Opinion
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 18938 and 18940 determine eligibility for benefits under California’s Cash Assistance Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled Legal Immigrants (CAPI). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 18937 et seq.) 1 An immigrant is eligible for CAPI benefits based in part on whether he or she “entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996.” (§ 18938, subd. (a)(2) & (3).) There are no California cases construing section 18938 or the phrase “entered the United States” as used in that statute.
Rita Saenz (Appellant) is director of the California Department of Social Services (DSS), which is charged with supervising CAPI. (§ 18937.) The DSS has construed “entered the United States” in section 18938 to mean the date an immigrant attained his or her current immigration status. (Cal. Dept. Social Services Manual of Policies & Procedure § 49-020.
BACKGROUND
I. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). (8 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) PRWORA severely restricted the eligibility of legal immigrants for federally funded benefits otherwise provided to needy persons, including benefits
Congress enacted PRWORA in part to promote self-sufficiency and to discourage aliens from immigrating to the United States just to avail themselves of welfare or other public resources. (8 U.S.C. § 1601;
Aliessa ex rel. Fayad
v.
Novella
(2001)
II. CAPI.
In 1998, the California Legislature enacted CAPI to provide benefits to qualifying aged, blind and disabled legal immigrants who, as a result of PRWORA, are no longer eligible for federal SSI benefits due solely to their immigration status. (§§ 18937, 18938, subd. (a); Stats. 1998, ch. 329, § 38.) CAPI provides a monthly subsistence grant to low-income persons who would have been eligible for federal SSI under the immigrant rules in effect before enactment of PR.WORA, and who otherwise meet the criteria for SSI benefits. (§§ 18938, subd. (a)(1), 18941.) Eligible immigrants include (1) LPR’s; (2) immigrants permanently residing in the United States under color of law (PRUCOL’s), i.e., residing in this country with the knowledge and permission of immigration authorities who do not plan to deport them (MPP, supra, § 49-005(p)(3)); and (3) other “qualified aliens.” 3 (MPP, supra, § 49-020.12.)
Eligibility for CAPI benefits is determined in part by section 18938— the statute at issue in this case. Section 18938 sets forth three eligibility groups based in part on whether the applicants entered the United States before August 22, 1996, or on or after that date: (1) immigrants who entered before that date; (2) immigrants who entered on or after that date and whose sponsors are dead, disabled, or abusive; and (3) other immigrants who entered on or after that date. (§ 18938, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) The group an immigrant falls into is relevant because it determines which sponsor-deeming rules for income apply. (§ 18940, subd. (b).) A sponsor is a person who signs a contract or “affidavit of support” agreeing to support an immigrant as a condition of his or her admission for permanent residence in the
CAPI provides that applicants in the first two groups—immigrants who entered before August 22, 1996, or whose sponsors are dead, disabled or abusive—are governed by federal SSI sponsor-deeming rules. (§ 18940, subd. (b).) Under the federal rules, the number of years of sponsor deeming depends upon the type of affidavit of support the immigrant’s sponsor signed. Depending on the affidavit, immigrants are either (1) subject to three years of sponsor deeming (old affidavit of support), or (2) subject to deeming until they become citizens or secure credit for 40 quarters of work history (new affidavit of support which is required for all applications for immigrant visas or for adjustments of status filed on or after December 19, 1997). (42 U.S.C. § 1382j(a); 8 U.S.C. 1631(a), (b); MPP, supra, § 49-005(a)(1); see also Wheeler, Immigration Act Imposes New Sponsorship Requirements, Modifies Restrictions on Benefits, Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 13, pp. 6, 8.) Because many immigrants eligible for CAPI may never become citizens or be able to complete 40 quarters of work due to their age or disability, those whose sponsors signed the new affidavit of support could be subject to indefinite sponsor deeming.
Immigrants in the third group—immigrants who entered on or after August 22, 1996, and whose sponsors are not dead, disabled or abusive—are not affected by which federal affidavit of support their sponsor signed. Instead, they are subject to 10 years of deeming of their sponsors’ income and resources, regardless of the affidavit signed. CAPI’s 10-year deeming period starts from the date the sponsor signed the affidavit of support or “the date of the immigrant’s arrival in the United States, whichever is later.” (§ 18940, subd. (b).)
The DSS determines when an immigrant “entered the United States” for purposes of determining eligibility for CAPI under sections 18938 and 18940 based not on the date an immigrant physically arrived in the United States, but on “the effective date of the non-citizen’s current immigration status as determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” (MPP, supra, § 49-020.4.) There are two exceptions. First, if the immigrant is a current CAPI recipient whose immigration status was adjusted after he or she began receiving CAPI benefits, then the DSS continues to use the same entry date that was used to determine his or her initial CAPI eligibility. (MPP, supra, § 49-020.41.) Second, if the immigrant was a “qualified alien” (e.g., LPR) 4 as of August 21, 1996, and has maintained continuous residence in the United States since that date, then the effective date of the “qualified alien” status held on August 21, 1996, will be deemed to be his or her “entry date” even if he or she later adjusts his or her immigration status. (MPP, supra, § 49-020.42.)
The DSS implemented the CAPI program in December 1998. Since May 2000, the interpretation set forth above of section 18938 has consistently been DSS policy. By September 2002, the DSS’s interpretation
III. Facts Relating to Respondents and Their Administrative Records.
The facts relating to the Respondents are undisputed. They are two elderly, immigrant couples, each of whom physically arrived in the United States on tourist visas before August 22, 1996. They all became LPR’s after August 22, 1996. After they applied for CAPI benefits, the DSS determined they “entered” the United States on or after August 22, 1996, for purposes of section 18938 based on the dates they obtained their LPR status. Relying on their date of entry and sponsor circumstances, the DSS concluded Respondents were not then eligible for CAPI benefits.
IV. Writ of Mandate Proceedings.
On September 10, 2002, Respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the DSS director to cease denying CAPI benefits to eligible applicants as a result of the DSS’s interpretation of section 18938, and to overturn the administrative decisions denying Respondents CAPI benefits. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085 [power to issue writ of mandate], 1094.5 [writ issued regarding validity of administrative decision].) On September 30, 2003, judgment was entered in Respondents’ favor. On the same date, the trial court issued a writ of mandate commanding the DSS director to interpret the phrase “entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996” in section 18938, subdivision (a)(2) in the same way the Social Security Administration interpreted that same phrase (albeit in present tense) in title 8 United States Code section 1613, i.e., to mean physical entry. (Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System SI 00502.135 (POMS).) The DSS director timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review of the Trial Court Judgment.
The underlying facts are undisputed in this case, and the issue before us is one of law. We review the trial court’s judgment independently.
(Helene Curtis, Inc.
v.
Assessment Appeals Bd.
(1999)
II. Standard of Review of the DSS’s Interpretation of “Entered the United States on or After August 22, 1996.”
A. The Legal Standard: Quasi-legislative Versus Interpretive.
There are two classes of agency-made rules or regulations—quasi-legislative and interpretive. Because of their differing legal sources, they
“command significantly different degrees of deference by the courts.”
(Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1998)
In contrast, we accord considerably less deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute when it is merely “an agency’s
legal opinion,
however ‘expert,’ rather than the exercise of a delegated legislative power to make law.”
(Yamaha, supra,
The court in
Yamaha
noted agency rules “do not always fall neatly into” either the quasi-legislative or interpretive category; “the terms designate opposite ends of an administrative continuum, depending on the breadth of the authority delegated by the Legislature.”
(Yamaha, supra,
The Supreme Court in Ramirez observed that regulations “have both quasi-legislative and interpretive characteristics . . . when an administrative agency exercises a legislatively delegated power to interpret key statutory terms.” (Id. at p. 799.) It concluded the regulation defining “outside salesperson” was quasi-legislative because the legislative authority delegated to the agency included “the power to elaborate the meaning of key statutory terms. On the other hand, since the [agency] is engaged in construing the meaning of a portion [of a statute], its regulation is in some sense interpretive.” (Id. at p. 800.) The court then went on to analyze the regulation under both the more deferential standard for quasi-legislative regulations, and under the less deferential standard for purely interpretive regulations. (Id. at pp. 800-801.)
Similarly, in this case, the DSS’s interpretation of section 18938 had quasi-legislative and interpretive characteristics. Its interpretation, now embodied in a regulation, was quasi-legislative because the Legislature gave the DSS the power to “adopt regulations, orders, or standards of general application to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced by” it, including CAPI. (§ 10554; see also §§ 18937 [DSS given authority to “establish and supervise” the CAPI program], 18943, subd. (a) [allowing DSS to “implement” CAPI
B. Quasi-legislative Analysis.
1. The DSS’s Interpretation Was Within the Scope of the Authority Conferred upon It.
Analyzing the DSS’s interpretation as quasi-legislative, we first determine that it is within the scope of the authority conferred on the DSS.
(Ramirez, supra,
This case involves an intersection of federal and state immigration and public benefits laws. In this context, there are varying definitions of “entry.” “The dictionary definition of ‘entry’ is to go or come into a material place: make a physical entrance or penetration.’
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
756 (1981). . . . ‘Entry’ is also defined as ‘to come into a group: gain admission.’
Id.
In immigration law, the term ‘entry’ also has different denotations.”
(Digamon v. Sullivan
(D.Md. 1993)
The ambiguity of the phrase “entered the United States” is shown by the conflicting definitions courts and agencies have applied to it and similar phrases. In construing the phrase “entry into the United States” in order to determine when a three-year federal sponsor-deeming rule for SSI begins to run, the district court in
Digamon
concluded it meant the date the immigrant was admitted to permanent residence in the United States.
(Digamon, supra,
813 F.Supp. at pp. 406-408; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(3) [regulation promulgated by Secretary of Health
Other courts and federal agencies have interpreted similar phrases to mean some form of physical arrival. (See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Parga-Rosas
(9th Cir. 2001)
Moreover, contrary to what Respondents argue, the DSS was not required to follow a federal regulatory interpretation of the phrase “entered on or after August 22, 1996.” In particular, Respondents argue the trial court correctly ordered the DSS to adopt the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of this phrase in title 8 United States Code section 1613(a) to mean physical entry on or after that date. 5 (POMS, supra, SI 00502.135.B.1; 62 Fed.Reg. 61344, 61415.)
In Ramirez, the state agency’s definition of a statute’s ambiguous term (“outside salesperson”) differed substantially from definitions of the same term found in federal regulations. The Supreme Court concluded the agency did not exceed its statutory authority when it adopted its own unique definition because there was no indication the Legislature intended to incorporate those federal regulations when it adopted the statute at issue. (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 796, 800-801.) Similarly, there is no indication in this case that the Legislature intended to incorporate federal interpretations of the phrase “entered on or after August 22, 1996” as it appears in title 8 United States Code section 1613.
Respondents point out that, in general, federal laws and regulations governing the SSI program also govern CAPI. (§ 18940, subd. (a); MPP,
supra,
§ 49-001.2 [DSS regulation interpreting § 18940 to mean CAPI is governed by SSI “laws and regulations pertaining to eligibility”].) However, the regulation interpreting title 8 United States Code section 1613 (62 Fed.Reg. 61344, 61414-61415) is not, strictly speaking, a regulation governing the federal SSI program. The statute this regulation interprets provides that any qualified alien “who enters the United States on or after August 22, 1996” is generally ineligible
More importantly, title 8 United States Code section 1613 is not analogous to section 18938. Consequently, applying a federal regulation interpreting the phrase “enters the United States on or after August 22, 1996” in title 8 United States Code section 1613 simply because the same phrase appears in section 18938 does not make sense. Section 18938 determines whether an immigrant
will be subject to federal sponsor-deeming rules or CAPI’s 10-year sponsor-deeming rule, and uses the phrase as a means of making this determination. (§§ 18938, subd. (a), 18940, subd. (b).) As the DSS points out, there is no counterpart to this statute in the federal SSI program because applicants for that program are subject to federal sponsor-deeming rules only. And title 8 United States Code section 1613 has nothing to do with sponsor-deeming rules; it uses the phrase “enters the United States” to determine which immigrants are subject to a five-year ban on all federal means-tested benefits, regardless of the income and resources of their sponsors. (Cf.
State, Dept. of Revenue
v.
Andrade
(Alaska 2001)
2. The DSS’s Interpretation Was Reasonably Necessary to Effectuate the Purpose of Section 18938.
We next determine whether the DSS’s interpretation was reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of section 18938.
(Ramirez, supra,
Obviously, sponsor-deeming rules are only relevant to an immigrant who has a sponsor. An immigrant obtains a sponsor when he or she seeks to
become a permanent resident; obtaining a sponsor is a federal requirement for gaining LPR status. In contrast, at the time an immigrant physically entered the country, he or she may not have had a sponsor. (8 U.S.C. § 1183a; see also
Aziz, supra,
In
Digamon, supra,
In concluding consistent with the federal regulation that “entry” meant “admission to permanent residence,” the court in
Digamon
noted that in order for an immigrant to be eligible for federal SSI, he or she must be either an LPR or “otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law . . . .”
(Digamon, supra,
Similarly, it was reasonable for the DSS to conclude the “triggering event” for selection of the appropriate sponsor-deeming rule under sections 18938 and 18940 is permanent residence, not physical entry. (See
Digamon, supra,
Respondents argue the DSS’s interpretation of the phrase “entered on or after August 22, 1996” has no fixed meaning, and thus is improper. They incorrectly assert the DSS interpreted the phrase to mean the date an immigrant attains LPR status only. In fact, the DSS’s interpretation is “the effective date of the non-citizen’s current immigration status,” whether that status be LPR, PRUCOL, or some other “qualified alien” status. (MPP, supra, § 49-020.4.) These eligible immigrants all have a date when their current immigration status became effective. More importantly, the DSS’s interpretation of section 18938 has no effect on any eligible immigrants who are not required to have sponsors. By definition, sponsor-deeming rules do not apply to them. And the two exceptions the DSS carves out of its interpretation are reasonably necessary to ensure that immigrants who have had multiple adjustments to their immigration status are treated the same as immigrants who have not. (MPP, supra, §§ 49-020.41 [current CAPI recipient with change to immigration status keeps original entry date], 49-020.42 [qualified alien as of Aug. 21, 1996 keeps same entry date if later adjusts immigration status and has been continuously residing in U.S.].)
C. Purely Interpretative Analysis.
On the other hand, even if we considered DSS’s regulation to be purely interpretative, it has “attributes which weigh in favor of considerable judicial deference.”
(Ramirez, supra,
From December 1998, when CAPI was first implemented, until May 2000, DSS officials met with both DSS county representatives, who had “front-line” interaction with CAPI applicants, and with immigrant advocates. They examined factual scenarios under which immigrants would arrive in the United States. They considered four different possible interpretations of the phrase at issue, including one based on physical entry. In the end, the DSS adopted its current interpretation in part because, unlike the date of physical arrival, the date an immigrant attains his or her immigration status is easily verifiable by objective criteria. For CAPI applicants with LPR status, the immigrants most likely to be affected by the DSS interpretation of section 18938 (because they must have sponsors), this entry date appears on their resident alien cards. The DSS determined it would be administratively burdensome and expensive to adopt a physical entry interpretation because it would require verification of pre-August
In selecting its current interpretation, the DSS also sought to address the policy issue of how to handle “entry” for immigrants who physically enter and leave the United States multiple times, e.g., for tourism or to visit relatives. As the DSS recognized, section 18938 does not specify whether in this situation of multiple physical entries the DSS should use the earliest or most recent U.S. arrival. The DSS concluded CAPI benefit-eligibility should not be triggered by earlier visits to our country that may have had nothing to do with the immigrant’s ultimate decision to become a resident. As in
Digamon,
discussed,
ante,
the DSS reasonably concluded the triggering event should instead be permanent residence.
(Digamon, supra,
Finally, the DSS interpretation has consistently been DSS policy since May 2000. Relative to when section 18938 was enacted and implemented (December 1998), the DSS interpretation is long-standing.
(Yamaha, supra,
The judgment is reversed and the writ of mandate is vacated. The trial court is directed to enter a new and different judgment denying the writ.
Corrigan, Acting P. J., and Poliak, J., concurred.
Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
A “qualified alien” is an alien who, at the time he or she applies for aid, is (1) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (LPR); (2) an alien granted asylum; (3) a refugee; (4) an alien paroled into the United States for a period of at least one year; (5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld; (6) an alien granted conditional entry; or (7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant. (8 U.S.C. § 1641(b).) Certain battered aliens are also treated as “qualified aliens.” (8 U.S.C. § 1641(c).)
“Qualified alien” is defined the same under CAPI as in 8 U.S.C. section 1641. (MPP, supra, § 49-005(q)(1); see fn. 2, ante.)
See fn. 2, ante, for a list of qualified aliens.
The trial court ordered the DSS to comply not with a federal regulation, but with the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of title 8 United States Code section 1613 found in its Program Operations Manual System. However, the Attorney General promulgated a regulation with a largely identical interpretation of the statute. (62 Fed.Reg. 61344, 61414-61415.)
Another phrase concerning when an immigrant enters—“entry into the United States”— appears later in title 8 United States Code section 1613 in the context of determining when, once triggered, the statute’s five-year ban on federal benefits starts to run. Consistent with the different contexts in which the two “entry” phrases appear in the statute, the same federal regulation interprets “entry” in this later phrase differently from “enters” in the phrase at issue in this case—namely, to mean “the date the [immigrant] attained qualified alien status.” (62 Fed.Reg. 61344, 61415.) This definition is very similar to the one adopted by the DSS for section 18938. (MPP, supra, § 49-020.4.)
The federal regulation interpreting title 8 United States Code section 1613 also sought to address this policy concern. The trial court ordered the DSS to follow the “plain language” interpretation of this statute found in this regulation. Under that regulation, in order for an immigrant who did not obtain qualified alien status before August 22, 1996, to be treated as having “entered the United States” before that date, he or she must have not only (1) physically entered before that date, but also (2) been continuously present here from the latest date of entry before August 22, 1996, until the date he or she obtained qualified alien status. (62 Fed.Reg. 61344, 61415.) Thus, in addressing this policy concern, not even that regulation was based on a plain language interpretation of entry.
We are not persuaded by Respondents’ legislative history arguments. First, Respondents note that, as originally adopted, section 18938 referred to immigrants who “legally entered the United States on or after August 22, 1996.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 329, § 38, italics added.) In 1999, the Legislature deleted the word “legally.” (Stats. 1999, ch. 147, § 42.7.) Respondents assert, without any additional evidence, that this deletion shows the Legislature sought to clarify in 1999 that it meant physical arrival without regard to the person’s immigration status on that date. This is speculation. In fact, deletion of “legally” could cut in favor of the DSS’s interpretation. Under the DSS interpretation based on the effective date of the immigrant’s current immigration status, use of the word “legally” in section 18938 would be unnecessary and redundant; under the CAPI statutes, only legal immigrants are eligible for benefits. (§§ 18937, 18938.)
Second, Respondents rely on a floor analysis of a bill extending CAPI benefits to post-August 22, 1996 entrants, which states the legislation was intended to assist “legal noncitizens who arrived in the United States on or after August 22, 1996.” (Assem. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1111 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 15, 1999, p. 4, <¡[ 22 (June 1999), italics added [as of June 20, 2005].) The DSS points out that this one-sentence description of section 18938 is the only place “arrived” appears in a bill analysis of that statute, that there is no accompanying substantive analysis whatsoever, and there is no indication this description was drafted by a member of the Legislature. Moreover, if the Legislature intended this meaning, it could have used the word “arrived” instead of “entered” in section 18938, just as it did so in section 18940.
Lastly, Respondents point out that the DSS proposed a bill to amend section 18938 to define “entered the United States” precisely the way the DSS construes the phrase in its regulation. The DSS introduced the bill after the trial court’s decision in this case and for the purpose of overturning that decision. The bill was defeated in committee in April 2004. (Assem. Bill No. 2667 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) <http://www.sen.ca.gov> [as of June 20, 2005].) However, Respondents acknowledge that, in general, unpassed bills provide “very limited guidance” in discerning legislative intent.
(Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
(1982)