Plaintiff Fundador Moreno Medina and his consensual partner Ivette Banuchi Rodriguez (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) bring suit for money damages against several on-scene and supervisory officers of the Puerto Rico Police Department (“PRPD”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 1 to the United States Constitution, stemming from allegedly unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also plead supplementary state law claims actionable under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141-5142. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12) under Federal Rule of *198 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendant officers Wilfredo Morales Rivera and Jose A. Morales Vazquez (hereinafter “Defendants”) 2 as well as Plaintiffs’ opposition thereto (Docket No. 17). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.
I. Factual Background
The Court draws the following facts from Plaintiffs’ complaint (Docket No. 5) and takes them as true fоr purposes of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
A. Facts Underlying the Searches and Seizures
On November 29, 2006, nearing midnight, Fundador Moreno Medina (“Moreno”) and his consensual partner, Ivette Banuchi Rodriguez (“Banuchi”), were preparing for bed when Moreno heard noises coming from the bushes in front of his house and from the rattling of his front gate. Looking through his bedroom window, Moreno noticed men jumping over the front gate of his residence. Thinking it was a robbery attempt, he opened the backdoor of the house, when various armed men dressed in dark clothing rushed into the house. The armed men began searching the entire house, removing Moreno from the room where he was found. 3 The armed men, it turns out, were police officers executing a search warrant on Moreno’s property.
Banuchi was ordered to sit on her bed in her present state, that is, in her underwear and t-shirt. Not allowed to move and guarded by one of the officers, Banuchi was very nervous and upset, thinking that they were robbing her home, and urinated on herself. She requested and was denied permission to change into proper clothing. The officer guarded over her for about a half-hour until Moreno was arrested and escorted away.
Before his arrest and about ten minutes after Banuchi’s urination incident, Moreno was taken into the same room where he had been removed from, and was confronted by defendant Miguel Arocho Irizarry (“Arocho”) who alleged to have found bullets in that room, which Arocho had searched out of Moreno’s presence. Shortly thereafter, Moreno was handcuffed, while defendant Wilfredo Morales Rivera (“Morales”) searched drawers containing jewelry and cash. During the arrest and subsequent search, the officers were using foul language in a loud voice, continuing to upset Banuchi’s nervous condition. Arocho proceeded to search Moreno’s pick-up truck, where he said he found $10,000.00. Moreno was then taken to the living room, while the officers continued their search of the house for approximately thirty minutes. At no time during the search of the house did any of the officers show Moreno or Banuchi a search warrant, even when he asked to see one. Arocho only replied that it would be shown to Moreno afterwards. Moreno was not shown a warrant until December 4, 2006, at a hearing in the Puerto Rico Superior Court of Isabela.
After the search of his house and his cars, the officers took Moreno to his mother’s home where they performed another search at that house. Moreno’s eighty-three year-old mother lived with two handicapped brothers, one deaf-mute and another mentally challenged. The officers sat Moreno in his mother’s living room and *199 began searching the house for a firearm which they never found. The officers asked Moreno if he had any keys to the two apartments and garage behind his mother’s house that he owned. He was forced to hand over the keys and the officers brought along Moreno’s deaf mute brother as a witness, while Moreno was kept watch in his mother’s living room. About fifteen minutes later, the officers executing the search of the rented apartments returned to the living room and said they had found a white powdered substance and bullets in the mother’s room, but no firearms.
At around dawn on November 30, 2006, the officers provided Moreno with an inventory of the two motor vehicles: a Nissan Frontier pick-up truck and a Mitsubishi Outlander. But at no time during the searches and seizures did the officers provide Moreno with a search warrant or other court order. No inventory was provided for the seized cash, jewelry, camera, dish card, lottery tickets, and other confiscated articles. 4 Moreno realized that these articles were seized after he performed his own inventory subsequent to his release on bond when he returned to his house which had been turned upside down by the defendants.
Moreno was taken to the Ramey police precinct, where he was detained for approximately four to five hours, and was booked and subpoenaed to appear in court the following Monday. Moreno was charged with four (4) counts of violating the Puerto Rico Controlled Substances Act: one (1) count under Article 401, one (1) count under Article 404, and two (2) counts under Article 412. Moreno was also charged with two (2) сounts of violating the Firearms Law of Puerto Rico under Article 6.01. The charges were submitted on December 4, 2006. The charges were allegedly based on the officers’ seizure of $7,040 in cash, 344 small bags of marijuana, 11 transparent plastic bags, and 220.380 caliber bullets. Moreno required the assistance of his family members in order to raise bond money for most of the charges six charges pending against him. The criminal case was set before the Puerto Rico Superior Court of Aguadilla (the “superior court”).
In the criminal case against Moreno, defendant Arocho and other officers testified that the searches and seizures that took place at Moreno’s property and at his mother’s house were justified by information provided by an informant. During pre-trial proceedings, Moreno’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence arguing that the information used by Arocho to obtain the search warrant, which was based on an informant’s tip-off, was false. The superior court held evidentiary hearings before Judge Manuel A. Acevedo Hernandez to rule on the motion to suppress. The court listened to the testimony of Arocho and other officers executing the search that night, as well as of defense witness Juan Santo Domingo (“Santo”). Santo was at home the day the officers or *200 informants allegedly saw Moreno conducting illegal drug transactions in front of his house.
On June 3, 2008, the superior court judge ordered the suppression of all the evidence seized by the officers on November 29, 2006. The judge ruled that the contents of the sworn statement used by officer Arocho to obtain the search warrant did not contain information from an informant sufficiently describing Moreno or indicating the time or dates of Moreno’s alleged drug sales; neither did it describe Moreno’s alleged clients or buyers. The informant also failed to describe the alleged firearms that Moreno possessed. The judge made a finding that Arocho had stated under oath that the informant actually never gave him information regarding any criminal act before charges were filed against Moreno. Moreno stated on the record that he had never spoken with the informant before the suppression hearing.
The superior court judge concluded that the search warrant was obtained based on Arocho’s false testimony, even if it was indeed the product of an honest mistake as Arocho submitted at the suppression hearing. The court inferred from the defense attorney’s cross-examination that the information provided by the informant to support the search warrant was unsubstantiated boilerplate regularly employed to obtain a warrant based on an informant’s tip-off. Moreover, defense witness Santo testified that he did not observe any criminal activity taking place at the time when the informant allegedly reported the drug transactions. The judge found the defense witness credible, as opposed to Aroeho’s testimony which was found to be false, ambiguous, and imprecise.
The superior court concluded that due to the erroneously issued warrant, based on Arocho’s sworn statement substantially omitting details regarding the alleged drug transactions, locations, and descriptions of the buyers and sellers, the search and seizure that took place at Moreno’s properties were illegal. The court, therefore, granted the motion to suppress all the evidence seized by Arocho and the other officers. On July 1, 2008, upon request by the district attorney’s office in Aguadilla, the superior court dismissed all charges against Moreno pursuant to the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, App. IV.
B. Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims
Plaintiffs argue that as a consequence of the reckless and callous acts and omissions of the named defendants, they had to endure a criminal prosecution, hire attorneys and pay $33,000.00 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs also argue that the illegal seizure resulted in the loss of two (2) motor vehicles that were confiscated and sold without providing Plaintiffs procedural or substantive due process, as well as the sale of real property that had hitherto provided income and for which they now claim past and future profits. Plaintiffs list as items of personal property illegally seized:
(1) 2 motor vehicles valued at approximately $48,000.00;
(2) $3,300.00 in cash;
(3) jewelry valued at $3,800.00;
(4) a digital camera valued at $230.00;
(5) 175 lottery tickets;
(6) $10,000.00 in cash taken from inside Plaintiffs’ pick up truck;
(7) a dish card valued at $80.00; and
(8) $340.00 in billfold cash.
(Compl. ¶ 42.). 5 Plaintiffs surmisе that they have suffered a total loss of income of *201 not less than $866,399.79, which includes the “confiscated auto loss, rental income loss, auto dealer loss, personal property-loss, attorneys fees ..., loss in the forced sale of a commercial building and loan interest losses.” (Compl. ¶ 43.). Finally, Plaintiffs claim emotional and psychological damages suffered by them and other family members, valued at not less than $1.5 million, and for which they have incurred $4,000.00 in medical expenses.
Plaintiffs plead several causes of action against the on-scene officers who directly perpetrated the constitutional violations as well as the supervisory officers who were in charge of disciplining the misconduct. Plaintiffs argue that the on-scene officers who executed the search warrant — Arocho, Wilfredo Morales Rivera, Carlos Bonet, Jose Nieves Soler and Ruben Colon Perez — did so with callous and reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they violated their constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and not to be deprived of property and liberty without due process of law under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as under Article II, Sections 8 and 10 of the Puerto Rico Constitution.
Plaintiffs also argue that Pedro Toledo, Jose A. Morales, Angel Perez Hernandez are liable under Section 1983 under a theory of supervisory liability. First, Plaintiffs premise liability upon their failing to “implement existing disciplinary systems intended to detect unconstitutional behavior such as that evidenced by defendants” and for allowing the on-scene officers to continue their duties despite knowledge of their records and propensities to disregard the constitutional rights of citizens. (See Compl. ¶ 49.) Had the supervisory officers implemented the existing disciplinary system, argue Plaintiffs, the on-scene officers’ violations would have been avoided because their previous conduct would have warranted their dismissal or reassignment. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the supervisory officers failed in their duty to control and discipline the officers executing the search warrant as they had actual or constructive knowledge of their subordinates’ unlawful pattern of behavior and did nothing to remedy it. Third, Plaintiffs claim that the supervisory officers should be held liable because they were reckless and callous in the training of the offending on-scene officers.
In addition to their Section 1983 claims, Plaintiffs plead supplementary claims for constitutional violations under Article II, Sections 8 and 10 of the Puerto Rico Constitution, as well as for a negligence cause of action under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Finally, for both the federal and state law claims, Plaintiffs ask for punitive damages.
II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review
“The general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.... This short and plain statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Gargano v. Liberty Intern. Underwriters, Inc.,
Motions to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are subject to the same standard of review.
See Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres,
“Yet [the Court] need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Maldonado v. Fontanes,
Moreover, “even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the Supreme Court has ... held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege a plausible entitlement to relief.”
Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc.,
III. Discussion
Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the claims against them should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and Puerto Rico negligence claims are time-barred. They also submit that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; that plaintiff Banuchi does not have standing to sue under Section 1983; and that plaintiffs Banuchi and Moreno do not have standing to sue under Section 1983 for the search and seizure of Moreno’s mother’s home. Finally, Defendants add that any supplemental state law claims should also be dismissed.
A. Statute of Limitations under Section 1983
“Affirmative defenses, such as statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that the facts establishing the defense [are] clear on the face of the plaintiff’s pleadings.”
Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila,
Claims under Section 1983 borrow from the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
See id. (citing Rodriguez-Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas,
Even though the Court borrows from Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, “[i]t is federal law, however, that determines when the statute of limitations begins to run.”
Gorelik v. Costin,
Finally, there are three ways “by which prescription of tort actions can be interrupted or tolled under Puerto Ricо’s Civil Code, although none are applicable here: (1) by their institution before the courts; (2) by extrajudicial claim of the creditor; and (3) by any act of acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.”
Cintron-Luna v. Roman-Bultron,
Defendants argue that the statute of limitations in this ease began to run on November 29, 2006, the date Moreno was allegedly unlawfully arrested, detained for several hours, and his place of abode, motor vehicles, mother’s residence, rental properties, and other items of personal property were searched and seized. Since Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 1, 2009, two and a half years after the unlawful sеarches and seizures, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims exceed Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations. As Plaintiffs did not toll the limitations period, Defendants call for the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs’ claims against them.
Plaintiffs respond by raising, for the first time, the argument that their Section 1983 claim is analogous to the tort action for malicious prosecution, and thus does not begin to prescribe until the case has ended favorably for the accused.
See
Pis.’ Opp. Mot. Dismiss 2
(quoting Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico,
In anticipation of this counter-argument, Defendants set forth in their motion to dismiss that while Plaintiffs might attempt to argue that their claims began to accrue when the criminal charges against Moreno were dismissed, it is “settled law that ‘the statute of limitations upon a Section 1983 claim seeking damages for false arrest ... where аrrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.’ ” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 7-8.)
(quoting Koto,
The Court concludes that, except for a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, all of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims stemming from the illegal searches and seizures and subsequent criminal proceedings, and pegged to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, are time-barred. 6 As a general federal rule of accrual, Plaintiffs claims began to accrue at the time of injury or wrongful act: the illegal searches and seizures on November 29 and 30, 2006. Taken in the light most favorable to them, Plaintiffs had one year from November 30, 2006, to sue for personal injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights arising from the searches and seizures of Plaintiffs’ persons and property, including Moreno’s arrest and post-arrest deprivations of liberty.
While Plaintiffs’ claims “have foundered on the shoals of the statute of limitations, one claim escapes this prohibition.”
Nieves v. McSweeney,
*205 Before approaching the subject of malicious prosecution, the Court notes that the task of deciphering Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims was made all the more difficult by the parties’ minimal efforts at argumentation. Plaintiffs raised a malicious prosecution claim almost as an afterthought in response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Furthermore, they failed to prove in cogent fashion how they met the elements of this common law tort claim. Citing scant authority, Plaintiffs merely set forth the conclusory statement that their complaint “complies] with all the above-mentioned criteria for constituting and filing a tort-action for malicious prosecution.... ” (Opp. Mot. Dismiss 7.) Defendants, as well, are guilty of relying on the previous argument that a claim for false arrest accrues at the time of arrest without explaining how the facts even allow for such a claim and without submitting a reply that definitively refutes a claim for malicious prosecution. The Court is forced to abandon the parties’ briefs and do their homework for them.
Whether Plaintiffs make out a malicious prosecution claim, as Plaintiffs aver, or a false arrest claim, as Defendants aver, is important because to determine the applicable accrual rule governing a Section 1983 claim, the Court “look[s] to the common law cause of action most closely analogous to the constitutional right at stake.”
Calero-Colon,
B. Malicious Prosecution under Section 1983
The First Circuit has “assume[d] without deciding that malicious prosecution can, under some circumstances, embody a violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus ground a cause of action under Section 1983.”
Nieves,
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]o establish malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish the elemеnts of malicious prosecution under state law and the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.”
Colon-Andino v. Toledo-Davila,
1. Malicious Prosecution Under State Law: Common Law Elements
Under Puerto Rico common law, a claim for malicious prosecution requires that: (1) a criminal action was initiated and instigated by defendants; (2) a criminal action terminated in favor of plaintiff; (3) the defendants acted
with malice and without probable cause;
and (4) plaintiff suffered damages.
Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico,
The Court cannot see how it can properly be said that Defendants “initiated and instigated” the criminal action by way of a defective search warrant, subsequently leading to the discovery of incriminating
*207
evidence, which then established probable cause for Moreno’s arrest.
See Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila,
It would also be sheer speculation to suggest that Arocho or any of the other officers were motivated by malice against Morеno or Banuchi. Plaintiffs have not posited a theory for any ill motivation, nor have they made any effort to show that the officers knew Plaintiffs at all, or wished a prosecution against them out of spite. They have simply set forth a factual scenario whereby either defendant Arocho was negligent in procuring his informant’s report or the informant was negligent in carrying out his investigation. Plaintiffs do not attribute any falsehoods upon which the search warrant may have been based to any improper purpose that would cast doubt upon any of the officer’s intentions. Falsehood as we all know can also be the product of negligence, faulty memory, mistake, or any other human error that cannot reasonably call into question the innocence of its proponent.
Moreover, while any hint of actual malice is notably missing from the complaint, there is also no sign that Defendants acted without probable cause. While the search warrant itself may have lacked probable cause, rendering the incriminating evidence fruits of the poisonous tree subject to the exclusionary rule, the same rules that apply to criminal cases do not always apply in the civil context. Specifically, in the context of a civil malicious prosecution claim, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the effect that it would nullify the officers’ probable cause to arrest Moreno.
See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott,
2. Federal Law Requirements
The Supreme Court has noted the “embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion” with regard to the extent to which a malicious prosecution claim is actionable under Section 1983, in particular whether a malicious prosecution tort under state law standing alone can violate the Constitution.
See Albright v. Oliver,
Under the federal standard requiring Plaintiffs show a deprivation of liberty akin to a seizure, the Court must first determine whether the alleged seizure occurred “pursuant to legal process” which generally means either by way of an arrest warrant or a subsequent charging document.
See Nieves,
Since plaintiff Moreno was not arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, “[t]his leaves [Moreno] with the task of showing some
post-arraignment
deprivation of liberty, caused by the application of legal process, that approximates a Fourth Amendment seizure.”
Nieves,
In reaching this conclusion, the Court asks whether the officers, by means of physical force or show of authority, have in some way restrained Moreno’s liberty.
See id.
at 55.
(quoting Terry v. Ohio,
C. Supplementary State Law Claims
Lastly, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed.
See Camelio v. American Federation,
IV. Conclusion
While the Court does not condone the improper conduct of the defendant officers, for the reasons explained at length above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12). For most of Plaintiffs’ viable Section 1983 claims, “[a] ripe civil rights suit was left to rot.”
Nieves,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiffs dropped their claims under the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, alleged in the complaint, in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. (See Opp. Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 25-26.) Plaintiffs pleaded a First Amendment violation in the complaint but did not articulate or substantiate it with any legal support or authority. Because Plaintiffs did not argue their First Amendment claim and because said claim would be time-barred in any case, as discussed later in this Opinion, the Court need not consider it here.
. Additionally, Plaintiffs sued on-scene officers Miguel Arocho Irizarry, Carlos Bonet, Jose Nieves Soler, and Ruben Colon Perez, and supervisory officers Pedro Toledo Davila (the former police superintendent) and Angel Perez Hernandez. All defendants named in the complaint are sued in their personal and official capacity.
. It is not clear from the factual allegations whether this room was Moreno's bedroom or another room in the house.
. Moreno lists the following items as personal property "callously and recklessly stolen and/or seized by the intervening agents/defendants without any previous court order or search warrant:”
(1) gold chain valued at approximately $2,600.00;
(2) gold bracelet valued at approximately $1,300.00;
(3) $340.00 in cash found in Moreno's billfold;
(4) $10,000.00 in cash found inside a Nissan Frontier pick-up truck;
(5) 175 lottery tickets dated December 20, 2006;
(6) a digital camera valued at approximately $230.00; and
(7) a dish card valued at approximately $50.00.
(Compl. ¶ 18.)
. The Court notes disсrepancies in Plaintiff's valuation of his items of personal property. First, the $3,300.00 in cash, the origins of which are not made clear, were not previously mentioned in the complaint. Second, the *201 jewelry previously listed add up to a total value of $3,900.00 not $3,800.00. Third and finally, the "dish card” was previously listed at $50.00 not $80.00.
. Finding all of Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments time-barred, save for a malicious prosecution claim, the Court need not entertain whether they are cognizable and state a plausible entitlement to relief. Thus, neither does the Court need to delve into Defendants’ standing arguments.
. Because the First Circuit has characterized a Section 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action as "an open question,” some lower courts have indicated that defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the constitutional right at issue is not sufficiently "clearly established” to grant state officers notice that their conduct is violative of that right.
See, e.g., Hernandez-Lopez v. Pereira,
. Though a plurality oрinion of the Supreme Court, a majority of the Justices in
Albright v. Oliver,