Menda K. WARNE v. Bill J. HALL

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 <div class="ldml-decision"><div class="ldml-decision"><div href="/vid/889236615" data-vids="889236615" class="ldml-header header ldml-header content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Header"><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-cite"><b class="ldml-bold">373 P.3d 588</b></span></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-cite"><b class="ldml-bold">2016 CO 50</b></span></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-party"><b class="ldml-bold"><span class="ldml-name">Menda K. WARNE</span>, <span class="ldml-role">Petitioner</span></b></span></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><b class="ldml-bold">v.</b><b class="ldml-bold"><span class="ldml-party"><span class="ldml-name">Bill J. HALL</span>, <span class="ldml-role">Respondent</span></span>.</b></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><b class="ldml-bold">Supreme Court <span class="ldml-cite">Case No. 14SC176</span> </b></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><b class="ldml-bold"><span class="ldml-court">Supreme Court of Colorado</span>.</b></p><p class="ldml-metadata"><span class="ldml-date"><b class="ldml-bold">June 27, 2016</b></span></p></div><div class="ldml-counsel header ldml-header content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Counsel"><p data-paragraph-id="145" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="145" data-sentence-id="145" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-role">Petitioner</span></span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Vaughn & DeMuro</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Gordon L. Vaughan</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">David R. DeMuro</span></span>, Colorado Springs, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="250" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="250" data-sentence-id="250" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-role">Respondent</span></span>: <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Clark Williams</span></span> and <span class="ldml-entity">Matsunaka, LLC</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Roger E. Clark</span></span>, Loveland, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="345" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="345" data-sentence-id="345" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amicus Curiae</span> Colorado Civil Justice League: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Jordan Lipp</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Geoffrey C. Klingsporn</span></span>, Denver, Colorado, <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Terence Ridley</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Evan Stephenson</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Thomas Werge</span></span>, Denver, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="578" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="578" data-sentence-id="578" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amicus Curiae</span> Colorado Defense Lawyers Association</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Jaudon & Avery LLP</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Jared R. Ellis</span></span>, Denver, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="696" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="696" data-sentence-id="696" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amicus Curiae</span> Colorado <span class="ldml-entity">Plaintiff</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Employment Lawyers Association</span></span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Lowrey Parady, LLC</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Sarah J. Parady</span></span>, Denver, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="828" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="828" data-sentence-id="828" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amici Curiae</span> The <span class="ldml-entity">State of Colorado</span> and <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(CIRSA)</span>: <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Cynthia H. Coffman</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">Attorney General</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Daniel D. Domenico</span></span>, Solicitor General, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Frederick R. Yarger</span></span>, Assistant Solicitor General, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Kathleen L. Spalding</span></span>, Senior Assistant <span class="ldml-entity">Attorney General</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Matthew D. Grove</span></span>, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(CIRSA)</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Tami A. Tanoue</span></span>, General <span class="ldml-entity">Counsel</span>, Denver, Colorado</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="1291" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-2"><span data-paragraph-id="1291" data-sentence-id="1291" class="ldml-sentence">Attorneys for <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyerrole">Amicus Curiae</span> The Colorado Trial Lawyers Association</span>: <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Leventhal & Puga, P.C.</span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">Benjamin Sachs</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">David Mason</span></span>, Denver, Colorado, Holland, <span class="ldml-lawfirm">Holland Edwards & Grossman, PC</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-lawyer">John R. Holland</span></span>, Denver, Colorado</span></p></div><h2 class="ldml-opinionheading"><span data-paragraph-id="1504" class="ldml-paragraph "><span class="ldml-judgepanel"><span data-paragraph-id="1504" data-sentence-id="1504" class="ldml-sentence">En Banc</span></span></span></h2><div class="ldml-opinion"><p data-paragraph-id="1511" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-4"><span class="ldml-opinionauthor content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Opinion (COATS)"><span data-paragraph-id="1511" data-sentence-id="1511" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">COATS</span></span> <span class="ldml-opiniontype">delivered <span class="ldml-entity">the Opinion of <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span></span></span></span>.</span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="1560" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="1560" data-sentence-id="1560" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_1560"><span class="ldml-cite">¶1</span></a></span> Warne petitioned for review of <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span>' judgment reversing the dismissal of Hall's complaint, which asserted, as relevant here, a claim of intentional interference with contract.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1560" data-sentence-id="1755" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:hallvwarne,no12ca719coloappjan23,2014" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_1815,sentence_1560"><span class="ldml-refname">Hall v. Warne</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">No. 12CA719</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo. App.</span> <span class="ldml-date">Jan. 23, 2014</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(f)</span> </span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1560" data-sentence-id="1857" class="ldml-sentence">Although invited to apply the standard for dismissal articulated in <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_1857"><span class="ldml-refname">Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. 544</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">167 L.Ed.2d 929</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">and</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_1857"><span class="ldml-refname">Ashcroft v. Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. 662</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">173 L.Ed.2d 868</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2009</span>)</span></a></span></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing either Twombly or Iqbal in its written order.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1560" data-sentence-id="2249" class="ldml-sentence">By contrast, <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> expressly declined to apply the more recent <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span> jurisprudence governing <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_2249"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(6)</span></span></a></span>, finding itself instead bound by <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span>'s existing precedent, which has heavily relied on <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span>'s earlier <span class="ldml-entity">opinion in <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_2249"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley v. Gibson</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. 41</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2 L.Ed.2d 80</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1957</span>)</span></a></span></span>, and particularly its language to the effect that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> can prove <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> in support of his claim.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="1560" data-sentence-id="2820" class="ldml-sentence">Declining, therefore, to be influenced by the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span>'s more recent admonition to the <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,’</span> ”</span> <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_2820"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 678</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="590" data-id="pagenumber_3120" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_2820"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 570</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> )</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> found the complaint sufficient to state a claim.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="3244" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="3244" data-sentence-id="3244" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_3244"><span class="ldml-cite">¶2</span></a></span> Because our <span class="ldml-entity">case law</span> interpreting the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_3244"><span class="ldml-cite">Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span> in general, and <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8 and 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span></span></a></span> in particular, reflects first and foremost a preference to maintain uniformity in the interpretation of the federal and state rules of civil procedure and a willingness to be guided by <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span>'s interpretation</span> of corresponding federal rules whenever possible, rather than an intent to adhere to a particular federal interpretation prevalent at some fixed point in the past, <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> too narrowly understood our existing precedent.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="3244" data-sentence-id="3812" class="ldml-sentence">Because <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>'s complaint, when evaluated in light of the more recent and nuanced analysis of Twombly and Iqbal , fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the judgment of <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> finding the complaint to be sufficient is reversed, and the matter is remanded with instruction to permit further proceedings consistent with this opinion.</span></p><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="I" data-ordinal_start="1" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_4171" data-value="I." id="heading_4171" data-content-heading-label="I." data-ordinal_end="1"><span data-paragraph-id="4171" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="4171" data-sentence-id="4171" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">I.</b></span></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="4173" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="4173" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_4173"><span class="ldml-cite">¶3</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">Bill</span> Hall</span> filed a complaint in <span class="ldml-entity">state district court</span> against the <span class="ldml-entity">Town of Gilcrest</span> and its mayor, <span class="ldml-entity">Menda Warne</span>, as an individual.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="4303" class="ldml-sentence">Hall's complaint alleged that Warne used her authority as mayor to interfere with his purchase agreement to sell a parcel of land in Gilcrest to <span class="ldml-entity">Ensign United States Drilling, Inc.</span>, which intended, according to an attachment to the complaint, to build its headquarters on the property.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="4589" class="ldml-sentence">Although the precise terms of the agreement were not included in the pleadings, the complaint, along with its attached exhibits, indicated that Ensign tried for more than a year to obtain approval to purchase the property and construct its headquarters in Gilcrest, but its efforts were thwarted by the town government.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="4909" class="ldml-sentence">More specifically, the complaint alleged that Warne caused Ensign to terminate the agreement by imposing unauthorized and unreasonable conditions on its proposed site development plan, by mayoral order, after the plan had been conditionally approved by the town board at a public hearing.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="5198" class="ldml-sentence">The complaint further alleged that Warne's actions were motivated by malice towards Hall and that the conditions imposed on Ensign's plans were <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“disproportionate to any impact Ensign would have on the town”</span> and <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“were not based on the reasonable requirements of applicable ordinances or law.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="4173" data-sentence-id="5490" class="ldml-sentence">On the basis of these and similar allegations, the complaint asserted several claims for relief under state and federal law, including intentional interference with contractual obligations, taking without just compensation, and violation of substantive due process under <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/944676263" data-vids="944676263" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_5490"><span class="ldml-cite">42 U.S.C. § 1983</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2012</span>)</span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="5785" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="5785" data-sentence-id="5785" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_5785"><span class="ldml-cite">¶4</span></a></span> Because the original complaint included both state and federal claims, <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> was removed to <span class="ldml-entity">federal district court</span> pursuant to <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/943325287" data-vids="943325287" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_5785"><span class="ldml-cite">28 U.S.C. § 1441</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2012</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="5785" data-sentence-id="5943" class="ldml-sentence">Upon removal, Warne and the town filed a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span> for relief under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_5943"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(6)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="5785" data-sentence-id="6074" class="ldml-sentence">Before briefing was complete, the <span class="ldml-entity">federal district court</span> accepted a stipulation by <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span> whereby the federal law claims would be voluntarily dismissed by Hall and <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> would be remanded to <span class="ldml-entity">state district court</span> for resolution of <span class="ldml-entity">the state</span> law claim for intentional interference with contractual obligations against Warne.<a href="#note-fr1" class="ldml-noteanchor" id="note-ref-fr1">1</a></span> </p><p data-paragraph-id="6405" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="6405" data-sentence-id="6405" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6405"><span class="ldml-cite">¶5</span></a></span> On remand to the <span class="ldml-entity">state district court</span>, the <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6405"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(6)</span></span></a></span></span> was converted into a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span> under the corresponding, though differently-numbered state <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">rule, C.R.C.P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="6405" data-sentence-id="6623" class="ldml-sentence">In subsequent briefing, Warne and the town urged <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> to review the <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span> according to the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible on its face”</span> standard recently articulated by the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court in <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_6623"><span class="ldml-refname">Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. 544</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">167 L.Ed.2d 929</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">and</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6623"><span class="ldml-refname">Ashcroft v. Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. 662</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">173 L.Ed.2d 868</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2009</span>)</span></a></span></span></span></span>, rather than the so-called <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> standard from <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_6623"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley v. Gibson</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. 41</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2 L.Ed.2d 80</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1957</span>)</span></a></span>, cited favorably by <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> in the past.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="6405" data-sentence-id="7164" class="ldml-sentence">Without expressly distinguishing the Conley from the Twombly /Iqbal standard of review, <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> granted <span class="ldml-entity">the defendants</span>' <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span>, finding that the <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="591" data-id="pagenumber_7331" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> complaint contained insufficient allegations that Warne in fact caused the conditions to be imposed on Ensign's proposed development plan that ultimately led Ensign to terminate its contract with Hall.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="7533" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="7533" data-sentence-id="7533" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_7533"><span class="ldml-cite">¶6</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity">The plaintiff</span> was granted leave to file an amended complaint, which <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> did, to include additional allegations that <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> had been informed that Warne exercised control over land development matters and would have used any means at her disposal to ensure that Ensign would never meet the requirements necessary to build, regardless of what had been approved by the town board.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="7533" data-sentence-id="7909" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The defendants</span> renewed their <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span>, which <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> again granted, finding that while the amended complaint provided additional allegations supporting a conclusion that Warne possessed the authority and intent to block Ensign's development plan, it lacked allegations of Warne's specific conduct causing Ensign's breach.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="7533" data-sentence-id="8280" class="ldml-sentence">Subsequently, <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span> also awarded attorney fees in favor of <span class="ldml-entity">the defendants</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="8367" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="8367" data-sentence-id="8367" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_8367"><span class="ldml-cite">¶7</span></a></span> On Hall's appeal of the dismissal of his claim for contractual interference, <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> reversed, finding itself bound by <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">this court</span>'s precedent</span> relying on Conley 's <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> standard and, therefore, rejecting Warne's proposal to examine the complaint under the Twombly /Iqbal <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible on its face”</span> standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8367" data-sentence-id="8700" class="ldml-sentence">Under the Conley standard, <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> concluded that the complaint sufficed to state a claim for relief and, more specifically, that Hall's allegations to the effect that Warne possessed the authority and intent to block Ensign's development plan and that <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> had exercised that authority to impose conditions despite the town board's prior approval of Ensign's plan sufficiently pled that Warne caused Ensign to terminate its contract with Hall.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="8367" data-sentence-id="9157" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The court of appeals</span> therefore also reversed <span class="ldml-entity">the district court</span>'s award of attorney fees.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="9246" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="9246" data-sentence-id="9246" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9246"><span class="ldml-cite">¶8</span></a></span> Warne petitioned <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> for further review by writ of certiorari.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="II" data-ordinal_start="2" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_9318" data-value="II." id="heading_9318" data-content-heading-label="II." data-ordinal_end="2"><span data-paragraph-id="9318" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="9318" data-sentence-id="9318" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">II.</b></span></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="9321" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="9321" data-sentence-id="9321" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9321"><span class="ldml-cite">¶9</span></a></span> In Bell Atlantic Corp.</span> v. Twombly , in addressing the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct, the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span> explicated the pleading <span class="ldml-entity">standard of <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9321"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8</span></a></span></span> in greater detail than it had done in at least a half-century, giving particular emphasis to the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-entity">plaintiff</span>'s obligation to provide the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘grounds'</span> of his <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘entitle<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[ment]</span> to relief.’</span> ”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="9321" data-sentence-id="9756" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_9321"><span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. 544, 555</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">167 L.Ed.2d 929</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_9321"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span> )</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="9321" data-sentence-id="9850" class="ldml-sentence">In that context, <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span> stated that the factual allegations of the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“above the speculative level,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_9850"><span class="ldml-cite">id.</span></a></span> , and provide <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible grounds to infer an agreement,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_9850"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 556</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="9321" data-sentence-id="10092" class="ldml-sentence">Had there been any doubt, two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span> made clear that Twombly 's <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility standard”</span> was in no way limited to the antitrust conspiracy context in which it had been articulated, but rather represented a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“construction of <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10092"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 8</span></a></span>,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10092"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. 662, 678–80</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2009</span>)</span></a></span>, which governs the pleading standard <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“in all civil actions and proceedings in the <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">United States district</span> courts</span>,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10092"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 684</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="9321" data-sentence-id="10556" class="ldml-sentence">Quoting liberally from its earlier <span class="ldml-entity">opinion in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_10556"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span></a></span></span> , <span class="ldml-entity">the Court in <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10556"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span></a></span></span> characterized that standard as being underlain by two working principles: First, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“the tenet that <span class="ldml-entity">a court</span> must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10556"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 678</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span>, and second, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span>,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_10556"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 679</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="11000" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="11000" data-sentence-id="11000" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11000"><span class="ldml-cite">¶10</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity">The Court</span> derived its <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility standard”</span> from <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11000"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 8</span></a></span> as it then existed, without feeling compelled to either amend the language of the rule or overturn any of <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span>'s prior interpretations, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_11000"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 569 n. 14</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>, instead characterizing the Twombly <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiffs</span>' main argument against this interpretation as its <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“ostensible conflict”</span> with an isolated statement in <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span>'s earlier construction in <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11000"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley v. Gibson</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. 41</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2 L.Ed.2d 80</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1957</span>)</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_11000"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 560–61</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="11000" data-sentence-id="11548" class="ldml-sentence">As <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span> explained, when it spoke <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(some fifty years earlier in Conley )</span> not only of the need for fair notice of the grounds for entitlement to relief, but also of <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> can prove no set of facts in support <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="592" data-id="pagenumber_11891" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> of his claim which would entitle him to relief,”</span> <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_11548"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 561</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_11548"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 45–46</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span> )</span></span>, the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“accepted rule”</span> to which it referred was a rule that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_11548"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 563</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="11000" data-sentence-id="12246" class="ldml-sentence">While <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span> openly conceded that the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> passage of Conley could be read in isolation as saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim would suffice unless its factual impossibility could be shown from the face of the pleadings, and that many <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> had understood it precisely that way, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_12246"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 561</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>, in context, Conley <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival,”</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_12246"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 563</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="12803" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="12803" data-sentence-id="12803" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12803"><span class="ldml-cite">¶11</span></a></span> Like many <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> and other <span class="ldml-entity">state courts</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> took Conley 's <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> language, at least ostensibly, at face value.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12803" data-sentence-id="12946" class="ldml-sentence">As <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> rightly noted, <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> has a long, and continuous, tradition of repeating, in reliance on Conley , that <span class="ldml-entity">motions for dismissal</span> are looked upon with disfavor and will be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that would entitle <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> to relief.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12803" data-sentence-id="13292" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See, e.g.</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/894062725" data-vids="894062725" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12946"><span class="ldml-refname">Qwest Corp. v. Colo. Div. of Prop. Taxation</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">2013 CO 39</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_12946"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 12</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:304p3d217,221"><span class="ldml-cite">304 P.3d 217, 221</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/887536655" data-vids="887536655" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_13454"><span class="ldml-refname">Sprott v. Roberts</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">154 Colo. 252</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">390 P.2d 465, 467</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">1964</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">quoting Conley 's <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> passage for the first time in a concurring opinion, while noting that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[t]</span>his expresses the recognized way to test the sufficiency of a claim, and it has been applied in a legion of <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> in the lower <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span>”</span></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12803" data-sentence-id="13709" class="ldml-sentence">In fact, our reliance on the <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> for our interpretation of the pleading standards of our own <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 8</span></a></span> can be traced back even before Conley , virtually to the initial replacement of our former <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-cite">Code of Civil Procedure</span></a></span> by the modern <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-cite">Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="12803" data-sentence-id="13975" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890023848" data-vids="890023848" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_14061,sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-refname">People ex rel. Bauer v. McCloskey</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">112 Colo. 488</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">150 P.2d 861, 863</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">1944</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-cert">citing</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885590751" data-vids="885590751" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-refname">Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">35 F.Supp. 296, 297</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">E.D.Okla.</span><span class="ldml-date">1940</span>)</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-cert">aff'd</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/886701598" data-vids="886701598" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-cite">120 F.2d 746</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">10th Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">1941</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892411554" data-vids="892411554" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-refname">Sparks v. England</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">113 F.2d 579, 582</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">8th Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">1940</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/891139106" data-vids="891139106" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-refname">Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, Mass.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">108 F.2d 302, 306</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">8th Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">1940</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(subsequently relied on by <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_13709"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 45–46 n. 5</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span>, for its characterization of the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“accepted rule”</span>)</span></span>)</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="14454" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="14454" data-sentence-id="14454" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_14454"><span class="ldml-cite">¶12</span></a></span> The question before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span> today is therefore less one of whether <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> will abandon the Conley pleading standard in favor of the Twombly /Iqbal standard than whether our pleading standard has always represented an attempt to mirror the accepted federal construction of the virtually identical federal pleading rules, rather than to adopt the particular interpretation of the corresponding federal rule that was prevalent at the time.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="14454" data-sentence-id="14886" class="ldml-sentence">For a number of reasons, in the absence of some compelling justification unique to the history or practice of this jurisdiction, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have always considered it preferable to interpret our own rules of civil procedure harmoniously with our understanding of similarly worded federal rules of practice.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="14454" data-sentence-id="15184" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/894906057" data-vids="894906057" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_15242,sentence_14886"><span class="ldml-refname">Leaffer v. Zarlengo</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">44 P.3d 1072, 1080</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2002</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">federal <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> interpreting federal rules provide <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“highly persuasive guidance”</span> when interpreting identical state rules</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:farisvthehonorablesandrairothenberg,oneofthejudgesofthesecondjudicialdistrictno81sa548648p2d1089july26,1982" data-prop-ids="sentence_14886"><span class="ldml-refname">Faris v. Rothenberg</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">648 P.2d 1089, 1091 n. 1</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">1982</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="14454" data-sentence-id="15422" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> see no reason to abandon that philosophy or approach today.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="15484" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="15484" data-sentence-id="15485" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_15485"><span class="ldml-cite">¶13</span></a></span> As a general matter, except as required by the Supremacy Clause of the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_15485"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Constitution</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> are clearly not bound to accept the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span>'s understanding of language susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, and for various reasons <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have, on occasion, deviated in our construction of similarly worded constitutional provisions, <span class="ldml-entity">statutes</span>, and rules.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15484" data-sentence-id="15876" class="ldml-sentence">However, quite apart from the fact that a considered interpretation by <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span>, applying rules of construction equally acceptable in this jurisdiction, will virtually always be worthy of serious consideration, as <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have previously observed, simply disagreeing with <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> about the meaning of the same or similar provisions appearing in both federal and state law risks undermining confidence in the judicial process and the objective interpretation of codified law.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15484" data-sentence-id="16365" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893579620" data-vids="893579620" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_15876"><span class="ldml-refname">Curious Theatre Co. v. Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Env't</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">220 P.3d 544, 551</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2009</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15484" data-sentence-id="16460" class="ldml-sentence">This concern is only heightened <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="593" data-id="pagenumber_16492" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> when the disagreement in question reflects our resistance to <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span>'s determination that our understanding of one of its prior pronouncements has in fact been mistaken.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="15484" data-sentence-id="16673" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">Cf.</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888320032" data-vids="888320032" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_16755,sentence_16460"><span class="ldml-refname">Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">159 P.3d 116, 123–25</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">overturning prior decision relying on federal caselaw subsequently repudiated by the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span></span>)</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="16869" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="16869" data-sentence-id="16869" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_16869"><span class="ldml-cite">¶14</span></a></span> In light of our unequivocal statements of attribution in the past, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> think it disingenuous to suggest that our understanding of the pleading requirements of our own rules was not directly borrowed from the prevailing interpretation of the corresponding federal rules, by both the lower <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> and ultimately <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> itself.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="16869" data-sentence-id="17216" class="ldml-sentence">Of course, were <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> to conclude that our reliance on this federal interpretation had become so much a part of the fabric of state practice that the benefit of retaining it unaltered would outweigh the benefits of harmonizing the construction of identical federal and state rules of civil procedure, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> could avoid the tension created by disparate interpretations of identical rules by simply amending our rule to expressly codify a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="16869" data-sentence-id="17675" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> do not, however, find that to be <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="17720" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="17720" data-sentence-id="17721" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_17721"><span class="ldml-cite">¶15</span></a></span> The desirability and importance of procedural uniformity in our unique, federal form of government has been a critical factor not only in the development of federal rules capable of serving as a model for the states, but also for our own decision to adopt a version of the federal rules and construe them accordingly.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="17720" data-sentence-id="18043" class="ldml-sentence">It cannot seriously be disputed that the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_18043"><span class="ldml-cite">Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span> were modeled almost entirely after the corresponding federal rules, with the principal goal of establishing uniformity between state and federal judicial proceedings in this jurisdiction.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="17720" data-sentence-id="18306" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_18043"><span class="ldml-refname">C.R.C.P. app. D</span> <span class="ldml-cite">at 427, Colo. Stat. Ann.</span></a></span></span> vol. 1 <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">Supp. 1941</span></a></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">“With the hope that procedure might be adopted in Colorado following as far as practicable the new federal rules, so that a Colorado lawyer would be equally at home in <span class="ldml-entity">the courts</span> of the United States and those of Colorado, the <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado Bar Association</span> in <span class="ldml-entity">September, 1938</span>, authorized the appointment of a Committee to effectuate that reform.”</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:thomaskeely,howcoloradoconformedstatetofederalcivilprocedure,16frd2911954" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_18819"><span class="ldml-refname">Thomas Keely, How Colorado Conformed State to Federal Civil Procedure</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">16 F.R.D. 291</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1954</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">authored by the Chairman of the <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado Supreme <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">Court Rules</span></a></span> Committee</span></span>)</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="18891" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="18892" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_18892"><span class="ldml-cite">¶16</span></a></span> Far from a novel concept, the prevailing policy in this country has been to favor procedural uniformity between state and <span class="ldml-entity">federal court</span> practice virtually since the founding of our Union.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="19084" class="ldml-sentence">Beginning with its adoption of the so-called <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19084"><span class="ldml-cite">Conformity Act</span></a></span>”</span> in <span class="ldml-entity">1789</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">Congress</span> required lower <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> to largely apply the procedural law of <span class="ldml-entity">the state</span> in which <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> were located.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="19271" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">Act of <span class="ldml-entity">Sept. 29, 1789</span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19271"><span class="ldml-cite">ch. 21, § 2</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">,</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19271"><span class="ldml-cite">1 Stat. 93, 93</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure</span> <span class="ldml-cite">§ 1002 <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(3d ed. 2002)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(titled, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“History of Federal Procedure Under <span class="ldml-entity">Statute</span>”</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="19480" class="ldml-sentence">While the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19480"><span class="ldml-cite">Conformity Act</span></a></span>'s localized approach to federal procedure ultimately proved problematic, it was replaced by the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19480"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span>, which were intended to facilitate state-federal uniformity by serving as a singular, authoritative model for states to follow.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="19762" class="ldml-sentence">See Report of the <span class="ldml-entity">Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure</span> , reprinted in <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19762"><span class="ldml-refname">Report of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association</span> <span class="ldml-cite">at 434–35</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1912</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">resolving to adopt rules of civil procedure for use in <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> and <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“as a model”</span></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule–Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">32 Mich. L. Rev. 1116, 1122</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1934</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">authored by one of the eventual drafters of the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_20177"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rules</span></a></span></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[T]</span>he primary purpose <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[of the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_19762"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rules</span></a></span> project]</span> ... was the attainment of local uniformity in <span class="ldml-entity">trial court</span> practice between <span class="ldml-entity">the state</span> and <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span>.”</span>)</span></span></span><span data-paragraph-id="18891" data-sentence-id="20401" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="20402" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="20402" data-sentence-id="20403" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20403"><span class="ldml-cite">¶17</span></a></span> Beyond the convenience and practical benefits of permitting practicing attorneys to move effortlessly from one forum to another, both <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span> and <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> have long emphasized the undesirability of having vastly different outcomes result from nothing more than a choice of forums.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="20402" data-sentence-id="20700" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See, e.g.</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890955767" data-vids="890955767" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20403"><span class="ldml-refname">Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">304 U.S. 64, 77–78</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">58 S.Ct. 817</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">82 L.Ed. 1188</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1938</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888418256" data-vids="888418256" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_20867,sentence_20403"><span class="ldml-refname">AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">168 P.3d 507, 511</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“Colorado's policy is to discourage ... forum shopping.”</span></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="20402" data-sentence-id="20926" class="ldml-sentence">While <span class="ldml-entity">state courts</span> are generally free to adopt procedural rules different from those governing federal proceedings, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">but see</span> <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="594" data-id="pagenumber_21050" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885891864" data-vids="885891864" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_20926"><span class="ldml-refname">Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">338 U.S. 294, 298</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">70 S.Ct. 105</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">94 L.Ed. 100</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1949</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-entity">state court</span> not permitted to dismiss federal law claim under strict local rule of pleading</span>)</span></span>, the more outcome-determinative any specific disparity between state and federal rules may be, the more undesirable that disparity becomes.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="20402" data-sentence-id="21363" class="ldml-sentence">In this respect, there can be little question that the difference between a rule of pleading that effectively permits reliance on the compulsory process available in civil actions to discover whether grounds for the action exist in the first place and another that effectively bars such reliance without being able to first allege plausible grounds for relief can be extremely outcome-determinative.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="20402" data-sentence-id="21763" class="ldml-sentence">One important benefit of uniformity in federal and state procedures has been and continues to be the reduction of forum shopping.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="21892" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="21892" data-sentence-id="21892" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_21892"><span class="ldml-cite">¶18</span></a></span> In addition to the clear importance <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have identified in maintaining a substantial degree of procedural uniformity between state and federal practice, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> also do not view the plausibility standard described by <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> as effecting a meaningful departure from the direction our interpretations and <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span> have taken in light of the existing realities of modern practice.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="21892" data-sentence-id="22281" class="ldml-sentence">Just as <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> observed that a good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_22281"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 562–63</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">citing numerous examples of Conley 's <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> language being <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“questioned, criticized, and explained away”</span> by judges and scholars, alike</span>)</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have at times found it problematic to accept factual allegations that appear too conclusory, and on at least one occasion have, without openly criticizing the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> standard, simply found a complaint insufficient to state a claim, for the reason that it merely asserted a theory without alleging facts which, if proved, would satisfy the elements of the claim, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888590819" data-vids="888590819" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_22281"><span class="ldml-refname">Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">255 P.3d 1083, 1088</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2011</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">favorably citing <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/886710015" data-vids="886710015" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_23080"><span class="ldml-refname">Western Innovations, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">187 P.3d 1155, 1158</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo. App.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2008</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(itself <span class="ldml-relatingauthority">relying on</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_23080"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 555–56</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> )</span></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893667687" data-vids="893667687" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_22281"><span class="ldml-refname">Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">27 P.3d 377, 385</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2001</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(predating Twombly )</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Mullarky, C.J., joined by Rice and Coats, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[T]</span>he Van Wyks' conclusory allegations of unreasonableness fail to support a nuisance claim and thus, the <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span> was properly granted.”</span>)</span></span></span><span data-paragraph-id="21892" data-sentence-id="23585" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="23586" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="23586" data-sentence-id="23586" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-cite">¶19</span></a></span> Similarly, just as <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span></a></span></span> referenced the costs of modern litigation and the inadequacy of discovery and case management alone to weed out groundless complaints as support for its decision to finally correct the widespread misinterpretation of Conley , <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 558–59</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 678–79</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_23968"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 8</span></a></span> ... does not unlock the doors of discovery for <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> armed with nothing more than conclusions.”</span></span>)</span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have similarly identified a growing need, and effort in our rules, to expedite the litigation process and avoid unnecessary expense, especially with respect to discovery, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893461004" data-vids="893461004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-refname">DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">2013 CO 36</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 27</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893461004" data-vids="893461004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-cite">303 P.3d 1187, 1194</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:richardpholme,pretrialrulesforcivilcases—partiiwhatischanged,44cololaw111july2015" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-refname">Richard P. Holme, Pretrial Rules for Civil Cases—Part II: What Is Changed</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">44 Colo. Law. 111</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">July 2015</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">discussing <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">2015</span> <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span></span> to the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_24462"><span class="ldml-cite">Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span>, which were <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“designed to significantly reduce the cost of and delays in litigation and to create a new culture for the handling of lawsuits”</span></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:richardpholme,pretrialrulesforcivilcases—partiiwhatischanged,44cololaw111july2015" data-prop-ids="sentence_23586"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 111</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">explaining</span> that one of the primary influences of <span class="ldml-entity">the <span class="ldml-entity">2015</span> <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span></span> were proposed <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span> to the federal rules which were later adopted</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="23586" data-sentence-id="24827" class="ldml-sentence">In light of our recent <span class="ldml-entity">ruling in <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893619184" data-vids="893619184" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24827"><span class="ldml-refname">Antero Resources Corp. v. Strudley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">2015 CO 26</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24827"><span class="ldml-cite">¶¶ 19–26</span></a></span></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/893619184" data-vids="893619184" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_24827"><span class="ldml-cite">347 P.3d 149, 155–57</span></a></span>, to the effect that the federal rules, in one particular regard, authorize <span class="ldml-entity">a trial court</span> to eliminate frivolous claims and defenses beyond what is currently authorized by our rules, the effectiveness of the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility standard”</span> in weeding out groundless complaints at the pleading stage may take on an even greater practical significance in this jurisdiction than in the <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="25329" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="25329" data-sentence-id="25329" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25329"><span class="ldml-cite">¶20</span></a></span> Finally, in addition to his other arguments for not accepting the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal as the correct interpretation of our own <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25329"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 8</span></a></span>, Hall asserts that, in fact, <span class="ldml-entity">the state</span> and federal rules are not similar at all and that material differences in the provisions of the two rules make a parallel interpretation of our rule untenable.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="25329" data-sentence-id="25689" class="ldml-sentence">Hall refers to language in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25689"><span class="ldml-cite">subsection <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="595" data-id="pagenumber_25727" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span> of the rule, which finds no analog in the federal rule.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="25329" data-sentence-id="25791" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">Compare</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25689"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">with</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25689"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(d)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="25329" data-sentence-id="25847" class="ldml-sentence">That subsection indicates, in relevant part, that when a pleader is without direct knowledge, allegations may be made upon information and belief, and that pleadings otherwise meeting the requirements of the rules shall not be considered objectionable <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“for failure to state ultimate facts as distinguished from conclusions of law.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="25329" data-sentence-id="26179" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_25847"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="26196" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="26196" data-sentence-id="26196" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26196"><span class="ldml-cite">¶21</span></a></span> Even without express authorization in the language of <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26196"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rule 8</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> had long understood it to permit pleading based on information and belief, and <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> continue to do so following Twombly and Iqbal .</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26196" data-sentence-id="26417" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See generally</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_26549,sentence_26196"><span class="ldml-refname">5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure</span> <span class="ldml-cite">§ 1224 & nn.1–1.75 <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(3d ed. 2002 & 2015 Supp.)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">titled, <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“Statement of the Claim—Pleading on Information and Belief”</span></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(gathering <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> and characterizing allegations on information and belief as a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“practical necessity”</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26196" data-sentence-id="26721" class="ldml-sentence">Far from its conflicting with the plausibility standard, <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> have observed that pleading based on information and belief may, in fact, be useful where the facts giving rise to a plausible claim are peculiarly within the possession and control of <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span>, or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="26196" data-sentence-id="27096" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See, e.g.</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:aristarecordsllcvdoe3docketno09-0905-cv604f3d110decidedapril29,2010" data-prop-ids="sentence_26721"><span class="ldml-refname">Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">604 F.3d 110, 120</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">2d Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_26721"><span class="ldml-refname">5 Wright & Miller</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">supra</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">§ 1224</span></a></span></span> & n.7 <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote">“Pleading on information and belief is a desirable and essential expedient when matters that are necessary to complete the statement of a claim are not within the knowledge of <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> but <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> has sufficient data to justify interposing an allegation on the subject.”</span>)</span></span><span data-paragraph-id="26196" data-sentence-id="27493" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="27494" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="27494" data-sentence-id="27494" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_27494"><span class="ldml-cite">¶22</span></a></span> With regard to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>'s reference to <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“ultimate facts”</span> and <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“conclusions of law,”</span> although this reference might on first glance appear to bear on the requirement of Twombly /Iqbal to allege plausible grounds for relief, in reality the term <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“ultimate facts”</span> appears as a term of art, with reference to distinctions between <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“evidentiary facts,”</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“ultimate facts,”</span> and <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“conclusions of law,”</span> having significance for pleading under the former code pleading system in this jurisdiction, but not for pleading under the scheme of the rules.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="27494" data-sentence-id="28038" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890023848" data-vids="890023848" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_28071,sentence_27494"><span class="ldml-refname">McCloskey</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">150 P.2d at 862</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">addressing <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_27494"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span> and explaining that it served to distinguish our rules from code pleading rules</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_28295,sentence_27494"><span class="ldml-refname">John Denison, Code Pleading in Colorado</span> <span class="ldml-cite">§§ 312–13</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1936</span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(authored by former Chief Justice of Colorado)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“It is said that ultimate fact is a conclusion by reasoning on evidentiary facts, and that evidentiary fact is acquired by the senses, i.e., sight, hearing, taste, etc.”</span></span>)</span></span></span><span data-paragraph-id="27494" data-sentence-id="28465" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="28466" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="28466" data-sentence-id="28467" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28467"><span class="ldml-cite">¶23</span></a></span> As the original committee comment explained, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>'s unique language—with regard to both pleading based on <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“information and belief”</span> and pleading <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“ultimate facts”</span>—was not added to distinguish our rule from the corresponding rule, but rather to <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“clarify the <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[rule's]</span> meaning and bring it in line with the majority of the Federal decisions.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="28466" data-sentence-id="28821" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span> note, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28821"><span class="ldml-cite">Colo. Stat. Ann.</span></a></span> vol. 1 <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">Supp. 1941</span></a></span>)</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="28881" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="28881" data-sentence-id="28882" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28882"><span class="ldml-cite">¶24</span></a></span> Because <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> understand our prior <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> as reflecting the merit of interpreting our rules of civil pleading harmoniously with the corresponding federal rules, wherever that can be accomplished without violating our own interpretative rules or interfering with important state policy, and because <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> find the interpretative gloss added by <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_28882"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span></a></span></span> and Iqbal to be very much in line with the direction our rule-making has taken and the current needs of the civil justice system in this jurisdiction, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> join those other states already embracing the plausibility <span class="ldml-entity">standard articulated in <span class="ldml-entity">those cases</span></span> as a statement of the pleading requirements of their own analogs to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_28882"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rule 8</span></a></span>.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="III" data-ordinal_start="3" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_29583" data-value="III." id="heading_29583" data-content-heading-label="III." data-ordinal_end="3"><span data-paragraph-id="29583" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="29583" data-sentence-id="29583" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">III.</b></span></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="29587" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="29587" data-sentence-id="29588" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_29588"><span class="ldml-cite">¶25 A</span></a></span> plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief on a claim of intentional interference with contract unless <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> alleges and proves that <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> intentionally and improperly induced <span class="ldml-entity">a party</span> to breach the contract or improperly made it impossible for <span class="ldml-entity">a party</span> to perform.<a href="#note-fr2" class="ldml-noteanchor" id="note-ref-fr2">2</a></span> <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="596" data-id="pagenumber_29859" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="29859" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="29859" data-sentence-id="29860" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892237309" data-vids="892237309" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">90 P.3d 859, 871</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">2004</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="29859" data-sentence-id="29925" class="ldml-sentence">Because it is so clearly dependent upon context and circumstances, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have never attempted to rigidly define <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“improper”</span> for all purposes of interference with contract, but <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have favorably referenced the <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Restatement <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Second)</span> of Torts</span> <span class="ldml-cite">§ 767</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Am. Law</span> <span class="ldml-cite">Inst. 1965</span></a></span>)</span></span>, in this regard and its enumeration of potentially relevant factors, which includes the nature of the actor's conduct, the actor's motive, the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference, and the relation between <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="29859" data-sentence-id="30670" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890317551" data-vids="890317551" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_29925"><span class="ldml-refname">Trimble v. City & Cty. of Denver</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">697 P.2d 716, 726</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">1985</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="29859" data-sentence-id="30740" class="ldml-sentence">Evaluated in terms of the plausibility standard and its disregard of legal conclusions, whatever else the amended complaint may or may not have adequately alleged, it failed to sufficiently allege that Warne acted improperly in inducing a breach or making performance of the contract between Hall and Ensign impossible.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="31059" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="31059" data-sentence-id="31059" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_31059"><span class="ldml-cite">¶26</span></a></span> While the complaint did not allege the specific terms of the purchase agreement between Hall and Ensign, the entirety of its allegations made clear that the agreement contemplated the town's approval of a site development plan before the property could be used for the purpose for which Ensign desired its purchase.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31059" data-sentence-id="31379" class="ldml-sentence">The thrust of Hall's complaint, therefore, was that Warne induced a breach of the purchase agreement or effectively made the purchase impossible by improperly imposing conditions on the plan that were not agreeable to Ensign.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31059" data-sentence-id="31605" class="ldml-sentence">The allegations of the complaint bearing on the question of the wrongfulness or impropriety of Warne's conduct were of two broad, and at times overlapping, kinds: allegations that Warne's actions were motivated by malice toward Hall and allegations that the conditions and the manner of their imposition were unauthorized, unlawful, or unreasonable.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="31954" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="31954" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_31954"><span class="ldml-cite">¶27</span></a></span> Much as was <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> in both Twombly and Iqbal , the allegations of Hall's complaint were insufficient to state a claim because a number of them were conclusory and therefore not at all entitled to an assumption that <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> were true, and because the remainder insufficiently alleged plausible grounds for relief, largely because <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> were equally consistent with non-tortious conduct.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="32342" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_31954"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 680–84</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_31954"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 564–70</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="32437" class="ldml-sentence">The broad allegations that Warne's actions were motivated by malice or animosity toward Hall were unchallengeably conclusory allegations of a kind elsewhere held to be incapable of supporting a plausible claim for relief.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="32659" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See, e.g.</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892961909" data-vids="892961909" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_32741,sentence_32437"><span class="ldml-refname">Emmons v. City Univ. of N.Y.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">715 F.Supp.2d 394, 425</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">E.D.N.Y.</span><span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">allegation that <span class="ldml-entity">defendant</span> acted out of <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“bad faith, self-interest, malice, and personal animosity”</span> deemed conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with contract</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">cf.</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_32980,sentence_32437"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 686</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">bald allegation of discriminatory intent held insufficient to support unlawful discrimination claim</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="33082" class="ldml-sentence">Similarly, the allegations that the conditions allegedly imposed by mayoral order were unlawful, arbitrary, or unreasonable, without reference to any particular law prohibiting them or any factual allegation specifying how or why <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> should be considered unreasonable, were bare, conclusory assertions.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="33386" class="ldml-sentence">Even alleging that the conditions were disproportionate to any impact Ensign would have on the town, without alleging the reasons why and manner in which the conditions were disproportionate, could only be considered formulaic or conclusory and therefore not entitled to be assumed true.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="33674" class="ldml-sentence">In any event, without factual allegations establishing that the imposition of disproportionate conditions exceeded Warne's authority or was otherwise prohibited, the complaint's conclusory allegation of disproportionality fails to plausibly suggest improper conduct, even if <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> were to assume its truth.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="31954" data-sentence-id="33978" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">Cf.</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_34025,sentence_33674"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 566</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">allegation of parallel conduct held insufficient to support antitrust claim requiring proof of an agreement</span>)</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="34134" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="34134" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_34134"><span class="ldml-cite">¶28</span></a></span> To the extent the complaint included allegations of specific examples of conduct that could be taken as previous exhibitions of <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“animosity”</span> toward Hall, like Warne's asking how and for how much <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> acquired the property in question and opposing Ensign's plan despite its having had the support of the town board, these allegations were, as was <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="597" data-id="pagenumber_34481" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> similarly <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> in both Twombly and Iqbal , equally consistent with non-tortious explanations for her conduct, namely attempting to fulfill her duty to the town by acting in its best interests.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="34679" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_34714,sentence_34134"><span class="ldml-cite">id. at 567–68</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">while alleged parallel conduct by antitrust <span class="ldml-entity">defendants</span> was consistent with an illegal agreement, it was equally consistent with each <span class="ldml-entity">defendant</span> acting independently according to its own economic interest</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_34963,sentence_34134"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 680–81</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">discrimination complaint against government officials held insufficient where there was an <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“obvious alternative explanation”</span> for the challenged conduct</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="35117" class="ldml-sentence">As <span class="ldml-entity">the Supreme Court</span> itself has emphasized, scrutinizing a complaint for allegations that are not as consistent with proper conduct may be particularly important with regard to the actions of government officials, who <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="35423" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_35117"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 685–86</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="35471" class="ldml-sentence">Even assuming, as Hall was allegedly advised, that Warne stated <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> was not going to allow Ensign to do business in Gilcrest, and taking as true the belief of a town official that Warne would have used any means at the disposal of the town to ensure that Ensign would never meet the requirements to build, those alleged statements do not plausibly suggest malice towards Hall any more than, or perhaps even as much as, merely an objection to doing business with Ensign, whether justified on legitimate grounds or not.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="34134" data-sentence-id="35989" class="ldml-sentence">Land use decisions can clearly involve a complex array of policy considerations as well as heated personal interactions, and therefore in the absence of factual allegations plausibly suggesting Warne was acting out of unrelated personal animus towards Hall or to the detriment, rather than the benefit, of the town for personal reasons, even angrily opposing Ensign's development plan does not plausibly allege impropriety.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="IV" data-ordinal_start="4" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_36412" data-value="IV." id="heading_36412" data-content-heading-label="IV." data-ordinal_end="4"><span data-paragraph-id="36412" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="36412" data-sentence-id="36412" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">IV.</b></span></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="36415" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="36415" data-sentence-id="36415" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_36415"><span class="ldml-cite">¶29</span></a></span> In his answer brief, <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> <span class="ldml-entity">requests that <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> be permitted to amend his complaint</span> in the event his complaint is deemed insufficient according to the plausibility standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="36415" data-sentence-id="36597" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_36597"><span class="ldml-cite">Rule 15<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span></span></a></span> of our <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_36597"><span class="ldml-cite">Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span> provides that leave to file amended pleadings <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“shall be freely given when justice so requires.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="36415" data-sentence-id="36736" class="ldml-sentence">Although our opinion today does not result in <span class="ldml-entity">an amendment</span> to the language of our rules of procedure, it clearly signals a shift in the considerations according to which a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span> is to be evaluated and, therefore, a change in the terms in which a complaint may have to be expressed to avoid dismissal.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="36415" data-sentence-id="37049" class="ldml-sentence">Because <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> has not until today had notice of the terms in which his claim must be pled, justice requires that <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> be given an opportunity to amend the allegations of this claim for relief before any ruling on a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="36415" data-sentence-id="37318" class="ldml-sentence">Only if <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> fails to overcome a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss his newly amended complaint</span> will an order of attorney fees become appropriate.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="V" data-ordinal_start="5" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_37456" data-value="V." id="heading_37456" data-content-heading-label="V." data-ordinal_end="5"><span data-paragraph-id="37456" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="37456" data-sentence-id="37456" class="ldml-sentence"><b class="ldml-bold">V.</b></span></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="37458" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="37458" data-sentence-id="37458" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_37458"><span class="ldml-cite">¶30</span></a></span> Because <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>'s complaint, when evaluated in light of the more recent and nuanced analysis of Twombly and Iqbal , fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the judgment of <span class="ldml-entity">the court of appeals</span> finding the complaint to be sufficient is reversed, and the matter is remanded with instruction to permit further proceedings consistent with this opinion.</span></p></div></div><div class="ldml-opinion"><p data-paragraph-id="37821" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-4"><span class="ldml-opinionauthor content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Dissenting Opinion (GABRIEL, GABRIEL)"><span data-paragraph-id="37821" data-sentence-id="37821" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">GABRIEL</span></span> <span class="ldml-opiniontype">dissents</span></span>, and <span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity">MÁRQUEZ</span> and JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity">HOOD</span> join in the dissent</span>.</span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="37904" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-4"><span class="ldml-opinionauthor"><span data-paragraph-id="37904" data-sentence-id="37904" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">JUSTICE <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-judge">GABRIEL</span></span>, <span class="ldml-opiniontype">dissenting</span></span>.</span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="37932" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="37932" data-sentence-id="37932" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_37932"><span class="ldml-cite">¶31</span></a></span> Today, the majority jettisons a rule that has stood the test of time for over fifty years, based largely on an asserted preference for maintaining uniformity with <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-entity">federal court</span> interpretations</span> of analogous federal rules of procedure.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="37932" data-sentence-id="38170" class="ldml-sentence">In reaching this result, the majority misperceives the existing state of the law in Colorado and grafts onto <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span> a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility”</span> requirement that the rule does not contain and that other <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> have correctly recognized results in a loss of clarity, stability, and predictability.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="37932" data-sentence-id="38459" class="ldml-sentence">Even more concerning, the majority's preferred standard allows a single district judge, at the incipient stages of <span class="ldml-entity">a case</span>, to weigh what the judge speculates <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> will plausibly be able to prove, based on the individual judge's subjective experience and common sense, and then to decide whether <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>'s action is viable.<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="598" data-id="pagenumber_38796" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="38796" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="38796" data-sentence-id="38797" class="ldml-sentence">I cannot subscribe to such a standard, which I believe will deny access to justice for innumerable <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiffs</span> with legitimate complaints.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="38796" data-sentence-id="38935" class="ldml-sentence">Indeed, the majority's application of its newly adopted <span class="ldml-entity">standard in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span></span> demonstrates the overreaching nature and ultimate unfairness of that standard.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="39091" class="ldml-paragraph no-indent mt-4"><span class="ldml-opinionauthor"><span data-paragraph-id="39091" data-sentence-id="39091" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39091"><span class="ldml-cite">¶33</span></a></span> Accordingly, I respectfully <span class="ldml-opiniontype">dissent</span>.</span></span></p><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="I" data-ordinal_start="1" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_39131" data-value="I. Current Law and the Plausibility Standard" id="heading_39131" data-content-heading-label="I. Current Law and the Plausibility Standard" data-ordinal_end="1"><span data-paragraph-id="39131" class="ldml-paragraph "><b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="39131" data-sentence-id="39131" class="ldml-sentence">I.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39131" data-sentence-id="39134" class="ldml-sentence">Current Law and the Plausibility Standard</span></b></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="39175" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="39175" data-sentence-id="39175" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39175"><span class="ldml-cite">¶34</span></a></span> As the majority correctly observes, in <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39175"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley v. Gibson</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. 41, 45–46</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2 L.Ed.2d 80</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1957</span>)</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-cert">abrogated by</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_39175"><span class="ldml-refname">Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. 544, 563</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">167 L.Ed.2d 929</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span></span>, the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span> concluded that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> can prove <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“no set of facts”</span> in support of his or her claim.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39175" data-sentence-id="39618" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39175"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶ 1</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39175" data-sentence-id="39632" class="ldml-sentence">The majority also correctly observes that this standard was first cited in <span class="ldml-entity">an opinion of <span class="ldml-entity">this court</span></span> over fifty years ago.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39175" data-sentence-id="39754" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/887536655" data-vids="887536655" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39632"><span class="ldml-refname">Sprott v. Roberts</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">154 Colo. 252</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">390 P.2d 465, 467</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1964</span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Frantz, J., concurring in the result)</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39175" data-sentence-id="39858" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> have consistently adhered to that standard, without apparent difficulty or controversy, ever since.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="39960" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="39960" data-sentence-id="39960" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_39960"><span class="ldml-cite">¶35</span></a></span> Notwithstanding this fifty-year history, the majority now assails the Conley standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="39960" data-sentence-id="40051" class="ldml-sentence">In doing so, however, the majority does not acknowledge either our long-established rules of notice pleading or the well-settled principles that inform how the Conley standard has been implemented in practice.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="40260" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="40260" data-sentence-id="40260" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40260"><span class="ldml-cite">¶36</span></a></span> It has been settled since before Conley that <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> need not set out in detail the facts on which his or her claim is based.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="40260" data-sentence-id="40394" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40260"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 47</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="40260" data-sentence-id="40436" class="ldml-sentence">To the contrary, both <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">and</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span></span></span> require only a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“short and plain statement”</span> of the claim that will give <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> fair notice of what <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span>'s claim is and the grounds on which it rests.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="40260" data-sentence-id="40668" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 47</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885877444" data-vids="885877444" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-refname">Smith ex rel. Leech v. Mills</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">123 Colo. 11</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">225 P.2d 483, 484</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1950</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">see also</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/886260019" data-vids="886260019" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_40867,sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-refname">Erickson v. Pardus</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">551 U.S. 89, 93</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 2197</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">167 L.Ed.2d 1081</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_41013,sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span> requires only <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’</span></span> <span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘give <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’</span> ”</span></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_40436"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 555</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> )</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="41248" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="41248" data-sentence-id="41248" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-cite">¶37</span></a></span> It is likewise settled that in considering a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">a court</span> assesses the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“well-pleaded”</span> factual allegations of a complaint and ignores conclusory allegations or allegations purporting to assert principles of law.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="41248" data-sentence-id="41506" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885614948" data-vids="885614948" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_41567,sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-refname">Ruiz v. McDonnell</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">299 F.3d 1173, 1181</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">10th Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">2002</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that for purposes of <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(6)</span></span></a></span>, all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/886340919" data-vids="886340919" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_41791,sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-refname">Fernandez–Montez v. Allied Pilots Ass'n</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">987 F.2d 278, 284</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">5th Cir.</span><span class="ldml-date">1993</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[C]</span>onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span>.”</span></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890243203" data-vids="890243203" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-refname">Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">2012 COA 113</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_41248"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 37</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890243203" data-vids="890243203" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_42002"><span class="ldml-cite">284 P.3d 191, 198</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that conclusory allegations are insufficient to defeat a <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span></span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/888158995" data-vids="888158995" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_42210"><span class="ldml-refname">Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Tr.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">277 P.3d 864, 869</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.App.</span><span class="ldml-date">2011</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that for purposes of <span class="ldml-entity">a <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span></span></a></span> motion</span>, <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> must accept all well-pleaded facts as true but are not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations</span>)</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="42405" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="42405" data-sentence-id="42405" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_42405"><span class="ldml-cite">¶38</span></a></span> These principles, which are central to the Conley standard, recognize the practical limitations on how much <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> can reasonably be required to plead, particularly given that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> often lacks information that is in <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span>'s exclusive possession and has no means of obtaining that information absent discovery.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="42405" data-sentence-id="42741" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_42786,sentence_42405"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 47–48</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> the civil rules' simplified notice pleading standard was made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial procedures established by the rules to allow <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span> to flesh out more precisely the basis of <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span>'s claim and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[t]</span>he <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_42405"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rules</span></a></span> reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by <span class="ldml-entity">counsel</span> may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits”</span></span>)</span></span>.<span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="599" data-id="pagenumber_43301" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="43301" class="ldml-paragraph "> <span data-paragraph-id="43301" data-sentence-id="43302" class="ldml-sentence">As amicus curiae <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado <span class="ldml-entity">Plaintiff</span> <span class="ldml-entity">Employment Lawyers Association</span></span> observes, this kind of <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“information asymmetry”</span> is especially acute in <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> in which <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> must prove <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span>'s motives and state of mind.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="43301" data-sentence-id="43520" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_43302"><span class="ldml-refname">Br. of Amicus Curiae Colorado Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Ass'n</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">at 6–7</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="43301" data-sentence-id="43598" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See generally</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_43302,embeddedsentence_43748"><span class="ldml-refname">Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke</span> <span class="ldml-cite">L.J. 1, 43–46</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2010</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">describing in detail the information asymmetry problem posed by Twombly and <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_43302"><span class="ldml-refname">Ashcroft v. Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. 662</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">173 L.Ed.2d 868</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">2009</span>)</span></a></span>, particularly in <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> involving questions of intent and malice</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="43301" data-sentence-id="43963" class="ldml-sentence">Indeed, as discussed more fully below, the information asymmetry in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span> underlies the majority's conclusion that Hall's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="43301" data-sentence-id="44180" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_43963"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶¶ 25–28</span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="44198" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="44198" data-sentence-id="44198" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_44198"><span class="ldml-cite">¶40</span></a></span> The foregoing principles do not, however, allow <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> to allege a claim and then rely on compulsory process to discover whether grounds for the action existed in the first place, as the majority suggests.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="44198" data-sentence-id="44413" class="ldml-sentence">See maj. <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">op. ¶ 17</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="44198" data-sentence-id="44432" class="ldml-sentence">As noted above, a complaint must contain and is assessed based on its <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“well-pleaded allegations,”</span> and not on any conclusory allegations or allegations of law.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="44198" data-sentence-id="44591" class="ldml-sentence">Moreover, all allegations of a complaint <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(and any other pleading)</span> are subject to the requirements of <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 11</span></a></span>, which requires all pleadings of <span class="ldml-entity">a party</span> represented by an attorney to be signed by at least one attorney of record, and which further provides:</span></p><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_44848" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="44848" class="ldml-sentence">The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.</span></blockquote><p data-paragraph-id="45332" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="45332" data-sentence-id="45332" class="ldml-sentence">Accordingly, <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> may not properly make baseless allegations and then later rely on discovery tools to try to find evidence to support such claims.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="45486" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="45486" data-sentence-id="45486" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_45486"><span class="ldml-cite">¶41</span></a></span> For all of these reasons, I believe that the Conley standard, as it has been refined over time, has worked precisely as it was intended.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="45486" data-sentence-id="45627" class="ldml-sentence">Neither trial nor <span class="ldml-entity">appellate courts</span> in Colorado have had any difficulty in applying this standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="45486" data-sentence-id="45725" class="ldml-sentence">Nor have I seen any evidence that this standard has contributed to a flood of frivolous <span class="ldml-entity">cases</span> overwhelming our legal system, or that <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> properly exercising their ample case management authority have had any difficulty in weeding out unmeritorious claims or in protecting <span class="ldml-entity">defendants</span> from needless expense and harassment.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="45486" data-sentence-id="46049" class="ldml-sentence">Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the existing standard has posed a problem in need of a solution, much less the sea change in pleadings practice that I believe the majority opinion will effect.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="46246" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="46246" data-sentence-id="46246" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46246"><span class="ldml-cite">¶42</span></a></span> Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority chooses to adopt the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46246"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 679</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that to survive a <span class="ldml-entity">motion to dismiss</span>, a complaint must state a <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible”</span> claim for relief</span>)</span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_46246"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 556</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(same)</span></span>, principally based on an asserted need for uniformity between how <span class="ldml-entity">federal courts</span> construe <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46246"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8</span></a></span> and how <span class="ldml-entity">Colorado courts</span> construe the Colorado analogue, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="46246" data-sentence-id="46726" class="ldml-sentence">For a number of reasons, I am unpersuaded.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="46768" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="46768" data-sentence-id="46768" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46768"><span class="ldml-cite">¶43</span></a></span> First, although <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> look to federal decisions interpreting federal rules for guidance, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> are not bound to interpret our rules of civil procedure in the same way that the <span class="ldml-entity">United States Supreme Court</span> interprets its rules.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="46768" data-sentence-id="46992" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890643209" data-vids="890643209" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46768"><span class="ldml-refname">Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">2012 CO 62</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_46768"><span class="ldml-cite">¶ 10</span></a></span></span>, <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890643209" data-vids="890643209" class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">287 P.3d 112, 115</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="46768" data-sentence-id="47075" class="ldml-sentence">This is particularly true when, as here, the language of our respective rules differs.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="47161" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47161" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47161"><span class="ldml-cite">¶44</span></a></span> As pertinent here, both <span class="ldml-entity"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47161"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">and</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span></span></span> require <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47321" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47161"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47161"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47365" class="ldml-sentence">Both rules also require that each allegation of a pleading be <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“simple, concise, and direct.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47458" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47365"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(d)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47365"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47502" class="ldml-sentence">Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the Colorado rule proceeds to allow a pleader who lacks direct knowledge to make allegations <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“upon information and belief.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47667" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47502"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="47161" data-sentence-id="47685" class="ldml-sentence">This difference suggests to me a preference in the Colorado rules for a more lenient pleading standard than the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility”</span> standard <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="600" data-id="pagenumber_47821" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> adopted in <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_47685"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 556, 570</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span>, and expanded in <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47685"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 678</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="47937" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="47937" data-sentence-id="47937" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47937"><span class="ldml-cite">¶45</span></a></span> Second, the Twombly and Iqbal <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility”</span> standard is neither set forth in nor required by <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47937"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 8</span></a></span> or <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_47937"><span class="ldml-cite">Fed. R. Civ. P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(6)</span></span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">governing <span class="ldml-entity">motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim</span> on which relief can be granted</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="47937" data-sentence-id="48173" class="ldml-sentence">Nor do I perceive any language in Colorado's corresponding provisions, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span> or <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span></span></a></span>, that supports the adoption of such a standard.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="47937" data-sentence-id="48324" class="ldml-sentence">To the contrary, I believe that such a standard is inconsistent with the purposes of the foregoing rules generally and with several of our pleading rules in particular.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="48492" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="48492" data-sentence-id="48492" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_48492"><span class="ldml-cite">¶46</span></a></span> C.R.C.P. 8, C.R.C.P. 12<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span>, and their federal counterparts require only fair notice of a claim, and <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> envision the use of proper case management and other devices set forth in the civil rules to clarify and address the merits of that claim.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="48492" data-sentence-id="48743" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See, e.g.</span> , <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892457052" data-vids="892457052" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_48492"><span class="ldml-refname">Conley</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">355 U.S. at 47–48</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">78 S.Ct. 99</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/885877444" data-vids="885877444" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_48492"><span class="ldml-refname">Smith ex rel. Leech</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">225 P.2d at 484</span></a></span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="48492" data-sentence-id="48836" class="ldml-sentence">The plausibility rule is contrary to these purposes.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="48888" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="48888" data-sentence-id="48888" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_48888"><span class="ldml-cite">¶47</span></a></span> Likewise, the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“factual enhancement”</span> that the plausibility standard requires, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="sentence_48888"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 557</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span></a></span></span>, is inconsistent with <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span>, which mandates only <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”</span> <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890330003" data-vids="890330003" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_48888"><span class="ldml-refname">Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">851 N.W.2d 598, 605</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Minn.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2014</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-relatingauthority">noting</span> that the plausibility standard raises the bar for <span class="ldml-entity">claimants</span> and thereby conflicts with Minnesota's counterpart to <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span>, which preferred non-technical, broad-brush pleadings</span>)</span></span>, and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span></span></a></span>, which allows for hypothetical pleading.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="49488" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="49488" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_49488"><span class="ldml-cite">¶48</span></a></span> And the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“factual enhancement”</span> requirement is inconsistent with <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 9</span></a></span>, which sets forth when certain matters must be pleaded with additional specificity or particularity, and which expressly provides that <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[m]</span>alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="49798" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_49488"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 9<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span></span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="49813" class="ldml-sentence">Under a plausibility standard, all matters, including matters relating to a person's state of mind, arguably must be pleaded with specificity, and this would be difficult, if not impossible, when the information that <span class="ldml-entity">the plaintiff</span> needs to satisfy such an enhanced pleading standard is within <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span>'s exclusive possession and control.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="50156" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_50188,sentence_49813"><span class="ldml-refname">Miller, 60 Duke L.J.</span> <span class="ldml-cite">at 43</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“It is uncertain how <span class="ldml-entity">plaintiffs</span> with potentially meritorious claims are expected to plead with factual sufficiency without the benefit of some discovery, especially when <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> are limited in terms of time or money, or have no access to important information that often is in the possession of <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span>, especially when <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> denies access.”</span></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-referencenote">footnotes omitted</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="50563" class="ldml-sentence">As a result, the plausibility standard will likely result in the disproportionate dismissal of meritorious claims, thereby closing the courthouse doors to many deserving <span class="ldml-entity">claimants</span> when the pleading rules were, in fact, designed to open the doors for them.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="50819" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:bellatlcorpvtwombly,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d929,550us544,127sct1955,1967,167led2d9292007" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_50892,sentence_50563"><span class="ldml-refname">Twombly</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">550 U.S. at 575</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">127 S.Ct. 1955</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Stevens, J., dissenting)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“Under the relaxed pleading standards of the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_51028,sentence_50563"><span class="ldml-cite">Federal Rules</span></a></span>, the idea was not to keep litigants out of <span class="ldml-entity">court</span> but rather to keep them in.</span> <span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">The merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.”</span></span>)</span></span></span><span data-paragraph-id="49488" data-sentence-id="51158" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="51159" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="51159" data-sentence-id="51159" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_51159"><span class="ldml-cite">¶49</span></a></span> Third, I believe that the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility”</span> standard is unworkable and gives far too much authority to judges to dismiss claims, even before <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> has been required to answer the complaint, based on subjective and inherently speculative factors.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="51159" data-sentence-id="51414" class="ldml-sentence">In <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890935004" data-vids="890935004" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_51414"><span class="ldml-refname">Iqbal</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">556 U.S. at 679</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">129 S.Ct. 1937</span></a></span>, <span class="ldml-entity">the Court</span> explained what it meant by <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible”</span>: <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing <span class="ldml-entity">court</span> to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="51159" data-sentence-id="51701" class="ldml-sentence">See also Plausible , Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity">2002</span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(defining <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible,”</span> in pertinent part, as <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“superficially worthy of belief: CREDIBLE”</span>)</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="51855" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="51855" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_51855"><span class="ldml-cite">¶50</span></a></span> Such a standard, which is subjective on its face, allows <span class="ldml-entity">motions to dismiss</span> to turn on the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“judicial experience and common sense”</span> of the particular judge who happens to be assigned to <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="52053" class="ldml-sentence">Moreover, such a standard requires the judge to speculate as to the evidence that <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> will likely be able to present and then to weigh that presumed evidence—before <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> has even submitted an answer to the complaint—to decide whether a claim based on such evidence would be <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausible”</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(itself an inherently <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="601" data-id="pagenumber_52378" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> amorphous concept)</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="52399" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/895633919" data-vids="895633919" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_52492,sentence_52053"><span class="ldml-refname">Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">346 S.W.3d 422, 431–32</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Tenn.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2011</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“<span class="ldml-parenthetical">[T]</span>he plausibility standard incorporates an evaluation and determination of the likelihood of success on the merits—a judicial weighing of the facts pleaded to see if <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘plausibly’</span> present a claim for relief—at the earliest stage of the proceedings, before a sworn denial is even required.”</span></span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="52789" class="ldml-sentence">In this regard, the <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“plausibility”</span> standard approaches a summary judgment test, albeit without any evidentiary record.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="52908" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">Cf.</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/895454293" data-vids="895454293" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_52969,sentence_52789"><span class="ldml-refname">Andersen v. Lindenbaum</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">160 P.3d 237, 239</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2007</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“To avoid summary judgment, the evidence presented in opposition to such a motion must ... be sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>.”</span></span>)</span></span></span><span data-paragraph-id="51855" data-sentence-id="53162" class="ldml-sentence">.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="53163" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="53163" data-sentence-id="53163" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_53163"><span class="ldml-cite">¶51</span></a></span> I cannot see how such a standard represents an advance over our present rule, which requires <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> to assess the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to determine whether, if true, such allegations set forth a viable claim for relief.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53163" data-sentence-id="53408" class="ldml-sentence">To the contrary, I agree with the <span class="ldml-entity">Tennessee Supreme Court</span>'s assessment that Twombly and Iqbal have resulted in <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“a loss of clarity, stability, and predictability in federal pleadings practice.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="53163" data-sentence-id="53601" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/895633919" data-vids="895633919" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_53408"><span class="ldml-refname">Webb</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">346 S.W.3d at 431</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53163" data-sentence-id="53627" class="ldml-sentence">I fear that the same outcome is now likely in Colorado.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="53682" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="53682" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_53682"><span class="ldml-cite">¶52</span></a></span> Fourth, in trumpeting the need for uniformity between <span class="ldml-entity">the state</span> and federal standards, the majority suggests that adopting a plausibility standard is necessary to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary expense.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="53900" class="ldml-sentence">See maj. <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">op. ¶ 19</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="53919" class="ldml-sentence">The majority, however, does not adequately account for <span class="ldml-entity">the case</span> management tools that <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> have recently implemented to achieve the majority's desired ends.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="54074" class="ldml-sentence">Specifically, although the majority's concern for expediting litigation and avoiding unnecessary costs, particularly with respect to discovery, is appropriate, <span class="ldml-entity">we</span> recently adopted significant <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span> to our rules of civil procedure to address these very concerns.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="54341" class="ldml-sentence">See generally <span class="ldml-entity">Richard P. Holme</span>, New Pretrial Rules for Civil <span class="ldml-entity">Cases</span>—<span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_54341"><span class="ldml-cite">Part II</span></a></span>: What is <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:richardpholme,pretrialrulesforcivilcases—partiiwhatischanged,44cololaw111july2015" data-prop-ids="sentence_54341"><span class="ldml-refname">Changed</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">44 Colo. Law. 111</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">July 2015</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">discussing the series of <span class="ldml-entity">amendments</span> to the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_54466"><span class="ldml-cite">Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure</span></a></span> that became effective on <span class="ldml-entity">July 1, 2015</span> and that were designed to reduce significantly the costs and delays in litigation, particularly with respect to discovery matters</span>)</span></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="54713" class="ldml-sentence">I have every confidence in our trial judges' abilities to implement these rules to achieve the desired ends.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="53682" data-sentence-id="54822" class="ldml-sentence">I therefore see no reason to alter our longstanding pleading rules, particularly in the context of this litigation as opposed to through the normal rulemaking process, to try to achieve the same ends.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="55022" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="55022" data-sentence-id="55022" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_55022"><span class="ldml-cite">¶53</span></a></span> Finally, I am unconvinced by the majority's suggestion that adopting the plausibility standard is necessary to avoid the undesirability of having <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“vastly different outcomes result from nothing more than a choice of forums.”</span></span> <span data-paragraph-id="55022" data-sentence-id="55250" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_55022"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶ 17</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="55022" data-sentence-id="55265" class="ldml-sentence">The federal and Colorado standards have been different for nine years, and I have seen no evidence to suggest that these different standards have resulted in a spike in forum-shopping or in <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“vastly different outcomes”</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(although I would anticipate that under the federal standard, some meritorious complaints likely have been dismissed)</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="55601" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="55601" data-sentence-id="55601" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_55601"><span class="ldml-cite">¶54</span></a></span> For these reasons, I see no compelling reason to overturn more than fifty years of precedent in order to adopt a plausibility standard that I believe is unworkable and unfair.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="55601" data-sentence-id="55781" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">See</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/890330003" data-vids="890330003" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="embeddedsentence_55812,sentence_55601"><span class="ldml-refname">Walsh</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">851 N.W.2d at 604</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-quotation quote"><span class="ldml-embeddedsentence">“The doctrine of stare decisis directs <span class="ldml-entity">us</span> to adhere to our former decisions in order to promote the stability of the law and the integrity of the judicial process.</span> <span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-entity">We</span> therefore require <span class="ldml-quotation quote">‘a compelling reason’</span> to overrule our precedent....</span> <span class="ldml-embeddedsentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">[The <span class="ldml-entity">defendant</span>]</span> has not presented a compelling textual reason to overrule <span class="ldml-parenthetical">[<span class="ldml-entity">the cases</span> setting forth the prevailing pleading standards in Minnesota]</span>.”</span></span>)</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-cert">quoting</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/889563630" data-vids="889563630" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_55601"><span class="ldml-refname">Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">617 N.W.2d 401, 406</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Minn.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2000</span>)</span></a></span> )</span></span>.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-specifier="II" data-ordinal_start="2" data-parsed="true" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_56272" data-value="II. Application" id="heading_56272" data-content-heading-label="II. Application" data-ordinal_end="2"><span data-paragraph-id="56272" class="ldml-paragraph "><b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="56272" data-sentence-id="56272" class="ldml-sentence">II.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="56272" data-sentence-id="56276" class="ldml-sentence">Application</span></b></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="56287" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="56287" data-sentence-id="56287" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_56287"><span class="ldml-cite">¶55</span></a></span> The overreaching nature and unfairness of the plausibility standard that I have identified above are well demonstrated by the majority's application of that <span class="ldml-entity">standard in <span class="ldml-entity">this case</span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="56470" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="56470" data-sentence-id="56470" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_56470"><span class="ldml-cite">¶56</span></a></span> The majority concludes that Hall's complaint failed to sufficiently allege that Warne acted improperly in inducing a breach or making performance of the contract between Hall and Ensign impossible.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="56470" data-sentence-id="56672" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_56470"><span class="ldml-cite">Maj. op. ¶ 25</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="56470" data-sentence-id="56687" class="ldml-sentence">In reaching this conclusion, the majority deems Hall's allegations to be conclusory and sees no factual allegations plausibly suggesting <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="602" data-id="pagenumber_56825" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> that Warne was acting out of unrelated personal animus toward Hall or to the detriment, rather than the benefit, of the town for personal reasons.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="56470" data-sentence-id="56973" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_56687"><span class="ldml-cite">Id.</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">at ¶¶ 27 –28</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="56470" data-sentence-id="56991" class="ldml-sentence">I do not agree with the majority's reading of Hall's complaint.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="57054" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="57054" data-sentence-id="57054" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_57054"><span class="ldml-cite">¶57</span></a></span> To establish a claim for intentional interference with contract, <span class="ldml-entity">a plaintiff</span> must prove that <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> was aware of a contract between two <span class="ldml-entity">parties</span>, <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> intended that one of <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span> breach the contract, and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(3)</span> induced <span class="ldml-entity">the party</span> to breach or make it impossible for <span class="ldml-entity">the party</span> to perform the contract.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="57054" data-sentence-id="57369" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892237309" data-vids="892237309" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_57054"><span class="ldml-refname">Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">90 P.3d 859, 871</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span> <span class="ldml-date">2004</span>)</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="57054" data-sentence-id="57435" class="ldml-sentence">In addition, <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> must have acted <span class="ldml-quotation quote">“improperly”</span> in causing the result.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="57054" data-sentence-id="57514" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a href="/vid/892237309" data-vids="892237309" class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_57435"><span class="ldml-cite">Id.</span></a></span></span></p><p data-paragraph-id="57517" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="57517" data-sentence-id="57517" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_57517"><span class="ldml-cite">¶58</span></a></span> To determine whether <span class="ldml-entity">the defendant</span> acted improperly, <span class="ldml-entity">courts</span> consider the following factors:</span></p><div class="ldml-embeddeddocument"><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57612" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57612" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span> the nature of the actor's conduct,</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57650" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57650" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span> the actor's motive,</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57673" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57673" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(c)</span> the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57746" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57746" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(d)</span> the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57799" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57799" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(e)</span> the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57916" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57916" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(f)</span> the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_57994" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="57994" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(g)</span> the relations between <span class="ldml-entity">the parties</span>.</span></blockquote></div><p data-paragraph-id="58032" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="58032" data-sentence-id="58032" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-refname">Restatement <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Second)</span> of Torts</span> <span class="ldml-cite">§ 767</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-date">1979</span>)</span></a></span> <span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span> <span class="ldml-signal">accord</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:memorialgardens,incvolympiansalesmanagementconsultants,incno83sc19690p2d207oct22,1984"><span class="ldml-refname">Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Mgmt. Consultants, Inc.</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">690 P.2d 207, 210 & n. 7</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo.</span><span class="ldml-date">1984</span>)</span></a></span></span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="58190" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="58190" data-sentence-id="58190" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_58190"><span class="ldml-cite">¶59</span></a></span> Here, Hall alleged, in substance, the following facts:</span></p><div class="ldml-embeddeddocument"><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_58248" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="58248" class="ldml-sentence">• Hall entered into a contract to sell certain property in the <span class="ldml-entity">Town of Gilcrest</span> to Ensign.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_58338" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="58338" class="ldml-sentence">• In subsequent meetings with the <span class="ldml-entity">Town Planner</span> and the <span class="ldml-entity">Town Board</span>, the Town imposed a series of conditions on Ensign.</span> <span data-sentence-id="58456" class="ldml-sentence">These conditions were onerous, and many of them had no lawful basis either in the Town's own ordinances or in any other applicable laws or regulations.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_58607" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="58607" class="ldml-sentence">• In May and <span class="ldml-entity">June 2007</span>, the Town made additional baseless demands on Ensign.</span> <span data-sentence-id="58684" class="ldml-sentence">As a result, Ensign became increasingly frustrated and began to look elsewhere for its business expansion.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_58790" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="58790" class="ldml-sentence">• At a <span class="ldml-entity">July 16, 2007</span> meeting of the <span class="ldml-entity">Town Board</span>, which Warne, the Town's mayor, attended, Hall explained that if the Town continued to demand more and more conditions of Ensign that were not tied to applicable law or regulations, then Ensign would withdraw from the contract to buy Hall's property and find somewhere else to do business.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_59126" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="59126" class="ldml-sentence">• The Board then unanimously approved Ensign's site plan and application <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(Warne did not vote)</span>.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_59220" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="59220" class="ldml-sentence">• After this unanimous vote, Warne stormed out of the meeting room and stated that <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> was not going to allow Ensign to do business in Gilcrest.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_59364" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="59364" class="ldml-sentence">• A former mayor and planning commission member stated that Warne exercised control over all land use matters and would have used any means at the Town's disposal to ensure that Ensign would never meet the requirements necessary to build, regardless of what had been approved by the Board.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_59653" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="59653" class="ldml-sentence">• Consistent with this statement, after the Board unanimously approved Ensign's site plan and application, and notwithstanding the fact that Hall had advised the Board <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(and Warne)</span> that further conditions would cause Ensign to terminate its contract with Hall, the Town imposed still more conditions on Ensign.</span> <span data-sentence-id="59963" class="ldml-sentence">These conditions again imposed requirements beyond those required by the <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_59963"><span class="ldml-cite">Town code</span></a></span><span class="ldml-referenceseparator">;</span></span> <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> were not connected to, or were disproportionate to, any impact that Ensign's operations would have had on the Town; and <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> were not reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare of the Town or its residents.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_60275" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="60275" class="ldml-sentence">• As a result of these new requirements and exactions, Ensign terminated its contract with Hall, as it said it would do <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(and as Warne was advised it would do)</span>.</span></blockquote><blockquote data-paragraph-id="b_60434" class="ldml-blockquote"><span data-sentence-id="60434" class="ldml-sentence">• Warne had previously exhibited animosity toward Hall, the additional exactions and conditions were imposed at <span class="ldml-pagenumber" data-val="603" data-id="pagenumber_60546" data-rep="P.3d" data-vol="373" data-page_type="bracketed_cite"></span> Warne's insistence and on her order, and Warne's actions were motivated by malice toward Hall.</span></blockquote></div><p data-paragraph-id="60641" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="60641" data-sentence-id="60641" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_60641"><span class="ldml-cite">¶60</span></a></span> In my view, and as the division below concluded, <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-refglobal="case:hallvtownofgilcrest,no12ca0719" data-prop-ids="sentence_60641"><span class="ldml-refname">Hall v. Town of Gilcrest</span> , <span class="ldml-cite">No. 12CA0719</span></a></span>, slip op. <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_60641"><span class="ldml-cite">at 7–12</span>, <span class="ldml-cite">2014 WL 260873</span> <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-court">Colo. App.</span> <span class="ldml-date">Jan. 23, 2014</span>)</span></a></span>, these allegations more than adequately alleged the requisite elements of an intentional interference with contract claim.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="60641" data-sentence-id="60918" class="ldml-sentence">Indeed, I would so conclude even were I to apply the plausibility standard.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="60993" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="60993" data-sentence-id="60993" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_60993"><span class="ldml-cite">¶61</span></a></span> Specifically, it appears undisputed that Hall properly alleged the existence of a contract between himself and Ensign and that Warne knew of this contract.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="60993" data-sentence-id="61153" class="ldml-sentence">Hall has also alleged specific facts to establish that Warne intended for Ensign to terminate this contract and that <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> either induced Ensign to breach the contract or made Ensign's performance impossible.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="60993" data-sentence-id="61360" class="ldml-sentence">For example, as noted above, Hall alleged that <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(1)</span> Warne was told that Ensign would terminate the contract if more conditions were imposed; <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(2)</span> <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> stated her intention to ensure that Ensign would not do business in Gilcrest ; and <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(3)</span> knowing that Ensign would terminate the contract if further conditions were imposed, <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> orchestrated the imposition of additional unreasonable <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(and legally unfounded)</span> conditions, which, in fact, induced Ensign to terminate its contract with Hall.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="61842" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="61842" data-sentence-id="61842" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_61842"><span class="ldml-cite">¶62</span></a></span> Finally, Hall has sufficiently alleged that Warne's conduct was improper.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="61842" data-sentence-id="61920" class="ldml-sentence">As noted above, <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> alleged that after the <span class="ldml-entity">Town Board</span> had unanimously approved Ensign's site plan and application, Warne acted unilaterally to impose unprecedented and unreasonable conditions that were inconsistent with the <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_61920"><span class="ldml-cite">Town code</span></a></span>, and Hall alleged that Warne did so out of malice toward him and with the intent of ensuring that Ensign would terminate its contract with him.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="61842" data-sentence-id="62297" class="ldml-sentence">In my view, such allegations are not at all conclusory, and <span class="ldml-entity">they</span> clearly and sufficiently assert that Warne was acting out of unrelated personal animus toward Hall, rather than for the Town's benefit <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(the <span class="ldml-entity">Town Board</span>, after all, had unanimously approved the deal)</span>.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="62560" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="62560" data-sentence-id="62560" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_62560"><span class="ldml-cite">¶63</span></a></span> Although the majority deems Hall's allegations insufficient, it is not clear to me, and the majority does not indicate, what more Hall could possibly have alleged.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="62560" data-sentence-id="62728" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">This case</span> reflects precisely the type of information asymmetry scenario discussed above, in which <span class="ldml-entity">a party</span> is required to make allegations about another <span class="ldml-entity">party</span>'s state of mind.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="62560" data-sentence-id="62903" class="ldml-sentence">Absent an ability to read Warne's mind, Hall could do no more than plead conduct reflecting her improper motives, and <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> has done that with what I perceive to be ample specificity.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="63083" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="63083" data-sentence-id="63083" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_63083"><span class="ldml-cite">¶64</span></a></span> In <span class="ldml-entity">these circumstances</span>, it is clear to me that Warne has received the reasonable notice of the nature and basis of Hall's claim to which <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> was entitled under <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference"><span class="ldml-cite">C.R.C.P. 8</span></a></span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="63083" data-sentence-id="63259" class="ldml-sentence">It is equally clear to me that Hall has pleaded a viable intentional interference with contract claim.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="63083" data-sentence-id="63362" class="ldml-sentence">Indeed, as pleaded, the complaint sets forth what I view to be a prototypical intentional interference case.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="63470" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="63470" data-sentence-id="63470" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_63470"><span class="ldml-cite">¶65</span></a></span> In holding otherwise, the majority has effectively granted Warne summary judgment before <span class="ldml-entity">she</span> was even required to respond to the complaint and before giving Hall a fair opportunity to conduct discovery to establish facts that are in Warne's exclusive possession and control.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="63470" data-sentence-id="63749" class="ldml-sentence">In doing so, I believe that the majority has denied Hall the fair day in <span class="ldml-entity">court</span> to which <span class="ldml-entity">he</span> was entitled.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-section"><section class="ldml-heading content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-format="upper_case_roman_numeral" data-id="heading_63853" data-confidences="very_high" data-ordinal_start="3" data-parsed="true" data-types="conclusion" data-specifier="III" data-value="III. Conclusion" id="heading_63853" data-content-heading-label="III. Conclusion" data-ordinal_end="3"><span data-paragraph-id="63853" class="ldml-paragraph "><b class="ldml-bold"><span data-paragraph-id="63853" data-sentence-id="63853" class="ldml-sentence">III.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="63853" data-sentence-id="63858" class="ldml-sentence">Conclusion</span></b></span></section><p data-paragraph-id="63868" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="63868" data-sentence-id="63868" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_63868"><span class="ldml-cite">¶66</span></a></span> For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="63914" class="ldml-paragraph "><span data-paragraph-id="63914" data-sentence-id="63914" class="ldml-sentence">I am authorized to state that JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE HOOD join in this dissent.</span></p></div></div><div class="ldml-notes content__heading content__heading--depth1" data-content-heading-label="Footnotes"><div class="ldml-note ldml-note"><p data-paragraph-id="63998" class="ldml-paragraph "><sup class="ldml-superscript"></sup><a href="#note-ref-fr1" class="ldml-notemarker" id="note-fr1">1</a> <span data-paragraph-id="63998" data-sentence-id="63999" class="ldml-sentence">Two unrelated claims against the town were also included in the remand order and later dismissed by the <span class="ldml-entity">state district court</span>.</span> <span data-paragraph-id="63998" data-sentence-id="64125" class="ldml-sentence"><span class="ldml-entity">The plaintiff</span> did not appeal the dismissal of these claims, and thus neither is at issue before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span>.</span></p></div><div class="ldml-note ldml-note"><p data-paragraph-id="64224" class="ldml-paragraph "><sup class="ldml-superscript"></sup><a href="#note-ref-fr2" class="ldml-notemarker" id="note-fr2">2</a> <span data-paragraph-id="64224" data-sentence-id="64225" class="ldml-sentence">Because Warne withdrew her argument that Hall failed to allege with adequate specificity the willful and wanton conduct required to overcome a defense of governmental immunity, <span class="ldml-referencechain"><span class="ldml-signal">see</span> <span class="ldml-entity"><a class="ldml-reference" data-prop-ids="sentence_64225"><span class="ldml-cite">§ 24–10–110<span class="ldml-parenthetical">(5)</span><span class="ldml-parenthetical">(a)</span>, <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(b)</span></span></a></span></span>, C.R.S. <span class="ldml-parenthetical">(<span class="ldml-entity">2015</span>)</span>, any separate statutory pleading requirements concerning willful and wanton conduct are not before <span class="ldml-entity">us</span>.</span></p></div></div></div></div>
 </div> </div>

Case Details

Case Name: Menda K. WARNE v. Bill J. HALL

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Jun 27, 2016

Citation: 373 P.3d 588

Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 14SC176

Court Abbreviation: Colo.