “that he neither taken the defendant be The direction that knew nor should have known the rele- (the new form “instanter” before court legal vant standard.” This issue was not § statute, 35-33-2-2 Ind.Code of warrant addressed the court below. If on re- (1982), language unnec- “without uses successfully mand the sheriff can show the sheriff some essary delay”) may afford the circumstances, may existence of such he in- discretion, by no reasonable limited but immunity. still be entitled to days. it mean 18 terpretation can court, granting The district summary § 35-l-8-l(a) (Burns Moreover, Ind.Code § judgment for defendant on the 1982), 1979) (repealed that “when count, plaintiff’s pen also dismissed the accused, he take officer an shall arrests arising state claims out of the sher dent issuing court the accused before Having iff’s detention of Mr. Coleman. statute language of this warrant.” concluded that the district court erred in its that the sheriff buttresses conclusion count, disposition of the I would responsibility July had the ultimate court, remand, direct the district to re assuring that the defendant was pendant consider its dismissal of the state reasonably brought court Gibbs, claims. United Mine Workers replaced by promptly. This statute was 715, 725-26, 1138- (1982),which was ac- Ind.Code 35-33-7-4 (1966). 16 L.Ed.2d 218 of Mr. tually prior enacted to the detention did not take effect until 1982. Coleman but reasons, foregoing I For the would re- § 2, May P.L. No. 298 Act of grant summary verse the district court’s 2314, 2317. Section 35-33-7-4 re- Ind.Acts judgment for the defendant and remand quires arrested to a that a proceedings. the case for further promptly for an warrant “be taken valid hearing (empha- the court.” initial before added). Ind.Code 18-1-11-8 sis Cf. 1982)

(Burns 1979) (repealed (required city bring

police officers to arrested be- arrest, 24 hours of or 48

fore a court within intervened.) Sunday to-

hours if a Read

gether, language of the bench warrant only and the relevant Indiana statutes WEXMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Hattie E. the conclusion that the serves to reinforce detention of Mr. Coleman for 18 sheriff’s WEXMAN, Todd Ellis as Trustee of the bringing him the court days without Trust, Joseph K. Wexman deprived of his estab- individually, Defendant-Appellant. right process. lished constitutional to due Thus, No. 83-3042. Sheriff Frantz violated because process through to due Mr. Coleman’s Appeals, United States Court of hearing, right clearly an initial Seventh Circuit. violation, time of the I established at the Argued hold that the district court erred Oct. 1984. would summary judgment granting favor Decided Feb. however, conclusion, the sheriff. This does automatically the sheriff’s lia- establish Harlow, bility. The su-

pra, 457 U.S. settled, if the

recognized that even law is may quali-

public official still be entitled to

Case Details

Case Name: Meredith Coleman v. Nyal Frantz, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date Published: Jan 30, 1985

Citation: 754 F.2d 719

Docket Number: 84-1248

Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.