REGINA MENTION v. KENSINGTON SQUARE APARTMENTS
(AC 42832)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
August 30, 2022
Elgo, Cradle and Alexander, Js.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff tenant sought, inter alia, an order to compel the defendant to exterminate an infestation of insects and rodents in her leased premises, one of six rental units in a building for which the defendant is the landlord. The plaintiff, who was the recipient of a rent subsidy, first reported the infestation to the defendant and then contacted the municipal agency responsible for housing code enforcement in the city in which the premises was located. An inspector from the agency ordered the defendant to rid the premises of the infestation and issued a notice of compliance after the defendant treated the infestation. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint for housing code enforcement pursuant to the applicable statute (
- This court declined to review the defendant‘s claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider evidence of housing code violations that predated the filing of the plaintiff‘s complaint with the municipal agency; the defendant did not dispute that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff‘s complaint, as the plaintiff complied with the requirement pursuant to
§ 47a-14h that a complaint be made to the municipal agency responsible for enforcement of the housing code at least twenty-one days prior to the filing of a complaint with the court, and the defendant‘s claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over any evidence of housing code violations prior to the filing of the complaint was an evidentiary claim raised for the first time on appeal. - The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendant violated the housing code; the city‘s housing code plainly and unambiguously required that, when an infestation exists in two or more dwelling units, the owner of the property was responsible for extermination, defined as the control and elimination of insects or other pests, and the court‘s factual findings that the defendant did not act reasonably to resolve the infestation problem because its actions were too slow and not effective were not clearly erroneous, as, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court found that the premises and several other units in the building had been infested, that more than one year had elapsed between the initial report of infestation and the notice of compliance from the municipal agency, and that multiple other units remained infested in violation of the housing code.
- The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the housing code, as applied to it in this case, was unconstitutionally vague: although the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable, as the municipal agency responsible for enforcing the housing code was not a state agency as defined by statute (
§ 4-166 (1) ); moreover, the defendant‘s unpreserved claim that the housing code was void for vagueness failed to meet the requirement of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 that a constitutional violation occurred that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, as the defendant had proper notice of what constituted an infestation under the housing code and the required steps to remedy such an infestation, and the housing code did not lack minimal guidelines or sufficient standards to guide the municipal agency or the court with respect to its proper application in this case. - The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim in her cross appeal that the trial court erred in calculating rent abatement based on her share of the subsidized rent rather than the full market rent:
§ 47a-14h clearly and unambiguously authorized the court to order abatement of rent and return such rent paid to the court in proportion to the amount paid by each party; moreover, although the court was not required to make the subsidizing entity a party to the action, and the subsidizing entity was not made a party, the statute explicitly provided that, when a subsidizing entity is joined as a party and pays its share of rent to the court, any rent to be returned shall be returned to the tenant and such entity in proportion to the amount of rent each deposited with the court.
Argued March 1—officially released August 30, 2022
Procedural History
Action for housing code enforcement, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, where the defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim, from which the defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Areeb Siddiqui and Patrick Monaghan, certified legal interns, with whom were J. L. Pottenger, Jr., and, on the brief, Shannon Price and Nathan Leys, certified legal interns, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).
Melissa Marichal and Shelley White filed a brief for New Haven Legal Assistance Association et al. as amici curiae.
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. In this housing code enforcement action, the defendant, Kensington Square Apartments, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Regina Mention. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider evidence in support of the plaintiff‘s claim that predated the filing of her complaint with the New Haven Livable City Initiative (Initiative), (2) the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendant violated title V of the New Haven Code of Ordinances (housing code), and (3) the housing code is unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiff also challenges the judgment of the trial court, by way of a cross appeal, claiming that the court erred in calculating rent abatement based on her share of the subsidized rent, rather than the full market rent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the court or otherwise undisputed by the parties, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In February, 2017, the plaintiff moved into an apartment located at 166 Edgewood Avenue, Apartment 2, in New Haven (premises). The premises is one of six rental units in the building. The defendant is the landlord of the premises. The plaintiff‘s rent is subsidized and her share is $226 per month.1 The premises became infested with insects and rodents around September, 2017, at which time the plaintiff reported the infestation to the defendant. Several other rental units in the building had been infested with insects and rodents during the period in which the premises was infested and remained infested through the date of trial. The defendant hired an exterminator who visited the premises several times between September, 2017, and December, 2018.
On September 17, 2018, the plaintiff contacted the Initiative to report the infestation of the premises. The Initiative is the municipal agency responsible for housing code enforcement in New Haven. On September 20, 2018, an inspector from the Initiative examined the premises and found evidence of insect and rodent infestation. The inspector determined that, pursuant to article III, paragraph 309 of the housing code, the defendant was responsible for extermination and ordered the defendant to rid the apartment of the insect and rodent infestation within three days and to provide documentation of a treatment plan from a licensed exterminator. See New Haven Code of Ordinances, tit. V, art. III, ¶ 309. The defendant treated the infestation and the inspector issued a notice of compliance on December 19, 2018.
On November 15, 2018, the plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint for housing code enforcement pursuant to
A trial on the plaintiff‘s complaint and the defendant‘s counterclaim was held on February 28 and March 28, 2019. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the premises was infested with insects and rodents from September, 2017, until at least December 19, 2018, and that such infestation materially affected the health and safety of the occupants. It also found that the plaintiff did not contribute to the infestation, that she expended her own resources and time in addressing the infestation, and that she reasonably cooperated with the defendant in its attempts to remedy the infestation. The court further found that, “to a small extent, insects and rodents still exist in the premises, likely because the insect and rodent infestation in other rental units within the building [had] not yet been brought under control.” The court determined that, although the defendant had “exerted substantial efforts to remediate the infestation problem . . . the defendant‘s efforts were not reasonable because of (i) the long time period that elapsed between initial report (September, 2017) and compliance (December, 2018), (ii) the fact that other units within the building remain infested, and (iii) insects still enter the premises, albeit to a much lesser extent, from the other units in the building.” The court concluded that the defendant had violated its duties as a landlord pursuant to
The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her complaint and on the defendant‘s counterclaim. It awarded the plaintiff $1130, the amount of rent she had paid into court. It also awarded an abatement of any rental arrearage that may exist and six months of prospective abatement of rent. Finally, the court ordered the defendant to eradicate the insect and
This appeal and cross appeal followed.
I
We first address the defendant‘s claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider evidence in support of the plaintiff‘s claim that predated the filing of her complaint with the Initiative. Specifically, the defendant contends that, because a cause of action pursuant to
We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles relevant to our review of this claim. “We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover . . . [s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . . [J]urisdiction of the [subject matter] is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 338 Conn. 651, 658 (2021). Furthermore, “[a] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings . . . including on appeal . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Premier Capital, LLC v. Shaw, 189 Conn. App. 1, 5 (2019).
We next set forth the relevant language of the statute. Section 47a-14h provides in relevant part: “(a) Any tenant who claims that the landlord has failed to perform his or her legal duties, as required by section 47a-7 . . . may institute an action in the superior court having jurisdiction over housing matters in the judicial district in which such tenant resides to obtain the relief authorized by this section . . . . (b) The action shall be instituted by filing a complaint, under oath, with the clerk of the court. . . . The complaint shall also allege that at least twenty-one days prior to the date on which the complaint is filed, the tenant made a complaint concerning the premises to the municipal agency, in the municipality where the premises are located, responsible for the enforcement of the housing code . . . .”
In Dugan v. Milledge, 196 Conn. 591, 595 (1985), our Supreme Court held that the requirement of notification to the housing code enforcement agency set forth in
In the present case, the defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff complied with the requirement that a complaint be made to the municipal agency responsible for enforcement of the housing code, namely, the Initiative, at least twenty-one days prior to the filing of a complaint with the court; see
“The standard for the preservation of a claim of improperly admitted evidence at trial is well settled. Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that [this] court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial . . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . Our rules of practice make it clear that counsel must object to a ruling of evidence [and] state the grounds upon which objection is made . . . to preserve the grounds for appeal. . . . These requirements are not simply formalities. . . . We consistently have stated that we will not consider evidentiary rulings where counsel did not properly preserve a claim of error by objection . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Villa v. Rios, 88 Conn. App. 339, 344 (2005). The defendant never objected in the trial court to the evidence it now challenges on appeal. Consequently, we decline to review such a claim. The plaintiff plainly complied with the notification requirement set forth in
II
We next address the defendant‘s claim that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendant violated the housing code. Specifically, the defendant contends that the trial court‘s incorrect interpretation of the housing code resulted in its improper conclusion that the defendant failed to act reasonably in the context of what the housing code requires. We disagree.
We first set forth our standard of review and the legal principles that guide our analysis. “Our interpretation of ordinances presents a question of law and, therefore, our review is plenary. . . . We interpret and construe local ordinances according to the principles of statutory construction.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Azzarito v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 79 Conn. App. 614, 622 (2003); see also O‘Shea v. Scherban, 339 Conn. 775, 784 (2021). “Under
We next set forth the relevant provisions of the housing code. The housing code authorizes an enforcing officer to “make inspections to determine the condition of . . . [the] premises” in order to safeguard “the health and safety and welfare of the occupants of dwellings and of the general public.” New Haven Code of Ordinances, tit. V, art. II, ¶ 200. It further provides in relevant part: “Whenever the enforcing officer determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a violation of any provision of this title, he shall give notice of such alleged violation to the person or persons responsible therefor, as hereinafter provided. Such notice shall: (a) Be in writing; (b) Include a statement of the reason why it is being issued; (c) Allow a reasonable time for the performance of any act it requires . . . (e) Contain an outline of remedial action, which if taken, will effect compliance with the provisions of this title and with rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto.” Id., ¶ 201. Additionally, the housing code provides that, “[w]henever infestation exists, in two (2) or more of the dwelling units in any dwelling . . . extermination shall be the responsibility of the owner.” Id., art. III, ¶ 309.
The housing code also provides relevant definitions. It defines extermination as “the control and elimination of insects, or other pests, by eliminating their harborage places; by removing or making inaccessible materials that may serve as their food; by poisoning, spraying, fumigating, trapping; or by any other recognized and legal pest elimination methods approved by the enforcing officer.” Id., art. I, ¶ 100 (h). Infestation is defined as “the presence, within or around a dwelling, [of] any insects, rodents or other pests.” Id., ¶ 100 (l).
The housing code plainly and unambiguously requires that, when an infestation exists in two or more dwelling units, the owner of the property, in this case the defendant, is responsible for extermination. It also clearly provides that extermination is the “control and elimination of insects, or other pests.” (Emphasis added). Id., ¶ 100 (h). The court, therefore, properly determined that, because an infestation existed in multiple dwelling units, the defendant was required to remove the infestation by controlling and eliminating insects and rodents from all affected units.
The defendant also challenges the court‘s determination that, although the defendant took steps to remediate the infestation, it did not act reasonably to resolve the infestation problem because it acted “too slowly and not as effectively as required.” To the extent the defendant challenges the court‘s factual findings, our review of those findings is limited to determining whether they were clearly erroneous. “In a case tried before the court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded to specific testimony. . . . [When] the factual basis of the court‘s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. . . . In other words, to the extent that the trial court has made
On our thorough review of the record, we cannot conclude that the court‘s findings were clearly erroneous. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court found that the premises and several other rental units in the building were infested with insects and rodents. The defendant, therefore, was required, pursuant to article III, paragraph 309 of the housing code, to exterminate the plaintiff‘s premises and any other infested apartments in the building. The court further found that a significant period of time had elapsed between the initial report of infestation and the issuance of the notice of compliance from the Initiative.
Although the housing code authorizes the inspector to uncover violations and provide an outline of remedial action to be taken, the notice of compliance issued by the Initiative in regard to the premises is not conclusive as to whether the defendant complied with its duties under the housing code. The court noted that insects were still present in the premises, just to a lesser extent, likely due to the fact that the insect and rodent infestation in other rental units had not yet been brought under control. At trial, there was also evidence that cockroaches can travel from one infested rental unit to another and that an individual‘s housekeeping habits may create conditions that allow for the increase of insect activity. On the basis of the totality of this evidence, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that, until the infestation in each affected rental unit was eliminated, the infestation in the premises would not be adequately addressed. Because the premises remained infested until at least December 19, 2018, and multiple other rental units in the building remained infested, the defendant did not comply with its duties under the housing code because it failed to adequately exterminate the infestation in each infested rental unit, including the premises. See New Haven Code of Ordinances, tit. V, art. III, ¶ 309; id., art. I, ¶ 100 (h).
III
We next address the defendant‘s contention that the housing code, as applied to it in this case, is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court‘s interpretation of the housing code “failed to provide the defendant with notice as to what actually constitutes an ‘infestation,’ as well as whether the defendant had to take any steps beyond what the Initiative had ordered to ensure its mitigation efforts were reasonable and, if so, what those additional steps were.” The defendant further claims that the housing code was arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced because the court “concluded that, notwithstanding the defendant having done everything the Initiative ordered, indeed having even made ‘substantial efforts’ at extermination, its actions were still unreasonable.” The defendant con- cedes that it did not raise its void for vagueness claim before the trial court, but argues that this claim is reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40 (1989). The
A
We first address the plaintiff‘s contention that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the defendant‘s void for vagueness claim because the defendant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the Initiative‘s inspector to New Haven‘s code enforcement board of appeals. In its reply brief, the defendant responds that its void for “vagueness claim is not one that could have been the subject of an administrative appeal from the agency‘s order because the claim is that the housing code is vague as applied to the defendant by way of and under the circumstances of the present § 47a-14h proceeding, not a challenge to the original administrative order.” We conclude that, because the Initiative is a local agency, rather than a state agency, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable to the present case. See Edwards v. Code Enforcement Committee, 13 Conn. App. 1, 10 (1987).
We begin with our standard of review. “Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [defendant‘s] claim. . . . [B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Godbout v. Attanasio, 199 Conn. App. 88, 97 (2020).
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. . . . The doctrine provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. . . . If the available administrative procedure . . . provide[s] the [party] with a mechanism for attaining the remedy that [it] seek[s] . . . [it] must exhaust that remedy. . . . The [party‘s] preference for a particular remedy does not determine the adequacy of that remedy. [A]n administrative remedy, in order to be adequate, need not comport with the [party‘s] opinion of what a perfect remedy would be. . . . A primary purpose of the doctrine is to foster an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review, offering a reviewing court the benefit of the agency‘s findings and conclusions. It relieves courts of the burden of prematurely deciding questions that, entrusted to an agency, may receive a satisfactory administrative disposition and avoid the need for judicial review. . . . Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to [the legislature‘s] delegation of authority to coordinate branches of [g]overnment, that agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that [the legislature] has charged them to administer.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coyle v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 142 Conn. App. 198, 206 (2013).
Article II, paragraph 203 (a) of the housing code provides in relevant part: “Any
In Edwards v. Code Enforcement Committee, supra, 13 Conn. App. 10, this court held that the defendant, the code enforcement committee of Vernon, was not a state agency and, therefore, was not subject to provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA),
The defendant in Edwards maintained that it was a town agency enforcing the local housing code in the exercise of the town‘s police power, and, therefore, it was not a state agency within the provisions of the UAPA. Id., 5. The court reasoned that, “[b]y virtue of . . . legislative delegation of general police powers to local officials and agencies [pursuant to
In the present case, we conclude that the New Haven housing code enforcement division is not a state agency as defined in
B
We next address the defendant‘s claim that the housing code is void for vagueness as applied to the present case. Although it did not raise its void for vagueness claim before the trial court, the defendant contends that this claim is reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. We conclude that the defendant cannot prevail pursuant to Golding because the housing code is not void for vagueness as applied to the defendant.
“Under Golding, a [party] can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the [party] of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the [party‘s] claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the [party‘s] claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Madison C., 201 Conn. App. 184, 190 (2020). “The first two [Golding] requirements involve a determination of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two requirements involve a determination of whether the defendant may prevail.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 554 (2022).
In the present case, the record is adequate to review the defendant‘s claim, and the defendant has asserted a claim of constitutional magnitude. We conclude, how- ever, that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the housing code is unconstitutionally vague as applied to it for purposes of the third prong of Golding and, therefore, the defendant cannot prevail on this claim.
“To demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to [it], the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [it] had inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [it was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . The determination of whether a statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. . . . The foregoing principles apply equally to municipal ordinances.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petrucelli v. Meriden, 197 Conn. App. 1, 18–19 (2020).
The defendant contends that the court‘s interpretation and application of the housing code rendered the housing code unconstitutionally vague because it (1) failed to provide the defendant with notice as to what constitutes an “infestation” and whether the defendant was required to take any steps beyond what the Initiative had ordered to ensure its mitigation efforts were reasonable and (2) was arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced because, despite the defendant‘s efforts at remediation and the Initiative‘s issuance of a notice of compliance, the court determined that the defendant‘s efforts were not reasonable.
We begin with the defendant‘s contention that the housing code does not provide proper notice as to what constitutes an infestation and what steps must be taken when the Initiative identifies an infestation. We disagree.
As we noted in part II of this opinion, the housing code defines an infestation as “the presence, within or around a dwelling, [of] any insects, rodents or other pests.” New Haven Code of Ordinances, tit. V, art. I, ¶ 100 (l). It further defines “extermination” as “the control and elimination of insects, or other pests, by eliminating their harborage places; by removing or making inaccessible materials that may serve as their food; by poisoning, spraying, fumigating, trapping; or by any other recognized and legal pest elimination methods approved by the enforcing officer.” (Emphasis added.) Id., ¶ 100 (h). The housing code authorizes an enforcing officer to perform inspections and determine the condition of dwellings, as well as to issue notice of alleged violations that includes an outline of remedial action and a reasonable time to perform such actions. See id., art. II, ¶¶ 200, 201. The housing code further provides that, “[w]henever an infestation exists, in two (2) or more of the dwelling units in any dwelling, or in the shared or common parts of any dwelling containing two (2) or more dwelling units, extermination
We conclude that the defendant had proper notice of what constitutes an infestation under the housing code and the required steps to remedy such infestation. The relevant provisions of the housing code expressly state what an infestation is and when a landlord has the duty to exterminate such infestation. It also expressly provides that extermination is both the control and the elimination of insects or other pests and provides the manner in which extermination can be performed.
The court, applying the applicable provisions of the housing code, determined that an infestation existed in both the plaintiff‘s premises and other rental units in the building and that, although such infestation had been treated by an exterminator, it had not been controlled and eliminated as required by the housing code. The fact that the Initiative, after determining that there existed an infestation that violated article III, paragraph 309 of the housing code, issued a notice of compliance7 to the defendant is not the determining factor as to whether an infestation existed or whether the defendant had complied with its duties under the housing code. In addition to the notice of compliance issued by the Initiative, the court was presented with evidence that insects and rodents still existed in the plaintiff‘s premises, albeit to a lesser extent, and that there existed an insect and rodent infestation in multiple other rental units in the building that contained the plaintiff‘s premises. The presence of insects and rodents in the premises and other units was sufficient to satisfy the definition of an infestation provided in the housing code. See id., art. I, ¶ 100 (l). Furthermore, although the defendant also claims that three days is not a reasonable time in which to remediate an infestation in a multifamily dwelling, the court ordered the defendant to eradicate the infestation within two months from the date of its decision. We conclude that, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case, a person of ordinary intelligence would know that the presence of insects and rodents in multiple rental units constitutes an infestation as that term is defined in the housing code and that the defendant had a duty to exterminate the infestation in each affected unit by controlling and eliminating the insects and rodents.
We next address the defendant‘s claim that the housing code was arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced because the defendant did everything the Initiative ordered and received a notice of compliance, but the court still determined that the defendant‘s efforts were not reasonable. We disagree.
The defendant claims that the vagueness of the housing code impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to the Initiative and to the court and that the housing code‘s lack of meaningful guidance resulted in its arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In light of the evidence that insects and rodents still existed in the plaintiff‘s premises at the time of trial, and that several rental units in the building remained infested, the court, applying the relevant, express provisions of the housing code, properly concluded that an infestation existed and that the defendant had not complied with the provisions of the housing code requiring it to exterminate an infestation that exists in two or more dwelling units. See id., art. III, ¶ 309. We cannot conclude that the housing code lacked minimal guidelines or sufficient standards to guide the Initiative and the
We conclude that the defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that it lacked adequate notice or that it was the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Accordingly, the defendant‘s claim fails under Golding‘s third prong because it failed to establish that a constitutional violation occurred that deprived it of a fair trial.
IV
We now turn to the plaintiff‘s cross appeal, in which she claims that the court erred in calculating rent abatement, pursuant to
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The plaintiff‘s portion of the monthly rent was $226. In her complaint, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, “[a] retroactive abatement of rent paid.” In its decision, the court awarded the plaintiff “the amount currently paid into court—[$1130].” It also ordered an abatement of any rental arrearage and prospective abatement of the plaintiff‘s share of the rent for the next six months.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff‘s claim. The plaintiff‘s claim raises a question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is plenary. See 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 827 (2020). “[W]hen interpreting a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . However, [w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and [common-law] principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dominguez v. New York Sports Club, 198 Conn. App. 854, 860–61 (2020).
We next set forth the relevant language of the statutes. Section 47a-14h (e) provides in relevant part: “The complainant may seek and the court may order interim or final relief including, but not limited to, the following . . . (4) an award of money damages, which may include a retroactive abatement of rent paid pursuant to subsection
Section 47a-14h (h) provides in relevant part: “On each rent due date on or after the date when the complaint is filed with the clerk of the court . . . the tenant shall deposit with the clerk of the court an amount equal to the last agreed-upon rent. If all or a portion of the tenant‘s rent is being paid to the landlord by a housing authority, municipality, state agency or similar entity, this requirement shall be satisfied if the tenant deposits an amount equal to such tenant‘s portion of the last agreed-upon rent with the clerk. The court may make such entity a party to the action. . . .”
We conclude that
In her brief, the plaintiff contends that “[t]his court has already addressed the issue of rent abatement and subsidized tenancies in title 47a of the General Statutes.” The plaintiff further asserts that, “[u]nder a subsidy based interpretation of rent abatement in § 47a-14h, a landlord who cannot lawfully receive rent under
In Rodriguez, this court interpreted the meaning of the phrase ” ‘one month‘s rent’ ” as used in
Rodriguez, however, is distinguishable from the present case. The statute at issue in Rodriguez,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“(a) Extension. The time for performance of any act required by the order may be extended for not more than eighteen (18) months subject to appropriate conditions and provided that the board makes specific findings of fact based on evidence relating to the following factors:
“(1) That there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of any provisions of this title; and
“(2) That such extension is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this title in securing the public health, safety and general welfare.
“(b) Variances. A variance may be granted in a specific case and from a specific provision of this title subject to appropriate conditions and provided that the board makes specific findings of fact based on evidence relating to the following factors:
“(1) That there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the provision;
“(2) That the effect of the application of the provisions would be arbitrary in the specific case;
“(3) That an extension would not constitute an appropriate remedy for these practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships and this arbitrary effect; and
“(4) That such variance is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this title in securing the public health, safety and general welfare. . . .”
We similarly find the plaintiff‘s reliance on out of state authority to be unavailing. None of the cases cited by the plaintiff involved the application of a statute with language similar to that of
“(d) A landlord may not enter the dwelling unit without the consent of the tenant except (1) in case of emergency, (2) as permitted by section 47a-16a, (3) pursuant to a court order, or (4) if the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.”