322 Mass. 236 | Mass. | 1948
This is a bill .in equity for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate. From a final decree ordering conveyance upon payment of the purchase price, the defendant appealed. The judge made a report of the material facts found by him. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 23, as appearing in St. 1945, c. 394, § 1. The evidence is reported.
The defendant is the owner of two parcels of land with the buildings thereon at 74 and 75 Willow Road, Nahant. On March 27, 1947, the defendant’s son-in-law, Edward Hicks, who was her agent to sell the property, wrote the following letter to the plaintiff’s brother-in-law, who was his agent as to this subject matter: “You will perhaps remember that we spent a pleasant visit ... on the break water at Nahant last summer. On that occasion either you or your brother-in-law expressed an interest in my Mother’s
On March 28 Hicks received a telegram from the plaintiff’s brother-in-law which read: “We are interested in your offer. Will look at house tomorrow. Communicate with you first of week.” On the same day shortly after the telegram was received Hicks telegraphed the plaintiff’s brother-in-law: “Have heard from three interested buyers tonight which means we must accept highest bid for Nahant property. Suggest you wire or phone me Elmsford N. Y.
It is unnecessary to recount the subsequent communications of the parties other than to state that the defendant entered into a written contract to sell the property to someone other than the plaintiff. This sale has not been completed pending this suit.
The judge in his report of material facts stated: “I find the defendant knowingly led the plaintiff to believe she had submitted an offer to sell the premises in question for $7,500 in the letter of Hicks dated March 27, 1947, and that the plaintiff accepted the offer by the same means of communication, namely, United States mail, in good faith within a reasonable time following the receipt of the offer and prior to any knowledge that the offer had been revoked or withdrawn, and that he was ready, willing and able to pay the purchase price of $7,500.”
“Knowingly to lead a person reasonably to suppose that you offer and to offer are the same thing.” Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198, 200. Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co. 303 Mass. 540, 542. Phoenix Spring Beverage Co. v. Harvard Brewing Co. 312 Mass. 501, 506. “The question of whether a contract was so made was one of law for the court, as there was no ambiguity and as nothing appears in the letters permitting a factual inference.” DeVito v. Boehme & Rauch Co. 239 Mass. 290, 294. Crane Construction Co. v. Commonwealth, 290 Mass. 249, 253.
The letter of March 27 was not an offer. It expressed “a desire to dispose of” the property. It announced that the agent was “writing the several people, including yourself, who have previously expressed an interest in the prop-, erty.” Its conclusion, in part, was, “I will be interested in hearing further from you if you have any interest in this property, for as I said before, I am advising those who have asked for an opportunity to consider it.” The recipient could not reasonably understand this to be more than an attempt at negotiation. It was a mere request or sugges-
The final decree is reversed, and a decree is to be entered dismissing the bill with costs. An appeal by the plaintiff from the decree denying the plaintiff’s petition to adjudge the defendant in contempt for violation of the decree which is herein reversed and the further appeal by the plaintiff from the decree allowing the motion of the defendant to stay the equity proceedings have become immaterial, and are dismissed.
So ordered.