Mena v. Frito LayMena v. Frito Lay
Attorneys:
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For Plaintiff
Adam G. Christian, Esq.,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lewis, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court sua sponte following Putative Defendant PepsiCo. Caribbean Inc.s (“PCI“) removal of this action from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it lacks subject mattеr jurisdiction over this action and will remand this case to the Superior Court.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 15, 2015, Plaintiff Edward R. Mena allegedly bit into a staple that was in a bag of Chicharrones that he had purchased from a grocery store in Frederiksted, St. Croix. (Dkt. No. 1-1 (Compl.) at paragraphs 4-5). Two years later, Mena filed a
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Principles
“Removal of cases from state to federal courts is governеd by
In a removal case, the party asserting fedеral jurisdiction “bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lаcks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
The amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is governed by
(2) If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by
section 1332(a) , the sumdemanded in good faith in the initial рleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy, except that— (A) the notice of removal may assert the amount in controversy if the initial pleading seeks—
(i) nonmonetary relief; or
(ii) a money judgment, but the State рractice either does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded; and
(B) removal of the action is proper on the basis of an amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph (A) if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount sрecified in
section 1332(a) .
Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs whether the amount in controversy requirement has been met here. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2014) (observing that “when a defendant sеeks federal-court adjudication, the defendants amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court,” and that
B. Application
“In removal cases, determining the amount in controversy begins with a reading of the complaint filed in the state court.” Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 398. Such an anаlysis contemplates a “reasonable reading of the value of the rights being litigated,” Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993), meaning “estimations of the amounts recoverable must be realistic,” Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 403. “The inquiry should be objective and not based оn fanciful, pie-in-the-sky, or simply wishful amounts, because otherwise the policy to limit diversity jurisdiction will be frustrated.” Id.
As PCI recognizes in its Notice of Removal, “Plaintiffs factual allegations are scant.” (Dkt. No. 1 at paragraph 12). As accurately characterized by PCI, Plaintiff “essentially alleges that he purchased a food product and, while eating it, bit into a staple. Plaintiff alleges that this incident caused him physiсal damages, pain and suffering, and emotional distress, for which he requests compensatory and punitive damages.” Id. Notably, Plaintiffs Complaint does not specify the injuries he sustained; nor does he allege that hospitalization or medical treatment was required to treat his injuries; that lost wages resulted from his injuries; or that his injuries are or were in any way serious or severe. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1-2). A reasonable reading of the Complaint therefore does not permit the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs claims exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Cf. Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 557, 567 (D.N.J. 2000) (reasoning that, while “such general considerations as [the plaintiffs] allegation of a ‘severe’ knee injury ... may indicate that it is possible for [the plaintiffs] claims to exceed the minimal amount requirement, they certainly do not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that they do.“); Rosado v. Encompass Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-01877, 2010 WL 2431829 at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2010) (finding amount in controversy requirement was not satisfied where the defendant relied only on the plaintiffs general allegations about severe injuries and loss of earnings); Stevenson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 14-CV-04073, 2015 WL 158811, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2015) (same).
However, as PCI rightly notes, Plaintiffs complaint does not specify the dollar amount of damages that Plaintiff seeks because ad damnum clauses are barred under Virgin Islands law. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12 (citing
PCI contends in its Notice of Removal that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied here because “the amounts of plaintiffs verdicts in personal injury cases vary widely where [a] plaintiff alleges he/she bit into a food product containing a foreign object and suffered injuries,” and “the U.S. Virgin Islands is a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction with high jury verdicts.” (Dkt. No. 1 at paragraphs 14-15). In support of its contention that the amount of plaintiffs verdicts vary widely in similar cases, PCI cites to five cases. Id. at paragraph 14. Two of these cases handily exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Id. (citing Jackson-Levy v. Eateries, Inc., JVR No. 449030, 2006 WL 2641142 (Unknown Miss. St. Ct. Mar. 2006) ($375,000.00 jury award); and Hoydilla v. Rustic Oak, Inc., CV86/0248424S, 1990 Conn. Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS 29 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 1990) ($244,393.00 jury award)). Conversely, the three other cases that PCI cites involve awards falling short of the jurisdiction minimum. Id. (citing Pollan v. Colony Delicatessen, Inc., 1991 Nat‘l Jury Verdict Review LEXIS 968 (Fla. Dade Cnty. Ct. Feb. 12, 1991) ($26,000 jury award); Harcarik v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., JVR No. 1104130033, 2004 WL 6019873 (Pa. C.P. Ct. July 30, 2004) ($22,500.00 settlement); and Cain v. Oroweat Foods Co., 89-2-01146-2, 2000 Wa. Arb. Dec. LEXIS 11317 (Aug. 31, 1990) ($2,284.00 arbitration award)).
While these five cases amply demonstrate that plaintiffs verdicts vary widely, these cases do not aid Defendant in еstablishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy threshold is met here. Indeed, the two cases that exceed the jurisdictional minimum—Jackson-Levy and Hoydilla—are not helpful to the Courts analysis. As a general matter, both cases are of limited utility because neither was decided under Virgin Islands law. See Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 398 (explaining that, in determining the amount in controversy, the court must apply state law); Scaife, 2019 WL 3353727, at *6 (deеming a case unpersuasive for purposes of determining the amount in controversy because it was litigated under the law of a different state). Moreover, the Jackson-Levy case does not indicate the injuries sustained by the plaintiff or the basic facts of the case, which prevents the Court from determining the degree to
Ultimately, PCI has not cited to a single instructive case exceeding the jurisdictional minimum, and the Court places little stock in PCIs contention that it should find that the threshold is exceeded here simply by virtue of the Virgin Islands alleged reputation as a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction. PCIs arguments thus leave the Court guessing as to whether the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. The Court, therefore, cannot conclude that it is more likely than not that Plaintiffs claims exceed thе jurisdictional threshold. See Heffner, 2013 WL 5416164, at *14-15 (“Where the court is left to guess at whether the jurisdictional threshold has been met, then a removing defendant has not carried its burden.“); Dorley v. Save-A-Lot, No. 16-CV-04510, 2016 WL 6213074, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2016) (“The Court cannot substitute Defendаnts expectations—nor its own assumptions—for the evidence necessary to support federal jurisdiction.“). Because “all doubts” must be “resolved in favor of remand,” Johnson, 724 F.3d at 346, the Court will therefore remand this case.
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court will remand the case to the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: January 13, 2023
/s/
WILMA A. LEWIS
District Judge