59 Fla. 312 | Fla. | 1910
The defendant in error brought an action in the Circuit Court for Bradford County, the declaration in one count alleging that the Melrose Manufacturing Company “converted to its own use and wrongfully deprived the plaintiff of the use and possession of
On the demurrer it is contended that the declaration “does not sufficiently show or allege the ownership or interest of plaintiff in and to the said property, or the land from which it is alleged said property was derived.”
Crude turpentine that is collected in boxes cut in pine trees in a condition to be dipped up and used in the manufacture of spirits of turpentine and kindred products, is personal property. See Richbourg v. Rose, 53 Fla. 173, 44 South. Rep. 69, 12 Am. & Eng. Anno. Cas. 274, 125 Am. St. Rep. 1061. Crude turpentine in boxes includes “scrape,” resin and gum. Being personal property the ownership of the crude turpentine charged to have been converted is sufficiently alleged under the form prescribed in section 1450 General Statutes of 1906. Where the
Three requested instructions refused by the court contain distinct propositions and the refusal to give them appear to have been excepted to as an entirety. One of these requested instructions was properly refused because it required “the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the owner of the timber.” As one of the three requested instructions was rightly refused, ■ the court will not consider the other instructions the refusals to give which were excepted to as a whole. See Gass v. State, 44 Fla. 70, 32 South. Rep. 109; Telfair v. State, 58 Fla. 110, 50 South. Rep. 573.
The statute authorizes charges given to be excepted to in a motion for a new trial, but the refusal to give requested instructions must be excepted to at the time. Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 South. Rep. 60; Thomas v. State, 49 Fla. 123, 38 South. Rep. 516.
As the authority under which the defendant claimed gave turpentine privileges to January 1, 1908, and sawmill privileges to January 1, 1910, it was not reversible error for the court to charge that the defendants had the timber rights “from January 1, 1910, subject to the plaintiff’s right to turpentine therein from the first day of January, 1908, until such time as timber shall be cut by” the defendant.
A letter from the plaintiff to a representative of the defendant was excluded. It does not appear that the letter referred to the subject of litigation, and its exclusion is not shown to be error.
The lease under which the defendant claimed rights was- properly admitted in evidence as it tended to show the property rights of the parties in the subject-matter of litigation.
Other matters argued are either not properly presented or are in effect covered by the above discussion.
The judgment is affirmed.