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Mellinger v. State
740 P.2d 73
Idaho Ct. App.
1987
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*1 likely step step ‘one at a time’ when that is drawn pense. contrary, To the it is gender____”); v. provider along in some instances the line of O’Brien health care will 524, 740, Skinner, at issue favored classifications 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. be here, disfavored, and (1974) (invalidating in other instances be absentee L.Ed.2d 702 part yet be and disfa others favored voting which did not extend to do not part. vored in Thesе circumstances However, in these cases jailed persons). “clearly legislative pur suggest a evinced right to and a volved the fundamental vote Breed, 111 Idaho at pose to discriminate.” contrast, gender-based classification. 206, opin the lead 725 P.2d at Optical and Cream Lee Clover Leaf correctly the rational ba today aрplies ion regulations ery involved cases business than intermediate stan sis test rather subject They test. are to the rational basis dard. us. Where more akin to case before is confined to a equal protection issue However, the are “under- classifications inquiry, greater deference is, rational basis they That confer benefit inclusive.” justified. persons in a underinclusive classifications burden some impose or I the lead legitimate public qualification, With this concur which furthers a manner attorney same purpose, opinion’s do not confer the benefit refusal invalidate but persons all the same impose regulation. or burden fee Cantrell, v. similarly situated. See State (1972). 496 P.2d 276

94 Idaho Supreme upheld has

United States Court theory on the

underinclusive statutes legislaturе all agency or need address

perceived evils at the same or ‍​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‍Rather, may implement a way.

same

program step by step, adopting measures an evil while de partially ameliorate 740 P.2d 73 complete to the future.

ferring a solution Creamery Alfred E.g. Minnesota v. Clover MELLINGER Leaf , Co., 456, 101 Petitioner-Appellant, 66 L.Ed.2d 449 U.S. S.Ct. (1981); Optical, v. Lee Williamson L.Ed. 563 Idaho, Respondent. Here, STATE perceivеd evil drafters plan im appears Idaho Medicaid No. pact appeals, with their of administrative costs, upon the finite resources attendant Appeals of Idaho. The drafters’ for health care. available 26, 1987. June category response one has been to reduce fees, attorney and discour expense, 17,1987. Sept. for Rеview Denied Petition filed, age being by limit appeals from some Although recovery fees. debatable, I be this scheme is wisdom of constitutionally are

lieve its classifications despite underinclusive

permissible their

ness. not mean that

This does opinion, that an the lead

broad statement “does con

underinclusive classification ‍​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‍equal protection problem.” Un

stitute an be, derinclusive schemes

been, down. West struck See Califano cott, 443 U.S. legislate (1979) (“Congress may not

32 application

An any be filed at (5) years within five expiration the appeal of the time for or from the deter- appeal mination of an or from the deter- proceeding mination of a following an appeal, whichever is later. Laws, 1979 Idaho Sess. ch. p. 428. § The district court held that the amendment applied Mellinger. to the statute court determined that had five (the years from July effective date amendment) applicatiоn of the to file his application for relief. Because the had expiration been filed after the of the five- year period, the district court dismissed the application.

Mellinger contends the court erred in applying the to his petition. amendment 73-101, on Relying provides I.C. § Trimming, Alan E. Ada County Public part compiled of these laws “[n]o Defender, Boise, fоr petitioner-appellant. retroactive, declared,” expressly unless so Jones, Gen., Minert, Jim Atty. David R. Mellinger asserts amendment Gen., Boise, Deputy Atty. respondent. for by expression I.C. no contains § legislature indicating the amended stat WALTERS, Judge. Chief retrospective given ute should be effect. July Effective 19- legisla It is well-settled that “unless the provide five-year wаs amended expressions ture in its uses enactments limitation clearly indicative of the intent that the stat post-conviction relief. Previous effect, given retrospective ute be will not amendment, of limitation was Pahlke, In re be so construed.” 56 Idaho prescribed appeal statute. This 338, 341-42, 53 P.2d presents five-year question whether the Mellinger posed argumеnt— same this ap mandated amendment unsuccessfully the district court. The —to plies to a conviction entered before court, citing University Utah district We effective date of the amendment. hold Pence, Hospital v. 104 Idaho 657 P.2d it does. (1982), legislative held that reductions June, ‍​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‍1972, Mellinger, Alfred statutory periods may apply of limitation law, persistent found to be a violator of the action, provided causes of accrued each of received concurrent life terms for reasonable time is within which to allowed deadly weap- with a counts assault Melling assert the cause. The court noted 18, 1985, on. he filed an On November applications previously er had filed relief. post-conviction relief in limita- аpplied court had applications Both of those been dis tion in Mel- I.C. 19-4902 and dismissed § The court ruled: missed. linger’s petition of untimeli- argue [Mellinger] cannot now Mellinger appeals ness. from the dismissal post-conviction rights cut off would order. application of I.C. retroactive enacted, rights those pro- when he has twice asserted originally As the effective the statute as vided after date that an case law and any amended. ... Both Idaho “may be filed at time.” In support appli- however, stat- considerations of fairness legislature amended the of limitations 5-year provide ute to that: tive of the statute. Justice under I.C. 19-4902 [sic] court, year the 5 before this opinion Bakes’ was based on his view that 1, 1979, commencing July the effec- plaintiffs acquired to file of the statute. tive date *3 one-year period. He also benefits for a by argued application this case is controlled that of the amended We Supreme ruling in rely Idaho Court’s Universi ignored plaintiff’s statute Pence, Hospital supra; and ty Utah existing law and caused them undue hence, correctly applied the district court Bistline, hardship. also con- Justice as amended in 1979. How curred Bakes on the retroac- with Justice ever, ruling, contrary the district court's issue, tivity additionally challenged wheth- not decided the retroactive this case is plaintiffs “fair notice” of er the received application of but rather amendment, they and whether had had The prospective application of the statute. opportunity a to file a claim reasonable court, faced with the same issue as Pence at- under the amended statute. We draw here, acknowledged appli that retroactive carefully tention to these constructed dis- such a time limitation would be cation of ruling sents because we conclude that our general principles contrary to of law and present case would be the same even (which requires express taking arguments. into consideration their application of a declaration for retroactive the amended statute the Pence statute). “a The Pence court stated that changеd filing period one-year to merely be statute is not made retroactive cause it draws facts antecedent to its forty-five days. The amendment here 174, operation.” at enactment for Id. changed the limitation from no time 657 P.2d at 471. years. limit at all to five We think the forty-five days difference al- between

The Pence case dealt with an Pence, and the allowed indigent patient medical services. The lowed five hospi important was admitted and released from the here is an distinction. Under applicable tal at a time when the statute Mellinger’s interpretation party a convicted permitted one-year period filing an prior as to 1979 would never be restricted Subsequent pa for aid. to the filing post-conviction petition; release, tient’s the statute was amended to reasonable time limit on the applying reduce the allowable time for petition could ever be established. We con- forty-five days following aid to admission Mellinger’s interpretation does clude that hospital. Supreme The Idaho Court comport a consideration of the ruled that the amended version of the stat justice. administration of The applicable. ute was indicated appears to created here represented change in the amendment to at least be a reasonable time this Court law, procedural plaintiffs, ‍​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‍although and the relief under Idaho’s Post-Con- within which statute, subject to thе amended were to be sought. Act viction Procedure forty-five day period afforded the full be Also, Mellinger peti- filed this at the time ginning from the date of the effective tion, existing case law and the amended amended statute. The Court noted clearly five-year limi- identified the plaintiffs had “fair notice” of the new time period. tation ruling limitation. Inherent in the Court’s Addressing Bistline’s concerns Justice forty-five days was that was a reasonable Pence, earlier which to file for aid. The note that within we questions posed to the Pence court and to after the effective date petitions were filed present court are the same. Therefore statute. Had of the amended we hold that of the amended hе filed statute at the time checked the proper. 19-4902 in this case was 1981, he would first even his We con- of the amendment. have known dissenting

We note that Pence drew two was fair notice clude that there argued apply- opinions. Justice Bakes change. a retroac- the new limitation Mellinger suggests the five- (1981)). 67 L.Ed.2d 17 year given post ex limitation was unfair Court further hеld that: deprived facto him of if a operates law defend [E]ven preexisting statutory right (to file his detriment, ant’s post prohibi the ex facto time). application at any We find such an “legislative tion does not restrict control argument unpersuasive. to be In State v. procedure remedies and modes of Coleman, P.2d Mont. which do not affect matters оf sub (1979), Supreme the Montana Court ad Florida, stance.” [Dobbert argument. dressed a similar The Montana (1977).] court had remanded court for post Hence no ex vio facto

resentencing of change the defendant for homicide. lation occurs if the in the law is argued The he merely procedural defendant was entitled to be does “not increasе punishment, change ingredi under law in the sentenced the effect at the nor the portion ents of time he his crime. The the offense or the committed ultimate facts guilt.” necessary Hopt to pen of that law which mandated the establish death unconstitutional; Utah, 202, 210, U.S. alty had 590 S.Ct. been held conse [4 original.] L.Ed. quently the defendant could been sen 262] [Italics — only tencеd to a term that life under law. at - - -, Id. U.S. at The Montana court ruled that the district 2452-2453. court, remand, correctly applied had the Here we conclude that no substantial subsequently sentencing enacted statute right materially has Al- been affected. which authorized—but did not mandate— though the amendment does reduce the penalty the a mitigation death after hеar filing for years, time to five such a ing. thoroughly court The Montana dis reduction, especially the of within context cussed what makes aof statute noted, this is material. As Mel- post ex facto. The court concluded that it linger petitions filed had within the was the will have the statute that effect allotted the amended statute. post determines ex facto nаture. The Therefore, Mellinger had notice and rea- against prohibition court noted that the ex sonable time within which to file his post laws roots in desire of facto has its the present petition relief. prevent of the framers the Constitution to (cid:127)We the district court Mel- with sovereign authority making from later an linger rights argue that cannot now his act criminal which innocent com was when would be cut off when he has twice assert- The the im mitted. court concluded that rights ed of those since the effective date portant question asked whether to be is the amendment. some substantial of the accused has Mellinger contends his earlier sec- materially Changes pro been affected. petition ond dismissed shоuld was affecting materially rights cedure not the against he not be “used ‍​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌‍him” because did not come defendant do within the not have effective assistance of counsel. prohibition against post ex facto laws. Id. filed, petition After had the second been giving judge an order recently, More the United States Su issued why preme implication Mellinger twenty days show cause addressed the post ex should not dismissed. The facto laws. The Court noted that public prohibition appointed court defender to post “central to the ex also facto Mellinger represent Mellinger. asserts concern for ‘the fair notice and lack do governmental legisla public that the defender’s office did when the restraint help has not punishment beyond anything what him. This Court ture increases pertaining records prescribed provided was con with the was when the crime been ” petitions post- Mellinger’s previous original] summated.’ Miller [Italics — Florida, U.S. -, -, what say Thus cannot convictionrelief. we 2446, 2451, (1987) proceedings. those exactly during (quoting occurred However, ruling today Graham, do our wе not base Weaver v. court, may file application to he proceedings with his those dealt whether reasserting subsequent important now same issues raised. fully. grounds more 19-4908. Mellinger peti- See filed two is that factor prisoner timely application if a filed a Thus amended. tions since the as- it was dismissed due to ineffective but significance. is of it is the act of counsel, prisoner I sistance of believe so, simply cannot Having done appli- subsequent entitled to file would be stat- application of amended argue that asserting relief more was unrea- utory five though fully five-year period even sonable or unfair. elapsed limitation under I.C. 19-4902had dismissing order of the district court To in the meantime. hold otherwise wоuld prisoner than leave the alternative relief is affirmed. attorney malpractice dis- sue the —a undertaking and onerous tasteful —or SWANSTROM,J., concurs. a federal corpus a writ of habeas seek BURNETT, concurring. Judge, specially court,1 producing very kind of outside foregoing opinion, but I concur processes judicial in state interference *5 separately to on the issue write comment in- Act was Post-Conviction Procedure of assistance of counsel. ineffective to avoid. tended Mellinger’s as I argument, of real thrust Unfortunately Mellinger, this does it, applica- is that his first two understand proper to a case to invoke appear not relief, filed within tions for Mellinger’s sec doctrine. the relation-back today five-year which the Court September, in application was filed ond him under says was available to February, 1984. and was dismissed 19-4902, be- summarily were dismissed elapsed and More than one one-half he did not have effective assistance cause in No he filed his third before re- establishing grounds of counsel This, vember, view, my exceeds a 1985. argument third goes, lief. subsequent a reasonable five-year after the —filed under 19-4908 and relat I.C. § prior elapsed back” —“relates appli an earlier back to should dis- applications and not have been ground ineffec upon the asserted of untimely opinion missed as filed. Our lead Moreover, Mel- of tive assistance counsel. squarely this contention. does not meet argu application, unlike his linger’s third prior did mention appeal, not even proper believe a relation-back ment a simply appli- counsel. It might well merit. An ineffective assistance of argument have validity the statute under cannot attacked the of cant for relief who as prosecuted originally under he was private сounsel is entitled pay for alleged deadly weapon, and representation by a court- sault with he “excess If effec- the sentence received was appointed attorney. he is denied counsel, Using appears what to be boiler a result assistance of and as ive.”2 tive ap- post-conviction relief language in grounds platе raises for relief in inadequately he can be barred might self-evident that the claim 1. also be invited from by Federal intervention prisoner statutory is barred literal terms under the time limit. a of I.C. seeking post-conviction during upon ground that was unknown relief his sentence ex- assertion that problem period. This the could be alleviated subject might summa- well have been cessive part by subjecting I.C. timely made. ry even if it had been dismissal "discovery” exception similar to to a § 19-4902 sentence, opposed of as excessiveness limitation. in other civil statutes of that found post- among grounds legality, is not con- broader it would resolve the However ceptual problem attempting in I.C. conviction enumerated impose а time upon based the claim excessiveness unless challenge prisoner's upon a con- limit tinuing, illegal deed, facts, previously of material "evidence liberty. deprivation In- of his heard, requires vacation of presented and is based where the claim for relief justice----” sentence in the interest the ... right, it is far deprivation of a constitutional pliсations prepared at the Idaho State Cor- for the appeal, first time on and is not Institution, Mellinger rectional character- supported by predicate a factual ized these for relief as record, matters I am reject constrained to it in this heard____” previously presented “not basis, case. On this narrow I concur in the Because issue of ineffective assistance opinion today. Court’s the. by Mellinger’s counsel was not framed application, surprising it is not showing

record now before us contains no

of how the results obtained the first two

applications would been if different

effective counsel had been Be- furnished. argument

cause the relation-back is made

Case Details

Case Name: Mellinger v. State
Court Name: Idaho Court of Appeals
Date Published: Jun 26, 1987
Citation: 740 P.2d 73
Docket Number: 16675
Court Abbreviation: Idaho Ct. App.
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