Tapia-Acuna, a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien, was convicted under Arizona law of possession of marijuana for sale. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) instituted deportation proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(ll). 1 The immigration judge found Tapia-Acuna deportable and denied his application for discretionary relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). 2 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, and Tapia-Acuna petitioned this court for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.
While the petition for review was pending, Tapia-Acuna moved the BIA to reopen and reconsider his case in light of an Arizo
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na state court order expunging his conviction. The BIA denied the motion on the ground that reopening would be futile. It ruled that the expungement did not eliminate the conviction for purposes of § 1251(a)(ll), and that in the Ninth Circuit an alien deportable under § 1251(a)(ll) is not eligible for § 1182(c) relief.
3
In an unpublished memorandum dated April 30, 1980,
On November 3, 1980, the Supreme Court - U.S. -,
Title 8, U.S.C. § 1182(c), on its face, gives the Attorney General discretion to waive certain specified grounds of exclusion in the case of a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and seeks to return to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years in the United States. One of the listed waivable grounds is conviction for “the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana....” Section 1182(a)(23). This is the exclusion counterpart of § 1251(a)(ll), the deportation ground applicable here.
Although the literal language of § 1182(c) refers only to the admission of aliens otherwise subject to grounds of exclusion, the provision has long been applied in deportation proceedings as well. See, e.
g., Matter of G.A.,
7 I. & N.Dec. 274 (1956);
Matter of F,
6 I. & N.Dec. 537 (1955);
Matter of S,
6 I. & N.Dec. 392 (1954),
aff’d by A.G.
(1955). In
Arias-Uribe v. INS,
Shortly after those decisions, the Second Circuit decided
Francis v. INS,
Like the Second Circuit, this court applies the rational basis test to federal immigration statutes distinguishing among groups of aliens.
See United States v. Barajas-Guillen,
As noted in
Francis,
no purpose would be served by giving less consideration to the alien “whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry” than to the alien “who may leave and return from time to time.”
See
The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying Tapia-Acuna’s motion to reopen is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Title 8, U.S.C. § 1251(a)(ll), renders deportable an alien “who at any time has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana .. .. ”
. Title 8, U.S.C. § 1182(c), provides in pertinent part: Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(l)-(25), (30), and (31)].
. This court has stayed these proceedings pending the BIA determination of the motion to reopen. After the BIA denied the motion, the INS filed a “Notice Regarding Termination of Proceedings,” in which it notified this court that the stay had terminated as a result of the BIA decision. The Notice also pointed out that the parties had previously stipulated “that this petition for review would encompass both the [original] ruling of the Board and the ruling on the motion to reopen.” That Notice, which manifests the clear intention of both parties to seek review of the second BIA decision, will be construed as a second petition for review.
. Although the court spoke of equal protection, it was actually referring to fifth amendment due process, which has been held to embody an anti-discrimination component.
See Francis,
. This court in
Dunn
expressly characterized
Arias -Uribe
as based on statutory interpretation.
See Dunn,
Bowe and Nicholas, in turn, were cited by Mondragon v. Ilchert, slip op. 1762, No. 75-3051 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1980), in which § 1182(c) was held inapplicable to an alien deportable under § 1251(a)(2) for having entered without inspection. We do not decide whether the interpretation adopted in Mondragon renders § 1182(c) unconstitutional as applied to aliens deportable under § 1251(a)(2).
