No. 6422 | Ga. | Dec 12, 1928
The petition in this case, set out in substance in the foregoing statement of facts, contains concisely the allegations of the plaintiff for specific performance. The demurrer is quite lengthy, and sets out a large number of special grounds which it is unnecessary to deal with specifically. We will therefore consider the questions which are controlling in the case, and which are raised by the petition as amended and the demurrer. One ground of demurrer was that the property was not described with sufficient particularity; that the loan which the purchaser was to assume was not definitely or sufficiently described, it not being shown who was the holder of the loan, the date, the maturity, or the original amount of the loan; that the deferred payments to be made by the purchaser were not sufficiently and definitely described, in that it was not shown that the alleged notes covering the deferred payments were to bear interest from date or maturity; that the taxes and interest referred to were not definitely alleged, and were subject to future calculation; that the deposit of $500 to be made by the purchaser was not made. This demurrer was overruled except as to two special grounds with reference to the description of the property to be conveyed and the loan to be assumed. The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend in these particulars; and within the time allowed he did amend his petition, by setting out a fuller description of the property and a more complete description of the loan to be assumed, and by alleging that from April 2, 1927, to May 1, 1927, was a reasonable time for examination of title to the property; that it was contemplated by the parties to the contract when it was executed that such examination would be made and the trade closed before May 1, 1927, and that the interest, insurance, and taxes were to be prorated as of May 1, 1927. We are of the opinion that the description in the petition as amended was sufficient. The location of the property as
As to the sufficiency of the loan to be assumed, the contract in this respect reads: “Assume loan now outstanding against said property, payable about March 23, 1931, 5-1/2 per cent, interest semi-annually, and principal reduction 5 per cent, 'annually, $11,-875.00.” In Trust Co. v. Neal, 161 Ga. 965 (132 S.E. 385" court="Ga." date_filed="1926-02-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/trust-co-v-neal-5585819?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5585819">132 S. E. 385), the contract was, “and assumption of loan $8,500;” and it was held that that description was too indefinite to be the basis of specific performance. But in the instant case it will be observed that the particular loan is definitely referred to in the contract as “the loan now outstanding against said property;” and furthermore the date of the maturity of the loan, the rate of interest which the loan bears, the time of the payment of interest, and the amount of the annual reduction of the debt, and the outstanding amount of the loan, are all set out. So we think that the language refers to a definite and specific loan; and the amendment setting out a more definite description of the loan was properly allowed. See Muller v. Cooper, 165 Ga. 439 (3) (141 S.E. 300" court="Ga." date_filed="1928-01-10" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/muller-v-cooper-5586667?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5586667">141 S. E. 300), where the language of the contract and loan was not as definite as in the instant case, and where a majority of the court held that the language was sufficient to support an action for specific performance.