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Medrano-Quiroz v. United States
705 A.2d 642
D.C.
1997
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*3 FARRELL, Before SCHWELB and PRYOR, Judges, Associate Senior Judge.

SCHWELB, Judge: Associate Medrano-Quiroz David and Ronald W. by jury Sermeno were convicted distri- possession of cocaine and of of cocaine bution it, with intent to distribute in violation of 33-541(a)(l) (1993).1 § appeal, D.C.Code On principal contention is by refusing abused his discretion disqualify a for misconduct.2 af-We firm.

I. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS A. The evidence. which, prosecution presented evidence credited, September

if established that on Metropolitan officers of the Police De- partment, who were in a concealed observa- binoculars, post using tion saw Medra- no-Quiroz and Sermeno sell two small white codefendant, objects Larry Peay.3 to their in post The officers the observation broad- descriptions participants cast of all three promptly ap- the transaction. Other officers prehended Peay per- from his and recovered Frankfurt, Jaclyn son two white rocks of crack cocaine. S. Public Defender Ser- vice, Cynthia with whom James Klein and thereafter, Medrano-Quiroz Soon and Ser- Goode, Service, Public Defender Immediately meno were also arrested. be- brief, appellant Medrano-Quiroz. David hall, apprehension pool upon fore his DC, officer, Shockley, Washington, making eye-contact

Tamara A. Medra- no-Quiroz filed a brief for Ronald W. Serme- threw into a trash can some white appellant paper holding in An no. which he was his hands. States, (D.C. was also convicted of willful United 662 A.2d 1371-72 court, appear 1995); failure to in violation of Lawrence v. United 23-1327(a) (1996). § (D.C. 1992). D.C.Code 2. Sermeno also the evidence contends that 3.Peay possession of unlawful was convicted support him was insufficient to his con cocaine, 33-541(d). § in violation of D.C.Code denying victions and that the trial eiTed in appeal. He did not judgment acquittal. These con motion See, e.g., Taylor tentions are without merit. however, Ev- point At this the case.” paper, which contained about officer retrieved judge. report the incident ans did not rocks of crack cocaine. Medrano- twelve Quiroz person. on his had $158.00 16,1994, until, on proceeded June The trial lengthy obliged to take a apprehended while he was Sermeno appellant Sermeno failed because recess bicycle. Upon approach on a seated trial to re- waiting for the appear. While officers, loose attempted to stuff three hallway sume, sitting in a No. 9 was white rocks into a hollow the handlebars. Ham, Es- jury room when Daniel near the proved recovered and also The rocks were prac- quire, a criminal defense Sermeno, Upon searching be crack cocaine. Court, by. walked Superior tices the officers found $90.00. No. 9 were friends Ham and Juror testified or called None of the defendants they up a conversation neighbors, and struck *4 any witnesses. with one another. provided to account later According to the B. No. 9. Juror Ham, No. 9 told Ham the court against The trial of the ease Medrano- in jury of a a criminal that he was a member Quiroz, Peay began on June Sermeno and case, might there be but that he believed that part preliminary 1994. As a of his instruc- nothing in his case because had a mistrial tions, prior opening which were delivered explained that happened day. all Ham there statements, jurors the not ordered delay. all of reasons for the could be kinds another, anyone to discuss with one or with juror judge had or- told Ham that the else, “anything at all about the no mat- jurors not to discuss the case. dered the insignificant may you.” ter it how seem into Juror No. 9 then followed Harn another statement, During opening Peay’s her at- proceedings in an courtroom and observed torney jurors police that told appear- Ham was unrelated matter which planted on her client the crack cocaine that judge. After Ham’s ing before a different they possession. claimed to have found completed, the two men left case had been She stated that together and rode the Metro the courthouse Ham to a station near their residences. Peay, they stopped

when the officers Mr. pri- in Ham’s wall, then drove Juror No. 9 home up they him threw and vate automobile. him. searched Those officers did not find any drugs Peay. point, on Mr. At that riding in Ham’s Juror No. 9 was While gentlemen, ladies and the officers had car, he told Ham that the case which he They choice to make. could either let Mr. charged was a involved two defendants Peay go, go the cor- and not back around charged pos- with selling drugs with and one they thought ner and arrest two men that Ham, According to Juror No. session. selling drugs, they say could that were “something to the effect [that] then stated And, they drugs Peay. on Mr. that found himself when all he could do to restrain way they go right back around and lawyers say police heard the they thought look for the two men that man drugs pocket of the planted the And, selling drugs. exactly that’s they wanted charged possession with because did, police officers ladies and what those Ham that he get the seller so bad.” said gentlemen. response No. 9’s made no verbal to Juror comment, “may have that Juror No. 9 Following completion of counsel’s might I have invol- giggling, sort of been statements, clerk, opening Mr. him.” Ac- untarily giggled along sort Evans, jurors jury room. led the to the Ham, cording route, While en Evans heard one say say anything he did not partic- I not say to no one in did —Juror 9— tell me what anything more. He did not that “isn’t that something ular to the effect in; not tell me incredible, the trial was police just plant stage would [that] testimony. any or not there was somebody?” told Juror whether something on Evans basical- it. Our conversation talking And that was “you’re supposed to be No. 9 well, ly hope you’re right I that he encountered ended with confirmed room, you that there is a mistrial so don’t miss Ham outside the that he had no, hope courtroom, I isn’t a work. And he said there proceedings watched in another interesting because it’s an case. I mistrial with Harn. and that he had ridden home want to sit on it. denied, however, Juror No. there had regard- been conversation in Ham’s car Meanwhile, had issued bench ing the case before the court. After Sermeno, warrant for the warrant questioning complet- of Juror No. 9 had been executed later on June 1994. The trial ed, Deputy reported Clerk Evans following day, Friday, resumed on the June court the comments that this had made arguments 17. Following closing and the immediately statements. instructions, jury began court’s to delib- thereafter, p.m. Shortly erate at 3:45 attorneys to state asked jurors were excused for the weekend. positions light foregoing disclo- Monday, On June Ham encountered response, all sures. counsel for three Yaffe, Esquire, prosecuting Eric who was argued defendants that Juror No. 9 should three defendants. Harn told Yaffe that he however, were, disqualified.4 There dif- be had heard that there would a mistrial in a be attorneys ferences as to how the between handling. case that Yaffe was Yaffe ex- proceed. Peay’s urged court should counsel plained anticipated, that no mistrial was *5 judge reopen questioning the to the of Juror Ham then related his conversation with Ju- him No. 9 and to confront with Ham’s ac- ror No. Harn “gave told the court that he count in the car. The of the conversation nugget, theory that [Yaffe] little that of de- Sermeno, attorneys Medrano-Quiroz and fense, appropriately and it.” that was Yaffe however, were reluctant for tactical reasons reported to the court the facts that he had agree interrogation to to further of Juror No. and, morning from Ham on the learned verdict, prior questioning to lest further 21, 1994, judge hearing convened a June him the defense. on the matter. judge The to declined point.”5 or to declare a mistrial “at this He hearing. C. The expressly description credited Ham’s of his hearing regarding con- The Juror No. 9’s judge conversation with Juror No. 9. The began juxy duct before the resumed deliber- also commented that proceedings ations. The were conducted likely I think it’s don’t this [that] presence jury. outside the After dis- forgot. He remembers the details of a cussing with counsel .the manner in which way essentially conversation Mr. Harn handled, judge the matter should be happened hour a does that half in called first Ham and then Juror No. 9 and earlier, likely, really, and it’s not that interrogated regarding each the incidents forgot. prosecutor reported which the judge court. The stated: potential me that [I]t Ham’s account of his conversations with does seem to problems, may 9 has forth in Part II.B of whatever their extent be Juror No. been set opinion. person, particular this it No. turn with this there is no When was Juror 9’s respond judge, frankly my mind to believe from questions to reason Peay’s attorney attorney objection. party’s See Duvall v. United Sermeno’s asked (D.C.1996). 449 n. 1 to declare a mistrial. Counsel for specific Medrano-Quiroz made motion for a no mistrial, that Juror No. 9 should but contended attorneys correctly 5. The and several noted permitted jury. not be to remain on the All three ruling that an definitive was unneces- immediate attorneys they willing because, stated that were sary any defendant was in the event that complete jurors, the trial with eleven but the acquitted, jurors proved or if the to be unable to defendant, prosecutor proce- any to such a declined to consent reach a unanimous verdict as to trial, dure. At the time of the lacked then that defendant’s motion for a mistrial would jurors authority proceed a moot. with eleven over become planting people using that as everything this evidence that we have heard per- 9 believed problem any way convicting.” more serious than this Juror No. having “just listening son from the first moment forward to me at the the clerk was Peay’s not enthusiastic about Mr. According been No. time.” to Juror litigation strategy. having expressed And At conclusion no comment. clerk made Evans, it, walking 9,6 Mr. down the hall with questioning his final of Juror prepared expressed having and I’m to find any they counsel if fur- judge asked all true, accept If it it to Mr. Harn. we that as attor- requests. prosecutor The and the ther any to me that there is rea- doesn’t seem neys for the two all answered anything think son from we have known to negative.7 person with that view of Mr. excused, and the Peay’s completely defense couldn’t be attorneys immediately proceeded to and the impartial juror evaluating [Me- fair and sentencing the selection of dates. Counsel drano-Quiroz’] gov- whether the request or comment rela- made no further proven beyond ernment has a reasonable alleged part tion to the misconduct thing regard doubt. And the same Indeed, party no Juror No. 9. demanded case. [Sermeno’s] any relief in the trial court new trial or other cautioned, however, just that “I’m completion post-verdict ques- after the here,” thinking through go as I and he tioning of Juror No. 9. plain ruling yet made it that his was not cast

in stone. II. Medrano-Quiroz’ attorney suggested that appropriate way proceed. would be LEGAL DISCUSSION “[l]etting having deliberate and voir appeal. A Preservation the issue dire if after verdict to see there was prosecu- taint.” Sermeno’s and the *6 matter, an initial we note that As agreed, judge proceeded tor and the as coun- question as to whether there is a substantial suggested jurors sel to directed the re- Medrano-Quiroz pre properly and Sermeno sume their deliberations. objections appeal served for their to Juror Shortly p.m., jury presence jury. Dim before 1:00 the returned No. 9’s continued prior to the guilty ing verdict of all three defen- his discussions with counsel verdict, a mis charges. judge judge dants on all then called the declined declare plainly point,”8 in No. 9 for a trial “at this and he contem ques- Juror second round of in tioning. plated proceedings on the issue the Juror No. 9 now softened some further any or of them previous categorical representa- measure his event that the defendants for tion that he and Ham had not discussed the were convicted. Counsel both case; questioning of Juror No. agreed he asserted that he did not remember that further of the issue of having the in the car which 9 and the ultimate resolution conversation the juror juror deferred until after Ham had described to the court. The bias should be that, did, however, to the prior stating, presence recall verdict. To the extent deliberations, clerk, jury’s the funny completion “I of the thought of the disqualify Juror cops judge had declined to that one would think that the sentencing. According questioning. 6.During would be for the second round of "may that he have been on gave No. 9 also remarked trying no information Juror No. Ham him get [Ham].” information out of After subjects. these juror judge to return to the the room, had told the inquire Peay's attorney judge asked the requested a dire examina- Peay’s counsel voir request for further about Juror No. 9’s informa- jurors. this denied tion of all of the juror for a third tion. The summoned request. on his at- time and directed him to elaborate tempt information from Ham. The to obtain point” phrase judge used the “at 8. The wanted to know “how stated that he had during the on several occasions "at this time” quantities things that we work in terms of the hearing. pre-verdict stage looking have been at” and whether trial, all, only provisional- during stage so relief an earlier of a No. 9 at he had done record, ly, incomplete changed on an and without the circumstances have as the where requests further for relief progressed, case has a defendant must renew questioning request changed defendants after the the basis of the cir completed. appeal had been preserve cumstances in order to any contention based on the record as modi conformity previously an- with his A.) (Leon fied. v. United Wilson intentions, judge interrogated nounced (D.C.1989). 1135, 1143 A.2d (and 9 for a time later a Juror No. second time) third after the three defendants all authorities, these as well as the si- Given guilty. judge inquired, been found When the key stage lence of defense counsel at the questioning, at the conclusion of the whether proceedings, government trial court further, however, anything counsel had appel- might plausibly argued have that the attorneys appellants responded for both preserved lants have not for our consider- they nothing. Significantly, party no principal they have ation issue which ques- asked the relief after the particular asked us to decide. We note ended, tioning of Juror No. 9 had even although only remedial action re- though this was the first time that all of the quested by and Sermeno Having relevant facts were before court. (Sermeno) the trial court —a mistrial and the declined to Juror No. 9 on an (Medrano-Qui- disqualification record, incomplete was never re- roz) during that is kind available —was quested to rule on that conduct once (but after) trial, appellants apparent- now complete. the record was ly complete, assert that once the record was post-verdict granted should have Counsel’s failure to their motions renew i.e., though a new trial9 —even no might post- consequence be of little if the relief — motion for a new trial was filed either essentially verdict record had been the same record, appellant in the court below.10 pre-verdict as the but this was not so. question On the whether or not Juror No. 9 Proeedurally, appellants thus find them- court, deliberately deceived the for exam- position. they in an If are selves awkward issue, ple according appel- critical —a complaining disquali- refusal to judge might lants —the have taken into mid-trial, fy appeal Juror No. 9 their juror’s post-verdict consideration the ac- by essentially undisputed reali- undermined knowledgment shortly after counsel had ties, namely, judge plainly had the statements, presented he made *7 authority questioning of the defer further questioning Peay’s proclaimed a comment de- verdict, appellants until after that both Arguably, appellants’ fense. claim that Ju- agreed procedure, to that as all preju- ror No. 9 had to conceal lied order knew, participants re- the record would dice that he harbored the defense incomplete until questioning main significantly by post-ver- weakened his If, hand, completed. on the other responses, may dict which have made him claiming judge or- are the should have significantly come across as more candid. of full dered a new on the basis the stated, verdict, developed they then We have a somewhat different record obstacle, context, comparable but nevertheless that “a are confronted with different judge party neglects ruling namely, to seek a on his that the trial was never asked record, preserve appeal.” motion fails to the issue for to rule on that that he therefore States, 964, so, being court is now Thorne v. 582 A.2d 965 never did and that this United (D.C.1990). judge an issue which the trial We have also held that where asked decide judge prayer never addressed. has denied defendant’s By Superior 10. Rule 33 of the Court’s Rules of the time the record as to Juror No. 9 was requires Procedure a motion for a new complete, Criminal disqualify it was too late to him or to newly trial not based on discovered evidence to mistrial, jury already declare a for the had com- days be filed seven after verdict. No such within pleted appellants guilty. its and found both work present has been filed to the date. motion

649 States, 145, 155, contend, 98 U.S. Reynolds v. United government does not howev- (1878). er, by 244 are barred 25 L.Ed. appellants’ claims speak up after the failure of their counsel to Where, here, impartiality of a contrary, the On the verdict was returned. plausibly question, been called into has Ser- government expressly has conceded that judge responsibility it is the the trial objections preserved appeal meno has his hearing determine hold a whether participation to the continued of Juror See, allegation e.g., Leeper merit. of bias has Although government has asserted 695, (D.C. States, v. United 579 A.2d 698 Medrano-Quiroz’ appeal procedurally is de- 1990) (citations omitted). In the argued grounds,11 other it has not fective on case, hearing, held an extensive omissions post-verdict that his counsel’s op afforded a full the defendants were proper disposition should affect the of his sug portunity positions to state their and to Moreover, appellants appeal. both gest questions to be to Harn and to posed forcefully objected, proceed- earlier in the Appellants challenged Juror No. 9. have not ings, participation to Juror No. 9’s continued utilized procedures ever indicated that and neither Indeed, hearing. on the fairness of the position changed. Under these cir- record, reasonably challenge no such cumstances, to consider the we have elected be sustained. they presented issues as have been to us. objection the absence of relevant circumstances, Under these government, appellants’ we address conten- scope refusal to our review apparent, As be tions on merits. will quite Juror No. 9 is narrow. “Fol however, appellants’ failure to ask the hearing, lowing proper the determination of finding to make a whether Juror No. 9 lied particularly bias or lies with bearing has some whether court, in the discretion of the trial reversible refusing abused his discretion in to excuse discretion, only ... for a clear abuse of juror. underlying findings of fact that determi great nation are entitled deference.” B. The standard review. Ctr., Washington Hosp. Washington v. 579 (D.C.1990) (citation right impartial to a trial A.2d and inter 185 omitted). deeply quotation is “fundamental and embedded in nal marks “Our review jurisprudence.” Hughes question preju American v. United is deferential because the (D.C.1997); substantially judge’s ap 689 A.2d 1207 see dice turns demeanor, Dowd, 717, 721-22, Irvin ... and is praisal also 366 U.S. (1961). S.Ct. 6 L.Ed.2d 751 one about which the trial therefore 1641 — opin impartial especially qualified “One touchstone of a fair trial is an to render a sound (cita McDonough trier at 698 Equip., Leeper, supra, of fact.” Power ion.” omitted). 548, 554, Greenwood, quotation Inc. v. internal marks U.S. 104 tions and (1984). 845, 849, key Judge S.Ct. here is that Morrison had L.Ed.2d “In The fact occasions [perplexingly enigmatic] language opportunity separate on three *8 Coke, juror to obtain a first question Lord a must be as ‘indifferent as to Juror No. 9 and demeanor, Irvin, credibility, impression he stands unsworne.’” 366 U.S. at hand of his 155b). 722, record available (quoting impartiality. 81 S.Ct. at 1642 Co. Litt. The cold juror “dehydrated peach,” theory appellate “The of the law is that a to an court —a who has called it12—cannot opinion impartial.” Judge has formed an cannot be Jerome Frank government, government, address According we need not and do not 11. the failure of to move the court to government's counsel the lack of a contention that (but precludes a mistrial this defendant Medrano-Qui- declare not rendered demand for a mistrial Sermeno) arguing appeal that Juror appeal procedurally deficient. roz' disqualified. No. 9 should have been Because appellants’ of we must reach the merits chal- Music, Res Havana Madrid 12. Inc. v. Broadcast lenge in order to decide Serme- to Juror No. 9 77, (2d Cir.1949) Corp., 80 F.2d taurant 175 appeal, no's and because we resolve the substan- (citation omitted) (quoted v. District in Stewart of juror’s qualifications tive issue of that in favor of 650 case and insight prejudged into the strates comparable

provide us with .that Klee, mind; keep open v. failed to an at hand. In United States problem (9th Cir.), denied, U.S. cert. 419 494 F.2d 394 possibility that Harn chortled or (1974), 62, 61 S.Ct. 42 L.Ed.2d 95 “giggled” after No. 9 ridiculed that Juror experi a wise and “[W]hen court stated: during the in Harn’s conversation at the trial and judge, presided enced “expert” constituted confirmation of car jury, comes to conclusion [the observed the juror’s premature rejection of the by prejudiced the defendant was defense; “planting” misconduct], it.” upset it is not for us to 4. Juror No. 9 was untruthful when he cases, assuredly in 396. In most Id. at that he discussed the case with denied one, agree. we Harn, deception compounded his and this Substantively, appellants had disregard of the court’s instructions of proving preponderance of a the burden and im- undermined his trustworthiness that Juror No. 9 biased the evidence partiality. Phillips, U.S. against them. Smith v. 455 agree appellants -with that the conduct We 209, 215-18, 940, 944-47, 102 S.Ct. 71 Juror No. 9 was unfortunate. Neverthe- .of (1982); L.Ed.2d 78 United States Maseratt less, appellants’ con- we do not believe that (5th Cir.1993). i, More 1 F.3d tentions, individually aggregate,13 or in the a specifically, they required were establish demonstrate that the abused his trial prejudice” actual as “substantial likelihood of juror, by refusing disqualify discretion juror’s a result of the unauthorized contact either before verdict or thereafter.. (or, as a result of the in this judge’s instructions and failure to follow (1) juror’s disregard instructions. statements). actions and See Hill his related (D.C. States, v. United A.2d agree with the We 1993). Once a defendant has carried this testimony that if Harn’s is believed—and burden, however, “all reasonable initial reasons, judge, expressly for sound juror’s ability to an doubts about the render can be no doubt that credited it—then there impartial verdict must be resolved favor No. 9 violated the court’s instructions Juror (citations, quota Id. internal accused.” Indeed, by discussing Harn. the case with omitted). tion marks and internal brackets made, early the remarks which the hearing proceedings, within ’ appellants motions. C. The merits of clerk, It is deputy improper. also Notwithstanding the deferential standard alone, established, however, standing a review, appellants contend that the pend juror’s unauthorized comments about deprived Juror No. 9 refusal to disqualification ing require case will not right them to a fair trial showing prejudice. in the absence of a substance, jury. They argue, in impartial (Woodrow J.) See, e.g., Wilson v. United follows: (D.C.1995) 663 A.2d 562-63 disregarded (where the trial

1. Juror No. telephoned prosecutor by discussing the ease judge’s instructions regarding proce posed questions friend and (and, extent, by making with Harn to some cases, terminat drug prosecutor dures the comments overheard conversation, not abuse ed clerk); by declining to order a new her discretion trial). regard agree in this premature disparage- No. 9’s following by the court United Peay’s “planting” defense demon- statement ment of Servs., press try stay Dep't Employment disposition *9 Columbia of 1350, (D.C. 1992). view, point how- prejudiced n. 5 of view. In our 1353 his ever, quite appropriately apparently argues that also context, juror’s interest in this conclude (the juror) Juror No. 9's remark to Harn that continuing the issue was irrelevant to to serve interesting case to be an one and found the of bias. hoped that there would be no mistrial reflected

651 376, pass constitutional 391 trials would Boylan, F.Supp. “[F]ew 698 States (1st Cir.), each (D.Mass.1988), required muster if a new trial [were] aff'd, 898 F.2d 230 poten in a juror time was discovered 849, 139, denied, 112 111 S.Ct. cert. 498 U.S. Boylan, tially compromising situation.” su (1990), L.Ed.2d 106 and with the authorities Smith, (citing supra, pra, F.Supp. 698 at 385 by cited the court: 946). 217, 102 455 U.S. at S.Ct. at Juror may Jurors make statements about undoubtedly golden 9 missed at least two yet open to the keep case their minds Nevertheless, silent. opportunities to remain remaining give evidence and the defendant jurors of the “although [one] the mouth[ ] See, e.g., a fair trial. v. Wainw Grooms may mind open, [his] [was] have been too (5th Cir.), right, 610 F.2d 344 cert. de [necessarily] shut.” Commonwealth v. Scan 1605, nied; 63 [100 445 U.S. 953 S.Ct. lan, 173, 1265, Mass.App.Ct. 9 400 N.E.2d (1980) (Trial judge ... 789] L.Ed.2d (1980). 1272 interrogate jurors refusing not err in I about one statement “from what (2) Pre-judgment the case. already guilty” heard he’s made after close contend, however, Appellants prosecution’s of the because state case by of the remarks made substance ment did not reflect serious and, earlier, the presence No. 9 to Harn only objective evidence to evaluation of clerk, predisposition reflected a date); Chiantese, United States v. 582 juror prosecu part of the favor the (5th Cir.1978), F.2d 974 cert. denied 441 7, on page supra, tion. As we have noted 2030, U.S. 922 S.Ct. 60 [99 395] L.Ed.2d no reason to found conclude (1979) (court refusing ... did not err in juror’s disagreement “planting” with the a hearing particular hold when after a by Peay’s attorney defense outlined in her juror cross examination a remarked to oth precluded being him opening statement jurors attorney “Stupid. er about the Stu impartial juror.” “completely fair and —” pid. Stupid. pain He’s a judge’s are assessment satisfied because the par-, remark did not indicate entirely reasonable. Klee, tiality); United States v. 494 F.2d fairly any juror’s expect One cannot mind (9th Cir.), denied, cert. 419 U.S. 835 respect to be a rasa to the kind tabula (1974) (no [95 S.Ct. 42 L.Ed.2d ... 61] See, presented e.g., of issue here. United mistrial warranted when one states Cir.1983), (1st Kelly, States v. 722 F.2d by jurors that nine affidavit ex denied, rt. 465 U.S. 104 S.Ct. ce 1425, pressed opinions guilt as to before the (1984); Boylan, supra, 79 L.Ed.2d 749 case, given jury’s close of the impartiality F.Supp. at 385. The traffic in unlawful by evidenced request re-reading drugs, the measures taken law en of court’s instructions on sole issue in the it, forcement officers to combat are matters case). important thing is not that unlikely public interest and concern. It jurors keep silent about the case but that jurors qualified that “those best to serve as each keeps open mind until the impression some will not have formed Klee, jury. case has been submitted to the opinion subjects].” these controversial [on 494 F.2d at 396. 722-23, Irvin, supra, U.S. at 81 S.Ct. at cited, Boylan, and in the there cases comments made various violation here, moreover, particular importance Of judge’s instructions were directed to juror expressed skepticism is that the jurors. other In the there is no Peay’s hearing it described in any juror any improper statement; heard evidence any “bias” he evinced opening comment Juror No. a circumstance frame-up plausibility of a appellants’ position. which further weakens A without outlined in this case. record, might On this Juror No. 9’s unfortunate bias whatever pro-prosecution failure to follow directions of the assertions skeptical was have been According to Peay’s not sufficient to him. statement. *10 Court, No. 9 knew of perior and that 'Juror attorney, Peay’s the officers of “arrest” profession presumably viewed Harn’s squad “planted” crack cocaine “jump-out” or sellers, Harn’s expert Medrano- him as an on criminal trials. client so that the on her chortle, Sermeno, con- according appellants, be arrested and Quiroz possible could seemingly au-. veyed for of to Juror No. from a successfully prosecuted distribution indeed, a sort of juror listening to the thoritative from drugs. So as a far source— discern, however, witness16 —the idea that expert statement could fight Peay’s obser- was on tar- the officers in the ridicule of police actually, — post, “jump-outs” get. persuaded. not the are not vation We —based largely sellers on appellants that belief transaction, impartiali safeguards of appellants’ of “The their observation protective instruc alleged ty, to this such as voir dire and Peay. It was for the sale infallible; judge, from the trial are not buyer that the two men were ar- tions particular If, fact, virtually sell to shield appellants impossible did not rested. might Peay, police every if knew this to contact or influence that theo and the cocaine Smith, supra, so, Peay retically affect their plant drugs then the motive to vote.” be 217, 102 According police to the 455 U.S. at S.Ct. at 946. which counsel ascribed —name- written, Friendly drug ly, Judge Henry has ly, apprehend two sellers —makes practical little sense.14 a case touchstone of decision in such [t]he emphasize that this is not case the mere fact have here is thus not as we any- juror conveyed or intimated to which a of extra- of molecules of infiltration some respect to that he had a closed mind with one matter, supposed conse- record with the defendant, any even innocence of guilt or quences that the infiltrator becomes . to listen to Peay,15or that he would refuse clause au- “witness” and the confrontation . evidence, arguments, or to-counsel’s tomatically applies, but the nature of what Rather, Juror No. 9 instructions. probability has been infiltrated and impres- occasions an voiced “out loud” on two prejudice. jurors may reasonable sion which other McMann, ex rel. Owen v. United States shared, they apparently kept have but which (2d denied, Cir.1970), F.2d cert. the case submitted to to themselves until was 28 L.Ed.2d 646 U.S. 91 S.Ct. juror impro- jury. The record reflects (citations omitted). (1971) reasonably con- priety, but the it does not show lack of clude infiltrat- allegedly impartiality. alleged “molecules of extra-record matter” ed possibility reversal consist to warrant ” (3) possible “giggle. Ham’s giggle. Harn was lawyer’s responsive aof did, it is not giggled. If he possi not sure if he Appellants argue next apparent that No. 9 would have “may readily bility that Harn have been sort what, seeking anything, Harn was dispar if response to Juror No. 9’s known giggling” in intima- convey by of this wordless Peay’s com means agement “planting” defense unequivocally testified impar lack of tion of mirth. Harn alleged Juror No. 9’s pounded No. 9 anything to Juror say that he did not tiality. They point out that Harn was a defenses. “planting” the case or lawyer practices before the Su- about about criminal argued bicycle, contraband attorney that the' Peay’s not that the officers claim Medrano-Qui- personal just anybody. use. drugs Sermeno's planted Rather, order to frame was mis- attorney his client police roz' contended that that the wanted to she asserted police contrary ac- Medrano-Quiroz identified and and Sermeno because arrest count, placed post that the officers believed the observation were, fact, drugs. selling crack cocaine into a trash can. two Medrano-Qui- argument, noting only Peay's oral counsel attor- 16.At is also worth It ‘ “confirmatory giggle” argued drugs. Harn's planted roz ney argued officers had significant was an because Harn his client counsel admitted that Sermeno's trial not, judge’s phrase, "a tree-trimmer." possessed secreted in the handlebars the cocaine

653 judge potential to subvert incon- from the had giggle as If viewed by the three justice depriving fault him for that.17 the course sequential, we cannot right to a trial an defendants of their event, expressed any Juror No. 9 first jury. a lies to the impartial When “planting” skepticism his about tending court in order to conceal information made immediately Peay’s his juror’s part, on the to show No evidence was her' statement. “impermissible partiality” reflects conduct counsel’s support of defense introduced expectation inconsistent “quite and is theory, nothing occurred at trial which give juror] will truthful answers that [the juror to compelled a reasonable would have weigh the ability or his concerning her of coun- negative impression alter his initial obey fairly and the instructions evidence quite theory. The trial sel’s Colombo, States v. 869 the court.” United giggle insofar as “the properly conclude (2d Cir.1989) (citation 149, omit- 151-52 F.2d concerned, “the may have been” ted). trying 9 had been to hide If Juror No. McMann, supra, probability prejudice,” impartiality, lack of we would be his own words, 818, 435 F.2d at In other nil. compelled appellants’ to reverse convictions. possibility appreciable no discerned as to defendant would that the verdict Supreme Court has made kept a have if Harn had been different clear, however, every that not false state This did not con- straight face. assessment by juror during a voir dire examina ment a judge’s considerable stitute an abuse of the juror’s disqualification. tion warrants discretion. applicable formulated the The Court has principles follows: (4) Lying to the court. a hold that to obtain a new trial in such We Finally, that Ju appellants contend situation, must first demonstrate party a 9 lied to the court when he denied ror No. honestly a that a failed answer that he had discussed the case with Harn dire, question material on voir and then riding According

while in Harn’s car. response further that a correct would show Medrano-Quiroz, appellate counsel for challenge basis for a provided valid have juror’s lying “motive for was to conceal his concealing in- for cause. The motives for par own misbehavior and the extent of his only may vary, but those rea- formation tiality, both before and after his conversation juror’s impartiality that affect a can sons with Mr. Harn.” claims of a truly be said to affect the fairness circumstances, “under these the trial court’s trial. appel to strike [Juror 9] refusal jury cannot be reconciled with the lants’] 556, Power, McDonough supra, 464 U.S. at right impartial Sixth Amendment to trial 850; at see also Harris v. United 104 S.Ct.

jurors.” (D.C.1992) 763, n. 5 McDonough standard in a (applying Power appellants The issue raised both case). North, In United criminal States regarding the Juror No. 9 trustworthiness of 343, (1990), U.S.App. D.C. 910 F.2d 843 court, if troubling Lying is a one. requests held that a defendant who did, the court is is what Juror No. 9 serious business. to reverse his conviction the court accept do not the notion that a deliberately pro- untruthful answers basis deliberately attempts to deceive juror’s by juror “must show vided inquiry juror’s qualifica during an as to at dire would have response correct voir tions “is no worse than student who U.S.App. actual bias.” 285 dog ABF demonstrated claims the ate homework.” NLRB, 404, add- (emphasis at 904 Sys., 510 U.S. D.C. at 910 F.2d Freight Inc. v. ed). rejected defen- 325-26, explicitly court 127 L.Ed.2d 152 114 S.Ct. (1994) dishonesty J., “juror at concurring). argument (Kennedy, In the dant’s context, per question to a se evidence a false answer voir dire expression ample opportunity garding possible of amuse- Harn’s Counsel ment, interrogate did so. Juror No. 9 re- but neither to ask the punish- Fear of contempt held in of court. compels a mistrial.”

partiality and therefore lie, may 904. ment not be a noble motive for at 910 F.2d at U.S.App. D.C. *12 only provides per- punishment ... is one factor —albeit a desire to avoid “[C]oncealment juror’s explanation one—in the critical test of the lack of important suasive 905; bias,” it is regardless pro- 910 F.2d at of whether he was actual id. at candor prosecution, pro-defense, in our with only ingredient one determination endowed least, impartiality. very “substantial appellant has shown a Solomonic whether At conclude, prejudice” judge properly of actual result without likelihood Hill, discretion, juror’s supra, 622 A.2d at No. 9’s abusing conduct. that Juror his Harn, failure to admit he had said what was, it that reprehensible as did not establish Applying principles these prejudiced appel- was agree appellants’ are unable to with we lants. judge his that the trial abused contention by refusing Juror No. discretion III. First, finding judge never made a that juror deliberately lied. The did CONCLUSION state, following pre-verdict his initial interro- following Supreme from the thought passage that he

gation of Juror McDonough unlikely forgotten opinion his con- Court’s for the Court in latter’s car. That purposes pres- versation with Harn in the Poioer is instructive for conclusion, however, was based on an incom- ent case: subsequent can- plete record. Juror No. 9’s litigant long This held that a Court has acknowledgment that he made the re- one, perfect entitled to a fair trial but not a clerk, by and

marks overheard perfect are no trials.... Trials for there attempted to elicit admission that he had costly, parties, are for the- but also only Harn, might additional information duty their civic performing for the more led the to a somewhat have judges society pays and for which and juror’s veracity. appraisal of the favorable support manage the trials. personnel who believed, will never know what We judicial system It seems doubtful that our however, ‘counselfailed to appellants’ because liti- provide have the resources to would up-to-date finding as to whether request an they possi- gants perfect-trials, Juror No. 9 lied. ble, constantly keep abreast of and still its increasing caseload.... assume, arguendo,

But even if we asked, long way 9 lied if from the Juror No. and have also come found, presumed have so have all trial error was would time when prong reviewing of the McDon were con- prejudicial not satisfied the second courts test. For the reasons ough technicality.... Power-North we sidered citadels of 653-654, pages supra, by at a cor this Court adopted have stated harmless-error rules embody principle Juror No. 9 to the response Congress rect prefer- judgment his conversation with Harn question about courts should exercise a substantial for “error” not have demonstrated to the automatic reversal would ence Moreover, actual bias. it is not do not affect the ignore likelihood of errors that for the all evident that the motive the trial. at essential fairness of lie, lie, to conceal his own if it was a Power, U.S. at McDonough supra, 464 impartiality. supposed lack (citations, quotation internal 104 S.Ct. at 848 omitted). marks, contrary, and internal brackets so far as this record

On the reveals, appellants’ all of Taking into consideration decep- obvious incentive for the most contentions, improper we conclude juror’s part the universal tion on the not affect the of Juror' No. 9 “did self-preservation. Presumably, conduct instinct for trial,” id., and that that he essential fairness of No. 9 did not want it known Juror his discretion trial did not abuse judge’s order not to discuss had violated the No. 9 to remain permitting either person wants to be the case. No reasonable occasions, to his he had not talked stage or pre-verdict jury at the else, anyone case. about the neighbor, nor to order a new refusing, sponte, sua jury returned its verdict. II. Affirmed. presented to a case has been Once a

PRYOR, dissenting: Judge, Senior deliberation, the role given them for Questions recedes. judge and counsel I. here can be multi- of the kind that arose decisions, the same case Having reviewed reasonable judge must make a faceted. The majority, record as the the same factual *13 and At the pertinent facts. effort to ascertain a entitled to appellant was I conclude time, must be taken not to intrude same care participation the verdict free from unduly jury’s function. or influence the upon question. juror in factors, of com- balancing this which we It is customary background of the Against the monly to as trial discretion. refer case not to discuss the judicial admonition recognizes that there is no approach Such an deliberation, juror except —Juror range to the of response one “correct” wide engaged pattern question- in a of number suddenly 9— arrive and unex- questions which throughout his service able behavior at the trial door. pectedly shortly During a court recess after case. judge, the the In this instance trial with statements, clerk the courtroom counsel, diligent participation of made a and aloud, juror to no overheard the state problem. resolve the Indeed careful effort to questioned particular, one in that he whether unsuccessfully government he tried —because on someone police plant the would evidence get parties agree not the counsel would —to The gain in order to a conviction. clerk person jury.18 eleven proceed to with an juror the that he not to talk reminded was Later, tampering not involve setting. This case does about the case in that source, juror an external unautho- jury the for delib- a from the case was submitted to false eration, juror investigation, demonstrable learned that Juror rized the selection, juror during jury a a chance encounter and statements number 9 had had clearly form of identifiable neighbor, a a defense at- or some other conversation with presents ques- torney, Rather this ease practiced in the trial court. misconduct. reflection, nature but nonetheless lawyer tions more subtle in Upon the decided dis- jury function. The essence of hearing In a outside the to the close the matter. central be free of jurors, lawyer factfinding is that the factfinder presence of other related hallway on determinative issues and neighbor prejudice in a bias or that he saw reasonably impartial open or similarly be neighbor was informed that the was on aware, presented. Thus being the evidence duty. lawyer the minded to Without from in re- lawyer require candor juror and observed the in a courts followed generally seek inquiries Upon sponse in a courtroom. leav- proceeding brief influences courtroom, minimize external lawyer agreed give preempt ing the a have focused lawyer upon their decisions. a ride in his car. As has the accused on whether primary concern together, the time stated recounted himself, the hands of bias at suffered actual hardly restrain when that he could communica- heard, of external is the result being that the which argued in the case 684 A.2d Hill v. United drugs on one of the defen- tion. police planted (D.C.1993). showing of substantial Upon may have lawyer recalled that he dants. emanating from unau- prejudice of nothing likelihood response, but said laughed a little be contact, should doubts reasonable subject. juror, in an- thorized expressly on Id. said, the accused. in favor of resolved from the two questions swer to twelve; size is reduction number Georgia, traditional 435 U.S. S.Ct. 18. See Ballew (a prosecutor). (1978) favorable generally discussion deemed 55 L.Ed.2d jury size from the studies of reduced scientific posture situation, the court left him the sponse to it is a combination In the impartial factfinder. me to conclude that causes of circumstances threshold of likelihood that the convictions, or alterna- I would vacate unremedied. been satisfied and has case to allow tively, remand the contrary, early in despite instructions to finding existing judge to make a an inclination to verbalize showed juror’s truthfulness regarding record public in the case in a being raised defenses Thereafter, deter- the court. of this aspect same way. Later he raised the mine if relief is warranted. practicing at- with a case under deliberation know, know, nor can we torney. We do unedited nature complete this. ju- stated encounter. The understandably not elaborate inquiry,

ror’s formal, beyond generalities, but went case raised in the specific

about no Although made being heard. HENDEL, Appellant, Diane J. *14 that, in the course finding, appears it specific coun- juror, the court and questioning lacking in candor. Ultimate- deemed him sel PLAN COUNCIL WORLD EXECUTIVE after the questioning last round of ly, in the and Maharishi International verdict, had dis- juror admitted that he University, Appellees. instructions, but obeyed some of the court’s No. 96-CV-105. how necessary to better understand felt it system works. Appeals. of Columbia Court of District likely any one of recognize that it is I -4, Argued March not suffice as probably would episodes these 30, 1997. Decided Dec. juror. But viewed discharging a basis total, who discloses record instruction, publicly disobeyed judicial de- a case under privately talked about

liberation, than candid with was less

court, reluctantly conceded that and who system rather figure out the

felt a need the case. simply

than decide essentially argues that the

Appellee meager that with the was so

contact exter- not be as substantial

it should viewed contact, none of the and further

nal prejudice to actual

incidents form a nexus Allowing considera-

this case. discretion, appears the stan-

ble room for likelihood of

dard of substantial has been met. The wisdom partiality recognizes is that it

this standard matters, simply can

reconstructing such we bearing on pertinent facts

not know all the juror prejudice. In fairness question of equally difficult to government, it is Thus, view, my rebuttal evidence. been should not have allowed

Juror 9 re- found that his unless it was

deliberate

Case Details

Case Name: Medrano-Quiroz v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 30, 1997
Citation: 705 A.2d 642
Docket Number: 94-CF-1517, 94-CF-1611, 95-CF-1564
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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