Melesio Manuel Tapia-Acuna v. Immigration and Naturalization ServiceMelesio Manuel Tapia-Acuna v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Tapia-Acuna, a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien, was convicted under Arizona law of possession of marijuana for sale. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) instituted deportation proceedings pursuant to
While the petition for review was pending, Tapia-Acuna moved the BIA to reopen and reconsider his case in light of an Arizo
On November 3, 1980, the Supreme Court - U.S. -,
Title
Although the literal language of
Shortly after those decisions, the Second Circuit decided
Francis v. INS,
Like the Second Circuit, this court applies the rational basis test to federal immigration statutes distinguishing among groups of aliens.
See United States v. Barajas-Guillen,
As noted in
Francis,
no purpose would be served by giving less consideration to the alien “whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry” than to the alien “who may leave and return from time to time.”
See
The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying Tapia-Acuna’s motion to reopen is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. Title
. Title
. This court has stayed these proceedings pending the BIA determination of the motion to reopen. After the BIA denied the motion, the INS filed a “Notice Regarding Termination of Proceedings,” in which it notified this court that the stay had terminated as a result of the BIA decision. The Notice also pointed out that the parties had previously stipulated “that this petition for review would encompass both the [original] ruling of the Board and the ruling on the motion to reopen.” That Notice, which manifests the clear intention of both parties to seek review of the second BIA decision, will be construed as a second petition for review.
. Although the court spoke of equal protection, it was actually referring to fifth amendment due process, which has been held to embody an anti-discrimination component.
See Francis,
. This court in
Dunn
expressly characterized
Arias -Uribe
as based on statutory interpretation.
See Dunn,
Bowe
and
Nicholas,
in turn, were cited by
Mondragon v. Ilchert,
slip op. 1762, No. 75-3051 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1980), in which