63 So. 546 | Ala. | 1913
— “To authorize a nonexpert to give his opinion of the existence of an unsound condition of mind, he must not only have had the opportunity to form a judgment but the facts should be stated upon which it is based.” — Burney v. Torrey, 100 Ala. 157, 14 South. 685, 46 Am. St. Rep. 33.
There are some loose expressions in some of our cases indicating that mere long and familiar acquaintance with the person alleged to be insane authorizes a non-expert, without stating the facts upon which his judgment is based, to testify that in his opinion such person is insane, but the above-quoted rule is the law of this state. — Burney v. Torrey, supra; Odom v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 56 South. 913; Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 16, 36 South. 1012.
2. The witness, whether expert or not, must first be shown to be competent or qualified to give an opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the party inquired of. The question as to the competency of the witness, whether expert or not, to give an opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the party inquired of is a question for the court and not for the jury. As to this question, its decision as to competency will not be revised unless it clearly appears to have been erroneous. — Parrish v. State, supra; Odom v. State, supra.
4. “It is a sound general rule that insanity at any particular, time, if shown to be habitual and permanent in its nature, is prima facie presumed as a matter of law to exist at any future time; and alone from its existence at a later time a presumption of fact may arise of its existence at a given prior time. — Murphree v. Senn, 107 Ala. 424, 18 South. 264; McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 Am. Dec. 180. But in the latter case it is clear that the probative value of subsequent insanity to show insanity at any prior time will depend upon (.1) the nature and degree of the insanity shown, and (2) its nearness or remoteness in point of time to the act under consideration.” — Odom v. State, supra.
5. We have set out the above general rules because each of them has its influence upon the only question presented by this record. We have not undertaken to give the reason for either of the rules because the reasons upon which they are based are set forth in the cases from which we have extracted them and which we have above cited.
6. The only question presented by this record is whether the trial court committed an error in refusing to allow certain nonexpert witnesses, or either of them, to testify that in their opinion Daniel J. Melvin was insane when he executed a mortgage on January 6, 1911. One of these witnesses was the wife of the said Daniel J. Melvin, and, according to the bill of exceptions, she testified as follows: “I am the wife of the
Taking into consideration the fact that this witness had for more than two years before the execution of the mortgage lived with the defendant as his wife, she certainly, in the above testimony, showed a sufficiently intimate acquaintance with the defendant to be allowed to give her opinion as to his insanity on the named occasion, provided the facts upon which she testified that she was prepared to base her opinion as to the insanity of the defendant are sufficient to meet the requirements of the above rules. It is true that the question which the witness answered covered the entire period between the spell of typhoid fever in September, 1910, and the day of the trial, and we might possibly, by a strained construction of the language of the witness, say, to uphold the ruling of the trial court, that the alleged ferocity of the defendant, unkindness to members of his family, and his entire loss of memory as to his
7. Two other nonexpert witnesses were offered by the defendant on the question as to the defendant’s insanity. The rules which we have above laid down with reference to the testimony of Mrs. Melvin will be a sufficient guide to the trial court, on the next trial as to the admissibility of nonexpert evidence on the question of the defendant’s insanity at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
In cases like the present, much is left to the discretion of the trial court, but the evidence of Mrs. Melvin, to which we have above referred, was, as we have already said, clearly admissible, and the judgment of the trial court must be reversed because of the refusal of the trial judge to allow her to testify, upon the facts hypothesized, that her husband was when he executed the mortgage in her opinion insane.
We deem it unnecessary for the reasons above stated, to consider the question as to whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow the other nonexpert witnesses, upon the facts hypothesized by them, to testify to their opinion as to the defendant’s insanity at the time referred to. As already stated, the rules above announced will furnish a sufficient guide for the trial court, on the subject under discussion, on the next trial of this case. Some authorities maintain that the question as to whether a nonexpert
Reversed and remanded.