Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION JAIME MENDOZA, §
§
Plaintiff, § V. § Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-154-O
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
Defendant. §
OPINION and ORDER
This case was filed by Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) inmate/plaintiff Jaime Mendoza (“Mendoza”) asserting claims against the United States of America. Complaint 1-5, ECF No. 1. Pending is a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) by defendant United States (“USA”) and an appendix thereto (ECF Nos. 14, 15). Mendoza did not file any response. After considering the relief sought by Mendoza, the record, briefing and applicable law, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss must be GRANTED .
I. BACKGROUND/COMPLAINT
Mendoza is a federal inmate who was, at the time of filing suit, hоused at FMC-Fort Worth. Complaint 7, ECF No. 1. Mendoza filed this case on February 20, 2020. He identifies the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) as the basis for his claim against the United States and generally alleges that he received inadequate medical care at FMC-Fort Worth. Id. at 2-6. As required by the FTCA, Mendoza filed an initial administrative claim with the BOP prior to filing this lawsuit. USA App. (Declaration of Brenda Victor ¶ 3) 4, ECF No. 15. [1] After filing the administrative claim, the BOP’s records show that at the time of filing the complaint on February 20, 2020, the BOP had not issued a final decision on the relevant administrative claim. Id. (Declaration of Brenda Victor ¶ 5). The United States now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
II. FACTS
The motion to dismiss contains a detailed chronology of the facts based on the BOP’s records related to Mendoza’s history оf filing documents associated with his efforts to exhaust the administrative tort claim. Mot. Dismiss Section II 2-6, ECF No. 14. The Court incorporates by reference that detailed factual chronology herein.
The Court also finds that the uncontested Declaration of Govеrnment Information Specialist Brenda Victor is helpful to understand the unique history of Mendoza’s administrative tort claim within the BOP:
I, Brenda Victor, make the following declaration in lieu of affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
1. I am a Government Information Specialist for the Federаl Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
2. I have personally reviewed the documents attached to this appendix as pages App. 004–035. I either have personal knowledge regarding them or I have confirmed via personal observation that they are what they purрort to be as indicated herein. Those documents are true and correct records kept in the ordinary course of business of the BOP. The records were made at or near the time of the event in question, or they were received by the BOP and placed into the business records of the BOP, by a person with personal knowledge regarding the events. It was the ordinary course of business for the BOP to keep and maintain such records. 3. The BOP received an administrative tort claim from Plaintiff on March 5, 2018. The BOP designated the claim “TRT-SCR-2018-03087.” Plaintiff later informed the BOP that he wished to withdraw his claim. On June 1, 2018, the BOP issued a letter to Plaintiff in which it informed him that, in light of Plaintiff’s withdrawal, the BOP was denying his claim and closing its file. Because that letter was returned as undeliverable, the BOP sent an identical letter to Plaintiff on June 11, 2018. 4. On Sеptember 12, 2018, the BOP received a new administrative tort claim from Plaintiff. The BOP interpreted the claim as a request for reconsideration of the prior claim and designated the claim “TRT-SCR-2018-03087,” the same designation as before. However, the BOP informed Plaintiff that it сould not accept Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration because he had failed to provide a signature on the claim form. On September 27, 2018, the BOP received the same form from Plaintiff. The only difference between the form received on Sеptember 12, 2018 and the form received on September 27, 2018 is that the latter form is signed. On October 9, 2018, the BOP sent Plaintiff an acknowledgment letter, again assigning the same claim number and stating it was interpreting Plaintiff’s claim as a request for reconsideration.
5. On January 2, 2020, the BOP received correspondence from Plaintiff, in which he inquired about an administrative tort claim that he claimed to have mailed to the BOP on May 28, 2019. The BOP has no record of receiving any claim or other correspondence from Plaintiff after September 27, 2018 and before January 2, 2020. In particular, the BOP did not receive any claim from Plaintiff on or around May 28, 2019. On January 21, 2020, the BOP sent Plaintiff a letter acknowledging his correspondence that the BOP received on January 2, 2020. The BOP deemed that correspondence to be “supplemental documentation” for claim “TRT-SCR- 2018-03087,” the same number assigned previously. The BOP has not denied the reconsideration of the administrative claim numbered “TRT-SCR-2018-03087,” which it received from Plaintiff on January 2, 2020.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the fоregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 23rd day of June, 2020, at Grand Prairie, Texas.
Signed Brenda Victor.
USA App. (Declaration of Brenda Victor ¶¶ 1-5) 3-5, ECF No. 15.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A.
Law Applicable to a Motion under Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) requires dismissal when a federal district court
does not have the right to exercise its limited jurisdictiоn over the subject matter presented in the
complaint. “Federal courts must resolve questions of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.”
Ashford v. United States
,
B.
Law Applicable to Exhaustion of Administrative Review
The FTCA provides that the jurisdiction authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) for civil
actions for loss of property, persоnal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his employment, is
an exclusive remedy against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (West 2019); 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(1) (West 2006). The United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued, and
the terms of such consent, or waiver of its sovereign immunity, “define [the] Court’s jurisdiction
to entertain the suit.”
United States v. Testan
,
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over an action against the United States undеr the
FTCA is thus expressly conditioned upon compliance with the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a),
which requires that a claimant “shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate federal
agency,” and either obtain a written denial of the claim оr wait six months after its filing at the
appropriate agency to deem the agency decision as a final denial.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (West
2006). “Even though the requirements of § 2675 are minimal, an FTCA claimant must nonetheless
provide facts sufficient to allow his claim to be investigated аnd must do so in a timely manner.”
Cook v. United States on behalf of U.S. Dep’t of Labor
,
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Gоvernment while acting within the scope of his office of employment, unless the claimant shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make a final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter , be deemed a final decision of the claim for purposes of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added).
Thus, the claimant may not bring suit in district court on the claim until the claim has been
finally denied by the agency in writing, or the agency has failed to adjudicate the claim within six
months of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (West 2019), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (West 2006);
see Price
v. United States
,
The Supreme Court has recognized thаt strict compliance with the administrative
exhaustion procedures outlined in the FTCA is required of a plaintiff who institutes an action
against the United States.
See McNeil v. United States
,
IV. ANALYSIS
Mendoza acknowledges that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to filing an FTCA complaint. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1 (“I have exhausted all required attempts at administrative remedy required under the Federal Tort Claims Act prior to filing this lawsuit.”). As noted above, the FTCA itself expressly provides:
[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimаnt shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a сlaim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.” Id.
Here, the BOP has issued no final denial of the administrative claim it received on January
2, 2020, regarding the medical care Mendoza received at FMC-Fort Worth, which is the care at
issue in the instant federal complaint.
[2]
USA App. (Declaration of Brenda Victor ¶ 5) 5, ECF No.
15. In addition, when Mendoza filed his federal complaint on February 20, 2020, six months had
not yet passеd from the date the BOP received the analogous administrative claim. Because the
passage of time is calculated from the filing date of the administrative claim to the filing date of
the federal complaint, Mendoza cannot overcome his failure to exhaust merely by waiting until six
months have passed.
See Price
,
The Supreme Court could not have been clearer in
McNeil
: “The FTCA bars claimants
from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.
Because petitioner failed to heed that clear statutory command, the District Court proрerly
dismissed his suit.”
McNeil
,
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For all of the above and foregoing reasons,
It is therefore ORDERED that defendant USA’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED , such that all Jaime Mendoza’s claims against the USA under the Federal Tort Claims Act are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED on this 17th day of November, 2020.
Notes
[1] The Court may consider materials outside the pleadings in connection with the motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(1). See text infra.
[2] Even if the BOP had issued a final denial, it would have no bearing on the jurisdictional question
to the extent the denial was issued after Mendoza filed his complaint.
See Hinojosa v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons
,