The complaint is in the usual form in a statutory action to determine adverse claims to real property. It alleges that Mellette County is the owner in fee of the twenty-fivе tracts described in the complaint. Plaintiff prays that defendants be required to set forth all their adverse claims to the land; that defendants be decreed to have no interest or estate in, or lien or encumbrance upon, said land; that title be quieted in the plaintiff; and that defendants be forever barred from asserting any interest or estаte therein.
The defendants Thomas Arnold, Edward M. Arnold, Frances Mullen and Rosamond Turnes filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and with more particularity than wе need recite here allege that in September, 1948, in three actions wherein Frances Mullen and Rosamond Turnes were plaintiffs and Mellette County was a defendant judgments were entered decreeing that any. and all right, title and interest in and to the land described in the complaint was transferred, conveyed and assigned by Mellette County to the plaintiffs; that in lieu of such transfers the plaintiffs relinquish title to certain lands involved in *213 the quieting title actions to various persons to whom Mellette County claiming title by virtue of tax deeds had contracted to sell such land, but that such tax deeds were void; that judgment in each of the three actions was. entered pursuant to a stipulation -of the parties for the purpose of avoiding extended litigation and enabling Mellette County to render performance according to the terms of the several sale contracts; that the three judgments were duly filed in the office of the clerk of courts -of Mellette County and written notices of the filing thereof were given to the county and its attorneys; that the judgments have been fully performed and satisfied; and that more than three years having elapsed since their completion and satisfaction, Mellette County is barred because of laches from invoking equitable relief.
The trial court in the instant case determined that the adverse claims of the county had been litigated аnd adjudicated in the prior actions and that the judgments therein are conclusive as to the rights of the parties; that more than three years having elapsed since rendition of the judgments and performance of their terms and conditions by the parties and retention of payments received by the county in settlement, the county is now estоpped from asserting title to the lands here in controversy; that there was no fraud, collusion or bad faith of any kind involved in the 1948 actions; that the judgments in the said actions werе duly rendered by the Circuit Court of Mellette County having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter; and that the judgments have become final. Plaintiff county appeals.
The dеfendants urge that the- former judgments -are res judicata of all issues involved in the present action. The position of plaintiff county is that since the judgments show that they were thе result of a compromise which the county officers had no authority to negotiate and not of the deliberation of the court upon contested issues the judgments are not res judicata. Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed., § 511) says in substance that if a consent judgment is entered as to a matter with respect -to which public officers had n-o authority to bind the public it is not res judicata. Thus in City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 139 Minn.
*214
322,
See also Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills,
It is conceded that counsel for the county with the consent and in the presence оf the members of the county board entered into the stipulations in open court and agreed to the entry of the judgments in the prior actions. The controlling question is whether or not there was authority to bind the county by such agreements. A county or other governmental agency cannot be bound for acts of its officers and agents in excеss of its. powers or in violation of positive law. Such is the implication of the holding of this court in Stockwell v. City of Sioux Falls,
It is also contended that the parties could not confer by consent jurisdiction of the land here in controversy in the prior actions commenced for the purpose of quieting title to other lands. Reliance is placed upon the principle that pаrties cannot by consent confer jurisdiction of subject matter. Jurisdiction in this sense “is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the pro *216 ceedings in question belong”. 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 23. “The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case, as made by the complaint, and the relief sought.” 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 35. In other words, the subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be thus conferred does not have reference to the res or property involved in the litigation and is not the equivalent of a jurisdiction in rem which may be conferred by consent. The court was vested with jurisdiction to try and determine causes of the class and nature of those invoked and the judgments rendered in the prior actions cannot now be complained of because the court pursuant to the voluntary agreements of the parties granted relief therein as to matters not within the issues. Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.) § 664.
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.