delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff, as administratrix of her deceased husband’s estate, brought this action to recover damages sustained by her husband resulting from an automobile collision between the automobile in which the deceased was riding and another driven by one Torgerson, an officer of the defendant company. The deceased was injured while riding in a car along the highway lеading from Butte to Anaconda in the night-time. The ear driven by Torgerson collided with the rear end of the car in which the deceased was riding while both cars were proceeding in the same direction, resulting in the injuries from which the husband of plaintiff died some ten days after the collision. A trial of the case resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $6,000, and judgment was entered in accordance therewith. A motion for new trial was made, heard and denied. The appeal is from the judgment.
On the 'trial of the case a witness who saw Torgerson some little time after the accident had happened, but before he had departed from the scene, after relating generally his knowledge and experience with reference to observing intoxicated persons, was questioned with reference to whether Torgerson was intoxicated. Objection was interposed on the ground that the question called for a conclusion and the proper foundation had not *322 been laid. The objection was overruled, and the witness answered that Torgerson was intoxiсated. This .ruling is assigned as error.
It is generally held that witnesses may express their opinion on the question of intoxication without qualifying as experts on the subject, and that such opinions are not conclusions which the ordinary witness is not entitled- to draw from his own observation. These matters are of common knowledge and observation.
(Commonwealth
v.
Barber,
Error is assigned on the ruling of the court permitting inquiry on cross-examination of one of the witnesses for the defendant as to whether Torgerson, the driver of the car, was in a crippled condition before he received injuries in the accident. Objection was made that it was not proper cross-examination. The court agreed with the objection but permitted the witness to answer. He said that he knew that Torgerson used “a cane when he walks. ’ ’ Obviously the cross-examination was improper and the court should have sustained the objection, but from the record it appears that- Torgerson was present in court and *323 testified during the trial of the cause. Thе witness merely said that he knew that Torgerson used a cane when he walked. If such is the fact, the jury, by using their senses, would observe the very thing to which the witness testified, and we are unable to see wherein the answer would in any way prejudice the rights of the defendant, as it only amounted to telling the jury what they would otherwise know.
During the cross-examination of one of the witnessеs of the defendant it appears that counsel for plaintiff was making inquiry with reference to the custom and practice of the defendant company in securing reports of accidents. The witness said of the report, “It is then brought into the Anaconda office and turned over to the insurance company.” Counsel for the plaintiff then made the fоllowing inquiry: “Do you send these reports to the office of the insurance company in Butte then?” Objection was interposed and the court said of the question which had elicited the first response: “As I understand your question, you asked what his instructions to his drivers were and he told you that the drivers reported to the insurance company ? ’ ’ That part of the record which relates to the turning of the report over to the insurance company is in narrative form. The objection was by the court sustained to the quoted question. It is urged that the injection of the question of insurance into the record was reversible error by appropriate specification. We have held that where the insurance company is nоt a party to the proceeding, ordinarily any attempt to convey to the jury the fact that a defendant is indemnified by insurance against loss arising from tortious liability is error. Our decisions on that subject are reviewed and cited in the case of
Vonault
v.
O’Rourke,
*324
It is apparent, in the light of the trial court’s remark, that the subject of insurance was first injected into this case by the witness testifying voluntarily, and not in response to a question by counsel for the plаintiff. The further inquiry made by counsel, while improper, did not add anything to the statement of the witness. It is generally held in most jurisdictions where similar views obtain to our own, that voluntary, unresponsive and incidental answers disclosing that the defendant carried liability insurance come within an exception .to the rule, and where the subject of liability insurance thus creeps into the record, a reversal is not warranted, especially where, as here, the damages are not asserted to be excessive.
(York Ice Machinery
Co. v.
Sachs,
It is contended by numerous specifications of error that the trial court was in error in denying defendant’s motion for nonsuit, and also its motion for a directed verdict, on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. It is argued in support of these contentions that the evidence fails to show that Torgerson, who was driving the car, was acting as an agent of the defendant company within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision.
Admittedly, Torgerson was the secretary of the defendant corporation, and the car which he was driving was licensed in the name of Torgerson Brothers, another corporation. The defendant company operated a bus depot in Butte, Montana, which was used by other bus companies. The witness O’Neil testified that he was a salesman and in Anaconda on the afternoon of November 14, 1933, the evening preceding the injury, and that *325 in leaving Anaconda on bis return to Butte be left from the “big garage” on Main Street which is owned and operated by Torgerson Brothers. He said he was there awaiting the return of another salesman with whom he returned to Butte. Of that occasion he said: “I remember seeing Mr. Torgerson, who is sitting there beside his counsel, with two other gentlemen. I do not know who thesе other two gentlemen were, and if they were in court I would not know them. Q. "What, if anything, called this scene of Mr. Torgerson to your mind at this time, Mr. O’Neil? A. Well, at the time I was waiting there I was to meet this gentleman to ride back with him. He told me to meet him at this garage between five and six o’clock. I was down there waiting around for him to come back, and these three gentlemen сame into the garage there, and it seemed like two of the gentlemen had missed the bus, and Mr. Torgerson here said that he was going to Butte. And it seemed that these gentlemen didn’t want to put him out to go over there, but he said in'his conversation that he had business to take care of in Butte — that he had papers and business to take care of in the bus depot in Butte anyway, and he was going over.”
Mrs. Ethel Godbout testified that on the same evening she went to the bus depot of the defendant in Butte after 6 o’clock and saw Mr. Torgerson there. She said of him at that time: “He was behind the desk and he apparently was looking at letters or something like that. There was a kind of little cubbyhole there. He was also in front of the cash registеr.” She related that she later returned in the evening about 8 o’clock and on that occasion she saw Mr. Torgerson standing behind the cash register.
Grace Roderick testified that she knew Mr. Torgerson and was in company with Mrs. Godbout on both visits to the bus depot on that evening. She testified as to his conduct with reference to the first visit, as follows: “The first trip I made to thе bus terminal Mr. Torgerson was selling a ticket and he answered the telephone, and that is all that I noticed he did.” And as to the second visit, she said: “Mr. Torgerson was work *326 ing around there, and I saw him opening some mail and he answered the telephone. On this second visit to the bus terminal I imagine we remained there about fifteen minutes before the bus arrived, and Mr. Torgerson was there during all that time. ’ ’ These ladies explained their presence in the depot bus by stating that they went there the first time to ascertain the time of the arrival of busses from Anaconda, and on the second occasion to meet a friend due to arrive by bus.
The evidence on behalf of the defendant as given by many witnesses denied all of the quoted testimony supra, with the exception that Torgerson admitted that two men accompanied him from Anaconda to Butte on the evening in question. From the testimony of Torgerson and other witnesses it appears that on the evening in question he attended a dinner party as an invited guest at a night club in Meaderville, returned to Butte after midnight and proceeded from thеre toward Anaconda which was his home and place of residence.
"We have frequently announced the rule that on motion for nonsuit or directed verdict the evidence must be viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the plaintiff, and every fact must be deemed proved which the evidence tends to prove. No case should evеr be withdrawn from the jury when reasonable men might draw a different conclusion from the evidence.
(Nangle
v.
Northern Pacific Ry.
Co.,
In the case of
Harrington
v.
H. D. Lee Mercantile Co.,
Admittedly, Torgerson was an officer of the defendant company. The question is fairly presented: Was he in making the trip from Anaconda to Butte (viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff), acting within the scope of his employment? We have detailed supra all the testimony which we find in the record which tends in any manner to establish that Torgerson was so acting in making the trip from Anaconda to Butte. The fact that Torgerson in making this trip was driving a car not the property of the defendant company and which he ordinarily used for his own рersonal service, will not preclude plaintiff from recovery. (Notes in 87 A. L. R. 787; 60 A. L. R. 1163; 57 A. L. R. 739.) In Blashfield’s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, page 130, it is written: “No hard and fast rule can be laid down by which it would be possible to determine in every instance whether the driver of a motor vehicle, in the general employ of another, was acting within the scope of his employment at a given time, but rather each case is to be decided largely upon its own facts, merely keeping in mind the basic idea that the use of the vehicle at the time must have been in the service of the employer, or while about his business.” We agree with the foregoing observations and the citation of decisions can only serve to illustrate the application of these *328 fundamental rules. Under the quoted evidence, Torgerson went to Butte at least in part on a mission for the defendant company and was apparently — viewing the evidence as we must view it — attending to some matters on its behalf in its bus depot while there.
It is urged that because he deviated from that purpose after arriving in Butte by attеnding a dinner party at Meaderville, he thereupon ceased to act within the scope of his employment, and if the accident had occurred while he was going to, or from, Meaderville and before his return to Butte, without question Torgerson during that period was acting without the scope of his employment
(Harrington
v.
Lee Mercantile Co.,
supra); but after his return to Butte and procеeding over the same route which he had traveled from Anaconda to Butte, he thereby resumed the prosecution of the defendant’s business and was acting within the scope of his employment.
(Cummings
v.
Republic Truck Co.,
We conclude that the court properly overruled defendant’s motions for nonsuit and directed verdict.
The defendant offered to prove that when this aсtion was begun there were three defendants, namely, Torgerson, the driver of the car, Torgerson Brothers, a corporation, and the appellant, but that the other two defendants had paid the sum of $7,350 to the plaintiff in consideration of the execution and delivery of a covenant not to sue. The record does not disclose any. ruling by the cоurt on the offer; however, the proof was not admitted. Apparently by stipulation of counsel the covenant not to sue is found in the record. It was entered into by the plaintiff in her representative capacity and as an individual. It was expressly provided in this document that plaintiff in both capacities reserved her right to proceed against thе
*329
defendant company. This court in an extensive opinion reviewing the authorities, in the case of
Black
v.
Martin,
It is argued that the court was in error in refusing to admit the offered testimony. It is generally held that testimony of this character is admissible in cases of this kind under appropriate pleadings in mitigation of damages.
(Anti
v.
Boston Elevated Railroad,
Defendant did not plead the covenant not to sue nor allege that any payments had been made to plaintiff on account of its execution, or otherwise. In order for defendant to render this testimony admissible it was necessary that some appropriate allegation be found in the answer.
(Shapiro
v.
Lyon,
Plaintiff, however, stipulated in the trial court and again renews the same offer that one-half of the sum of $7,350 should be applied in satisfaction of this judgment. We have recognized in the case of the death of a minor that two causes of action arise, one in favor of the parents for the loss of services during minority, and another which is in favor of the minor himself which survives and may be prosecuted by his administrator.
(Burns
v.
Eminger,
The cause is remanded' with directions that if the plaintiff will consent to a reduction of the judgment recovered in the sum of $3,675 within thirty days after the filing of the remittitur from this court, the reduction to be effective as of the date of the rendition of the judgment in the trial court, the judgment as so reduced will stand affirmed; if not, the judgment is reversed with direction to the trial court to grant a new trial to the defendant.