No question of the jurisdiction of this court over these bills was specifically raised by the demurrers, or made at the argument. It is clear that the court has jurisdiction in some form to pass upon claims of the nature and amounts here stated; and, for reasons stated in Third National Bank v. Eastern Railroad, 122 Mass. 240, we have not thought it necessary to consider whether the remedies in these cases should have been sought through appeals from the decisions of commissioners rather than in the present form.
I. The Merchants’ National Bank contends that it is either entitled to receive certificates for its full debt, and to retain for its own benefit the collateral securities held by it, or, at least, that it is entitled to certificates for the balance, after applying the collateral securities, by sale or otherwise, to its payment.
The defendants, in support of their demurrer, contend that, by the true construction of the St. of 1876, e. 236, the plaintiff is not entitled to certificates of indebtedness without first surrendering to the Eastern Railroad Company all collateral securities held by the plaintiff; that, as none of the creditors, secured or unsecured, are obliged to accept its provisions, the secured creditors are put to their election, either to surrender their securities and take certificates, or to retain the securities and go without the certificates. The construction contended for by the defendants is not warranted by the purposes or the terms of the act.
At the time of its passage, it is apparent, without going beyond the act itself, that the Eastern Railroad Company had no present ability to pay its debts as they became due. The corporation was greatly embarrassed, if not absolutely insolvent. Its property of every description was liable to be taken, and its business wholly obstructed, by creditors. A leading purpose of the act
Upon the question of the amount for which creditors partly secured shall receive certificates, we think it clear that the amount must be limited to the remainder of the debt, after the value of the securities, ascertained as authorized by the original contract, or by the subsequent agreement of the parties, or under the supervision of the court, shall have been applied in part satisfaction. The express provisions, and the peculiar language of the act, imply that the certificate with its mortgage security is intended to be a payment and satisfaction of the debt, and to represent the creditors’ exact share in the assets, after all payments, set-offs and securities have been applied. The certificate is to be delivered by the trustees to the creditor “ in exchange
Both parties at the argument relied on the thirteenth section of the act in support of their respective positions. This section provides that the corporation, with the written assent of the trustees, may sell certain property not needed for the operation of the road, and apply the proceeds under the direction of the trustees “to the payment of any existing liens, mortgages or other incumbrances upon such property, or upon any bonds or notes of said corporation pledged as collateral security.” It is argued from this by the plaintiff, that such collateral security is not required to be either surrendered or sold, but is to be held
As to the bonds of the Portsmouth, Great Falls & Conway Railroad Company, which the Merchants’ Bank holds with the indorsement and guaranty of the Eastern Railroad, it is the value of these bonds without the indorsement and guaranty which is to be applied in reduction of the debt. The conditional liability of the Eastern Railroad Company as indorser and guarantor cannot be treated as a security which can be availed of to give the bank any advantage over the other creditors. If sold or transferred to other parties under the terms of the original contract, or by the agreement of the parties, or the order of the court, the guaranty of the corporation must be first can-celled, and its indorsement so restricted that the purchaser can acquire no greater right than the bank has in this respect. This follows from the decision in Third National Bank v Eastern Railroad, above cited.
The conclusion in the case of the Merchants’ Bank ia, that the demurrer must be overruled.
II. The case of the First National Bank is governed by the decision in Third National Bank v. Eastern Railroad, above cited. The coupon notes are not securities which can be availed of by the creditor to give him any advantage over other creditors trader the provisions of this act. Nor can the bank legally claim any additional benefit under § 13, for the reasons above stated. In this case, the decree sustaining the demurrer is affirmed, with costs.
IV. In the case of Shaw and others, trustees, the plaintiffs show no absolute debt, but only a contingent liability against the corporation. They are the owners of certain railroad bonds, indorsed and guaranteed by the Eastern Railroad Company. The interest on these bonds has hitherto been paid, and the bonds fall due in 1892. The plaintiffs ask the court to declare that these conditional obligations are entitled to partake of the mortgage security after and when the same shall become absolute debts, at any time before the mortgage is foreclosed and the property distributed. The act nowhere mentions contingent claims and liabilities, and nowhere declares in what manner and to what extent they shall be permitted to come in and share the benefit of the mortgage.
It is contended by the plaintiffs that the case comes within the act, because, after providing in several preceding sections for the issue of certificates for all undisputed claims, and for all disputed claims “ which can be the subject of an action at law ” after the same have been adjusted, it goes on in § 9 to declare that “ any person claiming to hold against said corporation any other liability,” and to be entitled, under the St. of 1874, or otherwise, to be secured under the mortgage, may apply by bill in equity to the court and have that liability and his rights established and defined.
But the language of § 9 does not justify the application contended for. That section evidently has reference to existing absolute liabilities which can be ascertained and enforced only in a court of equity; all other liabilities which could be enforced at law had been fully provided for. It is well settled that, without express provisions, contingent liabilities of this nature are never provable in bankruptcy or insolvency. There is no way, in law or in equity, by which persons holding such claims can secure themselves out of the property of one so liable. The reference to the St. of 1874 does not aid the plaintiffs’ construction, and it is impossible to believe that the Legislature would
In this case the demurrer must be sustained and the bill dismissed, with costs. Decrees accordingly.