MEGALAND GP, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.; COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT.
No. 2014-1977
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 3, 2015
145 Ohio St.3d 84, 2015-Ohio-4918
Submitted June 9, 2015
{¶ 1} This case comes before us on an appeal filed by the Columbus City Schools Board of Education from an interim order of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) denying the school board’s motion to return this case to the BTA’s regular docket from its small-claims docket. See
{¶ 2} We must first decide whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal; if we do, we must then decide whether the BTA erred in denying the school board’s motion to have the case returned to the BTA’s regular docket.
{¶ 3} We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. We therefore exercise jurisdiction to review the interim order, and we affirm the BTA’s denial of the school board’s motion. We also remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND: THE BTA’S SMALL-CLAIMS DOCKET
{¶ 4} In 2013, the General Assembly passed Sub.H.B. No. 138, intended as a BTA reform bill. 2013 Ohio Laws File 37. One part of that act created a small-claims docket at the BTA. See
{¶ 5} The two key distinctions between small-claims cases and those on the regular docket are that (1) small-claims cases have less formal (and presumably less expensive) hearings and (2) the BTA’s decisions in small-claims cases are not appealable.
- Appeals to the BTA from the boards of revision in which the property at issue qualifies for the 10 percent tax reduction (sometimes called “rollback”) set forth in
R.C. 319.302 , i.e., the property is used as one-, two-, or three-family residential real estate or for farming. It is this provision that justified referral to the small-claims docket in this case. - Appeals from determinations of the tax commissioner or of municipal-income-tax review boards in which the amount of tax in controversy does not exceed $10,000.
{¶ 7} Procedurally, an appeal to the BTA is assigned to the small-claims docket in one of two instances:
- If “the appellant is one or more taxpayers that requests assignment of the appeal to the small claims docket,”
R.C. 5703.021(C)(1)(a) , which is the situation in this case. - If “the appellant is not a taxpayer, and the appellant files with the notice of appeal a written statement from every taxpayer that is a party to the appeal stating that each such taxpayer consents to the appeal being assigned to the small claims docket,”
R.C. 5703.021(C)(1)(b) .
{¶ 8}
- Upon the request of a party that is a taxpayer,
- When the appeal presents an issue of public or great general interest or presents a constitutional issue, or
When the BTA determines that the appeal does not meet the requirements for assigning the case to the small-claims docket under R.C. 5703.021(B) .
The school board’s motion was predicated solely on the first reason.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 9} Appellee, Megaland GP, L.L.C., holds title to a parcel of residential real estate and filed a complaint in March 2013 challenging the auditor’s valuation of the property at issue for tax year 2012. The school board filed a countercomplaint seeking retention of the auditor’s valuation.
{¶ 10} After holding a hearing, the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”) dismissed the complaint under
{¶ 11} Megaland appealed to the BTA from the dismissal order. On the prescribed form of the notice of appeal, Megaland marked “yes” in response to a question asking whether the case should be referred to the small-claims docket. Pursuant to the BTA’s rules, the case was placed on the small-claims docket. See Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-07.
{¶ 12} On or about October 8, 2014, the school board filed a motion to return the case to the regular docket, stating two grounds for doing so. First, the school board claimed that because the BOR order appealed from was a dismissal rather than a determination of value, the case did not qualify for the small-claims docket. Second, the school board claimed that it was a taxpayer and invoked the right under
{¶ 13} On October 16, 2014, the BTA examiner issued an order denying the motion. It states,
* * * The board of education has not alleged that the appeal “presents an issue of public or great general interest or presents a constitutional issue” and its contention that the appeal does not meet the requirements of
R.C. 5703.021(B) are [sic] not well taken. Accordingly, the BOE’s motion is overruled and the small claims telephonic hearing shall proceed as currently scheduled.
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER
{¶ 14} Because we have before us an interim order rather than a decision disposing of all claims as to all parties, we issued an order requiring the school board to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. The school board responded to the show-cause order on April 29, 2015.
{¶ 15} In its response, the school board cited
{¶ 16} In Southside Community Dev. Corp., we decided that appeals from BTA decisions are subject to analysis under the “final order” provision,
{¶ 17} There are two prongs of the test for determining whether a BTA interim order meets the appealability standard: the existence and substantiality of the right and the efficacy of a later appeal. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-6197, 898 N.E.2d 589, ¶ 6–7. The first prong is resolved by MB West Chester. Just as the board of education in that case had a “substantial right” to notification and participation in the taxpayer’s appeal there, so too does the school board in this case have a substantial right to participate in Megaland’s BTA appeal by virtue of its status as countercomplainant below.
{¶ 18} As for the second prong, there can be no question that the school board’s position cannot be vindicated on a later appeal, because the BTA’s retention of the case on the small-claims docket effectively forecloses any appeal from the ultimate BTA decision, under
{¶ 19} We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the claim of error that the school board raises in this appeal. Before doing so, we note that usually, parties are afforded the opportunity for oral argument in appeals from the BTA.
THE SCHOOL BOARD’S MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED BECAUSE ITS STANDING AS A PARTY DID NOT DEPEND UPON ITS OWNING TAXABLE PROPERTY
{¶ 20}
Notwithstanding division (B) of this section, the board shall reassign an appeal initially assigned to the small claims docket to the regular docket upon the request of a party that is a taxpayer, when the appeal presents an issue of public or great general interest or presents a constitutional issue, or when the board determines that the appeal does not meet the requirements of division (B) of this section.
(Emphasis added).
{¶ 21} The school board claims that it is “a taxpayer” under this provision. The school board did indeed own taxable property in Franklin County during the time period at issue. The question here is one of statutory construction: Does the school board qualify as “a party that is a taxpayer” for purposes of returning the case to the regular docket?
{¶ 22} We hold that “a party that is a taxpayer” under
{¶ 23} Indeed, there can be little doubt that by authorizing “taxpayers” to obtain both referral of the case to the small-claims docket under
{¶ 24} We also note that
{¶ 25} We reject the school board’s reading and conclude that the legislature intended the parties to be able to ascertain “taxpayer” status under
{¶ 26} It is important to state here what we are not holding. We do not hold that a board of education can never qualify as “a party that is a taxpayer” under
{¶ 27} In the present case, the school board is a party only by virtue of its countercomplaint. Its standing to have filed the countercomplaint under
CONCLUSION
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we exercise jurisdiction in this appeal, and we affirm the BTA’s order denying the school board’s motion to return the case from the small-claims docket to the regular BTA docket. We also remand to the BTA for further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.
LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., dissent.
FRENCH, J., dissenting.
{¶ 29} I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming the interim order of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which denied the Columbus City Schools Board of Education’s motion to return this case from the BTA’s small-claims docket to its regular docket. In my view,
{¶ 30} The question here is whether the school board is “a party that is a taxpayer” under
{¶ 31} Property owner Megaland GP, L.L.C., appealed to the BTA after the Franklin County Board of Revision dismissed Megaland’s valuation complaint. Upon Megaland’s request, the BTA assigned the appeal to its small-claims docket pursuant to
{¶ 32} “The primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature’s intention.” Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). To discern legislative intent, we consider the statutory language, reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21;
{¶ 34} Without expressly finding ambiguity in the statutory language, the lead opinion impermissibly restricts that language by holding that “‘a party that is a taxpayer’ under
{¶ 35} While acknowledging that a board of education qualifies as “a party that is a taxpayer” when it files a valuation complaint in its capacity as a property owner, the lead opinion suggests that the General Assembly intended to distinguish a party who has filed a valuation complaint by virtue of its ownership of taxable property from a school board whose standing arises under
{¶ 36} Because the plain statutory language of
LANZINGER and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., and Mark H. Gillis, for appellant.