after stating the case as abovb, delivered the opinion of the court.
' 'The granting of a nonsuit by the Circuit Court, because in its opinion the plaintiff had given no evidence sufficient to maintain his action, was in accordance with the law and practice of Pennsylvania prevailing in the courts of-the United States held within that State) and is subject to the revision of this court on writ of error.
Central Transportation Co.
v.
Pullman's Car Co.,
The requisites of a partnership are that thb parties must have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their common benefit, each contributing property or services,, and having a community of interest in the profits.
Ward
v.
Thompson,
Some of the principles applicable to the question of the liability of a partner to’ third persons were stated by Chief Justice Marshall in a general way as follows : “ The-power of an agent is limited by the authority given-him; and if .-he transcends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he acts no longer as an agent. The same- principle applies .to. partners. One binds the others so far-only as he is the agent-of the others.” ' A man who shares in the profit, although-his name may not be in the. firm, is responsible for all its debts.” “ Stipulations ■ [restricting the powers of .-partners], may bind the partners, but ought not to affect those.to whom they are unknown,, and who trust to the general and well'
*619
established commercial law.”
Winship
v.
Bank of United States,
How far sharing in the profits of a partnership shall make one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial discussion, and the various definitions have been approximate rather than exhaustive.
The rule formerly laid down, and long acted on as established, was that a man who received a certain share of the profits as profits, with a lien on the whole profits as security for his share, was liable as a partner for the debts of the partnership, even if it had been- stipulated between him and his copartners that he should not be so liable; but that merely-receiving compensation for labor or- services, estimated by a certain proportion of the profits, did not render one liable as a partner; Story on Partnership, c. 4; 3 Kent Com. 25 note, 32-34;
Ex parte Hamper,
above cited;
Pott
v.
Eyton,
3 C. B. 32, 40;
Bostwick
v.
Champion,
Accordingly, this court, at Becember term, 1860, decided that a person employed to sell goods under an agreement that he should receive half the profits, and that they should not be less than a certain sum, was not a partner with his employer. “ Actual participation in the profits as principal,” said Mr. Justice Clifford in delivering judgment, “ creates a partnership as between the parties and third persons, whatever may be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dormant' partner was not expected to participate in the loss beyond the
*620
amount of the profits,” or “ may have expressly stipulated with his associates against all the' usual incidents to that relation. That rule, however, has no application whatever to a 'case of service or special-Agency, where the employe has no power as a partner in the firm and no interest in the profits, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or special agent, and is to receive a given sum out' of the profits, or a proportion of the same, as a compensation • for his services.”
Berthold
v.
Goldsmith,
Mr. Justice Story, at the beginning of his Commentaries on Partnership, first published in 1841, said: “ Every partner is an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties . and obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules and principles as those of an agent. ¿A partner, indeed, virtually embraces the character both of a principal and of an ■agent. So fay.as he acts for himself and his own interest in the common concerns of the partnership, he may properly be deemed a principal; and so -far as he acts for his partners he may as properly be deemed an agent. The principal distinction between him and a mere agent is, that he has a community of interest with the-other partners in the whole property and business and responsibilities of the partnership ; whereas an agent, as Such, has no interest in either. Pothier considers partnership as but a sp'ecies of mandate, saying, Contractus societatis, non sécus ac contractus ma/rudatiP Afterwards, in discussing the reasons and the limits of the rule by which one may be charged as a partner, by reason of having received part of the profits of the .partnership, Mr. Justice Story obsefVed that the rule was justified, and the cases in which it had been applied reconciled, by considering that “ a participation in the profits will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership between the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other opposing circumstances,” but that it is not “ to be regarded as anything more, than mere presumptive,proof.thereof, and therefore liable to be repelled andx>Wm5me by other circumstances, and hot as *621 of itself overcoming or controlling them; ” ancl. therefore that “ if the participation in the profits can be clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the presumption of partnership is repelled.” And again: “ The true rule, ex aequo et bono, would seem to be that the -agreement and intention of the parties themselves should govern all the cases. If they intended' a partnership in the capital stock, or in the profits, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in favor of third per-' sons, even if the agreement were unknown to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were 'intended between the parties, then that there should be none as to third' persons, unless where the parties had held themselves out as partners to the public, or their conduct - operated as a fraud or deceit upon third persons.” Story on Partnership, §§ 1, 38, 49.
Baron Parke (afterwards Lord,V/ensleydale) appears to have taken much the same view of the. subject as Mr. Justice Story. Both in the Court of Exchequer, and in the House of Lords, he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be charged as. a dormant. partner for the acts of the active partners as depending on the law of principal and agent. Beckham v. Drake (1841) 9 M. & W. 79, 98; Wilson v. Whitehead (1842) 10 M. & W. 503, 504; Ernest v. Nicholls (1857) 6 H. L. Cas. 401, 417; Cox v. Hickman (1860) 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 312. And ip Cox v. Hickman he quoted the statements of 'Story and Pothier from Story on Partnership, § 1, above- cited.
In that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming embarrassed jn their circumstances, assigned all their property to trustees) empowering them to carry on the business,‘and to divide the net income ratably -among their creditors, (all of .whom' became parties tt> the deed,) and- to pay any residue to' the debtors, the majority' of the: creditors being authorized to make rules for conducting the business or to put an end to it altogether. The House of Lords, .differing from the majority of the .judges Who delivered opinions at various stages of the case, held that the creditors were not liable as partners' for debts - incurred by the trustees in carrying on the business *622 under the assignment. The decision was put upon the ground that the liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is in truth, the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent; that a right to participate in the profits, though cogent, is not conclusive, evidence that the business is .carried on in' part for the person receiving them; and that the test of his liability as a partner is whether he has authorized the managers of the business to carry it on in his behalf. Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313; S. C. nom. Wheatcroft v. Hickman, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99.
This new form of stating the general rule did not at first prove'easier' of application than the old one; for in.the first case which arose'afterwards one judge of three dissented; Kilshaw v. Jukes, 3 B. & S. 847; and in the nexf. case the unanimous judgment of four judges in the Common Bench was reversed by four judges against two in .the Exchequer Chamber. Bullen v. Sharp, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 614, and L. R. 1 C. P., 86. And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results -from partnership rather than. partnership -from agency. Kelly, C. B. and Cleasby, B., in Holme v. Hammond, L. R. 7 Ex. 218, 227, 233; Jessel, M. R., in Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458; 476. Such- a test seems to give a synonym, rather than a definitidn; another name for the conclusion, rather than- a statement of the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. • T.o say that a person is liable as, a partner, who stands in the relation of principal to those1 by whom, the business is actually carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idea of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent.
In the case last ajbove cited, Sir George Jessel said; “You cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless you grasp the notion of the existence' of the firm as a separate entity .from the existence of the partners; a notion which was .well'grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly understood • in the-courts of equity.” And in'a very recent case the Court of Appeals of New York, than which no court
*623
has more steadfastly .adhered to the old form' of stating the rule, has held "that a partnership, though not strictly a legal e.ntity a^ distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in interpreting a commercial contract.
Bank of Buffalo
v. Thompson,
In other respects, however, the rule laid down in
Cox
v.
Hickman
has been unhesitatingly accepted in England, asexplaining and modifying the earlier rule.
Re English & Irish Society,
1 Hem. & Mil. 85, 106, 107;
Mollwo
v.
Court of Wards,
L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435;
Ross
v.
Parkyns,
L. R. 20 Eq. 331, 335;
Ex parte Tennant,
6 Ch. D. 303;
Ex parte Delhasse,
7 Ch. D. 511;
Badeley
v.
Consolidated Bank,
38 Ch. D. 238. See also
Davis
v.
Patrick,
■In the present state of the law upon this subject, it may perhaps be doubted whether any more precise general rule can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this opinion, that those persons are partners, who contribute either property or money to carry on a joint business for their common benefit, and who'own and share the profits thereof in certain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences follow, that the acts of one in conducting the partnership business are' the acts of all; that each is agent for the firm and for the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as profits, and takes part of the fund to which the creditors of the partnership have a right to look for .the payment of their debts; .that all are liable as'partners' upon contracts made by any: of them with third persons within the scope of the partnership business; and that even an éxpress stipulation between them-that one shall not be so liable, though good between themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And participating in profits is presumptive, but hot conclusive, evidence of partnership.
In whatever form the rule .is expressed, it is universally held
*624
that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by a certain proportion of the profits of the partnership business, is not thereby made a partner, in any sense. So an agreement that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a cértain portion of the profits thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner with, the lessee.
Perrine
v. Hankinson, 6 Halst. (11 N. J. Law) 181;
Holmes
v.
Old Colony Railroad,
In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the person held liable as a partner furnished the whole capital on which business was carried on by another, or else contributed part of. the capital and took an active part in the management of the business.
Beauregard
v.
Case,
Throughout the original agreement and the renewals thereof, the sum of $10,000 paid by Perry to the partnership, and for *625 wbicb they gave him their promissory notes, is spoken of as a loan, for which the partnérship was to pay him legal interest at allevents, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly profits of the partnership business if those profits should exceed the sum of $10,006. The manifest intention of the parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreements, was to create the relation of debtor and creditor, and not that of partners. Perry’s demanding and receiving accounts and payments yearly was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There is nothing in the agreement itself, or in. the conduct'of the parties,.to show that he assumed any other relation. He never exer-' cised any control .over the business. The legal effect, of the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one of' the partners to his opinion that “it was capital he had in the business the same as ours; we owed it to him ; of course we owed it to him if we did not lose it.”
Upon the whole evidence, a jury would not b.e justified in inferring on the part of Perry, ■ either “ actual participation in the profits as principal,” within the rule as laid down by this court in
Berthold
v.
Goldsmith;
or that he authorized the business to- be carried on in part for him or on his behalf, within the rule as stated in
Cox
v.
Hickman,
and the later English cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perry never having held himself, out as a partner to the plaintiff' or to those under whom he claimed, the Circuit Court rightly ruled that the action could not be maintained.
Pleasants v. Fant,
22 Wall.
116; Thompson
v.
Toledo Bank,
Judgment affirmed.