Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
On this аppeal the validity of Chapter 158 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1940, now KRS 200.010 et seq., is questioned. If the act is held valid the validity of subsection (b) of Section 17, Part One of Chapter 1 of the Aсts of 1942 is incidentally involved. Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1940 provides that aid shall be granted to any dependent child who meets certain requirements as to age, residence, etc., prescribed by the act. In Section 1 of the act “dependent child” is defined as “a needy child under the age of sixteen (16), or under the age of eighteen (18) if found by the State Department to be regularly attending school, who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, or aunt in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their home.”
The appellee, Mamie Ray, an infant 14 years of age, resides with her mother in Franklin county. Her fаther was adjudged a person of unsound mind by the Franklin circuit court in 1937, and was committed to the Eastern State Hospital for the Insane. He is now an inmate of the Central State Hospital for the Insane at Lakeland, Kentucky. Her mother, because of physical infirmities, is unable to support herself and daughter. Application was made to the Department of Welfare оf Kentucky for aid under the act providing for aid to dependent children, and the Commissioner of Welfare refused to approve the application because the Attornеy General of Kentucky had advised him that there was serious doubt as to the constitutionality of Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1940. Thereupon Mamie Ray, suing by her next friend, Viola Ray, brought an action undеr the Declaratory Judgment Act to have the questions in controversy *328 determined and the rights of the parties declared. The Attorney G-eneral, Commissioner of Finance, Commissioner of Welfare, and Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky were made defendants. The circuit court overruled a demurrer to the petition, and adjudged that Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1940 аnd subsection (b), Section 17, of Part One of Chapter 1, of the Acts of 1942 are valid and constitutional, and directed the Commissioner of Welfare to take the necessary steps to put thе Aid to Dependent Children Act into operation. The defendants have appealed.
In appellants’ brief there is a lengthy discussion of the Legislature’s power to authorize сash payments to dependent children in view, of Section 3 of the Constitution which provides that no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made tо any man or set of men, except in consideration of public services. In Bowman v. Frost,
“Section 3 of the Constitution provides that no grant of exclusive privileges shall be mаde to any man or set of men, except in consideration of public services, and Section 59 prohibits special or local legislation. In addition to these provisions the Fоurteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution declares that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The purpose of these provisions was to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality and to render it impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment, or for those in powеr to grant favors for political support. However, it has been uniformly recognized that the foregoing provisions do not forbid a classification based on reasonable and nаtural distinctions, and an Act making a classification will only be voided where the classification is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable so as to exclude one or more of a clаss without reasonable basis in fact. ’ ’
In Williams v. City of Bowling Green,
“The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of certain classes does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. ’ ’
It is not necessary that the Legislature state its reasons for making the classification. As said in Markendorf v. Friedman, “if any possible reasonable basis can be conсeived to justify the classification, then it should be upheld.” Many reasons may have motivated the Legislature in making the classification found in *330 Chapter 158 of the Acts of 1940. It may have been its purpose to preserve and encourage the unity of the family. The relatives named in the act are persons who would naturally feel some obligation to the .child and who would treat it as a member of the family. If strangers were permitted to take dependent children into their homes and collect aid granted to the children by the state, abuses, no doubt, would result such as have occurred under the Pauper Idiot Law, KBS 203.250. Unworthy persons would be tempted to take into their homes children in whom they have no interest, not for the welfare of the children but for thе money payments involved. The Legislature in making the classification knew that a needy child who does not live in the home of a close relative and, consequently, cannot qualify under the act, may still be aided through other child welfare programs of the state. The act classifies dependent children as to age and time of residence in the state, and thesе classifications admittedly are proper. We are unable to say that the further classification as to residence with certain designated relatives is improper. Mathemаtical exactness in classification is impossible, and an act of the Legislature will not be declared unconstitutional merely because in practice it results in some inequality provided there is some reasonable basis on general lines for the division. We think the classification as made by the act before us is not arbitrary and is based upon a distinction having a reasonable relation to the purposes of the law. In view of the rule that all doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in its favor, we are constrained to hold thаt the act does not contravene any constitutional provision.
The plaintiff in her petition asked that Subsection (b) of Section 17 of Part One of Chapter 1 of the Acts of 1942, which makes a lump sum appropriation of $4,-250,000 to be used for old age assistance, aid to dependent children, child welfare, and aid to the needy blind be declared valid. Counsel for appellants concede that the decision rendered by this court in the case of Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, Atty. Gen., v. Johnson, Governor et al.,
The judgment is affirmed.