*1 fails if he gument April this case 1962—and 23, —in be requirements appeal may with the above comply dismissed. administration orderly prompt appeal as the interest of
law, justice, well taking no reluctance must be dismissed. We have ap- there argument this action because the oral will plaintiffs no merit in the pears appeal, case in Court their present still have an opportunity ordered. the lower Court at the new trial which dismissed. Appeal dissents.. Justice
Mr. Musmanno Appellant, Little. Meisel, v. March 1962. C. Mus-
Argued Before J., Bell, Eagen JJ. manno, Jones, Cohen, O’Brien, *2 Murray 8. with him Love, 8ikov Wirtzman, for appellants. Love,
Robert 8. with Mar- Grigsby, Bredin & Pringle, for appellee. tin,
Opinion by Mr. Justice 1962: Eagen, May 3, Janet Marie was ac- Meisel, minor, injured cident while riding a guest passenger in an auto- operated mobile defendant. At time, was single. ten Approximately months she mar- later, ried the defendant. these Subsequently, actions were instituted against the defendant, Wayne Richard Little, alleging that his careless accident. driving caused the The Mildred mother plaintiff, injured Meisel, sued to recover the minor, expended money necessarily in treatment of her daughter’s injuries and also lost earnings during The minority. minor plaintiff her natural through sued reason- guardian recover compensation pain able caused suffering and also for injuries future loss earning power.
After answer and filed to matter con- reply new tained the defendant filed a motion for judg- therein, ment on in the pleadings one action wherein the Janet Marie plaintiff. was the The court minor, Meisel, the motion. Both filed an plaintiffs below sustained appeal. aggrieved by Mildred was not Meisel, plaintiff, from. independent
the order action filed appealed appeal was on her behalf involved. Her really was entered because the court below mistaken- undoubtedly opinion course of its the action ly said could not be maintained. derivative and This irrespective action pursued not correct. This minor plaintiff. since the action However, from did not in fact appealed aggrieve the order *3 her must Meisel, appeal necessarily Mildred plaintiff, quashed. be other is wheth- appeal
The basic issue raised an action or not a maintain may er wife caused a tort com- injuries by for personal marriage. mitted prior could nor neither a husband wife
At common law
be-
injuries due to torts committed
other for
sue the
marriage. This was based
their
fore or during
and
are one per-
that a husband
premise
the legal
2d Ed. 670
Prosser on Torts,
entity.
See,
one
son,
and
upon social reasons
now based
This rule,
(1955).
of
in a great majority
followed
is still
public policy,
43 A.L.R. 2d
States. See,
in the United
jurisdictions
The same rule
and Wife
Husband
§82.
P.L.E.
18
632,
Common-
adhered
strictly
always
has been
it is
both statu-
Pennsylvania,
here
However,
wealth.
of June
P. L.
Act
8,1893,
344,
and decisional.
tory
March
P.
Act of
L.
27,
14,
1913,
amended
as
§3,
an action.
prohibits
such
specifically
§111,
48 PS
§1,
a married woman
“Hereafter
follows:
as
provides
It
in all
and
respects,
civilly,
sued
and
may sue
549
form of
and with
effect
results
action,
the same
and
an unmarried
but
consequences,
person;
not sue her
may
except
husband,
proceeding for
or in a
and recover
divorce,
proceeding
protect
separate
pro-
nor
he sue
property;
her, except
re-
or
ceeding
in a
or
protect
divorce,
proceeding
cover his separate property.”
(Emphasis supplied)
present
does
fall within
any of
exceptions. Unliquidated
above enumerated
claims
damage are not
“property”
meaning
within
44
Act.
Miller v.
Pa. 170
See,
Miller,
(1863); Sen
Penna.
v.
R.R.
It *4 dissipated pas- been has which fiction quated in 1848. Women’s Acts beginning Married of the sage clear legislature in that the fact This overlooks as late as the year 1913, has said language specific nor a wife the other may sue a husband neither that Appel- a cause of action. upon such during coverture advanced realistically more be might position lant’s upon decisional law. completely But, rested rule if the categorical exists a legis- There ease. not this provi- of the prohibition. statutory lative wisdom not for sion is us say. the Statute
Appellant requests also us to rule that is tolled the tort occurs before Limitations where before in consummated marriage, is, turn, is not This statutory period. question of the running not anticipate a situation now before us. We will involved. presently involved the facts is quashed. of Mildred Meisel Appeal (No. 10) affirmed. No. Appeal Judgment 9, Opinion Dissenting Musmanno: Mr. Justice carelesslyj On Richard Little July 6, Wayne 1958, into an ran automobile his recklessly negligently Pitts- Boulevard “underpass” on Saw Mill Run riding girl as a result of the burgh and, collision, in- bodily with Marie sustained Janet him, Meisel, attor- of an put She the matter into the hands juries. minor), mother ney who, through (since Richard Wayne in trespass against an action In the filed on June 1960. Little. suit was 15, Janet happened else something meantime, however, mar- tortfeasor and Marie. She fell love with her April 1959. taking place ried him, When Richard Little was served with Wayne attorney he notified the trespass action papers car insured which had company for the insurance here It stated damages. must be liability in per- during prius that trials nisi parenthetically entertained pleasant fiction is cases injury sonal liability the defendant carries no one knows knowledge that such supposed because it is insurance it in favor might predispose jury part on the here the deliberations of the However, the plaintiff. such fictions state, of last resort must court *5 realities are set conclusions consonant with aside, I be attained. when Opinion this Dissenting Thus, Richard of speak Wayne the of the defendant actions Little I insurance the actions of his mean, course, filed the company which is the real suit party opposing Janet Marie. the .upon Richard Wayne receiving Little, then, on complaint filed motion for judgment this a case, to the that “it pleadings, averring contrary public Pennsylvania the Commonwealth of policy trespass for a for spouse bodily maintain an action spouse.” Court injuries surviving Common mo- Pleas of County sustained Allegheny tion and plaintiff’s complaint. dismissed the plaintiff and the Majority appealed, Court has affirmed the decision of the court below, stating prohibition Pennsylvania wife suing during “statutory coveture Opinion and decisional.” The attention Majority calls fact neither nor that “At common law a husband could to torts com- injuries wife sue the other due marriage. mitted before or their This during that a husband and legal premise based are one one entity.” person, of this Prosser on support proposition cites “prem- 2d Ed. fact 670. Aside
Torts, that “a husband and wife are one is a person” ise” after palpable impossibility, Majority, accepting Prosser as an fails to state that authority, Prosser, after pages monumental work two Torts, only noted devas- the historical statement Majority, one-person the common condemns law entity tatingly belonged “All this state affairs to' a thesis: social been dead more than a which has century. order about 1844 statutes known as Married Wom- Beginning Emancipation passed were Acts, all Acts, en’s which were designed jurisdictions, primarily American separate legal identity to secure to a married woman a *6 separate legal property.” (Em- and a estate in her own phasis supplied) Pennsylvania
In may own married women now property from free husbands, the interference of their they may they sue and be unmarried, sued as if were they may become accommodation ahd sureties makers mortgage joinder and and without of their husbands, may acquire, possess, mort- own, control, use, lease, gage any property personal real or mixed, kind, they may convey joinder property and real without the of the husband. chain fastened The links of the which self-assuming the common law wife like a to a su- slave perior tyrannical and one husband have been smashed respected one until the wife in America now stands accepted phase society person every and a as free of her individual activities. spite of all we find this this, that this Court at job
late hour the afternoon of a done in behalf well emancipation unreasonable women thongs subserviency, of common insists that law still yet entity that somehowhusband wife are one disrupts entity if a wife sues husband infelicity that marital discord and domestic are bound Opinion Majority to follow. The thus states in tort at bar that wife sue husband “public policy.” defendant’s actions is expatiating subject, de- asserts that this brief, right her husband based nial of the wife’s sue “is promote principle public policy sound on the unity family family and avoid discord and disturb- ance.” repression promote family actually
But does such unity? If a husband beats his some wife, can, with unity degree family be assumed that realism, until been at least the wife shattered, has now recovers eyes” regain her “black from her bruises and the color their, of. normal pigmentation. How can that be further if the unity damaged proceeds civilly sue the husband the harm he has to her? her husband permits prosecute law the wife to in such a kind of a criminally situation. Does that incarcera- end in the husband’s procedure, may promote tion, family unity? company)
As much as the defendant insurance (the much as may eulogize unity” “family inability of the wife to sue argue disturb- discord and tort actions will “avoid family noth- done has it is certain that such inability ance,” divorce to reduce the as can be ing, perceived, so'far *7 mar- there were 71,885 rate Pennsylvania. divorces. 14,429 and there were Pennsylvania riages Division Department of Health, The Pennsylvania increas- rate is divorce has stated that Statistics, rate of divorce out that pointed and has ing that of 1959. than higher was 3.9% liti intra-marital civil prohibition against That the is a woven unity fantasy gation promotes family looks one who obvious filaments is flimsiest in deceived cliches by and is not the facts of life Wayne not that it is know very In this we vention. if Janet money to lose any stands Richard Little who It is the against him. in her lawsuit recovers Marie the verdict. pay have to which will company insurance com insurance a verdict of such The payment of disturb instead promote, thus will pany, happy be husband and wife will both Certainly unity. ex other and and that medical bills realization in the July 6, of the accident because accruing penses treasury company’s of the insurance out come will budget.* modest couple’s married the young Wayne plaintiff’s * Although filed a suit mother has daugh- charged expenses prior to her for medical Richard 5'54 acci- fact that must lose sight
We never prior lawsuit occurred dent which about If the- Wayne. Janet and marriage to the between mu- creates a that a suit between husband and wife ory what credence, given any hostile to be tually feeling supposed is offered for the fact that explanation marry- and Wayne did not Janet prevent hostility strong which is one another? the love ing Certainly one has persons together two after enough bring would accident hurt the other an automobile after a court ad- together to hold them strong enough between relationship business strictly judicates had car If Janet them out of that accident. arising damaged Wayne of her and it was before own her to sue during permit the law would marriage, to her to the damage according for the done car but, him for physical could not sue Majority decision, Is in that same accident. injuries which she sustained common in accordance consistent and with logical, for a that a wife her husband broken sense sue not for a broken leg? fender but suing There is no legal prohibition a wife (and course) her husband vice action versa, there is is based on contract. Is it to be assumed enmity less likelihood of engendering disharmony *8 a if either the of spouse the other over breaking sues unpremeditated formal than over an traffic agreement mishap? human nature and has Anyone who knows of much any experience had the life knows how ways in a battle bitterness sometimes arises between relatives of from disputed profits a over a piece property, over interpretation of a will. business, in- hatred the Certainly product conflicting charges when one apt spouse it is more arise terests, marriage, expenses all the husband will be liable for ter’s no marriage, how incurred. matter wife after the the other with deliberate promise of one’s breaking recorded in solemnly a solemn covenant than if the conflicting spontaneous interests from mis- spring calculation of an driving automobile. After all, suit this case is based on an accident charges resulted from negligence. her husband’s Negligence import does not Negligence is enmity. carelessness. simply It is not on premeditation based charged which, the de- contrary, always liberate breaking or of a contract. breaching
If litigation between husband and wife is it public should not be policy, permitted but all, when the permit litigation courts such out of rising a contractual prohibits but it when relationship out of a paradox lay arises is created which accident, people have And when difficulty comprehending. paradoxes are gravity noted by people, of respect for and faith in of the lessening the wisdom law and the courts is inevitable. does one take out insurance on one’s
Why liability automobile? is to one Primarily, save course, financial burdens the event he should heavy into an accident But unfortunately get and be sued. there is another and that reason mo- too, is, torist to be in a do position wishes something he hurt. person Every person unintentionally appreciation with an honesty self-respect, just obligations; desires to meet his dignity mankind, has person least that one can do for the he and the unintentionally grief compensate is to for the he has had to and the loss expenses undergo no fault of his own. The conscien- through he suffers about motorist thus is thinking protecting tious from his mistakes as much as he is pro- world whole through it not himself. Is strange, then, tecting expounded this Court of the law workings financial ambulance which has in the the motorist pur-
556 carry safety, renewed
chased remedial care, injured well-being persons may on life’s he have such highway, everybody loves he room for but those there is stranger place am- in that most? The remotest has a nor his children, bulance not his not wife, but premiums paid parents. Why? Not he hasn’t because may anybody policy he on a is intended to cover which (and injure, course, I am, Court but because this speaking Pennsylvania, only because there are here more little the matter a other States which look principles realistically conformity with more way justice) some of true that somehow, has declared public (not explained Majority) it is policy for one take care of his own. Majority as at Court
Of of this course, isn’t present doc- this cruel constituted which has announced present carrying Majority only out trine. The majorities proclaimed by rule heretofore other bring change I I Court. rule. would would developed glaring injustices end to of the kind In that case of Parles v. Pa. 287. the case Paries, five-year-old Majority held that a child could parents on the maintain an action in tort its unity disrupt theory family that such an action would family promote The Ma- and disturbance. discord spite jority this in fact view that, said parents com- not be case, insurance in the would expend pelled money as the a dollar of their own any “Where, rendered in the case. result of verdict dis- there arise cause would therefore, question my harmony?” I asked dis- That is the opinion senting not answered. and was particularly because I believe I refer to repudiate come to disavow and overrule, the time has Majority in that Ma- case. The what was stated relationship two-way “Family jority affair: said: flow care and affection still parental devotion *10 in- toward member of the confined in the family a stitution in a on account of hospital was baby [the relationship brain and injury] phase this and litigation well severed between the child may by the parent.” “sheer argument
I referred to the time as say To of course and still is. sophistry,” was which, an family relationship a will be severed because that child to injured buy is to receive to money medicine, hospital bed, to hire to rent a employ doctors, nurses, do do restore and to science can to everything helpless a frame and to the lantern of a light to vigor opposed demon- brain —is to what to say darkened contrary knowledge, strated to common phenomena, antago- and effect, the law cause and repugnant reverence, reality love, to established based nistic and child. parent between loyalty If same is true in the case at bar. this Court no a wife the view that under circumstances may is of arbi- her it should so say sue husband, didactically, explana- attempt It should not trarily finally. insults logic and reason, which offends tion justice. jettisons not is bound present Majority says
But the decisions this Court but statute. prior by only Opin- the Majority look at the statute us Let P. L. 8, The Act of June Assembly 1893, ion refers. P. L. 27, amended the Act of March 1913, §3, 344, a inter “Hereafter provides, alia, P.S. 48 §1, §111, 14, re- in all sue and be sued civilly, woman married form of and with the same action, spects, as an unmarried and consequences, and results effect in a except not sue her husband, but she may person; inor proceeding protect for divorce, proceeding sup- .” . . (Emphasis separate property recover plied) It is confined separate property?
is What personal property. it includes Obviously estate. real 558 prop-
Janet’s to recover for her right injuries became a on erty right the accident occurred. It day bond, in action.” “thing due on or “Money note, other damages due for breach of contract, covenant, the detention of are un- included chattels, torts, der this or title general head action.” things (Em- American phasis supplied). Kent’s Commentaries Ed. 14th Law, 351,
Under the Act of June right P. L. 3, 1887, sepa- of a wife an action for a tort done to is her 168.) rate v. Pa. property. (Walker Philadelphia, *11 In the case of Carver v. P. 2d the 44, Ferguson, in- like the one in the was plaintiff, who, bar, jured the mar- through negligence of the man she later The ried, brought against suit him coverture. during rejected trial court the but the District Court suit, Third stating: reversed Appeals, District, California, “. . . the entire transaction must be regarded by as one her concerning separate wife toas property, no can be asserted to the disability litigate according fortuitous circumstance of whether the hap- defendant her husband instead pens of a third . . . party The this case is the that fundamental feature fact accrued to right prior marriage.” (Em- wife phasis supplied) language the Pennsylvania Act of as 1893, is not as absolute as Court it
amended,
today’s
holds
As
as
recently
to be.
this Court
a
permitted
action
trespass
against
a widow
by
her deceased hus-
personal
representative
band’s
the casé of Johnson
Bk.
v.
First Nat.
& Tr.
Peoples
55Ó have against since she conld no action es- his lifetime had no action his during Court tate after death. I a member of was partici- which reversed the trial and of course court, un- pated that wise and decision. proper However, der of this Court the action of ruling today, improper. barring Court in Johnson case was suit a her husband his life- during time on the as- predicated (as Majority holds) is harmony sumed domestic public policy preserving changes I that be- don’t see how felicity. policy hus- cause husband is dead. Does a widow love surviving he about 'the band less after dies? What the back- members of the which is family, —the If there moral- bone of is organized society? something wrong the husband to be showing incorrect about ly it doubly seem me to be alive, while he would dead de- he is and cannot wrong to attack when I approved I repeat fend himself. emphatically made in the Johnson case when it of the decision good I endorse heartily still law today, the deci- precedent reversing I it is believe case at court sion of the lower bar, pro- to sue her order to husband, for a wife proper *12 her be- after husband is tect property rights, dead, her her performed act he he of a while was negligent cause proper it should be for a to wife sue living husband, performed act he he negligent for a her husband before husband. her became a 1893 as heretofore that Act of states, quoted, pro- her in . . . except not a husband, sue “may separate her property.” and recover protect
ceeding to- interpreted been is has language If this right a wife would have no bar, in the day her is trespass action where in a participate defendant. additional Whether she an in as brought him is still su- originally additionally, sued has against public policy him be- suing if is ing him, cause such an action tranquillity disturbs the domestic and marital I fail to felicity, public policy see how . appeased a third suing through person. Mrs. the case of Koontz v. 320 Pa. Messer, Koontz injured negligence was as the result of the Forrest husband, Koontz, employee Quaker en- State Oil Refining while he was Co., in the course of that business. Mrs. gaged company’s Koontz entered suit in trespass against company and a Samuel plaintiff’s owner Messer, father and of the car. The defendants in Koontz Forrest brought as an additional defendant. proceeded The case trial and the returned jury verdicts favor of the plaintiff against original and in favor defendants of the original defendants addi- Koontz, tional defendant. The defendants seeking appealed, that Koontz judgment n.o.v., arguing since Mrs. could not sue who was her Koontz, she could husband, sue his masters. reasoned They that since a.master’s liability is derivative the master could not be one, (cid:127) liable the servant is not liable. Under the ruling Court argument today, defendants in the Koontz been case should have a valid one because if, Act of Koontz under the could not be held liable to his wife damages any tortious on what act, employer should his be liable when ground supposed is based on the husband’s tortious act? If liability of the Act 1893 is to purpose preserve domestic and marital tranquillity, as this Court says what today, to that happened domestic tranquillity the Koontz Koontz was when as an additional trial defendant? -At that Mrs. Koontz had to show husband was at that her he had fault, improperly that he driven the car, inattentive, he was If and so on. this was spite reckless, proper, it not proper 1893, why Act of the instant- case *13 Marie to Janet Little show what for Mrs. Rich- Wayne did he was her Little when husband? ard Mr. Superior Fisher v. Ct. 476, Pa. Diehl, and Mrs. Maurice an (driver passenger Fisher Richard trespass suit automobile) brought against injuries S. owner of sustained Diehl, the truck, the truck Diehl when collided with the automobile. brought Maurice defendant Fisher as an additional and the favor Fisher returned verdict in of Mrs. jury Richard Maurice against Diehl and Maurice Fisher. Fisher insurance his (undoubtedly speaking through judgment ground moved company) n.o.v., there that he plaintiff was the husband and, Supe him improper. action fore, against was rior de party Court said that the husband was not a con fendant to the far Mrs. Fisher was so action, extravagant cerned. Of statement was course, he a defendant? subterfuge. Why party wasn’t He to appear against he had court sued, wife, to What and he had to which went his wife. pay money Superior makes a defendant? person party judgment against Court said that was “simply of the original to the benefit de enuring a judgment required or is wife’s pays pay fendant if he requires the husband to pay it then judgment; damages one-half of the only defendant original joint negligence a result latter as by the paid both.” mat- no argumentation because
This mere clever partici- wife the fact remains put how it is ter testified she husband, action pated money and the wrong, said he was him, in her up finally ended pay had husband purse. unity legal “The Court said: Superior
But domestic preservation wife and things are desirable them between felicity peace to the injustice not produce do they where maintain out- inflict they injustice and where do not *14 5'62 of deprive legal rights.” (Em-
aiders and them their phasis supplied) why that line of in at bar
Using the case reasoning re- Is the permitted isn’t Janet to sue her husband? “injustice sult not an announced here Majority by to the wife?” Superior 102 Pa. Nesbit v. Nesbit Cas. Ins. & Co., for her
Ct. working Mrs. Nesbit was while 554, injured claim brought husband in She his meat market. compensa- compensation and was awarded company tion. The the insurance husband (always to the according undoubtedly) appealed, arguing not sue her husband. law a wife may Pennsylvania, act compensation The “The Superior Court held that procedure is a from of common law departure is not litigation.”
We have seen from I dis- have cited and cases cussed that On Act of jacket. 1893 is a strait it was intended contrary, piece liberating as in legislation emancipation keeping with the of woman- kind which began earnest the mid-nineteenth cen- This tury. Court, by arresting its decision of today, that emancipation phases. vital program one of its The whole trend of the Married been Women’s Acts has to assure to complete married woman right as property as if feme-sole. untrammeledly she were a Any reasoning prevents a married woman obtaining which was married property hers before she is bound to be arbitrary. it is bound Majority says a statute but a statute interpreted in the light history which it birth. gave purpose Act of 1893 was to enlarge rights of wives, not to restrict them.
In the v. Thompson 218 U.S. Thompson, Supreme Court of the United States called up- on to interpret a statute in the District Columbia provided; women “Married shall pow- have code which er to engage whether and to business, contract, engaged business or and to sue not, separately their re- and also to sue for the contracts, separately protection covery, security of their property, for torts freely committed as them, fully were unmarried.” they (Emphasis supplied)
A Mrs. Thompson trespass against suit her husband in the sum of claiming damages ¡§70,000 because of her person “diverse assaults upon *15 Con- husband.” The of Court held that the majority com- could down gress not have intended to break the mon rule her law that a wife not sue husband tort. Justices John Wen- Marshall Oliver Harlan, of and Charles three Hughes, dell Holmes, Evans the of the the whole truly great justices history dissenting Supreme strong United States filed Court, the responded to opinion which I more closely believe of nothing of reason and logic say demands law, —to Opinion. justice Majority the Justice Harlan, —than “If said: supported Justices Holmes Hughes, wife’s of his violently possession the takes husband the under may, her she and withholds property for But such recovery. its separately, sue statute, him, de- If or injures tort. he action be one in a civil will sue under the may, statute, property her stroys also action would That damages. for him, separately, what are disputed, If these propositions one in tort. the effect in the statute to becomes of the words security for recovery, the separately ‘sue she may conceded are But they of property? her protection’ the under Congress, must be—then I think they —as statute, on the court by the placed now construction a married allowing of position the anomalous put the for tort, separately, her to sue woman the right her denying but her property, recovery damages for in tort, him separately, to sue privilege I her from his brutal assaults person. arising about will not assume that intended to Congress bring such I it intended to result. cannot believe permit tort, the wife to the husband separately, sue for damages detention, the recovery, including of her and at same time her deny property, tort committed to sue right him, separately, person.” Justice reflects dissenting opinion Harlan's modern just view and the suits be regard view with spouses. tween varying Seventeen States (in have now forms) adopted interspousal the rule favoring civil (43 litigation. position A.L.R. 647-651.) 2d, taken in the California Carver apparently case, supra, finds favor in In Curtis v. England. Wilcox [1948] 2 K.B. 2 All. E.R. held that a was CA, 573 — right damages wife’s of action husband for out of arising injuries from negligent operation in an accident automobile, prior which occurred marriage within parties, property meaning provision Wom English Married en’s Act that each entitled married woman should be to have and dis separate hold as her and to property *16 be pose personal all real and of, which has property to her longed the time of or should be marriage acquired devolve Earlier upon her after marriage. cases which be stated rule were said to contrary wrongly (43 and not decided, good law. A.L.R. 2d, 643).
I believe time has come to tear away veils of and show who camoflage are the parties real I believe that litigation. for a court wrong to speak of promoting family unity and tran- domestic quillity by refusing suits the character here before us when it clear is as as the sun in the heavens that permit is to increase litigation domestic tran- and quillity family felicity. The in- payment by the expenses from an un- company resulting surance fortunate pay, and accident, which it has contracted to will family save the crushingly heavy from a financial spell burden hardship which could tremendous and misery. cause litigation domestic I believe that such only public does not policy, offend on but, contrary, supports promotes good public policy. I really something against believe that there is public policy in a which doctrine holds that the head protect of a the whole world negligence except wholly those he loves most and are dependent upon him for maintenance and subsistence. say
To perfectly proper that means of a lawsuit, every way, moral and ethical instituted a wife against her money the wife husband, receives which she way needs and which no decreases what say perfectly has; that a decorous trial in a court- way room, resolves an issue which in no reflects party; the moral say standards of either procedure promote such a civilized will domestic dis- upset family (when unity cord we know that both parties happy are result) satisfied and with the simply not the truth. IAnd believe that the law should represent the truth at all times.
Fiction for fantasy should be the novelists and clairvoyants. Labyrinthian sophistical expla- superannuated philosophers nations should rest- ing maples melancholy in the shade of as the sun of disappears reality mystic conjec.- into the darkness of supposition. ture and In the courts there should be complicated reasoning no need for the elaborate and Peoples in Johnson v. manifested First Nat. Bk. & Tr. supra, supra, and Koontz v. Co., Messer, to achieve justice the case Parks v. in- inflict Parks, justice. *17 question speaks statute in with irresistible says It
clearness. a married woman sue to property. accept recover her Either the Court should Where so. accept its say mandate refuse —and through indemnifier lawsuit is directed recog- courts should the medium of another person, re- involved nize that is the party the indemnifier aim at substance sponsible. law should in the instant The formal defendant shadows. lia.- far financial so but, is Richard Little Wayne in- symbol is merely he bility concerned, paid money pay he company surance to which noth- injure. There is he might everybody expenses this indem- says in his insurance policy ing he loved girl but the nification applies everyone now wife. I dissent. Dairy, Inc. Appellant, Blue Mountain v.
Levin, Argued April 1962. Before Jones, C. J., Bell, Eagen JJ. Cohen, O’Brien, H. him Stevens & Weidner, Lee, Charles with appellant.