Zachary MEDLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-3288
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
June 29, 2012
683 F.3d 880
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, BAUER, Circuit Judge, and SHADID, District Judge.
Argued Feb. 21, 2012.
Subject to the Allocation section, the Insurer shall advance, on behalf of the Insureds, Defense Costs which the Insureds have incurred in connection with Claims made against them, before disposition of such Claims, provided that to the extent that it is finally established that any such Defense Costs are not covered under this Policy, the Insureds, severally according to their respective interests, agree to repay the Insurer such Defense Costs.
The insured vs. insured exclusion in the policy applies to “All Loss,” including defense costs. In their briefs, the plaintiffs argued that the duty to defend requires St. Paul to cover all defense costs, even that portion attributable to the defense of otherwise uncovered claims brought by insured plaintiffs. At oral argument, however, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the allocation clause should be applied to defense costs in the same manner as indemnity costs, thereby removing from coverage those defense costs brought by or on behalf of insured plaintiffs. We agree and hold that St. Paul has a duty to defend against only the claims of non-insured plaintiffs. St. Paul argues that it has no duty to defend against any of the claims, but its argument fails for the same reasons discussed above regarding its duty to indemnify. The allocation clause applies to the duty to defend and thus calls for an allocation of costs between covered and uncovered claims.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court‘s decision in part, to the extent it held that St. Paul is not required to defend against or indemnify the claims by the insured plaintiffs, Miller and Anderson, or by the Lane Trust, which acts on behalf of an insured. We REVERSE the district court‘s decision in part and hold that St. Paul must defend against and indemnify the claims by the non-insured plaintiffs, the Kings. The case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
On consideration of the petitions for panel rehearing filed on July 12 and July 30, 2012, all judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petitions, and the petition for rehearing filed by appellee St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company is denied. The request for clarification is granted to the extent that this court‘s opinion and mandate resolve the application of the “Insured v. Insured” exclusion, but no other policy exclusions or defenses. Possible application of the “Mend the Hold” doctrine was not presented to or decided by this court. That issue should be addressed in the first instance before the district court if and when other policy exclusions or defenses are raised. To the extent that the Glenda L. Lane Trust has sought rehearing in the filing of July 30, 2012, the request is denied. The date the trust was created is irrelevant in determining whether it acts for the benefit of Ms. Lane.
Trenten D. Klingerman (argued), Attorney, Stuart & Branigin LLP, Lafayette, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.
BAUER, Circuit Judge.
This case stems from the search of a student‘s dorm room at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. The plaintiff-appellant, Zachary Medlock, sought a preliminary injunction in district court to prevent enforcement of his one-year suspension from the University. Specifically, he asserts that the search of his room by state school officials (and later the campus police) violated the Fourth Amendment, and he claims that the University‘s suspension proceedings abridged his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed and denied his request for a preliminary injunction. Medlock now appeals, and we dismiss the request for a preliminary injunction as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to our decision are few, so we will be brief. Medlock was a student at Indiana University, Bloomington, during the spring of 2011. He lived in a single room in a dormitory known as the Willkie Residence Center. On March 9, 2011, as part of a routine “health and safety inspection,” two University resident assistants searched Medlock‘s dormitory room for safety hazards. Medlock was not present at the time of the search. When the resident assistants entered the room, they discovered marijuana in plain sight, and they notified the University police.
A University police officer later entered Medlock‘s room and seized the drugs. The possession of illegal drugs in a dormitory violates the University‘s housing policies; when officials reported the drug seizure to the Dean of Students, the Dean summarily suspended Medlock for one year, effective March 11, 2011. Medlock
II. DISCUSSION
In denying Medlock‘s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of his suspension, the district court considered each of his constitutional arguments in turn. It held that his Fourth Amendment claims did not have a reasonable likelihood of success such that they would justify a preliminary injunction; it also examined his procedural due process claims and came to the same conclusion. But we need not consider these issues; we lack subject-matter jurisdiction in this appeal and therefore must dismiss it.
The only issue before us on this appeal is the denial of a preliminary injunction which sought to prevent the enforcement of an academic suspension. That suspension was to last for one academic year, and it went into effect on March 11, 2011. At oral argument in this matter on February 21, 2012, we confirmed that even were we to take immediate action to enjoin Medlock‘s suspension, he would not have been able to re-enroll and begin classes midway through the spring 2012 semester. The term of the suspension has now expired. Thus, even if we were to decide that Medlock‘s constitutional rights had been violated, a preliminary injunction would do him no good. There is simply nothing left to enjoin. And there are no other issues before us on this appeal—e.g., no request for damages or declaratory relief. Because we are unable to grant any effectual relief, the request for a preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss the appeal.