Case Information
*2 Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 9, 2017 Pasadena, California Filed January 12, 2018 Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges, and Wiley Y. Daniel, [**] District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Reinhardt
[*] Xavier Becerra is substituted for his predecessor, Kamala Harris. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
[**] The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, United States District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Colorado, sitting by designation.
SUMMARY [***]
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed, on issue preclusion grounds, the district court’s dismissal of an action challenging the constitutionality of California Family Code Section 7962, which codified California cases that found gestational surrogacy contracts enforceable.
The panel first held that the district court was wrong to abstain from hearing this case under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The panel held that this case did not fall within the two limited categories of civil cases that define ’s scope, as set forth in Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs , 134 S. Ct. 584, 593-94 (2013). Thus, the panel determined that plaintiff’s then pending state court *3 constitutional challenge to Section 7962 was neither a civil enforcement proceeding, nor was it within the category of cases that involve the State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.
The panel affirmed the district court on the basis that the subsequent state court decision on the merits of plaintiff’s constitutional claims precluded further litigation of the issues in federal court. The panel stated that it was required to give the same preclusive effect to a California Court of Appeal’s judgment involving plaintiff’s claims as California courts would. The panel determined that given the Court of Appeal’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, which [***] This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. addressed each of plaintiff’s constitutional challenges, there was no question that the constitutional claims were necessarily decided in the state court proceeding.
COUNSEL
Harold J. Cassidy (argued), Joseph Zakhary, and Thomas J. Viggiano, The Cassidy Law Firm, Shrewsbury, New Jersey; Michael W. Caspino and Robert M. Dato, Buchalter Nemer, Irvine, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Daniel P. Barer (argued), Pollak Vida & Fisher, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees Cynthia Anne Harding, M.P.H.; Jeffery D. Gunzenhauser, M.D., M.H.P.; and Dean C. Logan.
Robert R. Walmsley (argued) and Marlea F. Jarrette, Jarette & Walmsley LLP, Los Olivos, California, for Defendant- Appellee C.M.
Chara L. Crane (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Jennifer M. Kim, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Julie Weng- Gutierrez, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Karen Smith, M.D., M.P.H.
Dean Masserman, Vorzimer/Masserman – Fertility & Family Law Center, Woodland Hills, California, for Defendants-Appellees Kaiser Foundation Hospital, *4 Panorama City Medical Center, and Payman Roshan.
OPINION
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
The California legislature enacted California Family Code Section 7962 (“Section 7962”) to codify California cases that found gestational surrogacy contracts enforceable. [1] Among other matters, Section 7962 authorizes the judicial determination of legal parentage in accordance with the terms of a gestational surrogacy agreement prior to the birth of any child so conceived.
Melissa Cook entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with C.M. pursuant to Section 7962. By the terms of the 75-page contract, titled “In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy Agreement” (“Agreement”), Cook agreed to the implantation of embryos created with ova from an anonymous woman and sperm from C.M., to carry any pregnancy to term, and to surrender upon birth the child or children to C.M. Under the contract, Cook’s parental rights would be terminated by court order prior to the birth of any child or children in accordance with Section 7962, and C.M. would be declared the only legal parent. Following the embryo transfer, Cook became pregnant, and eventually learned that she was carrying three fetuses. Cook’s relationship with C.M. soured when they disagreed during her pregnancy about selective reduction of the fetuses. Triplets were born on February 22, 2016.
Prior to the birth, Cook began her legal quest to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7962. On January [1] See Cal. Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1217 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 26, 2011, at pp. 1–3; Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1217 (2011– 2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2012, at p. 4.
6
C OOK V . H ARDING 4, 2016, she filed a complaint in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court alleging
that Section 7962 was
unconstitutional and seeking a parentage declaration. The
court struck this complaint because it was filed in the wrong
court and without proper service. On January 6, 2016, C.M.
filed a petition in the Children’s Court within the Los
Angeles County Superior Court to enforce the contract and
be declared the sole legal parent of the children. On February
1, 2016, Cook filed a counterclaim in response to C.M.’s
petition, again challenging the validity of the Agreement and
the constitutionality of Section 7962. The following day, she
filed a nearly identical complaint in federal district court
against C.M. as well as state and county personnel, raising
her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The district
court abstained pursuant to
Younger v. Harris
,
DISCUSSION
“We review a district court’s decision to abstain under
Younger
de novo and do not defer to the view of the district
judge.”
Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen
, 873 F.3d
716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017). We conduct the
Younger
analysis
“in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time
the federal action was filed.”
Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v.
Cty. of Solano
,
“We may affirm the district court on any ground[] supported by the record.” Schechner v. KPIX-TV , 686 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2012).
I.
Younger
Abstention
“ ‘abstention remains an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts “have
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given.”’”
Nationwide
873 F.3d at 727 (quoting
Potrero Hills
657 F.3d at 882
(quoting
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of
New Orleans
, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“
NOPSI
”))).
Abstention in civil cases “is appropriate only when the state
proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal
enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing
the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an
*6
important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise
federal challenges.”
ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State
Comp. Ins. Fund
,
At issue is the second prong of the ReadyLink test: whether this case falls within either of the two types of civil cases—quasi-criminal enforcement actions or cases involving a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts—in which Younger abstention is appropriate. The district court ignored Supreme Court precedent and our circuit’s controlling law when it abstained without conducting this required analysis. See Cook , 190 F. Supp. 3d at 934–38. Instead, it relied on previous applications of Younger abstention to family law cases and the state’s unique interest and sole jurisdiction in the law of domestic relations. See id. We write to clarify that Younger abstention is improper in civil cases outside of the two limited categories referred to above, regardless of the subject matter or the importance of the state interest.
We explained in that the extension of
Younger
began shortly after that case was decided.
See
754 F.3d at 758. This steady expansion included the
application of
Younger
abstention to family law cases.
Moore v. Sims
,
After more than forty years of unchecked doctrinal
expansion, the Supreme Court changed course and made
clear that
Younger
abstention was appropriate only in the
*7
two “exceptional” categories of civil cases it had previously
identified: (1) “civil enforcement proceedings”; and
(2) “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely
in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.”
Sprint
,
We emphasize that federal courts cannot ignore
Sprint
’s strict limitations on
Younger
abstention simply because
states have an undeniable interest in family law.
See Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow
,
This case does not fall within either category of civil cases which Sprint held warrant Younger abstention. 134 S. Ct. at 593–94; 754 F.3d at 759. First, Cook’s state court constitutional challenge to Section 7962 is not a civil enforcement proceeding. In Sprint , the Court explained that civil enforcement proceedings are generally “akin to a criminal prosecution” in “important respects”:
Such enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction the *8 10 C OOK V . H ARDING federal plaintiff, i.e. , the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act. In cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the action. Investigations are commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.
134 S. Ct. at 592 (internal citations omitted).
Sprint
cited
Moore
as an example of a quasi-criminal enforcement
action.
Id.
In
Moore
, parents challenged the constitutionality
of parts of the Texas Family Code that permitted removal of
their children following allegations of child abuse.
See
Defendants nonetheless argue that the state court proceedings are “a civil enforcement proceeding brought by C.M. to enforce the terms of a properly executed assisted reproduction agreement.” We have squarely foreclosed this broad interpretation of an enforcement proceeding: “If the mere ‘initiation’ of a judicial . . . proceeding were an act of civil enforcement, would extend to every case in which a state judicial officer resolves a dispute between two private parties.” , 754 F.3d at 760. The interpretation of a provision of the California Family Code also does not transform this into a civil enforcement proceeding because “litigants request that a court . . . interpret a statute, a regulation, or the common law” in most every case. Id.
*9
Second, Cook’s state action is not within the category of
cases that involve “the State’s interest in enforcing the orders
and judgments of its courts.”
ReadyLink
754 F.3d at 759
(citations omitted). Defendants contend that the case falls
within this category because challenges to parentage
determinations could impede the state courts’ ability to make
other decisions based on that parental status, such as custody
and child support. This is an argument regarding the state
courts’ power to apply its laws in subsequent proceedings
and the state’s interest in its interrelated family laws. It does
not relate to the state courts’ ability to enforce compliance
with judgments already made.
See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc.
,
Following
Sprint
, we have made clear that the category
of cases involving the state’s interest in enforcing its courts’
orders and judgments does not include cases involving “a
‘single state court judgment’ interpreting [a private
agreement] and state law” because such cases do not
implicate “the process by which a state ‘compel[s]
compliance with the judgments of its courts.’” ,
754 F.3d at 759 (quoting
Potrero Hills
, 657 F.3d at 886).
Cook does not question the
process
by which California
courts compel compliance with parentage determinations
under state law. Rather, she alleges that Section 7962 is
unconstitutional. Cook accordingly challenges
the
legislative prescriptions of Section 7962. As the Court held
even before
Sprint
,
Younger
does not “require[] abstention
in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing
legislative . . . action.”
NOPSI
,
This case does not fall within the two limited categories of civil cases that “define ’s scope.” Sprint , 134 S. Ct. at 591. The district court thus was wrong to abstain.
II. Preclusion
We may not consider events after the filing of the
complaint for purposes of our
Younger
analysis,
Potrero
Hills
,
We must give the same preclusive effect to the California
Court of Appeal’s judgment as California courts would.
Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.
,
First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.
Id. at 760–61 (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court , 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Cal. 1990) (in bank)).
Cook does not and could not credibly argue that the
issues in the two proceedings are different; the factual
allegations she made in both state and federal court are
almost identical in the literal sense of the word.
See
Hernandez v. City of Pomona
,
In the context of issue preclusion, an issue is actually
litigated “[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or
otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is
determined.”
People v. Sims
,
Cook’s position is that her constitutional claims “have never been directly addressed and decided.” This is baseless in light of the Court of Appeal’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, which devotes over eight pages to addressing each of her constitutional challenges in turn. See C.M. , 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363–70. The relevant section of the opinion begins with the heading “[Cook]’s Constitutional Challenges Fail.” Id. at 363. After finding that Cook had standing, the Court of Appeal explicitly proceeded to the merits of her constitutional claims, id. at 366 (“We therefore proceed to the merits of [Cook]’s constitutional claims.”), and finally concluded “that the Agreement did not violate the constitutional rights of [Cook] or the children,” id. at 370. On the basis of this language and the Court of Appeal’s analysis, there is no question that any and all constitutional claims were necessarily decided in the state court proceeding.
Cook nevertheless insists that the Court of Appeal did not decide her claims because it relied upon prior California cases that were decided on public policy rather than constitutional grounds. She argues that because the cited precedent did not address or decide all of the constitutional issues she raised, the Court of Appeal’s decision is likewise limited and engaged in no further, independent analysis. We
C OOK V . H ARDING 15
need not parse Cook’s reading of the earlier California cases.
Whether the Court of Appeal relied on cases that addressed
only public policy considerations or on no cases at all, it still
had the authority to decide Cook’s constitutional claims,
see
Cal. Const. Art. 6, §§ 1, 3;
see also, e.g.
,
Schmoll v.
Chapman Univ.
, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1436 (1999)
(deciding establishment and free exercise issues of first
impression);
People v. Bye
, 116 Cal. App. 3d 569, 573
(1981) (deciding due process issue of first impression);
In re
David G.
,
[W]e are not persuaded by [Cook]’s assertion that “the public policy considerations raised in [ Johnson v. Calvert , 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (in bank)] are not applicable to a constitutional challenge.” We do not believe that our Supreme Court would have held that the surrogacy contract in Calvert was consistent with public policy if it believed that the surrogacy arrangement violated a constitutional right.
C.M.
,
If the threshold requirements of issue preclusion are met,
a court must consider “whether preclusion would be
consistent with the ‘preservation of the integrity of the
judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and
protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious
litigation.’” , 754 F.3d at 761 (quoting
Lucido
795 P.2d at 1227). Preclusion in this case furthers these
*13
“public policies underlying the doctrine.”
Lucido
, 795 P.2d
at 1226. Giving the Court of Appeal’s opinion preclusive
effect is in the interest of both comity and consistency.
See
id.
at 1229. It preserves judicial resources by ending this
two-year set of proceedings in which Cook chose to litigate
her identical claims simultaneously in two forums. Finally,
Cook’s pursuit of her constitutional claims may not have
been “baseless or unjustified,”
see id.
at 1232, but the legally
irrelevant and deeply disparaging allegations about C.M’s
ability, intellect, and socioeconomic status throughout her
pleadings are wholly inappropriate. For these reasons, we
decline to “tackle anew the precise legal issue[s] resolved by
the California Court of Appeal.” ,
CONCLUSION
The district court was wrong to abstain pursuant to . Notwithstanding this error, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint because the California Court of Appeal’s decision precludes further litigation of Cook’s constitutional claims.