Meldish v. BraatzMeldish v. Braatz
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.Pursuant to Putnam County indictment No. 92/1982, petitioner and four codefendants were charged jointly with the crime of assault in the second degree committed in the following manner: “The defendants, in the Town of Putnam Valley, County of Putnam and State of New York, on or about the 24th day of October, 1982, acting in concert and each aiding and abetting the other, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, to wit, John Joseph Mazzei, did cause such injury to John Joseph Mazzei by striking him around the head and body.” Concomitantly, and as a result of the same Grand Jury presentation, the petitioner was separately indicted under Put*317nam County indictment No. 88/1982 and charged with the further crimes of assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree committed as follows:
count no. 1
“The defendant, in the Town of Putnam Valley, County of Putnam and State of New York, on or about the 24th day of October, 1982, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, to wit, John Joseph Mazzei, did cause such injury to John Joseph Mazzei by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to wit, a shotgun.”
count no. 2
“The defendant in the Town of Putnam Valley, County of Putnam and State of New York, on or about the 24th day of October, 1982 * * * under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to other persons, to wit, the defendant did fire a shotgun in the direction of Diane Janeck, Richard Stumbo and John Joseph Mazzei.”
Although it is clear from the bill of particulars served by the People that the incident giving rise to both indictments occurred at approximately the same time and place (i.e., “at approximately 6:45 P.M. at Perry’s Farm * * * in the vicinity of a barn located thereon”), the theory of the prosecution as revealed elsewhere in its bill of particulars and in the Grand Jury minutes is that the group assault underlying indictment No. 92/1982 was perpetrated in a corral adjacent to the Perry barn, while the acts underlying indictment No. 88/1982 were perpetrated subsequently inside the barn by the petitioner alone.
In October of 1983, the petitioner and his four codefendants were placed on trial under indictment No. 92/1982, and following a motion made at the close of the People’s case were successful in obtaining a trial order of dismissal (
In our view, the petition must be granted to the extent of barring the petitioner’s prosecution under the first count of the pending indictment, but otherwise denied.
That prohibition will lie to bar a prosecution which is about to proceed in violation of the statutory preclusion against double jeopardy set forth in
With this definition in mind and from our review of the record (which includes, inter alia, a copy of the Grand Jury minutes), we have reached the conclusion that the charges sub judice and the charge embodied in the dismissed indictment (No. 92/1982) are, in fact, based upon a lone “criminal transaction”. It clearly appears that the events giving rise to both indictments had their origin in an *319exchange of words which allegedly took place between the petitioner and John Joseph Mazzei in the Perry corral on the day in question, whereupon the petitioner’s codefendants under indictment No. 92/1982 descended upon Mr. Mazzei and struck him, inter alia, with their fists. Then, for reasons which do not clearly appear, the attack abated and an associate of Mr. Mazzei’s was able to assist him into an adjoining barn. At this point, however, the altercation resumed, and it was during this renewed period of fighting that the petitioner allegedly committed the acts underlying the pending indictment (No. 88/1982), i.e., striking Mr. Mazzei over the head with a shotgun (assault in the first degree) and then firing the weapon in the direction of Mazzei and his companions (reckless endangerment in the first degree).
Although the foregoing scenario compels the conclusion that the events underlying both indictments were sufficiently related in time and circumstance to constitute integral parts of “a single criminal incident” (
Accordingly, while none of the statutory exceptions set forth in
Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Weinstein, Brown and Rubin, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent that the petitioner may not be prosecuted on the first count of indictment No. 88/1982; proceeding otherwise dismissed on the merits. The stay granted by this court on January 9, 1984 is vacated.