*1 Anthony MEDINA, Appellant, Shawn Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of No. 72594. Texas, Appeals Court of Criminal En Banc. Oct. Concurring Opinion Judge Womack June *3 Schneider, Houston, for
Stanley ap- G. pellant. Atty., Hous- Roper,
Keli Pool Asst. Dist. ton, Paul, Austin, Atty., Matthew State’s for State.
OPINION
KELLER,
opinion
J. delivered
McCORMICK,
the Court which
P.J.
PRICE, HOLLAND,
MANSFIELD,
JOHNSON,
KEASLER, JJ., joined.
prior opinion
The
is withdrawn.
Court’s
August
was convicted in
January
capital
of a
murder committed
§
19.03. The
1996.
Tex. Penal
Code
to sen-
required
verdicts
the trial court
tence
to death. Tex. Code
Crim.
§ Appeal
from the
PROC. art. 37.071
direct and automatic
sentence of death is
I,
Id;
Art.
Court.
Tex. Const.
twenty-two points
§
raises
will affirm.
error. We
Valadez,
Johnny
who was
car with
I. SUFFICIENCY
OF
THE EVIDENCE
appellant,
affirmed
testified that
that he
“her”
“he
had shot
saw fat
Legal Sufficiency
A.
fly
meat
off.”1
two,
one and
theory
murder
appellant challenges
legal sufficiency
was indicted and convict-
to establish
intent to kill.
ed,
19.03(a)(7)(A)
in-
Tex. Penal
Code
Citing
Morrow
cludes within its ambit both intentional
(Tex.Crim.App.1988), appellant argues the
19.03(a)(7)(A)
knowing
murders.
evidence is insufficient because it fails to
provides
part
person
in relevant
specifically
establish that he
intended
commits an
if he
“murders more
death
from his conduct.
result
person
during
than one
...
the same crim-
*4
light
most
Reviewed
favorable
inserted).
inal
(ellipsis
transaction”
Sec-
verdict,
Virginia,
the
Jackson v.
443 U.S.
19.03(a)
capital
tion
defines
murder with
307,
(1979),
2781,
99 S.Ct.
argues that Vuong, the circumstances sur- As directly (Tex.Crim.App.1992), is support rounding against agree We point appellant. acted with finding rational State; Vuong controlling. the use Clearly, to kill. specific intent cir- under these weapon of an automatic murder Vuong capital was convicted of of use” cumstances was “manner restaurant and after he entered crowded bodily harm was which death or serious Vuong argued opened patrons. fire at the auto- fire with an likely Opening result. evidence was insufficient to establish rifle, range, group on a to kill matic at close specific that he acted with the intent appel- people supports that he had the conclusion because the evidence showed kill. irrationally thinking. specific with the intent to acted without lant acted today, Vuong argued overruled. As does Points of error one and two are gun people into a crowd of firing Sufficiency B. Factual murder could not be specific act intent to kill. We lacks four, three and rejected Vuong’s arguments, holding that sufficiency challenges factual in a Appellant’s deadly weapon use of a an intent of the evidence to establish *5 patrons supplies ample tavern filled with State, 126, kill. 922 131- Clewis v. S.W.2d jury for a rational to conclude evidence Factual suffi (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 132 beyond Appel- a reasonable doubt that ciency take into consideration all reviews requisite lant had the intent to kill: challenge, of the evidence related to the kill in- specific may “The intent to be and the evidence which tends weigh deadly weapon, ferred from the use of a dispute the fact in prove the existence of in it unless the manner of its use is contradictory evidence. Cle- against the reasonably apparent that death or seri- But, wis, at to avoid 922 S.W.2d bodily injury ous could not result.” jury’s arbiter of intruding upon the role as State, Godsey v. 719 580-81 S.W.2d evidence, credibility of the weight and (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Clearly, the use defer sufficiency a factual review remains an weapon automatic these of Clewis, jury’s ential to the verdict. ' circumstances was a “manner use” in 133. That a different verdict S.W.2d at bodily which death or serious harm was is, therefore, would be more reasonable addition, likely there are a result. reversal; justify jury’s insufficient to number of other factors that could have upheld, unless it is so verdict will be jury reasonably Appel- led believe great weight of the evidence” “against knowing lant’s conduct was or intention- i.e., unjust,” “clearly wrong it is (1) al, wit- including: testimony con- unjust, shocking to the manifestly concerning calculated appellant’s nesses clearly Id. at 135. science or biased. (2) demeanor, showing evidence Appellant argues that the evidence approximately of the shots seven eleven great factually insufficient because during episode fired the criminal struck of the evidence weight preponderance (3) targets, human the fact that the only to that he intended shoot establishes directly in victim Tien was shot twice at individual. at the house and not victim Hien was killed the face and the point of holding in first Our in squarely that hit him bullet this assertion. See error defeats it is not Finally, chin. we note two, contrary, To the supra. show a motive required that the State intended find -no evidence order to sustain conviction State, at the house. only to shoot murder. Garcia The vie- occupied. knew the home (Tex.Crim.App.1973). standing plain sight, tims were denying requested front court erred in in- of the house. Most of the bullets were structions on the lesser included offenses And, shot at human height. appellant em- murder, felony involuntary murder and ployed especially deadly weapon, which manslaughter. Appellant argues that he range. jury’s he fired at close verdict was entitled to the lesser offense instruc- against great weight was not of the tions because there is evidence in the rec- evidence, clearly wrong unjust, or bi- victims, ord that he killed the he did so ased. Points three and four are only without the intent to kill.4 The State overruled. counters that there is no such the record. II. GUILT PHASE Under Rousseau v. Jury
A. instructions (Tex.Crim.App.1993), 672-75 a two- prong test must be Transferred Intent met before lesser- given: included-offense instruction must be six, In points ap of error five and the lesser-included-offense must be includ- pellant claims that the trial court erred in necessary within proof ed to establish instructing on intent. transferred and, charged, the offense some evidence Acknowledging objection that he made no must exist in the record that if the defen- trial, he argues, under Almanza v. is guilty, guilty only dant he is 171 (Tex.Crim.App. lesser offense. Appellant cannot meet 1985)(op. reh’g), the error was prong second of this test. egregious. But if correct finding guilt upon a transferred intent mur- argues that because the theory would be irrational under the evi ders were committed in a “random” drive- dence, it appear highly unlikely then would by-shooting there evidence that he if correctly that a framed transferred intent victims, he killed the it was without the *6 jury instruction would result in a verdict specific intent kill that he was enti- theory.3 that similar circum Under to the tled lesser-included offense instruc- involving parties, stances the law of disagree. tions. We have held that the defendant failed to show earlier, capital As discussed murder State, egregious Cathey harm. v. provision present at issue in the case is (Tex.Crim.App.l999)(no satisfied the evidence shows two mur- egregious correctly harm from par framed ders, killings whether the are intentional ties instruction if support evidence fails to or would entitled knowing. Appellant be parties). submission of law of The reason ing in of murder Cathey equally applicable to the lesser (§ 19.02(b)(1) (2)) present case. only Points of error five and six or if he showed that are overruled. three possessed culpa- he one of the above victims, ble mental states as to one
2. Lesser Included Offenses
victim.5 No evi-
as to the other
points
through
produced during
suggest
of error
dence was
trial to
seven
nine, appellant
appellant
only
contends that
that
victim or
intended
one
argument
applies
3. We assume for the sake of
5.If
intent
to the
law of transferred
the evidence does not
issue
raise the
of trans-
produce evi-
would have to
express
opinion
ferred intent. We
no
on that
possessed
dence that he
one of the relevant
issue.
culpable
only
person,
mental states as to
one
person present that
and not as to
other
4. We assume that
refers to murder
above,
night. As
we do not address
noted
19.02(b)(2), felony
§
under
murder under
applies
whether the law of transferred intent
19.02(b)(3)
manslaughter
§
under
to the
case.
§ 19.04. These are all forms of criminal homi-
specific
cide committed without the
intent to
kill.
jury
only
alleges
particular
As
this
certainty
knew
a reasonable
33.1.
he
with
person
one
would die.
appeal,
the first time on
charge error for
egregious
appellant must establish
entitled
would be
to the lesser
error,
is,
alleged
harm arose from the
felony
manslaugh-
murder and
offenses of
fair trial. Alvarado
that he
denied a
only
culpable
ter
if he showed
his
(Tex.Crim.
199, 216
state,
v.
mental
did not rise to
level of
App.1995).
knowing
as
killing
intentional or
—such
no
But there is
recklessness.
on our fur
light
it sheds
Because
anything
record that
less
issue,
ther
we answer
resolution of
than reasonably
multiple peo-
certain that
murder under
capital
first whether
Section
ple
appel-
would be killed. Evidence that
19.03(a)(7)(A) might be committed know
lant
care who he
did not
killed does
already given
ingly. For
reasons
reduce
mental
culpable
his
state from
two,
points
supra, capital
murder
knowing to mere recklessness.
19.03(a)(7)(A)
“knowing”
includes
record,
reviewing
After
we conclude
correctly
killings.
trial court
deter
no
appel-
there was
evidence that if
jury
instructed
that capital
mined and
lant
homicide he did
committed
so without
19.03(a)(7)(A)
murder
can
under Section
a culpable mental state
him for
qualifying
intentionally
knowingly.
committed
or
two,
capital
murder. See
one and
19.03(a)(2).
Compare Tex. Penal Code
not,
supra.
therefore,
Appellant was
enti-
tled
alleges.
to the instructions as he
murder is a
Capital
result-of-
Points
through
of error seven
nine are
offense;
charge
jury
conduct
which de
overruled.
“intentionally”
fines
as it relates to the
nature of
as well as the result of
conduct
Knowingly
is, therefore,
conduct
incorrect. See Cook
ten,
point
appellant con
(Tex.Crim.
tends that the trial court erred in overrul App.1994).
points out
ing
objection to the trial
in
court’s
“knowingly”
trial court
with
defined
refer
jury
struction to the
that he
be found
could
and not
ence
nature of conduct
as to
guilty
murder if the
found
stated,
result of
The instructions
conduct.
knowingly engaged
he
the conduct
person
knowingly,
A
acts
or with knowl
leading to the victims’ deaths. The State
nature
edge,
respect
to the
of his
agrees that the trial court’s
definition
*7
conduct
to circumstances surrounding
or
“knowingly” was incorrect
it de
because
his
he
aware
conduct when
is
of the
“knowingly”
fined
as to the nature of con
nature
or that the
of his conduct
circum
duct,
argues
State
because
stances exist.
object
did not
on
same
According
appellant,
this error caused
grounds upon
complains,
which he now
egregious
it
harm because
lessened
egre
error must be shown to have been
gious.
proof, authorizing
State’s burden of
his
jury
that he
conviction if the
found
know-
objected
At
trial
the inclu
ingly
in the conduct instead of
engaged
sion of a definition of
“knowingly”
finding
in conduct
engaged
that he
which
jury charge.
argued
He
mur
certainty
knew
he
with reasonable
would
19.03(a)(7)(A)
only
der under
could
be
concedes
it
result
death. The State
intentionally
knowingly.
and not
committed
was error
the trial court
define
for
argues,
correctly
As the State
his
knowingly
the nature of
conduct
as to
object
particular
did
not
definition
appellant’s
the result
conduct.
was incorrect. As
ob
included
agree
to define know-
We
that it is error
jection
comport
trial does not
with his
ing murder
to the nature of conduct
as
objection
appeal,
present objection
App.
alone.
most accurate definition of
preserved.
was
The’
Tex. R.
PROC.
knowingly would
death,
have referred to the re-
certain to result in
the actor must
sult of conduct.
also be aware of the lethal nature of his
Tex.
Penal
Code
6.03(b).
But for the following reasons
conduct:
agree
we cannot
egre-
error was so
19.02(a)(1),
Murder under
supra,
Section
gious and created such harm that appel-
by knowingly
death,
causing
contem-
lant has not had a fair and impartial trial.
plates both the commission of an act
First,
correctly
court
in
clearly dangerous to human life and an
jury
structed the
regarding intentional
awareness of the nature of
Ap-
that act.
murder, and the
sufficient to
plying
“knowingly,”
the definition of
support
conviction under
theory
person knowingly causes death “when he
was, therefore,
the offense. There
at least
is aware that his conduct
reasonably
theory
of the
upon
ap
certain to cause the result.” Section
pellant’s
may
conviction
stand. See
6.03(b), supra.
prosecution
of error one and two. See also Atkinson
19.02(a)(1),
surely
Section
it
cannot be
State,
923 S.W.2d
27 (Tex.Crim.App.
inferred that the individual was reason-
1996) (the
jury
harmfulness of error
ably certain his conduct would result in
charge
against
should be measured
death unless his conduct
in causing
jury’s
likelihood that the
verdict was actu
clearly dangerous
death was
to human
ally
upon
based
an alternative available
Thus,
life.
respect
to a murder
theory of culpability
by
not affected
erro
19.02(a)(1),
act,
under Section
supra, the
portions
Second,
neous
charge).
by necessity,
objectively
must be
clearly
application paragraph repeatedly
con
dangerous to human life and the individ-
sistently
instructed the
they
ual,
definition,
by
subjectively
must
beyond
must believe
a reasonable doubt
resulting
aware that
act
the death
appellant “intentionally
knowingly
or
clearly
dangerous to human life.
caused the
they
death” before
could find
Lugo-Lugo v.
guilty.
him
application para
Where the
(Tex.Crim.App.1983). Appellant’s case is
graph correctly
jury,
instructs the
an error
illustrative; appellant
guilty
of murder
in the abstract
egregious.
instruction is not
because
firing
he was aware that
an auto-
See Plata v.
302-3
was,
matic weapon into a crowd of
(Tex.Crim.App.l996)(The
people
inclusion of a
merely superfluous
by
conduct,
abstraction never
pro
reasonably
nature of the
duces reversible
short,
the court’s
certain to result
in death.6 In
charge
it
19.02(b)(1)
has no effect on the
knowing murder under
is a re-
jury’s ability fairly and accurately to im
sult-of-conduct offense which
definition
plement the
application
commands of the
is also a nature-of-conduct
offense.
or
paragraph
paragraphs).
light
discussion,
foregoing
we cannot
conclude that appellant
egregious
suffered
murders,
Finally, for knowing
harm. Point of error ten is overruled.
distinction between result of conduct and
*8
nature of conduct blurs because awareness
Accomplice-witness
Instructions
of the
necessarily
result of the conduct
through
thir-
of error eleven
entails awareness of the nature of the con
teen, appellant contends that
the trial
duct as well. Murder is committed know
in refusing
give accomplice-
court erred
to
ingly when
engages
the actor
in conduct
regarding
witness instructions
the testimo-
while
reasonably
aware that death is
cer
Holmes,
Valadez,
ny of
Johnny
tain
Dominic
to result from his conduct. Tex. Pe
6.03(b)
19.02(b)(1).
Juarez,
Regina
respectively.
At
To
nal
Code
aware that
reasonably
his conduct is
appellant’s requested instruction was de-
State,
6. This is what
e.g., Vuong
is meant when courts hold that
v.
830 S.W.2d
1992).
intent to kill can be inferred from the manner
(Tex.Crim.App.
deadly weapon
employed.
in which a
See
member,
Holmes,
objec-
gang
was
plice
he
no
he was a
nied as
raised
because
offense,
accomplice
night of
request
tion and did not
an
on the
the
with
The
instruction as to Valadez and Juarez.
the offense. The State
and “observed”
that,
the wit-
responds
as none of
State
evidence does not raise
responds
nesses
been convicted of
could have
accomplice
an
liability
of
as
question
the
murder,
in fail-
trial court did not err
the
corroborating
instruction.
purposes
for
give
accomplice-witness
instruc-
ing
the
is no
the record
There
direct evidence
tion.7
any
appel-
of these witnesses knew of
A
is an
he
person
accomplice
the offense. Nor is
plans
lant’s
commit
before,
participates
during, or after the
an overt
any
there
evidence of
act commit-
prose
commission
the crime
and can be
during
shootings by
before or
ted
for
offense
the defen
cuted
the same
as
would
of these witnesses that
indicate
or
offense.
dant
for
lesser-included
they
intending
were
to assist the commis-
State,
Blake v.
454-455
All of the
of the
witnesses
sion
offense.
(Tex.Crim.App.1998).
presence dur
Mere
testified,
the car with
consistent-
ing the commission of
crime does
contradiction,
ly
without
accomplice,
make one
nor
one an
an
plans to them and
did not announce his
accomplice
“knowing
a crime and
for
about
sur-
complete
came as
it,
failing
concealing
it.”
disclose
or even
prise to them. Holmes and Valadez testi-
that,
Id. at 454. And we have
even
held
gunfire,
heard
they
fied
when
where
evidence shows that the witness
they
they initially thought
targets
were
present during
was
of the
commission
shooting.
participated
concealing
crime and
question
gang
is whether
crime, such
evidence
not sufficient
presence
membership, combined with
at
accomplice
raise
issue of
status.
of a crime often associ
concealment
and/or
(Tex.
State,
Smith v.
activity,
is sufficient evi
gang
ated
Crim.App.1986). The defendant is entitled
support
finding
accomplice
dence to
to an
if and
accomplice-witness instruction
has
no
status. Our research
revealed
only if
is sufficient
in the
“there
ques
from
in which this
cases
this Court
support
record to
charge against
addressed,
tion has been
whether
witness
an
Id.
alleged
accomplice.”
to be
of the
rule or
(internal
accomplice-witness
context
omitted).
at 455
quotation marks
law
parties.
of the
Several Courts
Appellant argues that
was an
Holmes
affiliation,
gang
Appeals’ cases have found
witness,
accomplice
or that an issue was
factors,
with other
to be suffi
combined
accomplice,
raised as
as
to his status
an
cient, but those other factors have included
because the evidence established
at
presence
than
and conceal
more
mere
Holmes was
fellow
mem-
allegedly gang-related
ment of an
offense.
offense,
ber,
appellant during
was with
Cunningham
643
the offense.
by
preceding
harmed
the months
could be
irrelevant,
only
an
if the
argues
lack of
instruction
and
this evidence was
that
(2)
(1)
testimony,
Holmes’
disbe
401,
believed
seq., and constituted
Tex. R. Evid.
et.
(3)
Valadez,
both
and
lieved
Juarez
offense, Tex.
extraneous
an inadmissible
as a factual matter that Holmes
believed
R. Evid. in the
as an ac
participated
had
murders
his
that,he
put
had
Rodriguez testified
Although
pos
such
complice.
a scenario
to
prior
market
the offense
house on the
sible,
not man
harm” test does
“some
targeted
his house had been
possible
of
upon
showing
date reversal
that
He testified
gang.
the “La Raza”
harm be
requires
harm—it
actual
es
July
drive-by
shooting
there had been
appellate court reviews the
tablished. The
10, 1995,
“La
had
day,
Raza”
next
of the record as a
part
evidence and
garage,
on his
been painted
actual,
illuminate “the
may
whole
had
daughter’s
of his
car
rear window
theoretical,
just
harm to the accused.”
not
speculated that
Rodriguez
been smashed.
Almanza,
174. Given the
686 S.W.2d at
relationship with a member
daughter’s
his
non-accomplice
substantial amount
evi
“La
Crips
was the reason
the H-Town
crime,
connecting appellant to the
dence
Raza”
his
targeted
home.
and the
evidence that
tenuousness of
accomplice, we find that
Holmes was an
that the evidence was
We believe
give
failing
the trial court’s error in
to
an
explain
gang
the context of
relevant
concerning
accomplice witness instruction
in which the offense occurred.
rivalries
harmless. Points of error
Holmes was
theory
The evidence furthered
State’s
thirteen
overruled.
through
eleven
are
target
Rodriguez’s
home
appellant’s gang. That the house was
B.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
tendency to
target
some
gang
has
fourteen,
point
In
con-
of error
show
had motive to shoot
tends
he was denied
effective
at that house.
persons
kill
guaranteed by
assistance of counsel
federal constitution because counsel failed
claim,
for
Rule 404
As
request accomplice-witness
instructions
Appellant made
preserved.
error
not
Johnny
regarding
Regina
Valadez’s
relevancy objection at
only a
trial. Such
testimony.
Appellant purports
Juarez’s
does
con
objection
preserve
argument
raise
same
state
Rule
404 extraneous
cerning
constitution in his
point
fifteenth
error.
524,
State, 864
claim. Camacho v.
holding
Our
of error twelve
denied,
cert.
(Tex.Crim.App.1993),
appellant’s present
and thirteen defeats
1215, 114
Under Rule evidence of an 92 33 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 346 Ap may extraneous offense be admitted it is pellant that precedent is correct the is motive, intent, to identity, relevant as op directly point against argument. portunity, preparation, plan or absence of We explanation refer to our bar, mistake. In the at the case State’s the in argument flaws in his Lawton v. theory of the offense was appellant State, 913 (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d opened gathered fire into the group in 1995); see also Howard v. front of a in revenge home for the murder 102, 119 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Ap gang of a fellow member. Various wit pellant presents no argument per new to nesses testified at the time of the precedent. suade us abandon to our offense, Crips the H-town La Raza eighteen through twenty- Points of error context, were at Arguenta’s odds. this two are overruled. testimony was most relevant as to appel lant’s night motive intent on the J., MEYERS, note. concurs with And, offense. in the context the entire J., WOMACK, joined opinion by filed an record, it cannot be Arguenta’s said that J., JOHNSON, which concurred in point of testimony prejudicial was more than pro joined ten opinion error and otherwise the bative. The elements of the testimony of the Court. might prejudicial which be considered member, J., he was a MEYERS, concurs with note: —that a grudge against he had violent the specific particu- Under this the facts of H-town Crips, deadly that he carried a presented lar I that the agree error weapon and that he did not hesitate to ten, in point misdefining in error “know- threaten others with gun facts —were However, ingly” egregious. I can- established in record. elsewhere Point agree “knowing murder” under of error seventeen is overruled. 19.02(b)(1), § Penal is Code which defined offense, by caselaw as result of conduct III. MITIGATION ISSUE SPECIAL by definition, is always also nature of eighteen through conduct offense. twenty-one, appellant asserts the trial court fading jury erred in instruct J., WOMACK, concurring opinion filed a on the burden of as to proof State’s JOHNSON, J., joined. which mitigation special issue.8 Tex.Code CRiM. 2(e). In point PROC. art. 37.071 Sec. join and, I judgment of Court twenty-two, appellant error asserts that Ten, Point except opin as to of Error its sustaining trial court erred State’s ion. I agree the trial court erred objection his argument asserting when it terms of “knowingly” defined proof the State regard- bears burden of conduct, nature of and that error ing special the mitigation issue. to, objected it was not and that does not require I to the reversal. do not subscribe precedent concedes that the knowing statement “a murder under clearly against him argues that our 19.02(b)(1) a result-of-conduct offense place refusal to burden on the State and nature-of- gives review the evidence definition is also 640). (ante I discretion unconstitu conduct offense” at And untrammeled held question tional in think Georgia, Furman 408 U.S. decide the should argues point eighteen 8. the trial court's error amounted "cruel and process due court's denied him punishment" unusual “cruel or unusual under the federal constitution. U.S. Const. punishment," respectively. latter These refer- argu- 14. amend. 5 and He raises same are, course, and state ences to the federal point ments in due nineteen under course of constitutions, respectively. U.S. Const. law. Tex. art. In his twenti- Const, 14; art. amend. 8 Const, Tex. twenty-first points, argues eth by doing looking than harm more State, See Almanza v.
statutes. *12 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).* S.W.2d 157 Wyman Appellant, BADGETT, Thomas
v.
Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of
No. 14-97-01404-CR.
Texas,
Appeals
Court
(14th Dist.).
Houston
7,
Oct.
Rehearing Overruled Nov.
*
remotely
destroy the
ny was
calculated to
As statement
how to determine the sever-
as
ity
charge
egregious error in the
in connection
State’s case when considered
improve
following
on the
from the
cannot
testimony
well
the other
as
appeals in 1890:
court of
charge
phase
as a whole? Was
as
determining
whether the error is
'But
simply
as
case
an addition to
case
...
we are to look to
whole
material
therewith,
by the State and consistent
made
bearing upon
subject.
was
record
What
it in
conflict with the State’s
direct
or
testimony supporting the
the nature of the
theory?
important
all
matters to
These are
cogent
overwhelming?
it
verdict? Was
passing upon
(degree
be considered
testimony
character of the
What
presenting
harm)
in the omission or error.
theory
phase or
case
Tex.Ct.App.
13 S.W.
v.
Davis
charge,
to be noticed in the
omitted
dism’d,
(1890),
U.S.
writ
assigned?
upon which omission error is
(1891).” Al-
S.Ct.