Cоrina MENDOZA, Petitioner v. WIS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Anthony Adams, and Washington Inventory Services, Inc. Respondents
No. CV-15-677
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
Opinion Delivered April 14, 2016
2016 Ark. 157
Huckabay Law Firm, PLC, Little Rock, by: D. Michael Huckabay, Jr., and Kathryn B. Knisley, for respondents WIS International, Inc., and Washington Inventory Services, Inc.
McMillan, McCorkle, Curry & Bennington, L.L.P., Arkadelphia, by: F. Thomas Curry; and Munson, Rowlett, Moore, Little Rock, by: Shane Strabala and Kara B. Mikles, for respondent Anthony Adams.
Law Office of David H. Williams, PLLC, Little Rock, by: David H. Williams, for Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association, amicus curiae.
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, Little Rock, by: Gregory T. Jones and Kristen S. Moyers, for American Trucking Associations, Inc. and Arkansas Trucking Associаtion, Inc., amici curiae.
This case involves a question of law certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 and accepted by this court on September 17, 2015. See Mendoza v. WIS Int‘l, Inc., 2015 Ark. 321.
The certified question is:
Under the facts of this case, does Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703, which restricts the admissibility of seat belt-nonuse evidence in civil actions, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2, of the Arkansas Constitution?
We conclude that the answer is yes.
WIS and Adams filed motions in the district court challenging the constitutionality of
It is well settled that there is a presumption of validity attending every consideration of a statute‘s constitutionality; every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and before an act will be held unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it and the constitution must be clear. Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007)). Any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See id. The heavy burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality is upon the one attacking it. See id. Finally, when possible, we will construe a statute so that it is cоnstitutional. See id.
In determining the constitutionality of the statutes, we look to the rules of statutory construction. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. When construing a statute, the basic rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. (citing Rose v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 363 Ark. 281, 213 S.W.3d 607 (2005)). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine the legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id.
As a threshold issue, Mendoza asserts that respondents’ motions challenging the constitutionality of
We now turn to respondents’ chаllenge to the constitutionality of
(a)(1) The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action.
(2) Provided, that evidence of the failure may be admitted in a civil action as to the causal relationship between non-compliance and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions have been satisfied:
(A) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim related to an alleged failure of a seat belt;
(B) The defendant alleging non-compliance with this subchapter shall raise this dеfense in its answer or timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and
(C) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging non-compliance has the burden of proving:
(i) Non-compliance;
(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and
(iii) The extent of the reduction of the injuries.
(b)(1) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance with the provisions of this section and the rules of evidence.
(2) The finding of the trial judge shall not constitute a finding of fact, and the finding shall be limited to the issue of admissibility of such evidence.
Mendoza argues that the statute is a matter of substantive law, dеfining what is negligent for purposes of comparative fault and is therefore within the province of the legislature. She asserts that
Law is substantive when it is “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of the parties.” See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141 (quoting Summerville v. Thrower, 369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419-20 (2007) (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 1443 (7th ed. 1999))). Procedural law is defined as “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.” Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d at 420 (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed. 1999)).
It is undisputed that the rules of evidence are “rules of pleading, practice and procedure.” See Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, at 10, 308 S.W.3d at 142. We have held that the rules of evidence fall within this court‘s domain. See id., 308 S.W.3d 135 (citing Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986)). Accordingly, under our holding in Johnson, if the statute is a rule of evidence, then it violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional. In Johnson, we held that the nonparty provision of
Any evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment, or services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall be legally responsible.
2009 Ark. 241, at 10, 308 S.W.3d at 142 (emphasis in original) (quoting
In Johnson, we held that because the provision clearly limited the evidence that may be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses, thereby dictating what evidence is admissible, the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. In the seat-belt statute,
Mendoza contends that
However,
Moreover,
The failure to provide or use a seat belt shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence.
In 1995 Ark. Acts 1118, the language “shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence” and “with regard to negligence” was removed, from
Mendoza also argues that even if
This court has specifically given the General Assembly the power to enact statutes regarding testimonial privilege. See
Ark. R. Evid. 501 (no person has a privilege to refuse to testify or prevent another from being a witness “except as otherwise provided by constitution or statute“) (emphasis added). Therefore, this section doеs not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Bedell, 2012 Ark. 75, at 17, 386 S.W.3d at 505. Mendoza asserts that our holding regarding
Bedell and Johnson are distinguishable. We have previously ruled that a statute granting a privilege is substantive law. See Cato v. Craighead Cnty. Circuit Court, 2009 Ark. 334, at 9, 322 S.W.3d. 484, 489 (2009) (holding that a statute granted a “privilege” to members of the organized militia serving military duty by granting them exemption from civil process). We held that the creation of such a privilege was substаntive legislation.
In
Prior to the passage of
The seat-belt statute is procedural and therefore offends the principle of separation of powers and the powers specifical-
Certified question answered.
Baker, Hart, and Wood, JJ., dissent.
Karen R. Baker, Justice, dissenting.
Based on the record before the court, I cannot join the majority opinion, and I therefore respectfully dissent. The question of law certified to this court is as follows:
Under the facts of this case, does Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703, which restricts the admissibility of seat-belt-nonuse evidence in civil actions, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine found in article IV, section 2, of the Arkansas Constitution?
The answer to this certified question of law should be answered in the negative.
A particular provision in a statute must be construed with reference to the statute as a whole. Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000) (citing Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993)).
At issue is Chapter 37 of Title 27, which governs equipment regulations. Subchapter 7 is entitled “Mandatory Seat Belt Use.”
Each driver and front seat passenger in any motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this state shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt properly secured to the vehicle.
Therefore, under the facts in this case, I would answer the certified question in the negative and must respectfully dissent from the majority‘s consideration of a statutory provision that is clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, dissenting.
This court accepted a very specific certified question from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The very first clause in the certified question expressly limits the inquiry to the “facts of this case.” There is no dispute that Ms. Mendoza, at the time of the accident, was asleep in the back seat of the vehicle being driven by Anthony Adams. Likewise, in clear language, the Arkansas Mandatory Seat Belt Use Law requires only the occupants of the front seat of a vehicle to wear seat belts. Because
Under these circumstances, this court must remain true to its rules and well-established practices and decline to answer this certified question. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-8 (2012), contemplates just such a disposition:
(a)(5) In its discretion, the Supreme Court may at any time rescind its decision to answer a certified question. The Clerk shall promptly mail notice to the certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel.
I contend that it is only prudent to rеscind this court‘s acceptance of the certified question.
In my view, the majority was, not only wrong for agreeing to answer this question, it is wrong in its answer as well. Although the majority recognizes it, it fails to honor the presumption of validity attending every consideration of a statute‘s constitutionality. Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, 308 S.W.3d 135. Before this court can declare an act to be unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it and the constitution must be clear. Id. Any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Id. When possible, we must construe a statute so that it is constitutional. Id. There is ample basis to construe this stаtute so as to find it constitutional.
With the substantive/procedural dichotomy in mind, we turn to the challenged “Failure to Comply” provision of our Mandatory Seat Belt Use law, codified at Ar-
(a)(1) The failure of an occupant to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action.
(2) Provided, that evidence of the failure may be admitted in a civil action as to the causal relationship between non-compliance and the injuries alleged, if the following conditions have been satisfied:
(A) The plaintiff has filed a products liability claim other than a claim related to an alleged failure of a seat belt;
(B) The defendant alleging non-compliance with this subchapter shall raise this defense in its answer оr timely amendment thereto in accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and
(C) Each defendant seeking to offer evidence alleging non-compliance has the burden of proving:
(i) Non-compliance;
(ii) That compliance would have reduced injuries; and
(iii) The extent of the reduction of the injuries.
(b)(1) Upon request of any party, the trial judge shall hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury as to the admissibility of such evidence in accordance with the provisions of this section and the rules of evidence.
(2) The finding of the trial judge shall not constitute a finding of fact, and the finding shall be limited to the issue of admissibility of such evidence.
When we interpret a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the lеgislature. State v. Colvin, 2013 Ark. 203, 427 S.W.3d 635. The process requires us to place the statute beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question so that we can derive the meaning and effect from the whole. Id. Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and in harmony, if possible. Id.
As stated previously,
(a) Any person who violates this subchapter shall be subject to a fine not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
(b) When a person is convicted, pleads guilty, pleads nolo contendere, or forfeits bond for violation of this subchapter, court costs under § 16-10-305 shall be assessed, but other costs or fees shall not be assessed.
Further, the original version of
SECTION 5. The failure to provide or use a seat belt shall not be considered under any circumstances as evidence of comparative or contributory negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence. Neither shall the failure to provide or use seat belts be considered under any circumstances as evidence in any prosecution for negligent homicide.
As such, this section is substantive law because it “defines and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties,” relative to the newly created requirement to use seat belts. See Rockwell Automation, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, 308 S.W.3d at 141. While the original version of this statute was amended by Act 1118 of 1995 so as to
When the Rockwell court struck down the nonparty-fault provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act, it noted that
I am mindful that the plain language of
Any evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment, or services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall be legally responsible.
It is undisputed that the rules of evidence are “rules of pleading, practice and procedure.” Moreover, we have held that the rules of evidence are rules falling within this court‘s domain. See Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986). Our review of the plain language of the medical-costs provision reveals that thе instant statute promulgates a rule of evidence. Here, the provision clearly limits the evidence that may be introduced relating to the value of medical expenses to the amount of medical expenses paid or the amount to be paid by a plaintiff or on a plaintiff‘s behalf, thereby dictating what evidence is admissible. Because rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are within our province, we hold that the medical-costs provision also violates separation of powers under
article 4, § 2 andamendment 80, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
Rockwell Automation, 2009 Ark. 241, at 10-11, 308 S.W.3d at 142. Nonetheless, I contend that Rockwell does not control the question before us.
The mere use of the word “evidence” in the statute does not make the statute a rule оf evidence. “Evidence” appears in more than 4000 sections and subsections of the Arkansas Code, and it is truly absurd to think that each and every time the legislature enacted one of these statutes it violated the separation of powers. A more searching analysis is required.
While
In Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493, this court held that the legislature did not violate the separation-of-powers clause when it created by statute,
In my view,
(b) In any criminal prosecution under § 5-14-101 et seq. or § 5-26-202, or for criminal attempt to commit, criminal solicitation to commit, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense defined in any of those sections, opinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim‘s prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim‘s prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant cоncerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies making the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.
This court has upheld the constitutionality of
In cоmparison, the medical-costs provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act that was struck down by the Rockwell court dictated not only what evidence could be admitted, but also what foundational predicates would be required before that evidence could be admitted, which essentially invaded the circuit court‘s discretion in admitting evidence, which conflicts with the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. See, e.g.,
Rhonda K. Wood, Justice, dissenting.
Becausе I think the majority‘s analysis is inherently flawed and only further confuses this court‘s application of
Inexplicably, the majority finds that our rules do not mean what they say. Instead of giving the words of
In addition, the majority attempts to rectify its ruling with conflicting precedent by rewriting its analysis in Bedell v. Williams, 2012 Ark. 75, 386 S.W.3d 493. In Bedell, we held that
This court has specifically given the General Assembly thе power to enact statutes regarding testimonial privilege. See
Ark. R. Evid 501 (no person has a privilege to refuse to testify or prevent another from being a witness “except as otherwise provided by constitution or statute“) (emphasis added).
Bedell, 2012 Ark. 75, at 17, 386 S.W.3d at 505. Thus, despite our holding in Johnson in 2009 that the General Assembly cannot enact a statute that “clearly limit[s] the evidence that may be introduced,” our court more recently held in Bedell that our words mean what they say.
Despite this clear precedent, the majority now concludes that the statute in Bedell is distinguishable from the statute for the following reason:
In
Rule 501 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence , we granted the legislature the authority to enact statutes regarding privilege because the power of the legislature to enact statutes regarding privilege is substantive law and does not conflict withamendment 80 and the separation-of-powers doctrine.Rule 402 , however, is procedural in that it dictates what evidence is relevant.
What the majority does not explain, because it cannot, is that
Tom MUCCIO, Mike Muccio, and Next Chapter Resources, LLC, Appellants v. Johnelle HUNT; Phil Phillips; David Schumacher; Trey Trumbo; Johnelle Hunt, LLC; Phil and Judy Phillips Family Limited Partnership, LLLP; and Big Horn Lodge Financing, LLC, Appellees
No. CV-15-636
Supreme Court of Arkansas.
Opinion Delivered: April 21, 2016
Rehearing Denied May 26, 2016
2016 Ark. 178