268 Mo. 394 | Mo. | 1916
— This- is an action to determine interest in certain real estate situate in Crawford County. Upon trial defendant had judgment, and plaintiff has appealed.
The common source of title is the Meramec Iron Company. Defendant claims through mesne conveyances from a sheriff’s deed bottomed upon a judgment and sale for taxes in an action instituted by publication against the Maramec -Iron Company. The plaintiff claims through a conveyance made in 1902 by all of the surviving directors of the Maramec Iron Com
On the 2nd day of January, 1894, an action was begun in the circuit court of Crawford County by the collector of revenue, of that county against the Meramec Iron Company for taxes upon the land here in controversy. This action was commenced by filing, among other things, an affidavit for an order of'publication,, which order was duly made so far as concerns the point here, and duly published for a sufficient length of time. This order recited that the' Maramec Iron Company was defendant therein. It will be noted
It is conceded that the surviving directors of the Maramec Iron Company who conveyed the land in controversy to the plaintiff, were- all of the surviving directors of the Meramec Iron Company. And since no point seems to he made upon this conveyance we need not set it forth (nor the facts concerning it) •more at length. In passing it may he stated that in the written request to the said surviving directors of. the Meramec Iron Company to convey the land in dispute to plaintiff here, the word Meramec, is spelled once as last above herein and once it is spelled Maramec. Also, it may he observed, that in'the deed of conveyance made pursuant to the above request by said surviving directors of the Meramec Iron Company, the word “Meramec” as it appears in the title, of said Iron Company, is spelled thirteen times Maramec and not once otherwise. Which fact, we predict, will prove unlucky for plaintiff if we shall come so far as to reach it in our discussion.
To a determination of this question, in the light of the various attacks thereon, our discussion of the case will be directed. In the discussion of it, if other facts shall become necessary we shall state them.
It will be instantly appreciated that all of these questions are interesting; many of them are novel, and some of them are very close and difficult; largely because in any view which we may take, we must in our consideration thereof seem to beg many questions and assume as facts things.which are in reason contradictory antitheses of each other.
While thus on obvious principle it would appear to follow that no action can be maintained against a corporation after it expires by statutory limitation, and that a judgment against such defunct corporation is absolutely void, we have not in this State been able to find a case so holding in express terms. But in the Federal courts, and in other jurisdictions, as shown by the text-books and the cases themselves, this rule seems to be settled beyond dispute. In the case of Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. l. c. 644, it was said:
“Looking at the judgment of the circuit court of the United States, we are satisfied that the ruling of the Court of Appeals was correct. That judgment purports to be against the insurance company, Put that, company, at. the time, had no legal existence. It had been dissolved and its franchises, rights and privileges declared forfeited by a decree of the Supreme .Court of New York, in a proceeding brought by the Attorney General of the State, in the name of the people, and a receiver appointed of the effects of the corporation. The judgment was therefore no more .valid against a non-existing corporation than it would have been if rendered for a like amount against a dead man. The receiver was not substituted in the place of the dissolved corporation; no process or citation was issued by that court to bring him before it, nor any proceeding taken for that purpose. Nor would such a proceeding have had any effect, for, the corporation having expired, the suit itself had abated. ’ ’
In the case of Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 Cal. l. c. 580, it was held: “It is settled beyond question that, except as otherwise provided by statute, the effect of the dissolution of a corporation is to ter
Likewise it was so held m the late case of Venable Bros. v. Southern Granite Co., 135 Ga. 508, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446. In an excellent note to the above case to be found in the citation last above, it is said: “The doctrine is well established that in the absence of statutory regulation, the expiration of corporate life hy. lapse of time or decree of dissolution works an abatement of pending actions at law or against it, the reason being that its existence as a legal entity is ended, and therefore a judgment subsequently rendered will be void.” [Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238; Wilcox v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 468; Terry v. Bank, 66 Ga. 177; Eagle Chair Co. v. Kelsey, 23 Kan. 632; Bank v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. 599; Musson v. Richardson, 11 Rob. (La.) 37; Read v. Bank, 23 Me. 318; Olds v. Trust Co., 185 Mass. 500; Torry v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 192; Greenbrier Lumber Co. v. Ward, 30 W. Va. 43; National Bank v. Colby,
We conclude then that since the judgment for taxes was rendered against the Meramec Iron Company, which was organized as a corporation de facto under chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1865, after said company had become dissolved by statutory efflux of time, such judgment was void and the subject of collateral attack,, and a sale for taxes of the land in controversy bottomed on said judgment did not pass title to the purchaser thereof. This view disposes of the case and renders unnecessary a consideration of the other interesting points mooted.
It follows that the judgment nisi was wrong, and that this case should be reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff decreeing it to be the owner of said land and adjudging that defendant has no title or estate therein. Let this be done.