25 A.2d 743 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1942
Argued March 3, 1942.
In this workmen's compensation case there are no disputed facts. The claimant was being paid compensation at the rate of $18 per week for a 165 week period for the loss of the right thumb, index and middle fingers under section 306(c) of the Workmen's Compensation *408
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended,
The referee awarded compensation of $18 per week from January 5, 1939, to March 5, 1939, "notwithstanding the fact that he is now receiving the maximum compensation for specific losses of the use of certain fingers of the right hand due to injuries sustained in another earlier accident, on July 28, 1938, while employed with the same employer." His action was sustained by the board and the court below.
An employe who suffers the loss of two or more members in the same accident in the course of his employment is entitled to compensation under section 306(c) for the aggregate periods allowed for the several injuries, but in no event shall the compensation period extend beyond the limitation provided for total disability or the maximum compensation fixed by the statute: Lente v. Luci,
In Baffi v. Lehigh Valley Coal Company,
In Rocco v. Pennsylvania Coal Company,
In Ingram v. W.J. Rainey, Inc.,
In Barlock v. Orient Coal Coke Co. et al.,
Applying the principles to which we have referred to the facts in the case at bar, it is clear that the period of 8 3/7 weeks between January 5 and March 5, 1939, during which the employe claimed compensation for total disability under section 306(a), begins to run from the date of the second injury, and runs coincidentally with the 165 week period. The awarding to *411 claimant of double or greater compensation than the weekly maximum during that concurrent period is not warranted by our compensation statutes.
The board and the court below attempted to differentiate the decision in Ingram v. Rainey from the instant case on the ground that there the period of total disability under section 306(a) preceded the 35 week period for a specific loss under section 306(c) whereas here the 165 week period under section 306(c) came first. It is immaterial in what order the periods fall. The same rule applies whether the initial compensation is paid under section 306(a), (b), or (c). To the extent that they coincide the weekly payments are limited to the maximum fixed by our statutes. We said in the Ingram v. Rainey case, p. 487: "In this connection it should be noted that the period of partial disability in the Barlock case extended beyond the fixed period under (c), while in the Olinsky case, as in the one now before us, the period of total disability expired during the running of the definite period under (c)."
In view of our disposition of the main issue before us it is unnecessary to discuss the secondary question raised by the appellant that the claimant is not entitled to compensation for the first seven days after disability begins. We call attention, however, to the act approved June 4, 1937, P.L. 1552,
Judgment of the court below is reversed.