24 S.E.2d 795 | Ga. | 1943
Where an intervenor comes into an equity case to claim payment of an indebtedness due by a partnership whose assets are being administered in such proceeding, and a final decree is entered in which his rights with reference to such indebtedness are adjudicated, it is too late, several terms after the decree has become final, for the court to award to such intervenor reimbursement for attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of his rights under the intervention.
1. Where equity has acquired jurisdiction for any purpose, it will retain jurisdiction to give full and complete relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject-matter. Mays v. Taylor,
It is also observed in the present case that the object of the intervenor in seeking reimbursement was not to reopen or review the final decree in which costs were assessed and in which the rights of the intervenor as a creditor were adjudicated. The intervenor had presented to the court its notes evidencing the indebtedness and its collateral. The decree itself recites the payment of the claim which included principal and interest. The record does not show whether all the notes were in default. No claim was made for attorneys' fees at the time the principal and interest of the indebtedness was claimed, although the whole amount of such fees had already been incurred, unless some portion was due for services in connection with the bill of exceptions brought to this court where the final decree was affirmed. The decree purported to be final in all respects. Having recited the payment in full of intervenor's indebtedness, it hardly seems that any further action in reference to its claims or indebtedness was in contemplation of the court. Intervenor relies upon the recital in the decree to the effect that "jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of any purely administrative order," but we do not consider that this recital detracts in any respect from the finality of the decree in so far as the rights of the intervening bank are concerned. It will be noted that after this decree was affirmed by this court a further order was entered in the case, exonerating and discharging the defendant and his surety on the bond which had been filed in the case and which in effect had taken the place of the res which otherwise would have been in the custody of the court. This same order recites full compliance on the part of the defendant with the terms of the final decree, and was entered after the recital that jurisdiction was retained for "any purely administrative order." In Clements v. Empire Lumber Co.,
"There must, of course, be some point or stage in every court procedure, legal or equitable, when the particular cause is finally disposed of, its thread cut, and the parties are out of court, to be brought in again only by some new process duly served on them." 30 C. J. S. 1028, § 625. See also 19 Am. Jur. 288, § 419. "A supplemental decree is one made after final decree in respect of the execution of the decree, or to adjust all the matters incidental to *497 the litigation. Such decrees when made in the identical suit can not, however, create any other or different liabilities than those imposed by the original decree." 30 C. J. S. 977, § 586.
"A decree in equity is conclusive upon the parties to the case on all questions raised, or which could have been raised, relating to the property to be affected by the decree." ClaflinCo. v. DeVaughn,
In reaching this conclusion we have considered the case ofPine Mountain Mica Asbestos Co. v. Carver,
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. *498