Michael Melendez v. University of New Hampshire, et al.
Case No. 23-cv-00172-SM-TSM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
January 6, 2025
Talesha L. Saint-Marc, United States Magistrate Judge
Filed 01/06/25
ORDER ON PARTIES’ MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 11
Self-represented plaintiff Michael Melendez (Melendez) was enrolled as a student at the University of New Hampshire‘s Franklin Pierce Law School (UNH Law) from August 2020 to September 2023, when he was disenrolled from the program. On March 3, 2023, Melendez filed this action against the University of New Hampshire (UNH) and three of its employees, asserting claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Following a number of amendments to the complaint in which Melendez added new defendants and new claims, this court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of all except for Melendez‘s claims for disability discrimination under the ADA and for violations of his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The matter is before the undersigned magistrate judge for an order on the parties’ motions for sanctions pursuant to
BACKGROUND
The instant motions for sanctions arose out of the circumstances surrounding Melendez‘s motion to supplement his Fourth Amended Complaint in March 2024. The facts relevant to that motion and the parties’ decisions to pursue sanctions are described briefly as follows.
Facts Leading Up to Melendez‘s Motion to Supplement
Melendez filed his initial complaint in this action on March 3, 2023. Doc. No. 1. He named UNH and three individuals as defendants and asserted seven claims. Id. Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss on June 16, 2023, and on June 23, 2023, Melendez filed an assented-to motion to amend his complaint. Doc. Nos. 6 & 13. The court allowed plaintiff‘s motion to amend and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. In his First Amended Complaint, Melendez named UNH and eight individuals as defendants and asserted six different causes of action. Doc. No. 15.
On September 22, 2023, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 19. Instead of filing an opposition, Melendez filed another motion for leave to amend his complaint. Doc. No. 24. On October 31, 2023, the court denied plaintiff‘s motion without prejudice on the grounds that the proposed complaint was excessively long and unnecessarily redundant, and gave Melendez until November 30, 2023, to file a renewed motion to amend his complaint. Melendez filed a third motion for leave to amend his complaint on November 29, 2023. Doc. No. 28.
Defendants opposed Melendez‘s motion on the grounds that the proposed amendments were futile and defendants would suffer undue prejudice if the court granted the motion. Doc. No. 29. On December 14, 2023, the court determined that defendants’ arguments should be addressed in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice, and on January 10, 2024, Melendez filed an opposition to the motion. Doc. Nos. 32 & 35. On the same date, Melendez filed another motion to amend his complaint to eliminate certain claims and address certain deficiencies identified by defendants in their pending motion to dismiss. See Doc. Nos. 36 & 36-1. Defendants did not oppose the motion, although they reserved their right to refile their motion to dismiss following the filing of a Fourth Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 37.
Given defendants’ position, the court allowed Melendez‘s motion to amend and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. However, it cautioned plaintiff that the litigation has been pending since March 3, 2023 and that any additional motions to amend would be viewed with greater scrutiny. In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Melendez continued to name UNH, Morgan, Brown and nineteen individuals as defendants. Doc. No. 38. He also alleged eighteen separate causes of action. Id.
Melendez‘s Motion to Supplement His Complaint
On February 2, 2024, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, and on February 16, 2024, Melendez filed an opposition to the motion. Doc. Nos. 39 & 41. On March 11, 2024, while the motion to dismiss remained pending, Melendez notified defendants’ lead litigation counsel in this case, Gregory Manousos, Esq., of his intent to file a motion to
Should you proceed with the proposed Motion to [Supplement] and therefore present demonstrably false statements to the Court, UNH will oppose the Motion. In addition, because the proposed Motion is frivolous and not advanced in good faith, we will ask the Court to require you to pay UNH‘s attorney‘s fees in opposing this Motion and to issue other sanctions against you, as appropriate.
Id. at 6.
Melendez was unpersuaded by Attorney Manousos’ arguments, and on March 18, 2023, he filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement Complaint (Motion to Supplement). Doc. No. 42. Therein, Melendez sought to supplement his Fourth Amended Complaint by asserting three additional claims based on the alleged facts that Attorney Manousos contested in his communications with plaintiff. He also sought to assert a fourth claim, against Attorney Manousos, based on the Attorney Manousos’ efforts to dissuade Melendez from seeking to supplement his complaint.1 In their instant motion, defendants argue that they are entitled to
On April 1, 2024, Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Leave to Supplement the Complaint (Opposition). Doc. No. 45. In their Opposition, defendants argued that the court should deny Melendez‘s Motion to Supplement because the proposed claims were futile and would cause defendants undue prejudice, and because Melendez failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(c) before filing his motion. They also noted, in passing, that Melendez‘s proposed supplement was harassing, frivolous, not advanced in good faith, and represents a further abuse of the legal process. Doc. No. 45 at 2. In a footnote to their Opposition, defendants stated that they will be filing, under separate cover, a Motion for Sanctions in connection with Plaintiff‘s abuse of process and bad faith litigation tactics. Id. at 2 n.1.
Although defendants did not file their present motion for sanctions until April 29, 2024, in the Conclusion to their Opposition, they requested the following ruling:
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff‘s Motion to Supplement the Complaint be denied, especially considering the Court‘s statement that further motions to amend would be viewed with greater scrutiny, and Plaintiff‘s case be dismissed in its entirety[.] Defendants further request that the Court award its fees and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). In his motion for sanctions, Melendez argues that this request constituted an improper motion for sanctions that violated
The Parties’ Motions for Sanctions
On April 2, 2024, one day after defendants filed their Opposition, Melendez contacted Attorney Manousos, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c),2 to inform him of his intent to file a motion for
On April 25, 2024, Melendez filed the pending Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions against Attorney Manousos, his co-counsel, Jeffrey T. Collins, Esq.,3 and defense counsel‘s law firm, Morgan, Brown. In support of his motion, Melendez argues that sanctions are warranted under Rule 11 because Defendants knowingly filed a frivolous motion for sanctions under the ‘Conclusion’ of their April 1, 2024 [Opposition], Doc. No. 50-1 at ¶ 12, defendants’ counsel relied on unauthorized discovery material to dispute the facts alleged in support of Melendez‘s supplemental claims, and Attorneys Manousos and Collins failed to withdraw the April 1, 2024, request for sanctions after acknowledging that it was improper. See generally Doc. No. 50-1. Melendez requests that the court grant his motion and impose whatever sanctions the court deems appropriate. Id. at ¶ 52.
Defendants filed their pending motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Melendez on April 29, 2024. Defendants argue that they are entitled to sanctions because the claims contained in the Motion to Supplement were frivolous, caused undue delay, and imposed a significant burden on defendants and the court. Doc. No. 51-1 at 2. They also argue that despite being provided with objective evidence that his proposed amended claims relating to a minor email glitch were in fact not grounded in fact, Plaintiff nevertheless furthered his frivolous and bad faith litigation tactics
LEGAL STANDARD
Both parties move for sanctions pursuant to
Significantly, Melendez‘s status as a self-represented party does not render him immune from Rule 11 sanctions. Vizcaino v. Isaac, No. 15-11565-LTS, 2016 WL 1163652, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2016); see also Bone v. Hadco Corp., No. CIV 00-293-JD, 2001 WL 531531, at *3 (D.N.H. May 10, 2001) (noting that [p]ro se parties, like all parties and counsel, are required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and putting self-represented plaintiff on notice of his obligations under Rule 11). The Rule appl[ies] to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper and the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings[.] Vizcaino, 2016 WL 1163652, at *5 (quoting Vizvary v. Vignati, 134 F.R.D. 28, 31 (D.R.I. 1990)). Nevertheless, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations. Id. (quoting Vizvary, 134 F.R.D. at 31). Where, as here, a party seeks sanctions against a self-represented litigant, the objective standard to be applied regarding Rule 11 asks what a reasonable person in the pro se litigant‘s position would have done. Arguments that a lawyer should or would recognize as groundless may not seem so to the pro se litigant. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Vizvary, 134 F.R.D. at 31).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff‘s Motion for Sanctions
As described above, Melendez moves for Rule 11 sanctions against Attorney Manousos, Attorney Collins, and Morgan, Brown on the grounds that they filed an improper and frivolous Motion for Sanctions on April 1, 2024, when they asked the court to award defendants attorney‘s
Melendez attempts to dispute any such conclusion by arguing that defendants’ present Motion for Sanctions is a second motion for sanctions in accordance with Rule 11[,] which defense counsel drafted after they became aware that their April 1, 2024 motion[ ] for sanctions was improper[.] See Doc. No. 50-1 at ¶¶ 34-38. However, this argument is belied by defendants’ statement, in their April 1, 2024, Opposition, that they planned to file a separate Motion for Sanctions, and by the title and substance of the Opposition, which are directed at opposing Melendez‘s Motion to Supplement and make no mention of Rule 11. Moreover, under Rule 11,
Finally, in his motion for sanctions, Melendez argues that Attorney Manousos improperly relied on unauthorized discovery material to dispute the facts alleged in support of his Motion to Supplement. Specifically, Melendez asserts that Attorney Manousos violated
II. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions
Defendants also move for Rule 11 sanctions against Melendez on the grounds that he filed a frivolous Motion to Supplement, even after defense counsel presented him with factual evidence demonstrating why his proposed claims were baseless. See Doc. No. 51-1 at 9-13. Melendez argues that this motion should be denied because defendants failed to comply with the 21-day notice requirement set forth in
A. Whether defendants complied with Rule 11‘s notice requirement
A threshold issue raised by Melendez‘s opposition to defendants’ motion is whether defendants complied with Rule 11‘s notice requirement. As indicated above, a party moving for sanctions under Rule 11 must adhere to certain procedural requirements. The motion must be made separately from any other, and it must be served [on the offending attorney or unrepresented party] under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.4 Triantos v. Guaetta & Benson, LLC, 91 F.4th 556, 561 (1st Cir. 2024) (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting
On April 8, 2024, defendants served Melendez with a copy of their proposed motion for Rule 11 sanctions, along with an email informing plaintiff of their intent to file the motion on April 29, 2024, unless Melendez withdrew or appropriately amended his Motion to Supplement. See Doc. No. 50-3 at 3. On April 29, 2024, 21 days after service, defendants filed their motion for sanctions with the court. See Doc. No. 51. Nevertheless, Melendez argues that defendants failed to comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 because April 29, 2024, was the twenty-first
It is unclear whether Melendez‘s argument is sufficient to defeat defendants’ motion for sanctions. On the one hand, the procedural requirements of Rule 11 are mandatory rather than suggested and defendants filed their motion for sanctions before the expiration of the full 21-day safe harbor period. See Triantos, 91 F.4th at 561. On the other hand, there can be no question that defendants attempt[ed] to comply with the requirements of the safe-harbor provisions and Melendez had no intention of withdrawing or amending his Motion to Supplement. See id. at 563 (citation omitted) (concluding that sanctions order could not stand where parties seeking sanctions made no attempt to comply with the safe harbor provisions of Rule 11, district court failed to grapple with those requirements, and allowing sanctions order to stand would undermine the objectives of Rule 11). This court concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve this question because even if the court were to determine that defendants satisfied Rule 11‘s procedural requirements, it would still deny their motion for sanctions on the merits.
B. Whether sanctions are warranted
The record demonstrates that in his communications with Melendez regarding the proposed Motion to Supplement, Attorney Manousos presented Melendez with specific evidence showing why his proposed claims lacked merit. In particular, he provided Melendez with information explaining why plaintiff was incorrect to conclude that his UNH email account had been accessed without authorization. See Doc. Nos. 50-2 at 5-6 and 50-3 at ¶¶ 2-7. He also provided Melendez with the means to confirm that his UNH email account remained active and that his factual allegations regarding the deletion of his account were inaccurate. See Doc. No. 50-2 at 3-5. Additionally, Attorney Manousos warned Melendez that defendants would seek sanctions if plaintiff proceeded to present demonstrably false statements to the Court by filing his Motion to Supplement. Id. at 5. Melendez filed his Motion to Supplement despite the evidence and warning he received from Attorney Manousos. Thus, the record indicates that his Motion to Supplement lacked a sufficient factual basis to support the proposed claims. See Ryan v. Clemente, 901 F.2d 177, 179-80 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding sanctions based on allegations that state officials failed to investigate an illegal scheme despite evidence to the contrary).
Nevertheless, this court finds that the circumstances presented in this case weigh against the imposition of sanctions at this stage in the litigation. As an initial matter, courts have shown reluctance to impose sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys’ fees against pro se litigants. See, e.g., Triantos, 91 F.4th at 562-63 (considering plaintiff‘s pro se status in connection with a determination that plaintiff did not waive his procedural objections to a sanctions order directing him to pay attorneys’ fees and costs by failing to raise those objections in his opening brief on appeal); Johnson v. Continental Airlines Corp., No. 03-11992-PBS, 2008 WL 11510809, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2008) (declining to impose sanctions against self-represented plaintiff that would
This court also finds that sanctions are unwarranted due to the unique circumstances surrounding plaintiff‘s mental health. Melendez alleges that he suffers from a number of mental health disorders, including combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, paranoia, major depressive disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 38) at ¶ 28. He further alleges that the Department of Veteran‘s Affairs and the Social Security Administration each rated him 100% disabled, and that the aggravation of his symptoms can render him mentally incapable of completing social, work-related, or other necessary tasks. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 59. Although it is unclear whether and to what extent Melendez‘s mental health conditions have impacted him in the context of this litigation, the nature of his alleged condition further convinces the court that sanctions are inappropriate at this stage in the proceedings. For this reason as well, defendants’ motion for sanctions is denied. However, Melendez is cautioned that by signing pleadings filed in this court, all parties certify to the court their reasonable belief that their pleadings are filed with a proper purpose, that their claims and defenses are warranted, and that their allegations and denials of allegations have evidentiary support. Bone, 2001 WL 531531, at *3 (citing
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‘s Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. 50) and Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. 51) are denied.
SO ORDERED.
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
January 6, 2025
cc: Michael Melendez, pro se
Counsel of record
