Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Case No. 21-cv-22819-ALTMAN/Reid MEGLADON, INC. ,
Plaintiff ,
v.
VILLAGE OF PINECREST , et al .,
Defendants .
___________________________________/
ORDER
Megladon, Inc., our Plaintiff, is a Florida corporation engaged in developing residential real estate. In 2016, Megladon acquired a parcel of land in the Village of Pinecrest with the intention of building a new single-family house there. After demolishing the existing house that was on the parcel, Megladon applied to the Village for a building permit. Since then, Megladon has found itself caught in a web of bureaucratic delay and administrative uncertainty.
As a condition of receiving the permit, the Village required Megladon to dedicate— i.e. , transfer ownership of—the first 7.5 feet from the parcel’s northern property line to the Village for use as a public right-of-way. Not wanting to redesign its building plans or apply for a variance, Megladon instead sued the Village, challenging the legality of the dedication requirement under Florida and federal law. Miami-Dade County soon intervened in that action as a defendant, asserting that the County —and not the Village—retained jurisdiction over right-of-way dedications.
Megladon and the Defendants have since filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s MSJ”) [ECF No. 172]; Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ MSJ”) [ECF No. 170]. Both motions seek summary judgment on similar issues, including (and especially) on the extent of the County’s jurisdiction over the dedication requirement, see Pl.’s MSJ at 2–7; Defs.’ MSJ at 11–17, the ripeness and timeliness of Megladon’s claims, see Pl.’s MSJ at 7–18; Defs.’ MSJ at 9–11, and the constitutionality of the land-dedication requirement, see Pl.’s MSJ at 18–24; Defs.’ MSJ at 20.
After careful review of the motions, the record, and the governing law, we conclude that Megladon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the County’s lack of jurisdiction and the ripeness of its claims. But, because there remain genuine factual disputes about the timeliness of Megladon’s state-law claim (under F S TAT . § 70.45) and the Village’s liability (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), we’ll proceed to trial to resolve those issues and to determine the amount (if any) of Megladon’s damages. In other words, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 172] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part , and the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 170] is DENIED .
T HE F ACTS [1] In 1996, the Village of Pinecrest (the “Village”) and Miami-Dade County (the “County”) executed an interlocal agreement that “transfer[red] and convey[ed]” from the County to the Village the “jurisdiction, ownership and control of all public roads within the corporate limits of the Village[.]” [2] Transfer Road Agreement [ECF No. 171-15] at 2–3. By its own terms, that agreement was “sufficient to accomplish the transfer” under Florida law and included “the transfer of the County’s regulatory and proprietary jurisdiction, and the conveyance of all right, title and interest of the County[.]” Id. at 3.
Twenty years later, Megladon, Inc., “purchased a parcel of land in a single family residential neighborhood located” at 13100 S.W. 77th Avenue in the Village. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSOUF”) [ECF No. 133] ¶ 1. The parcel “has frontage on both S.W. 77th Avenue and S.W. 131st Street[,]” id. ¶ 2, and “had been developed with a single-family home, which had been torn down to make room” for the new single-family home Megladon intended to build, id. ¶ 3. That street (S.W. 131st Street) is “a two-lane roadway without sidewalks,” Defendants’ Statement of Facts (“Defs.’ SOF”) [ECF No. 171] ¶ 7 (first citing Deposition of Leandro Ona (“Ona Dep.”) [ECF No. 171-2] at 137:12–21; and then citing Plat PB 98-87 Plan [ECF No. 171-5]); see also Plaintiff’s Response Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. SOF”) [ECF No. 182] ¶ 7 (disputing statement on other grounds), and is somewhere between twenty and thirty-five feet wide, compare Defs.’ SOF ¶ 6 (“SW 131st Street is currently a 35-foot-wide roadway (first citing Ona Dep. at 137:12–19; and then citing Plat PB 98-87 Plan), with Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶ 6 (“SW 131st Street is approximately 20 feet wide.” (first citing Ex. A to Declaration of James Paterson (“Paterson Decl.”) [ECF No. 131-9] at 6; and then citing Ex. A to Declaration of Reginald Mesimer (“Mesimer Decl.”) [ECF No. 131-8] at 7)).
On August 19, 2019, Valeria Fossi, Megladon’s architect, met with Patricia Janisse, a member of the Village’s Planning Division, to discuss “Megladon’s proposed redevelopment of the Parcel.” JSOUF ¶ 14. At that meeting, Janisse informed Fossi that, because “the street adjacent to the northern boundary of the [parcel], S.W. 131st Street, was a substandard width, . . . dedication of a portion of the [parcel] may be necessary to proceed with development.” Affidavit of Patricia C. Janisse (“Janisse Aff.”) [ECF No. 171-18] ¶ 7. In the Village’s view, S.W. 131st Street’s “35-foot” width, Defs.’ SOF ¶ 6 (first citing Ona Dep. at 137:12–19; and then citing Plat PB 98-87 Plan), fell below the 50-foot minimum width “required for a local road,” Ona Dep. at 63:2. [3]
Janisse—after consulting with Mark Spanioli, the Village’s Public Works Director, see Janisse Aff. ¶ 10 (“On September 5, 2019, Mr. Spanioli . . . responded that Megladon would likely have to dedicate half of the required right-of-way (7.5 feet).”)—emailed Fossi to confirm that Megladon would be subject to the 7.5-foot dedication requirement, see Janisse Aff. at 8 (“[I]t will be necessary to dedicate 7.5 ft. to [the] Village and the lot would then be reduced in area, which would require a smaller building and setbacks would have to be adjusted to comply.”). [4] She then directed Fossi to contact Stephen R. Olmsted, the Village’s Planning Director, to schedule a “public hearing before the Village Council to dedicate the right of way.” Ibid. Megladon didn’t do that. Instead, on “December 12, 2019, Megladon submitted a building permit application to the Village[,] . . . [which] did not show the 7.5-foot dedication.” Defs.’ SOF ¶ 19 (citing Janisse Aff. ¶ 9); see also Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶ 19 (disputing statement on other grounds).
Before issuing a residential building permit, the Village “examine[s] applications for code compliance,” JSOUF ¶ 8, and its Planning Division “performs [a] zoning review[,]” id. ¶ 9. Although the decision “to grant or deny residential building permits” rests with the Village’s Planning Director, id. ¶ 7, Planning Division staff may “post comments [about an application] to an online Plan Review System (‘PRS’) for consideration by senior staff, including the Village Planning Director, and applicants[,]” id. ¶ 10. The PRS process allows “a conversation between the property owner and the Village regarding a pending application.” Id. ¶ 12. Through this process, “Village staff identify issues they think warrant further discussion or revision of a pending application.” Id. ¶ 11. On December 24, 2019, Janisse posted the following comment on the PRS:
No review having Public Works Director to research possible road dedication as this property has not made a road dedication to SW 131 Street–-if a dedication is required the building will need to be revised to respect the new property line and process of a road dedication will be required[.]
Plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s SOF”) [ECF No. 169] ¶ 21 (quoting Ex. 14 to Deposition of Stephen Olmsted (“Olmsted Dep.”) [ECF No. 131-2] at 431–32 (errors in original)).
Soon after Janisse posted that comment, Megladon “requested a meeting with the ‘Village Manager, Building and Planning Department, Zoning Department and Public Works Department’ to discuss Janisse’s comment concerning dedication.” JSOUF ¶ 18 (quoting Declaration of Peter Weintraub (“Weintraub Decl.”) [ECF No. 131-10] ¶ 3). In preparation for that meeting, Olmsted expressed to Village Manager Yocelyn Galiano, Village Public Works Director David Mendez, and Village Attorneys Mitchell Bierman and Chad Friedman that the “issue in this particular case [was] . . . whether or not additional right-of-way will need to be dedicated and, if dedication is required, the impacts on required setbacks from the new property line.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Ex. 2 to Olmsted Dep. at 1). Galiano responded that, “[i]f [the frontage of S.W. 77th Avenue] is substandard, then we would require dedication to correct that issue[.]” Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Ex. 2 to Olmsted Dep. at 369).
Before meeting with Megladon, Olmsted also contacted Miami-Dade County Chief of Platting and Traffic Review Raul Pino to inform him about the proceedings with Megladon. Olmsted told Pino that “[t]he Village also requires a minimum of 50 feet of right-of-way for local roads, consistent with County requirements, and it has always been the Village’s policy to require dedication of right- of-way in instances where existing right of way is substandard.” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Ex. 9 to Olmsted Dep. at 415). According to Olmsted, “the Village has always believed that the County . . . retain[s] jurisdiction over local roads and rights-of-way within the areas of the County that have been incorporated into cities, such as the Village.” Verified Statement of Stephen R. Olmsted (“Olmsted Statement”) [ECF No. 171-19] ¶ 14. Pino confirmed that “the County requires 50-60 feet of right of way.” Id. ¶ 17.
On February 13, 2020, Megladon and its attorney, Peter Weintraub, met with Olmsted, Mendez, and Friedman. Friedman explained to them that it was “typical of the Village to request a 50- foot right of way for local roads[.]” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Weintraub Decl. ¶ 6). The Village also informed Megladon that it wouldn’t have to “apply for a waiver of plat” if it dedicated the requested 7.5-foot strip of its property to the Village[,]” and that it “could apply for a variance from the Village’s setback requirements after making the dedication.” Ibid. (citing Weintraub Decl. ¶ 6). Megladon “objected” to those conditions. See Weintraub Decl. ¶ 6.
The dedication issue remained in limbo for the next month—and, by late March, Olmsted had not reached a decision. Id. ¶¶ 10–11 (“On March 26, 2020, Village Planning Director Olmsted emailed Megladon and [Weintraub] and said: ‘The question of platting and right-of-way dedication has not yet been resolved. . . . Plans have been resubmitted and we will provide a zoning review. However, this issue regarding platting and dedication of right-of-way will need to be resolved.’” (quoting Ex. D to Weintraub Decl. at 18)). But, on April 3, 2020, Olmsted posted a new comment on the PRS, which stated in relevant part:
PLEASE PROVIDE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO EACH OF THE REVIEW COMMENTS NOTED BELOW INCLUDING A NOTE INDICATING WHERE THE REVISION OR INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW IN THE REVISED PLAN SET. PLEASE ATTACH THIS SHEET TO THE FRONT SHEET OF EACH SUBMITTED SET OF PLANS.
1. Additional right-of-way (7.5 feet) adjacent to SW 131 Street is required to be dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest. Please adjust the proposed northern property line 7.5 feet to the south and revise all setback, lot coverage, impervious coverage, green space, and building area information. . . .
2. Dedication of right-of-way to the Village of Pinecrest requires acceptance by the Village Council and can be completed prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Coordination with the Village Attorney will be required. . . .
PRS at 17. Seeing that post, Fossi reached out to Janisse and Olmsted “to discuss” the comments. Declaration of Valeria Fossi (“Fossi Decl.”) [ECF No. 168-3] ¶ 10. And, on April 30, Fossi had a virtual meeting with Olmsted and Janisse, at which she and her project manager, Viviana Conley, “pushed back against the Village’s dedication proposal and sought clarification about what the Village wanted Megladon to dedicate, the mechanics of dedication, and the reasons for the dedication.” Id. ¶ 11. Olmsted says he took the meeting simply to explain how Megladon could “complete the dedication and what was needed in order to proceed with the review process if they were going to comply with the dedication.” Olmsted Statement ¶ 31.
After Fossi asked Olmsted to “confirm [her] understanding of the call,” Olmsted emailed her on May 14:
With regard to the existing survey of the property, the right-of-way will need to be dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest but the process is expected to take some time to complete. In the meantime, the Village can review your application for a building permit, provided the site plan and all required building setbacks, lot coverages, green space calculations, etc., are indicated for the property excluding the right-of-way to be dedicated. On the site plan that will be submitted for building permits, please crosshatch and indicate the portion that is the area of right-of-way to be excluded from the property and dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest.
Prior to issuance of a building permit, an affidavit, similar to the attached affidavit, will need to be completed, signed, and submitted to the Village of Pinecrest. The affidavit includes the owners’ consent to dedication of the right-of-way and their acknowledgment that a certificate of occupancy will not be issued until dedication of the right-of-way is complete. . . .
Ex. H to Defs.’ SOF (“May 14 Email”) [ECF No. 171-8] at 1.
Megladon never submitted “the proposed affidavit consenting to the dedication” and “did not transfer title over any portion of the Parcel to the Village.” JSOUF ¶ 30; accord Hase Decl. ¶¶ 16–17 (“Megladon refused to dedicate the 7.5-foot strip of its property demanded by the Village and refused to execute the proposed affidavit consenting to the dedication. . . . Megladon has not transferred title over any portion of the Parcel to the Village.”). Instead, on October 1, 2020, Megladon served the Village a pre-suit notice letter, informing the Village that it intended to bring an action under F LA . S TAT . § 70.45 challenging the dedication requirement. See Pre-suit Notice Letter [ECF No. 131-11] at 1–3. Pursuant to that section, “[a]t least 90 days before filing an action . . . , but no later than 180 days after imposition of the prohibited exaction, the property owner shall provide to the relevant governmental entity written notice of the proposed action.” F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(3) (2020). [5] In its letter, Megladon identified Olmsted’s May 14 email as the event that imposed the prohibited exaction. See Pre-suit Notice Letter at 1 (“Specifically, the attached May 14, 2020 email from Village Planning Director Stephen R. Olmsted required in wring a land dedication . . . absent which no certificate of occupancy will be granted.”).
In response to Megladon’s letter, Village and County officials held a meeting with Megladon’s counsel on November 4 in an attempt to clarify which sovereign had jurisdiction over the right-of- way dedication. See Declaration of Amy Brigham Boulris (“Boulris Decl.”) [ECF No. 131-7] ¶ 6 (“Specifically, on November 4, 2020, I met by Zoom with Village Planning Director Olmsted, Village counsel Friedman and Gonzalez, County Chief of Platting and Traffic Review Pino, County Plat Committee Coordinator Rodriguez, and County attorney Kerbel.”). According to Megladon’s counsel, “[n]o resolution concerning the subject land dedication condition was reached during this . . . meeting.” Id. ¶ 9. That same day, Olmsted posted a new comment on the PRS, now informing Megalodon that the right-of-way “is required to be dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest pursuant to the requirements of Miami-Dade County [.]” PRS at 10 (emphasis added). Olmsted then directed Megladon to “confirm with Miami-Dade County the width of right-of-way required to be dedicated or seek and obtain a variance from the requirements from Miami-Dade County.” Id. at 11. Megladon did not seek a variance from the County. See Olmsted Dep. at 319:7 (“I don’t believe they have.”). Nor did they pursue further avenues of review by the Village Council or the Zoning Board. See Olmsted Decl. ¶¶ 41–42 (“Megladon could have appealed the administrative determination concerning dedication to the Village Council. It did not do so. . . . Additionally, Megladon could have applied to the zoning board for a variance from the setback requirements, which would have been impacted by the dedication.”).
On December 29, 2020, the Village responded to Megladon’s pre-suit notice, refusing to change its position. The Village explained:
The dedication is required to correct an existing deficiency on S.W. 131st Street. Specifically, the current right of way available for the road is insufficient to allow proper drainage of the existing road. The owners north of the Property dedicated 35 feet of right-of-way when those properties were developed in 1978. The development of those properties required a roadway because the driveways for the property were designed to face the then-non-existent SW 131st Street. Accordingly, to accommodate those driveways, the owners of those properties dedicated their proportionate share of the road right-of-way, which was only part of the right-of-way needed for a properly functioning road. Similarly, Megladon is proposing to construct a driveway that leads to and from S.W. 131st Street, a road that was predominantly established to serve the properties whose driveways face it. . . . [T]he additional right-of-way is needed to have a road that adequately functions and that road is needed in part to serve Megladon’s driveway.
Ex. N to Declaration of Timothy J. McGinn (“Notice Resp.”) [ECF No. 131-12] at 5–6. The Village, once again, asserted that “Megladon must, like its neighbors before it, dedicate the right-of-way for the road that is needed to accommodate its development.” Id. at 6.
With the specter of litigation looming, the Village and the County sought to shore up their position on who exactly had jurisdiction over the right-of-way abutting Megladon’s parcel. On March 1, 2021, Village Manager Galiano reached out to Jimmy Morales, the County’s Public Works Director, requesting “something in writing from . . . Miami-Dade County confirming that [the County] has jurisdiction over the right-of-way widths.” Ex. T to Defs.’ SOF (“Kerbel Email”) [ECF No. 171-20] at 5–6. Morales forwarded the email to Frank Guyamier, Morales’s deputy director, who responded to Morales with an attachment of the Transfer Road Agreement. Id. at 4. Guyamier explained to Morales that, given the Transfer Road Agreement, “SW 131 Street and SW 77 Ave is a City of Pinecrest maintained road and its jurisdiction regarding right of way width must falls [sic] under the City of Pinecrest. The only elements excluded are traffic operations which is [sic] still under Miami Dade County’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 4. Morales then conveyed the news to Galiano, telling her that it “[l]ooks like the County transferred jurisdiction to Pinecrest in 1996. The [right-of-way] is all yours.” Ibid. Galiano remarked that “[t]his has not been the position of the County in the past.” Id. at 3. Apparently, it isn’t the position of the County now, either.
P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY On July 27, 2021, Megladon sued the Village in Florida state court, alleging claims under F S TAT . § 70.45, Article X, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See State Court Compl. [ECF No. 1-1] ¶¶ 50–71. The Village quickly removed the case to federal court. See Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1]. On April 11, 2022, the County filed a Motion to Intervene, asserting that it (and not the Village) had “exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of traffic engineering in Miami-Dade County,” including “the required right-of-way width” Megladon was being required to dedicate. Mot. to Intervene [ECF No. 40] ¶¶ 4, 20. We granted that motion, allowing the County to intervene as a defendant. See Paperless Order Granting Mot. to Intervene [ECF No. 67].
Once the County had been joined to this action, Megladon filed a Second Amended Complaint—the operative complaint here—reasserting its claims against the Village under F S TAT . § 70.45, see Second Amnd. Compl. (“SAC”) [ECF No. 77] ¶¶ 125–35 (Count I), the Florida Constitution, see id. ¶¶ 136–47 (Count II), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see id. ¶¶ 148–54 (Count III). Specifically, Megladon asserts that the dedication requirement amounts to a prohibited exaction and unconstitutional condition because the “condition lacks the essential nexus and/or rough proportionality to the impacts of Megladon’s proposed development required for constitutional validity.” Id. at 1–2. Megladon also brought a second § 1983 claim against both the Village and the County—alleging (again) that “the Village’s demanded land dedication constitutes an unconstitutional condition” under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 38.
The Defendants moved to dismiss Megladon’s Second Amended Complaint. See Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) [ECF No. 82]. The main thrust of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was that Megladon had no claim against the Village because, in their view, only the County has “the final decision regarding the amount or configuration of the roadway dedication at issue.” Id. at 12. The Defendants also argued that none of the claims were ripe because “neither the Village nor the County ever reached a final decision regarding the dedication,” id. at 18, and because, even if they had, Megladon’s § 70.45 claim would be “time-barred because [Olmsted’s] first written comment regarding the dedication requirement was on April 3”—thus rendering Megladon’s service of pre-suit notice on October 1st one day too late, id. at 19. Finally, the Defendants claimed that the dedication requirement could not constitute a prohibited exaction or unconstitutional condition as a matter of law. See id. at 19–21.
We denied the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. In our view, Megladon had plausibly alleged
that the Village, not the County, had authority over the right-of-way abutting the property.
See Megladon
v. Vill. of Pinecrest
,
Next, we considered whether Megladon’s claims were ripe for adjudication. An
unconstitutional-conditions claim ripens (we explained) once “‘the government has adopted its final
position’ on the application of the relevant regulations.”
Id.
at 1234 (quoting
Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of
S.F.
,
Second , the Defendants said that the claims weren’t ripe because “Olmsted never actually came to a final decision on the dedication requirement.” Ibid. (citing MTD at 13). To us, “[t]his argument strain[ed] credulity.” Ibid. Based on Olmsted’s use of mandatory, unequivocal language in his May 14 email to Megladon, see id. at 1233 (“Olmsted’s unequivocal use of the phrase ‘will need’ in relation to the dedication requirement puts to bed the Defendants’ bordering-on-frivolity contention that ‘the response to [the architect’s] email was not a refusal to continue processing the application absent a showing of dedication.’” (quoting MTD at 13)), we found it plausible to believe that Olmsted’s email constituted a final decision.
Third
, the Defendants asserted that the claims were unripe because Megladon had not appealed
the Village’s decision to the County. Unpersuaded, we explained that “[t]he Defendants’ insistence
that the Plaintiff seek a variance from a second-level reviewer (the County) is . . . flatly inconsistent”
with the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City
,
We then turned to the Defendants’ alternative position that, had Count I ripened at all, it would have ripened with Olmsted’s April 3 PRS comment, making Megladon’s pre-suit notice untimely. Her’s how we framed this issue:
Count I (recall) alleges a violation of Fla. Stat. § 70.45, which (as relevant here) requires that, “[a]t least 90 days before filing an action under this section, but no later than 180 days after imposition of the prohibited exaction, the property owner shall provide to the relevant governmental entity written notice of the proposed action.” Because the Plaintiff gave pre-suit notice on October 1, 2020, that notice (and, by extension, Count I) would be untimely if the claim ripened on April 3, 2020, when Director Olmsted entered his first set of comments into the Plan Review System. That’s because from April 3, 2020 to October 1, 2020 is 181 days (or one day too late). By the same token, if the Plaintiff’s claim ripened on May 14, 2020—when Director Olmsted responded to Fossi’s clarification email—then Count I would be timely, because May 14 is just 140 days before October 1. In the Defendants’ view, the Village made its final decision (if it made any final decision at all) on April 3, 2020, because “the April 3 Comment does not differ in any material sense from the Village Planning Director’s email [of May 14, 2020].”
Id.
at 1237 (first quoting F S TAT § 70.45(3); then citing SAC ¶ 73; then citing Ex. 5 to SAC [ECF
No. 77-5] at 1; and then quoting MTD at 18–19). Megladon, however, had alleged that the April 3
comment was not the kind of “final decision” that would ripen its claims, but merely “‘an invitation
for Megladon to comment in response to’ Olmsted’s communication.”
Ibid.
(quoting SAC ¶ 73). So,
given our obligation at the motion-to-dismiss stage to take all allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff,
see Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co
., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016), we were
satisfied that Megladon’s “factual” characterization of that comment plausibly brought “the Plaintiff’s
notice letter within that 180-day window,”
Megladon
,
Lastly, we reached the merits of Megladon’s unconstitutional-conditions claims. Under the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “a unit of government may not condition the approval of a land-
use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless there is a nexus and
rough proportionality between the government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.
,
The parties then proceeded to discovery. After the close of discovery, Megladon filed a Motion to Strike [ECF No. 206] three paragraphs from the Verified Statement of Alicia Gonzalez [ECF No. 179-2], an attorney for the Village, arguing that the information she provided there contradicted interrogatory responses the Village never supplemented, see Motion to Strike at 2–3. We referred that motion to U.S. Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid for an order. See Order of Referral [ECF No. 208]. After review, Magistrate Judge Reid denied Megladon’s motion, concluding that “the Village’s failure to supplement its earlier response . . . was substantially justified” and “[did] not prejudice” Megladon. Order on Mot. to Strike [ECF No. 211] at 6. Megladon has since filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Reid’s Order, which is currently pending and ripe for review. See Objection [ECF No. 212]; Defendants’ Objection Response [ECF No. 216].
The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Pl.’s MSJ; Defs.’ MSJ. Both parties request summary judgment on whether the County has authority over the land-dedication requirement, see Pl.’s MSJ at 2–7; Defs.’ MSJ at 11–17, whether Megladon’s claims are ripe and timely, see Pl.’s MSJ at 7–18; Defs.’ MSJ at 9–11, and whether the dedication requirement is an unlawful prohibited exaction or unconstitutional condition, see Pl.’s MSJ at 18–24; Defs.’ MSJ at 20. Additionally, the Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether Megladon can even use its unconstitutional-conditions claim to challenge the County’s assertion of jurisdiction over public-works dedications in the first place. See Defs.’ MSJ at 6. We’ll consider those motions here.
T HE L AW
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED R. C IV . P. 56(a). “By its very terms,
this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
,
At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of “showing the absence of
a genuine issue as to any material fact.”
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
,
The Court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” F ED R. C IV . P. 56(c)(3);
see also Green v.
Northport
,
In sum, then, if there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must deny summary
judgment and proceed to trial.
See Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
,
A NALYSIS Both parties move for summary judgment on (1) whether the County has jurisdiction over the dedication requirement, see Pl.’s MSJ at 2–7; Defs.’ MSJ at 11–17; (2) whether Megladon’s claims are ripe and timely, see Pl.’s MSJ at 7–18; Defs.’ MSJ at 9–11; and (3) whether the dedication requirement violates the Fifth Amendment and F S TAT . § 70.45, see Pl.’s MSJ at 18–24; Defs.’ MSJ at 20. The Defendants also seek judgment on whether Megladon can even “use its takings claim to challenge the County’s assertion of jurisdiction over public works dedications.” Defs.’ MSJ at 6 (cleaned up). We’ll address that threshold question first before taking up the remaining issues in turn.
I. Megladon’s “Challenge” to the County’s Jurisdiction As a threshold matter, the Defendants assert that Megladon “cannot use its Takings claim to challenge the County’s assertion of jurisdiction over public works dedications.” Ibid. (cleaned up). In their view, “[i]f Megladon wanted a judicial determination that it did not have to seek relief from the County,” then it should have sought a writ of mandamus “commanding the Village to issue a building permit” or “a declaratory judgment to rid itself of the development process that was being imposed.” Id. at 8 (cleaned up). And, since “Megladon has not sought available relief from the entity that has asserted that its general regulations impose the [dedication] condition”— i.e. , from the County— Megladon’s constitutional claim (the Defendants insist) “is not ripe.” Id. at 8–9.
Let’s reflect on how we got here. Originally, Megladon sued the Village—and only the Village— alleging that its dedication requirement “constitute[d] an unconstitutional condition in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State Court Compl. at 15. Because the Village responded that “the Plaintiff is subject to the County’s regulations governing the required right-of- way width, and the Plaintiff is obligated to apply to the County for relief from the applicable regulations[,]” the County soon sought to intervene “in this action to defend the enforceability of its regulations.” Mot. to Intervene ¶¶ 20–22 (citing Village’s First Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 9]). We allowed the County to intervene as a defendant , recognizing that its asserted “defenses present questions of law and fact that are virtually identical to the defenses Pinecrest advanced[.]” Paperless Order Granting Mot. to Intervene.
Based on that decision, Megladon amended its complaint, now jointly pleading an unconstitutional-conditions claim under the Fifth Amendment against both the Village and the County. See SAC ¶¶ 155–65 (Count IV). Megladon, however, never retreated from its initial position that it was “[t]he Village’s actions in refusing to process and effectively denying Megladon’s residential building permit application [that] improperly burdened Megladon’s [constitutional] rights[.]” SAC ¶ 110 (emphasis added). [6] Accordingly, Megladon again asks us to “[d]etermine that the Village’s demanded land dedication constitutes an unconstitutional condition” and to “[o]rder the Village to promptly process and approve Megladon’s application[.]” Id. at 38.
Now, compare that to Megladon’s requested relief as to the County: Since Megladon
doesn’t
believe that the County has jurisdiction at all,
see, e.g.
, SAC ¶ 121 (“Megladon has declined invitations
to apply to the County Public Works Department for an exception or waiver because of the legal
inconsistency of doing so[.]”), it’s only asking that we “[d]etermine that the County has jointly acted
with the Village in furtherance of maintaining and
falsely
justifying the demanded land dedication as a
condition of development approval under [the County’s] alleged concurrent jurisdiction or retained
jurisdiction” and “[e]njoin the County from interfering with the processing of Megladon’s permit
application[.]”
Ibid.
(emphasis added). But those considerations are downstream of (and potentially
mooted by) our adjudication of Megladon’s
primary
claim that “the Village [is] the entity responsible
for the alleged unconstitutional condition[.]”
Id.
¶ 17;
cf. Scott v. Jones
,
As an intervening defendant, the County “ought not be allowed to hijack [this] litigation” by reframing Megladon’s claims. Sierra Club, Inc. v. EPA , 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004). But the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment does just that by characterizing this suit as “contesting Tr. of Jan. 20, 2023, Hearing at 10:9–11:1. Because Count IV simply “plead[s] in the alternative that the Village is responsible and if the Village is not responsible[,] the County is responsible[,]” id. at 10:17–21; see also SAC ¶ 17 (“[T]his Second Amended Complaint sues the Village as the entity responsible for the alleged unconstitutional condition, and in the alternative ( should this Court later determine that the County has any relevant jurisdiction ) sues the Village and County jointly for the unconstitutional condition violation[.]” (emphasis added)), Megladon has unambiguously continued to assert that only the Village has jurisdiction.
[7] In
Bonner v. City of Prichard
,
the development process itself, not the dedication.” Defs.’ MSJ at 8. The County has asserted no
counterclaims and pleads only as an affirmative defense that, because it allegedly has “exclusive
jurisdiction over minimum roadway widths[,] . . . Megladon’s request to waive the required dedication
on its parcel should have been directed to the County[.]” County’s Answer [ECF No. 145] at 13. But
pleading an affirmative defense does not somehow reformulate a plaintiff’s claim into something it’s
not.
See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen
,
Even so, the Defendants insist that, “[b]ecause the County required dedication as a condition
of a permit, the question for the Court then becomes whether the lawsuit is ripe[.]” Defs.’ MSJ at 8.
But that begs the question whether the County
did
, in fact, validly require the dedication—and (as of
now) that’s far from clear.
See Megladon
,
The Defendants, therefore, are wrong to say that Megladon (necessarily) “cannot ripen its
Takings claim by simply ignoring the County’s assertion that its requirement applies[,]” Defs.’ MSJ at
8, since that assertion is only pled and briefed as a
defense
to Megladon’s “cause of action against the
Village as the maker of the dedication demand,” Plaintiff’s Response to Defs.’ MSJ (“Pl.’s MSJ Resp.”)
[ECF No. 183] at 8. If—as Megladon maintains—the County has no jurisdiction over the dedication,
see, e.g.
, Pl.’s MSJ at 1 (“[T]he County has no jurisdiction over Megladon’s application to build a single-
family home on its private property in the Village[.]”), then the County’s ripeness defense is irrelevant,
see Megladon
,
II. The County’s Jurisdiction over the Dedication Requirement
The parties hotly dispute whether the County has the authority to impose a dedication
requirement on Megladon’s parcel at all.
See
Pl.’s MSJ at 3 (“Defendants . . . continue to assert the
County has jurisdiction over Megladon’s permit application by virtue of its supposed jurisdiction over
the road abutting Megladon’s parcel. Defendants are still wrong.”); Defs.’ MSJ at 15 (“[T]he County
has exclusive jurisdiction to set standard right-of-way configurations throughout the entire County.”).
In denying the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, we observed that the terms of the Transfer Road
Agreement plausibly “support[ed] the Plaintiff’s view that the Village had jurisdiction over the land
dedication at issue here.”
Megladon
,
Since there remained several outstanding questions surrounding the validity of the Transfer Road Agreement, we invited the parties “to answer these . . . at summary judgment.” Id. at 1225. [9] Both sides now place the Transfer Road Agreement at the center of their motions. See Pl.’s MSJ at 3 (“The County transferred ‘jurisdiction, ownership and control of all public roads within the corporate limits of the Village’ to the Village (excepting four roads that do not abut Megladon’s parcel) in a Transfer Road Agreement dated November 8, 1996.” (quoting Transfer Road Agreement ¶ 2)); Defs.’ MSJ at 15 (“The Road Transfer Agreement upon which Megladon relies failed to transfer the County’s exclusive regulatory jurisdiction.”). Additionally, the Defendants have (once again) identified several provisions of the “County’s Charter, Comprehensive Development Master Plan (‘the Master Plan’), County Code, and Public Works Manual,” Defs.’ MSJ at 12, that they believe “work in concert to demonstrate that the County has exclusive jurisdiction to set standard right-of-way configurations throughout the entire County[,]” id. at 15.
Because our determination about the legitimate “power of a municipality [presents] a mixed
question of law and fact,”
City of Coral Gables v. Burgin
,
According to Megladon, the County “cannot have jurisdiction over Megladon’s building permit application incident to its [purported] jurisdiction over the road” because the County, through the Transfer Road Agreement, transferred jurisdiction over “the road abutting Megladon’s parcel [ ] to the Village.” Pl.’s MSJ at 3–4 (citing Transfer Road Agreement ¶ 2). We agree.
By its plain terms, the Transfer Road Agreement conveys “regulatory and proprietary
jurisdiction,” “ownership, and control of all public roads within the corporate limits of the Village” to
the Village. Transfer Road Agreement ¶¶ 2–3. Florida law explicitly allows for the transfer of public
roads between jurisdictions, so long as the transfer is made “by mutual agreement of the affected
governmental entities.” F S TAT . § 335.0415(3). Before the Transfer Road Agreement’s execution,
the County and the Village “entered into” an interlocal agreement—which was “approved by the
Village Council . . . and the Board of County Commissioners”—for “all municipal roads within the
boundaries of the Village [to] be officially transferred to the Village by separate agreement executed
by the County Manager or designee on behalf of the County, and the Mayor on behalf of the Village[.]”
Transfer Road Agreement at 1. The Transfer Road Agreement officially executed that transfer.
See id.
¶ 3 (“[T]his Agreement shall be sufficient to accomplish the transfer of Public Roads from the County
road system to the Village road system pursuant to [F LA . S TAT . § 335.0415(3)].”). Accordingly, the
Transfer Road Agreement “plainly suggests that . . . the Village is the
only
entity with authority to
regulate the Village roads,”
Megladon
,
The Defendants nonetheless say that the Transfer Road Agreement “only transferred proprietary jurisdiction” to the Village—and they insist that it did not transfer “ regulatory jurisdiction[.]” Defendants’ Response to Pl.’s MSJ (“Defs.’ MSJ Resp.”) [ECF No. 181] at 7. In their view, “[p]roprietary jurisdiction refers to the ownership, control, and maintenance of right[s]-of-way[,]” while “[r]egulatory jurisdiction refers to the ability to set standards for traffic, traffic control, and other minimum planning and engineering standards.” Ibid.
Wherever the Defendants got that distinction, it certainly wasn’t from the text of the statute. Section 335.0415 doesn’t delineate between transfers of “proprietary” and “regulatory” jurisdiction. It simply governs “ any change of the jurisdiction of a public road.” F LA . S TAT . § 335.0415(3) (emphasis added). Nor do the Defendants provide any textual basis for their view that “jurisdiction in this context relates [only] to [the] operation and maintenance of roadways.” Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 8 (citing F LA . S TAT . § 335.0415(1)). If that were true, then the statute’s coverage of the “jurisdiction of public roads and the responsibility for operation and maintenance within the right-of-way of any road” would be superfluous. F S TAT . § 335.0415(1); see also A NTONIN S CALIA & B RYAN A. G ARNER , R EADING L AW : T HE I NTERPRETATION OF L EGAL T EXTS 174 (2012) (“No[ ] [word or provision] should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”). Plus, reading a distinction between types of jurisdiction into the statute would require us to contravene the text’s clear statement that “[p]ublic roads”—without limitation—“may be transferred between jurisdictions . . . by mutual agreement[.]” F LA . S TAT . § 335.0415(3); see also S CALIA & G ARNER at 93 (“Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies . . . . That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”). We won’t be doing that.
Unable to find a textual hook in § 335.0415, the Defendants direct us to “[t]he County Code’s own adopted definitions,” which “defin[e] what roadways the County controls in its proprietary capacity.” Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 7. The County Code, the Defendants explain, “defines ‘County-owned’ rights of way as ‘[(i)] property in which the County has a property interest, such as fee simple ownership or an easement, and (ii) property that the County maintains regardless of ownership, such as rights-of-way that are in incorporated areas but are maintained by the County.” Ibid. (quoting M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 2-99(3)). But how the County defines the scope of jurisdiction is irrelevant, since § 335.0415 governs “any change of the jurisdiction of a public road,” “[ n ] otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary[.]” F S TAT . § 335.0415(2) (emphases added); see also S CALIA & G ARNER at 127 (“[T]he catch-all notwithstanding is a fail-safe way of ensuring that the clause it introduces will absolutely, positively prevail.”). And (as we’ve said) § 335.0415 isn’t limited to transfers of proprietary jurisdiction.
Failing to undermine the Transfer Road Agreement on its own terms, the Defendants pivot
to professing that it is “unenforceable.” Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 9. In their view, “[t]he County retains
jurisdiction over all traffic engineering by virtue of the Home Rule Charter and the County Code,
which codifies ordinances adopted by the Board of County Commissioners.”
Id.
at 7. Because neither
the Charter nor an ordinance can be “superseded by a resolution or [by] mere agreement,” the
Defendants claim, the Transfer Road Agreement cannot “strip the County of its regulatory power.”
Id.
at 7–8 (citing
Wallace v. Leahy
,
But this argument necessarily assumes that the County’s purported jurisdiction over “traffic engineering” also gives the County jurisdiction over the right-of-way dedication on Megladon’s parcel. Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 7. To bridge this logical gap, the Defendants identify eleven provisions of “[t]he County’s Charter, [Master Plan], County Code, and Public Works Manual,” which (they say) “provide the systematic web” governing the “roadway network within the County.” Defs.’ MSJ at 12 (cleaned up). Unfortunately, all those provisions (whether viewed separately or together) fail to establish the County’s jurisdiction over the parcel at issue here.
The Defendants first cite to the County Charter, which grants “the Board of County Commissioners . . . the powers to ‘[p]rovide and regulate arterial, toll, and other roads, bridges, tunnels, and related facilities; eliminate grade crossings; provide and regulate parking facilities; and develop and enforce master plans for the control of traffic and parking.’” Id. at 12–13 (quoting M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C HARTER § 1.01(A)(1)). The Charter also instructs the County to “[p]repare and enforce comprehensive plans for the development of the County,” id. § 1.01(A)(5), “[a]dopt and enforce uniform building and related technical codes and regulations for both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of the county,” id. § 1.01(A)(13), and “[s]et reasonable minimum standards for all governmental units in the county for the performance of any service or function[,]” id. § 1.01(A)(18).
Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Cowart
, the Defendants claim that the
Charter implements “the County’s authority to implement a uniform plan of regulation for . . . the
control of traffic[.]” Defs.’ MTD at 12 (citing
Cowart
,
Cowart has very little to do with our case. The court there held only that “the Home Rule Charter and county ordinances adopted thereunder shall in cases of conflict supersede all municipal charters and city ordinances, except in those instances where the charter of Dade County specifically provides otherwise[.]” But that just begs the question of whether, on the central issue we face here— viz. , whether the County requires dedications of a certain width on streets within the Village—there exists some County regulation that conflicts with a Village ordinance. . . . [T]he Defendants have pointed us to no such conflict—and, as a result, Cowart seems to have little bearing on our facts.
Megladon
,
We needn’t dwell on the Defendants’ § 1.01(A) argument, since they don’t even try to engage
with our distinction of
Cowart
or alter their interpretation from the one we rejected.
See Cifuentes v.
Regions Bank
,
The Defendants next point to three provisions of the County’s Master Plan, which purportedly “require[ ] the County to maintain . . . minimum rights-of-way and [ ] require dedications to meet those standards.” Defs.’ MSJ at 13. First , “Objective TC-2 of the Traffic Circulation Subelement provides that ‘the rights-of-way and corridors needed for existing and future transportation facilities will be designated and reserved.’” Ibid. (quoting Traffic Circulation Subelement [ECF No. 89-2] at 7). Second , “Policy TC-2B further provides that ‘[t]he County shall require the dedication of appropriate share of all necessary rights-of-way from all developments at the time of development.’” Ibid. (quoting Traffic Circulation Subelement at 7). Third , “Policy TC-2A of the Traffic Circulation Subelement requires that the County ‘maintain and enforce the minimum right-of-way requirements established in the Public Works Manual . . . to ensure Countywide continuity of the thoroughfare system.’” Ibid. (quoting Traffic Circulation Subelement at 7).
In our MTD Order, we observed that, by the Master Plan’s “own terms,” the Master Plan “doesn’t have the force of law, and . . . ‘is not a substitute for land development regulations’”—but instead “must be implemented through the County’s land development regulations.” Megladon , 661 F. Supp. 3d at 1229 (quoting Statement of Legislative Intent [ECF No. 89-1] § A(3)–(4)). The Defendants now argue that the “requirements [of the Master Plan] cannot be ignored or negated” because Florida law creates a private cause of action to challenge “a development order inconsistent with its Master Plan[.]” Defs.’ MSJ at 13 (first citing Growth Policy Act, 1999 Fla. Sess. L. Ch. 99-378 (Fla. 1999) (codified at F LA . S TAT . §§ 163.2511–163.2520); and then citing F LA . S TAT . § 163.3215). We’re not sure why these statues are relevant here.
The Growth Policy Act allows a “local government [to] designate a geographic area or areas
within its jurisdiction as an urban infill and redevelopment area for the purpose of targeting economic
development[.]” F S TAT . § 163.2517(1). To do so, the government “must amend its comprehensive
land use plan . . . to delineate the boundaries of the urban infill and redevelopment area[.]”
Id.
§ 163.2517(4). We have no idea what a municipality’s ability to designate urban-redevelopment areas
has to do with Megladon’s parcel. The Defendants certainly don’t explain the relevance of the Growth
Policy Act to the County’s purported control over rights-of-way.
See
Defs.’ MSJ at 13 (referencing the
Growth Policy Act in passing);
cf. Transam. Leasing, Inc. v. Inst. of London Underwriters
,
The Defendants’ reference to F LA . S TAT . § 163.3215 fares no better. That section allows an
“aggrieved or adversely affected party [to] maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or
other relief against any local government to challenge any decision of such local government granting
or denying an application for, or to prevent such local government from taking any action on, a
development order . . . on the basis that the development order materially alters the use or density or
intensity of use on a particular piece of property, rendering it not consistent with the comprehensive
plan adopted under this part.” F LA . S TAT . § 163.3215(3). But neither Objective TC-2 nor Policy TC-
2A provides any substantive standards regarding the “use or density or intensity of use [of] a particular
piece of property,”
ibid.
, with which a development order—
viz.
, an “order [deciding] an application
for a development permit[,]”
id.
§ 163.3161(15)—could be inconsistent,
see
Traffic Circulation
Subelement at 7 (“[T]he rights-of-way and corridors needed for existing and future transportation
facilities will be designated and reserved. . . . The County shall require the dedication of appropriate
share of all necessary rights-of-way from all developments at the time of development.”);
see also Conservancy of Sw. Fla., Inc. v. Collie County
,
Policy TC-2A, which directs the County to “maintain and enforce [ ] minimum right-of-way requirements,” is tethered to the specific “requirements established in the Public Works Manual.” Traffic Circulation Subelement at 7. And the Defendants have since come forward with the specific provision of the Manual “governing the construction of a local road in a residential area without parking”: Section R8-1. Defs.’ SOF ¶ 42 (first citing Ona Dep at 130:8–17; and then citing Public Works Manual [ECF No. 171-13] at 32). This section sets “the standards for a 50-foot, 2-lane road with a swale and a sidewalk where required.” Id. ¶ 43 (citing Public Works Manual at 32). But the Public Works Manual (and the standards set there), is limited only to “public works construction.” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 2-100(d). We must therefore determine whether Megladon’s proposed construction of a single-family home constitutes a “public work” under the Code.
The Code defines a “work” as “any activity or result of such activity as set forth in Section 2-
103.1, or the area or site of such activity.”
Id.
§ 2-99(c)(9) (cleaned up). Section 2-103.1 doesn’t provide
a clear list of activities that qualify as a “public work,”
id.
§ 2-103.1, but the term’s ordinary meaning
refers to “[s]tructures (such as roads or dams) built by the government for public use and paid for by
public funds,”
Public works
, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014);
see also Demeter Land Co. v. Fla.
Pub. Serv. Co.
,
Putting aside the circularity of the Defendants’ assumption that S.W. 131st Street is, in fact, a “County-owned” road, id. § 2-103.1(b)(1), Megladon doesn’t seek to undertake construction on the road, see On , Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on (defining “on” as “a function word [used] to indicate position in contact with and supported by the top surface of” something) (last visited May 28, 2025); see also JSOUF ¶ 5 (“Megladon did not propose to build on existing public right of way.”). And, unlike the development of a “road, bridge, tunnel, [or] canal,” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 2-103.1(b)(2), Megladon’s private development of its parcel doesn’t constitute a project for “public use and paid for by public funds,” Public works , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY ; see also S CALIA & G ARNER at 195 (“Associated words bear on one another’s meaning[.]”). Moreover, the Defendants have provided no evidence that S.W. 131st Street is a road that the County’s Department of Transportation and Public Works (“DTPW”) has deemed “necessary for appropriate traffic movement on the County’s roadway network.” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 2-103.1(b)(2). [10]
The Defendants also point to four provisions of the County Code which, in their view, “vest[ ]
the [DTPW] . . . with exclusive jurisdiction over traffic engineering in the County.” Defs.’ MSJ at 13
(cleaned up) (citing M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES §§ 2-95.1, -96.1, -99(c)(7));
see also id.
at 14 (“Also built into DTPW’s traffic engineering authority is a specific variance process by
application to the DTPW Director[.]” (citing M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES §
2-100(d)). But jurisdiction over traffic
engineering
—defined in the Code as “that phase of engineering
which deals with the planning and geometric design of streets, . . . and abutting lands, and with traffic
operation thereon,” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 2-95.1(d)—still doesn’t
give the County “the power to
alter
[a street’s] configuration long
after
it’s been constructed[,]”
Megladon
,
The plan or design of a thing, after all, necessarily precedes its construction. In other words, the act of planning—or designing—a thing connotes the sketching-out process that occurs before the thing is built. That’s why Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines ‘planning’ as ‘the act or process of making or carrying out plans specifically, the establishment of goals, policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit[.]’ Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s defines “design” as “the process of selecting the means and contriving the elements, steps, and procedures for producing what will adequately satisfy some need[.]” . . . It may be, then, that the County retains exclusive jurisdiction to ‘plan’ and ‘design’ all streets in the first instance. But that doesn’t mean the County retains the far broader power to confiscate parcels of private property that were carved out long before the County’s designs were ever promulgated. Ibid. (cleaned up). And, as before, “that’s the situation we have here.” Ibid.
Next, the Defendants point to § 28-14 of the County Code, which provides that “[s]treet right- of-way widths shall be as shown on the master plan . . . and where not so shown shall be not less than . . . Fifty (50) to sixty (60) feet right-of-way as may be determined in uniform standards prescribed by the County’s manual of public works construction.” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 28-14(b)(14). When read in the context of the Code, however, § 28-14 provides no List of Roadways , M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , https://www.miamidade.gov/transit/library/list-of- roadways.pdf (last visited May 21, 2025).
indication that the County can require a land dedication from Megladon to effectuate conformity with that standard.
Chapter 28 covers “subdivision,” which is defined to include both the division of land into
multiple parcels and the “dedication of a road, highway, street, alley, easement through or on a tract
of land regardless of area.”
Id.
§ 28-1(k)(1)–(2). The specific section on which the Defendants rely,
§ 28-14, promulgates “[d]esign standards” for streets. But, as we’ve said, we are well past the “design”
phase of the streets abutting Megladon’s parcel.
See Megladon
,
Megladon also isn’t a subdivider— viz. , a “legal entity commencing proceedings under [Chapter 28] to effect a subdivision of land hereunder for himself or for another.” Id. § 28-1(j). It’s undisputed that “Megladon did not propose to subdivide the Parcel.” JSOUF ¶ 6. In fact, Megladon is wholly exempt from the platting requirements set out in Chapter 28. See ibid. ; M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 28-4 (outlining exemptions to platting). Since Megladon isn’t proposing a subdivision, we don’t much care that the County may require that a “proposed subdivision” “conform in principle with [the] master plan.” Id. § 28-14(a).
The Defendants counter that “Megladon mistakenly conflates” its exemption from platting “with an exemption from the infrastructure design standards set forth in section 28-14[,] . . . which apply to any development permit that requires dedication.” Defs.’ MSJ at 15. Even if we were to ignore the fact that Megladon isn’t a covered subdivider—which is dispositive in itself—this argument would still fail, because the Defendants haven’t identified a single provision of the Code that requires, as a condition of development, the dedication of a right-of-way for roadway expansion. The County certainly knew how to do this, since Chapter 28 does, in fact, require such a dedication “[w]henever any drainage way, stream, or surface drainage course is located or planned in any area that is being subdivided[.]” M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 28-13(c). But the County promulgated no comparable dedication requirement to address the width of existing streets, see generally id. § 28, and we won’t be amending the Code to add that in, see S CALIA & G ARNER at 101 (“The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.”).
Despite their attempt to construct a “systematic web” of regulations supporting the County’s jurisdiction over Megladon’s permit, Defs.’ MSJ at 12, the Defendants have (again) failed to thread together a legal basis for that assertion. Whatever jurisdiction over “traffic engineering” the County believes it retained following the Transfer Road Agreement, Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 7, that authority is not implicated here. The decision to impose the land-dedication requirement on Megladon was thus wholly the Village’s. In short, Megladon has established, as a matter of law, that the Transfer Road Agreement validly assigned to the Village jurisdiction over the streets abutting Megladon’s parcel— and over any rights-of-way along those streets.
* * * The County has no authority to demand that the Village require a road dedication from Megladon before Megladon can receive a building permit. We therefore GRANT the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DENY the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. And, since the County no longer has any role to play in this case, we’ll exercise our discretion under Rule 21 and DISMISS the County from this action. See F ED R. C IV . P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”); see also Daker v. Head , 730 F. App’x 765, 768 (11th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a district court’s “authority under Rule 21 [to] sua sponte . . . dismiss improper defendants”). We’ll therefore consider the parties’ motions only insofar as they implicate the Village from here on. [11]
III. The Timing of Megladon’s Claims against the Village The parties also seek summary judgment on the ripeness of Megladon’s claims and the timeliness of the prohibited-exaction claim Megladon has pled in Count I. See Defs.’ MSJ at 9–11, 19; Pl.’s MSJ at 7–17.
a. The Ripeness of Megladon’s Claims
The parties dispute whether Megladon’s claims challenging the land-dedication requirement
are ripe for adjudication. Because the issue of ripeness presents a “threshold jurisdictional question,”
we may only proceed to the merits of these claims if we’re satisfied that they’re ripe for judicial review.
Elend v. Basham
,
“When a plaintiff is challenging a governmental act, the issues are ripe for judicial review if ‘a
plaintiff . . . show[s] he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the
result of that act.’”
Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Miami
,
Megladon’s claims are ripe for adjudication because the Village has made a final decision—
from which it has never departed—that Megladon would have to comply with the dedication
requirement to receive its permit. On May 14, 2020, Director Olmsted, the official to whom the Village
“has delegated authority . . . to grant or deny residential building permits,” JSOUF ¶ 7;
accord
Olmsted
Dep. at 229:13–232:11, emailed Fossi to confirm that “the right-of-way
will
need to be dedicated to
the Village of Pinecrest” and explained that Megladon’s “certificate of occupancy
will not
be issued
until dedication of the right-of-way is complete.” May 14 Email at 1 (emphases added).
[12]
By that point,
Olmsted and his staff had already made it clear to Megladon that the right-of-way would be 7.5 feet,
see
PRS at 17; Ex. 2 to Janisse Aff. at 8 (telling Megladon, on September 5, 2019, that “it will be
necessary to dedicate 7.5 ft. to Village and the lot would then be reduced in area”), which Megladon
would be required to account for on its new site plan,
see
May 14 Email at 1 (“On the site plan that
will be submitted for building permits, please crosshatch and indicate the portion that is the area of
right-of-way to be excluded from the property and dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest.”). As we
explained in a prior order,
see Megladon
,
Parrying, the Defendants return to their argument that “Olmsted’s determination was
not . . . final” because Megladon “could still appeal to the Village Council or seek review from the
Planning Board.” Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 11 (citing Olmsted Statement ¶¶ 38–44). But the Supreme Court
made clear in
Pakdel
that “administrative exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite for a takings
claim when the government has reached a conclusive position,” since “the finality requirement looks
only to whether
the initial decisionmaker
has arrived at a definitive position on the issue.”
The Defendants offer two such “avenues.”
First
, they say that Megladon could have appealed
Olmsted’s decision to the Village Council.
See
Defs.’ MSJ at 11. True, the Village Council is authorized
to “[h]ear and decide appeals with regard to administrative interpretations or decisions.” V ILL . OF
P INECREST , F LA ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES ch. 30, art. 2, div. 2.1(
l
). But satisfying the finality
requirement doesn’t require an applicant to pursue an
appeal
of the initial denial to
a different
decisionmaker
—even one within the same jurisdiction.
See Williamson County
,
Second
, the Defendants maintain that Megladon could have “[sought] review from the Planning
Board.” Defs.’ MSJ at 11. We’re not entirely sure what the “Planning Board” is, as the Defendants
never tell us.
See generally
Defs.’ MSJ; Defs.’ MSJ Resp.; Defendants’ Reply (“Defs.’ Reply”) [ECF No.
191]; Defs.’ SOF. We’ll assume—at least for purposes of Megladon’s Motion—that the Defendants
are referring to the Village’s
Zoning
Board.
See Am. Bankers
,
Instead, the record makes clear that the setback requirements are distinct from, and
downstream of, the dedication itself.
See
Ex. 2 to Olmsted Dep. at 1 (considering “whether or not
additional right-of-way will need to be dedicated and,
if dedication is required
, the impacts on required
setbacks from the new property line” (emphasis added)). The Village’s only other evidence mentioning
the setback requirement comes from a single paragraph in Olmsted’s Verified Statement: “Megladon,”
the Village says, “could have applied to the zoning board for a variance from the setback requirements,
which would have been impacted by the dedication.” Olmsted Statement ¶ 42. Obviously, the distance
from a building to the property line would be “impacted” by a right-of-way dedication—precisely
because
the Village would be taking the right-of-way and then redrawing the property line. But
Olmsted’s recognition of this truism doesn’t suggest that the Zoning Board could have given
Megladon a variance to avoid that taking and redrawing in the first instance. And the Defendants have
offered no other evidence, nor identified any provisions of the Village Code, establishing that the
Zoning Board had the authority to waive the dedication requirement itself. They have thus failed to
create any dispute of material fact on this issue.
See Chapman v. AI Transport
,
The Village also argues that these claims cannot be ripe given its later communications with Megladon—specifically, a November 4, 2020, comment in the PRS, in which the Village directed Megladon to “confirm with Miami-Dade County the width of right-of-way required to be dedicated or seek and obtain a variance from the requirement from Miami-Dade County.” PRS at 10–11. In the Defendants’ view, “[n]o interpretation of that comment could be deemed a final decision as it does not even specify the width of the dedication that will be required.” Defs.’ MSJ at 11 (emphasis omitted). A few problems here.
First
, the November 4 comment
itself
doesn’t have to communicate a final decision since the
dedication requirement had already been imposed on Megladon as a condition precedent to receiving
its permit.
See
May 14 Email at 1;
cf. Knick
, 588 U.S. at 192 (“The government’s post-taking
actions . . . cannot nullify the property owner’s existing Fifth Amendment right.”).
Second
, any
uncertainty as to the County’s position about the required width is irrelevant, since the County doesn’t
have jurisdiction over the right-of-way.
See Pakdel
,
True, “[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation goes ‘too far’ unless it knows how far
the regulation goes.”
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
,
Even if we were to credit the Village’s mistaken belief that Megladon was required to consult
the County about the width of the dedication,
see
Defs.’ MSJ at 11;
but see Pakdel
,
And the Village has never departed from that final position. In response to Megladon’s pre-
suit notice on December 29, 2020, the Village—as it had many times before—reaffirmed that
“Megladon
must
. . . dedicate the right-of-way for the road that is needed to accommodate its
development.” Notice Resp. at 6 (emphasis added). Given the Village’s consistent, unwavering
commitment to having Megladon comply with the dedication requirement, Megladon’s suit is not
premised on “a hypothetical harm”—but rather on the “definitive position” the Village has stood
behind throughout the permitting process.
Pakdel
,
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendants, we conclude that Megladon has established, as a matter of law, that the Village reached “a final, definitive position” that Megladon would have to comply with the dedication requirement before it could receive a building permit. Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 191. Since each of Megladon’s claims is ripe for adjudication, we GRANT Megladon’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DENY the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of ripeness.
b. The Timeliness of Megladon’s § 70.45 Claim
As we’ve said, Megladon has established that the dedication was “a final condition of approval
for the requested use of real property.” F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(2). But we can’t say exactly
when
the Village
first imposed that condition. Although this question has no bearing on the
ripeness
of Megladon’s
§ 70.45 claim—
i.e.
, whether the condition inflicted “an actual, concrete injury,”
Pakdel
,
As a condition precedent to filing a § 70.45 claim, a property owner must “provide to the relevant governmental entity written notice of the proposed action” “[a]t least 90 days before filing an action under this section, but no later than 180 days after imposition of the prohibited exaction[.]” F S TAT . § 70.45(3). Megladon served pre-suit notice on the Village on October 1, 2020, see JSOUF ¶ 31, and first filed this action on July 21, 2021, see generally State Court Compl.—thus complying with § 70.45(3)’s 90-day waiting period. So, the timeliness of this claim turns on whether the Village “imposed” the “prohibited exaction” within 180 days of October 1, 2020. To answer that question, we must first define those terms.
In our MTD Order, we defined “impose” to mean “to ‘give or bestow (as a name or title) authoritatively or officially,’ as in to ‘impose a tax’ or to ‘impose a duty[.]’” Megladon , 661 F. Supp. 3d at 1238 n.15 (quoting Impose , Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/impose). Based on that definition, we rejected Megladon’s argument that “the 180-day clock hasn’t even started yet because, given this lawsuit, the Village’s condition has never actually been ‘imposed[,]’” reasoning that, “[j]ust as a tax can be imposed, even if the tax is never paid, the Village’s condition was imposed, even though the Plaintiff hasn’t agreed to play along.” Ibid.
Now renewing this issue, Megladon highlights that the Florida Legislature passed a “‘clarifying’
amendment” to § 70.45 in 2021, defining “‘imposition’ to ‘refer[ ] to the time at which the property
owner must comply with the prohibited exaction or condition of approval.’” Pl.’s MSJ at 10 n.15
(quoting F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(1)(c) (2021)). But, as Megladon concedes, this statutory definition is not
included in the “version of the statute applicable in this case[.]”
Ibid.
;
see, e.g.
,
Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc.
v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One
,
Megladon says that the 180-day period is triggered only upon “the latter accrual event of actual imposition,” and that our understanding of “impose” “inadvertently collapses Section 70.45(2)’s two distinct statutory accrual points—when a prohibited exaction is imposed and when it is required in writing as a final condition of approval—into a single event[.]” Pl.’s MSJ at 10 n.15. We disagree. As the statute makes clear, the 180-day clock is triggered upon the “imposition of the prohibited exaction.” F S TAT . § 70.45(3) (2020). The statute defines “prohibited exaction” as “any condition imposed by a governmental entity on a property owner’s proposed use of real property” that lacks an essential nexus and proportionality. Id. § 70.45(1)(c). At first blush, that definition doesn’t help us much because substituting it into § 70.45(3) only tells us that a plaintiff must serve notice within 180 days after the “ imposition of” “any [prohibited] condition imposed ” on the property. Id. § 70.45(1), (3) (emphases added). By viewing these provisions in the context of the entire section, however, we can eliminate this apparent circularity. See S CALIA & G ARNER at 170 (“The text must be construed as a whole.”). Section 70.45(2) provides that an “action may not be brought until a prohibited exaction”— that is, an unlawful “condition imposed” on the property—is either “actually imposed or required in writing as a final condition of approval.” F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(1) (emphasis added). But, under the statutory definition of “prohibited exaction,” for there to be a “prohibited exaction” at all, there first must be a “condition imposed” on the property. Id. § 70.45(1)(c). So, for each of the provisions of subsections (1), (2), and (3) to have effect, a condition must be sufficiently “imposed,” such that there exists a prohibited exaction to challenge, either when that condition is “actually imposed” or when it’s “required in writing.” Id. § 70.45(2); see also S CALIA & G ARNER at 180 (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”).
Contrary to Megladon’s protestations, this understanding actually comports with Megladon’s preferred definition of “impose”— viz. , “to establish or apply by authority,” Pl.’s MSJ at 10 n.15 (quoting Impose , Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impose (emphasis added))—as it reflects that a prohibited exaction may be imposed either when it’s applied ( i.e. , “actually imposed” on the land) or when it’s established ( i.e. , “required in writing”). That is, because the statute makes clear that the clock begins to run upon the “imposition of the prohibited exaction,” F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(3), Megladon’s preferred rule (which would trigger the statutory window only upon “actual imposition”) renders the word “actual” superfluous, Pl.’s MSJ at 10 n.15 (quoting F S TAT . § 70.45(3)). Our reading, by contrast, doesn’t “reduce . . . the . . . accrual events of Section 70.45(2) to surplusage[,]” ibid . (cleaned up), since it recognizes that time accrues upon the occurrence of either event. Plus, it avoids the surplusage that would result from giving “imposed” and “ actually imposed” identical meanings. Cf. S CALIA & G ARNER at 170 (“No[ ] [word] should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it . . . to have no consequence.”). Based on the plain text and structure of § 70.45, we thus conclude that the 180-day period to serve pre-suit notice began to run when the Village first “required in writing” the dedication “as a final condition of approval” for Megladon’s building permit. F S TAT . § 70.45(2).
And a reasonable jury, considering all the summary-judgment evidence, could disagree as to when exactly that was. In Megladon’s view, the Village made its final written decision on May 14, 2020—140 days before Megladon tendered pre-suit notice—when Olmsted emailed Fossi that “the right-of-way will need to be dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest[.]” May 14 Email at 1. As we’ve explained, Olmsted’s email expressed the Village’s final position on the dedication requirement. See ante , at 35–42. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that May 14 was the first time the Village expressed this position. According to the Defendants, if the Village ever imposed a final condition, then it first imposed that condition in writing not on May 14, but on April 3, 2020—181 days before Megladon sued—when Olmsted posted the following on the PRS:
PLEASE PROVIDE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO EACH OF THE REVIEW COMMENTS NOTED BELOW INCLUDING A NOTE INDICATING WHERE THE REVISION OR INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW IN THE REVISED PLAN SET. PLEASE ATTACH THIS SHEET TO THE FRONT SHEET OF EACH SUBMITTED SET OF PLANS.
1. Additional right-of-way (7.5 feet) adjacent to SW 131 Street is required to be dedicated to the Village of Pinecrest. Please adjust the proposed northern property line 7.5 feet to the south and revise all setback, lot coverage, impervious coverage, green space, and building area information. . . .
2. Dedication of right-of-way to the Village of Pinecrest requires acceptance by the Village Council and can be completed prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Coordination with the Village Attorney will be required. . . .
PRS at 17.
The parties offer conflicting evidence about the extent to which this comment likewise represented the Village’s “final” position. Megladon contends that Olmsted’s April 3 comment was not a “decision” that Megladon would have to comply with the dedication requirement but merely an invitation for further “communications, negotiations, and clarifications.” Pl.’s MSJ at 11 (cleaned up). And Megladon has submitted competent evidence to substantiate this view. For starters, the April 3 comment—unlike the May 14 email—invites Megladon to “provide a written response” to the comment. PRS at 17; cf. May 14 Email (including no such language). Megladon has also produced evidence indicating that the PRS is not a forum for publishing final decisions, but rather a place for mere “conversation between the property owner and the Village[.]” Notice Resp. at 3; accord JSOUF ¶ 12. And, indeed, even after Olmsted posted the April 3 comment, Megladon and the Village continued their dialogue about the dedication requirement. See Fossi Decl. ¶¶ 9–11 (“Olmsted asked Megladon to provide a written response and invited Megladon to schedule a meeting with the Village to review and discuss the Village’s comments. . . . During our meeting, Ms. Conley and I pushed back against the Village’s dedication proposal and sought clarification about what the Village wanted Megladon to dedicate, the mechanics of dedication, and the reasons for the dedication (to widen S.W. 131st Street, according to Mr. Olmsted).”). Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Megladon, we think a reasonable jury could infer from the contents of the April 3 comment, the nature of the PRS process, and the Village’s continuing engagement with Megladon that the Village did not issue Megladon a written, final decision on the dedication requirement on April 3.
But the Defendants have also introduced competent evidence to support the opposite inference. At the end of the April 3 comment, for instance, the Village invited Megladon “to schedule a meeting with staff of the Building and Planning Department to review and discuss the provided review comments before resubmittal ,” PRS at 19 (emphasis added)—an option Megladon never pursued, see Olmsted Statement ¶ 34 (“In fact, a building permit could not be issued to Megladon because it never submitted a complete building permit application.”). Moreover, contrary to Megladon’s characterization of the PRS system, Olmsted explains that the comments are generally not disputed before the Building and Planning Department, but rather “appeal[ed] [for an] administrative determination to the Village Council[.]” Olmsted Statement ¶ 28. And, as Olmsted saw it, his continued communications with Megladon merely provided Megladon with “clarification on how to comply with the comment”—not an avenue for Megladon to seek reconsideration. Id. ¶ 29. So, taking those facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants, we think a jury could reasonably infer that the April 3 comment was a final decision.
“If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court
should deny summary judgment.”
Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc.
,
One more thing. Megladon claims that, even if the Village made its final decision on April 3, its pre-suit notice is still timely because “Megladon did not see or have notice of Olmsted’s comment” until April 6—or 178 days before it gave pre-suit notice. Pl.’s MSJ at 13 (citing Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 33–34). Not so. As a statute waiving sovereign immunity, § 70.45 “must be strictly construed, with any ambiguity concerning the scope of the [statute] resolved in favor of the government[.]” City of Jacksonville v. Smith , 159 So. 3d 888, 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). We needn’t even resort to a strict construction of § 70.45, though, since no reasonable reading of that statute supports Megladon’s interpretation. Section 70.45(3) states that a property owner must provide pre-suit notice “no later than 180 days after imposition of the prohibited exaction”—full stop. F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(3). Although the Florida Legislature certainly knows how to condition accrual upon actual notice, see, e.g. , id. § 766.106(4) (“Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.”); id. § 627.70131(7)(a) (“Within 60 days after an insurer receives notice of an initial, reopened, or supplemental property insurance claim from a policyholder, the insurer shall pay or deny such claim or a portion of the claim unless the failure to pay is caused by factors beyond the control of the insurer.”), it elected not to do so here, cf. S CALIA & G ARNER at 93 (“Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies[.]”). We decline to rewrite § 70.45 to save Megladon’s (potentially) untimely filing. Instead, we’ll DENY both parties’ motions on the timeliness of Count I and proceed to trial on that issue.
IV. The Merits
Finally, we reach the merits of Megladon’s claims. [13] Both parties move for summary judgment on the constitutionality of the Village’s dedication requirement. See Pl.’s MSJ at 18–24; Defs.’ MSJ at 21. The parties agree that we apply the Nollan / Dolan / Koontz Test in answering this question. See Pl.’s MSJ at 19; Defs.’ MSJ at 21; see also Joint Notice of Withdrawal [ECF No. 224] at 2 (“This notice is specifically withdrawing the argument that laws of general application are not subject to the Nollan / Dolan standard of review.”). But they dispute exactly how the Village may be liable if we find the dedication requirement unlawful. See Defs.’ MSJ at 17–19; Pl.’s MSJ Resp. at 16–20. We’ll thus begin by assessing whether the dedication requirement amounts to an unconstitutional condition before considering Megladon’s available remedies.
a. The Constitutionality of Megladon’s Claims
The Fifth Amendment safeguards the “right to just compensation for property the
government takes when owners apply for land-use permits.”
Koontz
, 570 U.S at 605 (cleaned up).
Under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “a unit of government may not condition the
approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless there
is a nexus and rough proportionality between the government’s demand and the effects of the
proposed land use.”
Id.
at 599;
accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n
,
Here, the Defendants assert that the right-of-way dedication is necessary to “mitigate[ ] the impact of [Megladon’s] development” because the development will “create[ ] more traffic” on the road. Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 18 (citing Ona Dep. at 149:7–150:9). In their view, the “Plaintiff’s development demonstrably puts cars on SW 131st Street because [the] Plaintiff’s property is one of six properties that access their property directly from a driveway on this road and that gain access to the entire County road system through this road.” Ibid. (citing Ex. A to Defs.’ Resp SOF (“Defs.’ Amnd. ROG Ans.”) [ECF No. 179-1] ¶ 10).
The Supreme Court, on multiple occasions, has endorsed the view that, “if a proposed
development will ‘substantially increase traffic congestion,’ the government may condition the
building permit on the owner’s willingness ‘to deed over the land needed to widen a public road.’”
Sheetz v. County of El Dorado
,
Perhaps recognizing this gap in their evidence, the Defendants reframe the comparative
analysis. In their view, the increase in harm should not be measured against the traffic caused by the
prior single-family home but rather against the traffic caused by the
current
undeveloped state of the
parcel.
See
Defs.’ MSJ Resp. at 19 n.4. From that viewpoint, they say, “denial of a permit . . .
would
prevent additional burdens on 131st Street and the rest of the County road system,”
ibid.
(emphasis
added), because, unlike at present, all six lots “that have direct access to and from that roadway” would
be occupied, Defs.’ Amnd. ROG Ans. ¶ 10. Although the Defendants provide no legal authority to
support this framing, we think it makes sense to assess the marginal cost of Megladon’s proposal based
on the parcel’s undeveloped state, since that was the condition of the parcel at the time “the initial
decisionmaker . . . arrived at a definitive position on the issue.”
Williamson County
,
But we needn’t resolve this question here because the Defendants fail to meet their burden of
showing that their required condition bears a “‘rough proportionality’ to the development’s impact on
the land-use interest” under either framing.
Sheetz
,
The Defendants purport to dispute Mesimer’s findings.
Compare
Pl.’s SOF ¶ 6 (“Even if there
had previously been no single-family home on the Parcel, the addition of one new single-family home
to the neighborhood would have factually and legally de minimis traffic impact.” (first citing Mesimer
Rpt. at 3–4; and then citing Olmsted Dep. at 189:9–24)),
with
Defs.’ Resp. SOF ¶ 6 (“Disputed.” (first
citing Defs.’ Amnd. ROG Ans. ¶ 10; and then citing Ona Dep. at 148:27–150:9)). But the evidence
—even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendants—does not create a genuine dispute
about Mesimer’s conclusions.
See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta
,
Although “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, [the government] must make
some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication . . . beyond the conclusory statement
that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated.”
Dolan
,
What’s worse, the Defendants provide no evidence that they made an “
individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.”
Dolan
,
The Takings Clause . . . is no “poor relation to other constitutional rights.” And the government rarely mitigates a constitutional problem by multiplying it. A governmentally imposed condition on the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, or the right to confront one’s accuser, for example, is no more permissible when enforced against a large “class” of persons than it is when enforced against a “particular” group. If takings claims must receive “like treatment,” whether the government owes just compensation for taking your property cannot depend on whether it has taken your neighbors’ property too.
Sheetz
,
Absent “any individualized determination” as to the relationship between the dedication and
Megladon’s development,
Dolan
,
In a final effort to save their position, the Defendants contend that this dedication cannot
amount to an unconstitutional condition because they offered Megladon “at least one alternative that
would satisfy the essential nexus and rough proportionality test”—namely, “the option of seeking an
exemption from the condition altogether by obtaining a variance from the County, which exercises
jurisdiction over the requirement.” Defs.’ MSJ at 21 (quoting
Koontz
,
Accordingly, we GRANT the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the legal issue of whether the Village’s dedication requirement is an unconstitutional condition in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
b. The Village’s Liability Having found (for summary-judgment purposes) that the Village’s dedication requirement is unconstitutional, we now must assess the remedies that are available to Megladon. The Fifth Amendment “mandates a particular remedy—just compensation—only for takings .” Koontz , 570 U.S. at 608. So, where (as here) “there is an excessive demand but no taking, whether money damages are available is not a question of federal constitutional law but of the cause of action—whether state or federal—on which the landowner relies.” Ibid. Megladon seeks damages, as well as prospective relief, under two distinct causes of action: F LA . S TAT . § 70.45 (Count I); and 42 U.S.C § 1983 (Count IV). [15]
After Koontz , the Florida Legislature enacted § 70.45 to provide a state cause of action for damages and declaratory relief “against a prohibited exaction.” S TAFF OF THE F LA . H OUSE OF R EPS ., F INAL B ILL A NALYSIS , H.B. 421, 2021 Reg. Sess., at 4 (July 7, 2021); see also F LA . S TAT § 70.45(2) (“In addition to other remedies available in law or equity, a property owner may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction under this section to declare a prohibited exaction invalid and recover damages caused by a prohibited exaction.”). Under that law, “the governmental entity has the burden of proving that the exaction has an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose and is roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use that the governmental entity is seeking to avoid, minimize, or mitigate.” F LA . S TAT . § 70.45(4). As we just found, the Village has failed to do that. See ante , at 49–55. Provided that Megladon can prove that this claim is ripe, therefore, it would be entitled to declaratory relief and an opportunity to prove any damages “that result[ed] from [the] prohibited exaction.” F S TAT . § 70.45(4).
Likewise, Megladon’s § 1983 claim seeks damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief. Because
the unconstitutional-conditions claim in
Koontz
was brought only under Florida law, the Court declined
to “decide whether federal law authorizes plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions
claims predicated on the Takings Clause.”
Koontz
,
While Koontz did not establish any remedy at law to recover damages for the unconstitutional conditions violation in that case, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an alternative claim that may allow for the recovery of money damages. The cause of action cannot be for a taking, since no actual taking has occurred, but for a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s right, implied by Koontz , not have one’s property “impermissibly burdened.” Section 1983 authorizes suits at law and in equity. Under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the remedy might be money damages for loss of use of the property from the time the government demanded the mitigation fee until, should it occur, the state court’s finding on remand that Nollan / Dolan were violated.
161 A M J UR . P ROOF OF F ACTS 233 § 15 (3d ed. 2017) (cleaned up). Fortunately, we needn’t wade
deeply into this question since “the parties here have litigated on the assumption” that § 1983 allows
a plaintiff to recover damages for an unconstitutional-conditions claim based in federal law.
Usme v.
CMI Leisure Mgmt., Inc.
,
But the parties disagree about what exactly Megladon must show to establish the Village’s §
1983 liability—specifically, whether Megladon’s § 1983 claim against the Village should be assessed
under the
Monell
standard for municipal liability.
See
Defs.’ MSJ at 17–19; Pls.’ MSJ Resp. at 16–20. It
has been blackletter law for nearly fifty years that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a
respondeat superior
theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Rather, a
municipality will be liable only if “‘the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers’ and when constitutional deprivations result from ‘governmental “custom” even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking
channels.’”
Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale
,
Megladon, however, asks us to ignore this “axiomatic” doctrine of public-law litigation.
See
Brown v. Crawford
,
As the Defendants rightly highlight, none of the cases Megladon relies on presented a situation
in which the governmental entity’s liability was at issue,
either
because the condition was imposed
pursuant to an official policy
or
because the plaintiffs didn’t challenge the relevant governmental
commission’s final decision-making authority.
See
Defs.’ Reply at 9–10 (first citing
Lingle
, 544 U.S. at
533 (challenging statute); then citing
Nollan
,
“A plaintiff can establish municipal liability under
Monell
in three ways: (1) identifying an
official policy; (2) identifying an unofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent and
well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law; or (3) identifying a municipal
official with final policymaking authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Chabad Chayil v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty.
,
At the outset, then, we must first determine
who
is the Village’s final policymaker with respect
to the dedication.
See Morro v. City of Birmingham
,
To survive summary judgment on this theory, therefore, Megladon must offer competent
evidence from which a reasonably jury could infer
both
that the Village had a “widespread practice” of
conditioning permitting on land dedications
and
that the Village Council “must have known about
[this practice] but failed to stop it.”
Brown
,
For starters, it’s undisputed that the County “regularly” requires right-of-way dedications.
Miami-Dade County, Fla., Resolution No. R-139-22 (Feb. 1, 2022) [ECF No. 171-21] at 3;
see also
Ona
Dep. at 63:1–2 (“Yes, the
normal
dedication required for a local road is 50 feet, okay.” (emphasis
added)); Defs.’ SOF ¶ 14 (“Miami-Dade County routinely accepts dedications of land in incorporated
cities to meet right-of-way standards.” (first citing Ona Dep. at 222:1–7; and then citing Miami-Dade
County, Fla., Resolution Accepting Rights-of-Way (July 7, 2022) [ECF No. 171-6] at 3–4, 13, 22, 30,
39)). In turn, the evidence suggests that the Village Planning Division’s rank-and-file
both
believed that
the County had implemented widespread dedication requirements
and
routinely implemented them.
See, e.g.
, Olmsted Statement ¶ 37 (“[T]he County has always required dedication to meet their minimum
right-of-way widths, and we are required to coordinate with other governmental entities.”);
id.
¶ 15
(noting that, in his thirteen years as Planning Director, Olmsted’s “practice” has been to go to “the
County when there is a question concerning matters over which the County asserts jurisdiction, such
as the dedication of right-of-way on substandard roads”); Janisse Decl. ¶ 9 (“I assumed, at the time,
that 15 feet of additional right-of-way was needed to bring the existing 35-foot roadway up to a
standard 50-foot width, and that half of that right-of-way (7.5 feet) would have to be dedicated by
Megladon . . . I assumed this because generally speaking, when the County requires dedication in order
to meet standard street widths, the property owners on either side of the street dedicate half of the
required width.”). We think a reasonable jury could infer—from this evidence of the Planning
Department’s unwavering insistence on dedication as a condition for the building—that this practice
had become the “standard operating procedure” for the Village.
Hoefling
,
So too could a jury find that the Village Council— i.e. , the “final decisionmaker”—has “acquiesced” in, if not outrightly endorsed, that practice. Ibid. That’s because Megladon has adduced evidence for its view that requiring dedication is the standard policy of the Village as such . See Ex. 9 to Olmsted Dep. at 1 (noting that it has “always been the Village’s policy to require dedication of right- of-way in instances where existing right-of-way is substandard” (emphasis added)); Olmsted Dep. at 63:1–3 (“It’s the Village’s policy to require dedication of right-of-way if required by Miami-Dade County, for sure.” (emphasis added)); Olmsted Statement ¶ 14 (“[T]he Village has always believed that the County does, retain jurisdiction over local roads and rights-of way within the areas of the County that have been incorporated into cities, such as the Village.” (emphasis added)); Kerbal Email at 6 (“ Pinecrest believes that the County has jurisdiction over right-of-way widths in the incorporated and unincorporated areas per the Miami-Dade County public works manual.” (emphasis added)). Since the Village Council is the authority empowered to make final policy as to “administrative . . . decisions” on land development, V ILL OF P INECREST , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES ch. 30, art. 2, div. 2.1( l ), we don’t think it’s unreasonable to infer that the referenced “Village policy” on that subject refers to the policy of the Village Council .
In reply, the Defendants accuse Megladon of trying to “have it both ways: either the Village
was enforcing a County requirement, or Olmsted unilaterally imposed a requirement that is not
provided for in the Village code.” Defs.’ Reply at 10. This is a false dichotomy. Although the County,
in fact
, doesn’t have jurisdiction over right-of-way dedications in Pinecrest, the Village “always
believed” that the County had jurisdiction and enforced the (supposed) dedication requirement
accordingly. Olmsted Dep. ¶ 37. That the Village
thought
it was following the orders of the County
doesn’t shield it from liability for its own unconstitutional practices.
See Cooper v. Dillon
,
This is not to say, however, that Megladon has left no triable issue of fact as to the Village’s
(alleged) complicity in perpetuating this practice. We still know relatively little about the role the Village
Council has historically played in the dedication process, and we know virtually nothing about the
extent to which it has affirmatively sanctioned prior dedications. It may very well be that Olmsted and
his subordinates have flown under the radar in implementing the County’s (extra-jurisdictional) will
by requiring dedications without triggering the ire or notice of the Village Council. Put another way,
the Planning Department’s conception of “the Village’s policy” might not extend beyond the Planning
Department. Olmsted Dep. at 63:1–3. Since both parties have moved for summary judgment on the
Village’s § 1983 liability,
see
Pl.’s MSJ at 18–24; Defs.’ MSJ at 17–19, we must view the evidence “in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party on each motion,”
Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank,
N.A.
,
We can’t say the same, however, for Megladon’s ratification theory. A “municipality can be
held liable ‘on the basis of ratification when a subordinate public official makes an unconstitutional
decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone who does have final policymaking
authority.’”
Hoefling
,
Megladon has failed to rebut the Defendants’ evidence that Megladon never “appealed the
administrative determination concerning dedication to the Village Council.” Olmsted Statement ¶ 41.
Instead, Megladon cites evidence of the Village Manager’s position,
see
Pl.’s MSJ Resp. at 18 (citing
Ex. 2 to Olmsted Dep. at 369 (“If [SW 77th Ave.] is substandard, then we would require dedication
to correct that issue.”)), and “the Village’s institutional position” in general, Pl.’s MSJ Resp. at 18 (first
citing Olmsted Statement ¶¶ 14–15; and then citing Olmsted Dep. at 34:15–36:5, 52:2–63:14);
see, e.g.
, Olmsted Statement ¶ 14 (“I contacted Mr. Pino because Miami-Dade County claims to, and the Village
has always believed that the County does, retain jurisdiction over local roads and rights-of way within
the areas of the County that have been incorporated into cities, such as the Village[.]”); Olmsted Dep.
at 56:20–23 (“[T]he [Village’s] comprehensive plan certainly includes policies that require coordination
with other review agencies, intergovernmental coordination, with Miami-Dade County[.]”). But the
Village Manager isn’t a
final
policymaker on this issue either, since the Village Council has the power
to review any “decision” regarding land development. V ILL OF P INECREST , F ., C ODE OF
O RDINANCES ch. 30, art. 2, div. 2.1(
l
);
see also Mandel
,
And, while evidence of the Village’s general approach to land dedications may reasonably
suggest an authorized
custom
, it tells us nothing about whether the Village Council—in this particular
case—“knew about [Olmsted’s] decision[ ], understood the unconstitutional basis for th[at] decision[,]
and ratified [it] anyway.”
625 Fusion, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale
,
Although Megladon has shown for purposes of summary judgment that the Village’s land-
dedication requirement is an unconstitutional condition as a matter of law, it would be premature for
us to grant Megladon prospective relief or damages against the Village under § 1983 until Megladon
has satisfied
Monell
.
See L.A. County v. Humphries
,
* * * Two questions of fact thus remain: (1) the date on which the Village made its final decision to impose the dedication; and (2) the extent of the Village Council’s involvement in perpetuating the Village’s custom of requiring dedication. The first issue is dispositive of Megladon’s claim under F . S TAT § 70.45, and the second is dispositive of Megladon’s claim under § 1983. At trial, the parties may present evidence on these questions of fact. The parties may also offer evidence about the extent of Megladon’s alleged damages.
C ONCLUSION After careful review, therefore, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows: 1. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 170] is DENIED .
2. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 172] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .
a. The Motion is GRANTED on Miami-Dade County’s lack of authority, the ripeness of the Plaintiff’s claims, and the unconstitutionality of the dedication requirement.
b. The Motion is DENIED on the timeliness of Count I and the Village’s liability under § 1983.
3. The Plaintiff’s Objection [ECF No. 212] is DENIED as moot .
4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, Defendant Miami-Dade County is DISMISSED from this case.
5. The Clerk shall REOPEN this case.
6. By June 11, 2025, the parties shall submit an Amended Joint Scheduling Report, proposing dates for all remaining pre-trial deadlines and trial.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on May 28, 2025. _________________________________ ROY K. ALTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE cc: counsel of record
Notes
[1] “The facts are described in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party].”
Plott v. NCL Am.,
LLC
,
[2] The Transfer Road Agreement refers to the County as “Metropolitan Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida[.]” Transfer Road Agreement [ECF No. 171-15] at 2. In 1997, the County officially changed its name to “Miami-Dade County” following a referendum. See Miami-Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 97-212 § 1 (Dec. 2, 1997) (“‘Miami-Dade County’ is hereby recognized as the official name of Dade County, Florida.”).
[3] But see Pl.’s Resp. SOF ¶ 4 (“Disputed. Local road is not a defined term. The standard for minor streets to which Defendants cite, concerns ‘[s]treet right-of-way widths.’ A right-of-way is ‘a strip of ground dedicated by the subdivider.’” (cleaned up) (first quoting M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY , F ., C ODE OF O RDINANCES § 28-14(B)(14); then quoting id. § 28-1(i)(11); and then citing Declaration of Andreas Hase (“Hase Decl.”) [ECF No. 131-6] ¶ 9)); id. ¶ 6 (“Disputed. SW 131st Street is approximately 20 feet wide.” (first citing Ex. A to Paterson Decl. at 6; and then citing Ex. A to Mesimer Decl. at 7)).
[4] The exhibit attached to Janisse’s Affidavit cuts off some of the body of the email. See Janisse Aff. at 8. But the parties reproduce the full text of the excerpt in their Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts. See JSOUF ¶ 17.
[5] Unless we say otherwise, all citations to F S TAT . § 70.45 are to the 2020 version of that section.
[6] The Second Amended Complaint also pleads a Fifth Amendment claim against only the Village.
See
SAC ¶¶ 148–54 (Count III). Because (in our prior order) we read Count IV as not “conced[ing] that
the County has jurisdiction,” Tr. of Jan. 20, 2023, Hearing [ECF No. 154] at 10:17–18, and merely
reiterating Count III’s claims against the Village,
see Megladon
,
[8] The Defendants’ position would essentially inject a Catch-22 into most public-law litigation. See J OSEPH H ELLER , C ATCH -22, at 46 (1961) (“Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to.”). That is, we could only determine whether a plaintiff’s claims against an intervening defendant were ripe by looking to the merits of that claim, but we couldn’t reach the merits without first determining whether those claims were ripe. But that cannot be the law. See Elend v. Basham , 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[R]ipeness present[s] the threshold jurisdictional question of whether a court may consider the merits of a dispute.” (cleaned up)). A governmental entity could thus defeat any lawsuit by simply inviting some other governmental entity to intervene and assert that the intervenor has sole jurisdiction over the matter. We’ll decline this “poorly disguised invitation to a wild goose chase.” Plaintiff’s Response to Defs.’ MSJ (“Pl.’s MSJ Resp.”) [ECF No. 183] at 15.
[9]
See Megladon
,
[10] We may take judicial notice of the County’s publicly available “list of roadways that the Department
of Transportation and Public Works . . . has deemed necessary for the appropriate traffic movement
on the County’s roadway network.”
Local Roadways Permitting Authority
, M IAMI -D ADE C OUNTY ,
https://www.miamidade.gov/global/transportation/public-works/roadways-permitting-
authority.page (last visited May 21, 2025);
see also Setai Hotel Acquisition, LLC v. Miami Beach Luxury
Rentals, Inc.
,
[11] As we noted above, also pending before us is Megladon’s Objection to Magistrate Judge Reid’s Order for Sanctions. Megladon appealed that order after Magistrate Judge Reid denied Megladon’s request to strike three paragraphs from the Affidavit of Alicia Gonzalez. According to Megladon, that evidence “could taint the Court’s determination of whether Megladon’s claim against the County is ripe.” Objection at 2. Because we’re dismissing the County from this case, no such determination is necessary. Accordingly, Megladon’s Objection [ECF No. 212] is DENIED as moot
[12] This is not to say that May 14, 2020, was necessarily the
first
time the Village apprised Megladon of
its final decision to impose the dedication requirement. As we discuss in Section III.B,
infra
, it’s far
from clear, on this record, when
exactly
that occurred. Even so, the remaining factual dispute about
when
Megladon’s § 70.45 claim accrued isn’t material to the issue of ripeness, which only requires
Megladon to show that the Village had reached its “final” position
at some point
before this judgment.
See Williamson County
,
[13] Even though we cannot determine at summary judgment whether Megladon’s § 70.45 claim is timely, we can still consider the merits of that claim and resolve any outstanding legal issues before trial, since a pre-suit-notice requirement isn’t jurisdictional. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg , 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990) (“While such a condition precedent to suit is necessary in order to maintain a cause of action, the failure to do so does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Because we apply the same standard to determine whether an action is a “prohibited exaction” under § 70.45 as we do in determining whether it is an “unconstitutional condition,” compare F S TAT . § 70.45(4) (“For each claim filed under this section, the governmental entity has the burden of proving that the exaction has an essential nexus to a legitimate public purpose and is roughly proportionate to the impacts of the proposed use that the governmental entity is seeking to avoid, minimize, or mitigate.”), with Koontz , 570 U.S at 606 (“[T]he government . . . may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”), for the sake of simplicity, we’ll limit our discussion to the latter.
[14] In fact, “[t]he single-family home that previously stood on Megladon’s Parcel had two driveways exiting onto S.W. 131st Street and one driveway exiting onto S.W. 77th Avenue,” while “Megladon’s proposed redevelopment would reduce the number of driveway connections, with a single driveway exiting onto S.W. 131st Street and one driveway exiting onto S.W. 77th Avenue.” Pl.’s SOF ¶ 55 (citing Hase Decl. ¶ 5); see also Defs.’ Resp. SOF ¶ 55 (“Undisputed.”).
[15] In Count II, Megladon only seeks declaratory relief that the dedication requirement violates Article
X, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution. SAC ¶ 136. “Florida’s Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is a
procedural mechanism [that] does not confer any substantive rights.”
Coccaro v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.
,
[16] To prevail on the “official policy” theory of liability, a plaintiff must first “identify[ ] an official
policy,”
Malone v. Johnson
,
[17] This doesn’t alter our earlier conclusion that Olmsted is a final
decisionmaker
for ripeness purposes.
The Eleventh Circuit has explicitly warned us not to conflate these two concepts.
See Quinn v. Monroe
County
,