MEDINA NURSING CENTER, INC.; ALPINE FIRESIDE HEALTH CENTER, LTD.; NEIGHBORS REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; аnd FAIRVIEW NURSING PLAZA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellants, v. THE HEALTH FACILITIES AND SERVICES REVIEW BOARD; THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; PECATONICA PAVILION, LLC; REVERE HEALTHCARE, LTD.; DALE GALASSIE, in His Capacity as Chairman of The Health Facilities and Services Review Board; RONALD S. EAKER, in His Capacity as a Member of The Health Facilities and Services Review Board; ALAN GREIMAN, in His Capacity as a Member of The Health Facilities and Services Review Board; JOHN HAYES, in His Capacity as a Membеr of The Health Facilities and Services Review Board; and DAVID PENN, in His Capacity as a Member of The Health Facilities and Services Review Board, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 4-12-0554
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
July 12, 2013
2013 IL App (4th) 120554
Held
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Deсisions for the convenience of the reader.)
In an action challenging a decision of the Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review Board‘s approval of an application to construct a long-term nursing care facility in a community in which plaintiffs already provided such serviсes, the trial court‘s judgment against plaintiffs was vacated and the cause was remanded to the Board with directions to provide a reasoned explanation in writing for its decision, including “findings and conclusions” based on the application and other information that came before the Boаrd, since the Board‘s letter confirming its approval was insufficient, and the fact that plaintiffs did not request a “written decision” did not excuse the Board from providing one.
Decision Under Review
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 11-MR-175; the Hon. John Schmidt, Judge, presiding.
Judgment
Vacated and remanded with directions.
Counsel on Appeal
Nicholas J. Lynn and Mark
Edward J. Green and Jonathan W. Garlough (argued), both of Foley & Lardner LLP, of Chicago, for appellees Pecatonica Pavilion, LLC, and Revere Healthcare, Ltd.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Laura M. Wunder, Assistant Attorney Genеral, of counsel), for other appellees.
Panel
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Pope and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiffs are Medina Nursing Center, Inc.; Alpine Fireside Health Center, Ltd.; Neighbors Rehabilitation Center, LLC; and Fairview Nursing Plaza, Inc.
¶ 2 Defendants are the Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review Board and its members (the Board); the Illinois Department of Public Health (Department); Pecatonica Pavilion, LLC (Pecatonica); and Revere Healthcare, Ltd. (Revere).
¶ 3 Plaintiffs brought this action for judicial review of the Board‘s decision to approve project No. 10-031, a proposal to construct a 24-bed long-term-care nursing facility in Pecatonica, Illinois. The circuit court entered judgment against plaintiffs and in defendants’ favor. Plaintiffs appeal.
¶ 4 Because judicial review is impossible without a reasoned explanation by thе Board, we vacate the circuit court‘s judgment and remand this case to the Board with directions that the Board provide, in writing, a reasoned explanation for its decision, complete with “findings and conclusions.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. An Overview of the Parties and the Controversy
¶ 7 Plaintiffs are in the business of providing long-term nursing care, and they object to the advent of а new competitor, Pecatonica. Their stated reason for objecting is that the more empty beds they have, the fewer patients they will have among whom they can spread the cost of their operations, with the consequence that their per-patient prices will have to gо up. To prevent the construction of redundant health care facilities, the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act (Planning Act) (
¶ 8 Pecatonica applied to the Board to construct a nursing care facility, and Revere prepared a study in support of the application. These two appellees, Pecatonica and Revere, have filed a brief, and we will call them “the applicants.”
B. The Public Hearing and the State Agency Report
¶ 10 Whenever someone files an application for a permit under the Planning Act, the Department—not the Board, but the Department—holds a public hearing on the application.
¶ 11 Plaintiffs attended the public hearing and presented testimony and written comments in opposition to the project. The gist of their objection was that the project failed to meet the requirements of the Planning Act in that there was no need for a new facility in the planning area, given the excess capacity of existing facilities to provide the same services the project would provide.
¶ 12 Afterward, the Department prepared a “state agency report,” in which the Department found that the project met sоme of the criteria in the Board‘s regulations but that it failed to meet other criteria. Specifically, the Department found that the project met 12 criteria: the size of the project (
C. The Board‘s Meeting of March 21, 2011
¶ 14 On March 21, 2011, the Board held a meeting, in which it considered Pecatonica‘s application, among other applications.
¶ 15 The Board members heard a short presentation by George Anderson, the
D. The Approval Letter
¶ 17 On March 24, 2011, the Board followed up with a letter to Anderson confirming its approval of the Pecatonica project. The first paragraph of the letter reads as follows:
“On March 21, 2011, the Illinois Hеalth Facilities and Services Review Board approved the application for permit for the referenced project based upon the project‘s substantial conformance with the applicable standards and criteria of Part[s] 1110 and 1120. In arriving at a decision, the State Bоard considered the findings contained in the State Agency Report, the application material, and any testimony made before the State Board.”
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 The approval letter, addressed solely to Anderson, contains no reasoned explanation. Of the standards and criteria in parts 1110 and 1120 (
¶ 20 Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with this boilerplate verbiage; they expect the Board to “provide some reasoning for its decision.” They cite, among other authorities, Reinhardt v. Board of Education of Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 61 Ill. 2d 101, 103 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
“It is clear that a decision by an аdministrative agency must contain findings to make possible a judicial review of the agency‘s decision. The Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Com. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94, 87 L. Ed. 626, 63 S. Ct. 454, [462,] (1943) described the requirement stating that ‘the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.’ ”
” ‘[A]dequately sustained’ ” grounds is another name for a reasoned opinion. An administrative decision should contain basic findings and ultimate conclusions linked together by a coherent rationale. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law § 7.29, at 458 (3d ed. 1991).
¶ 21 The Board argues, however, that “if plaintiffs were unsаtisfied with the level of detail in the Board‘s approval letter, they could have requested a ‘written decision’ from the Board as set forth in section 12(11) of the Planning Act (
“(11) Issue written decisions upon request of the applicаnt or an adversely affected party to the Board within 30 days of the meeting in which a final decision has been been made. A ‘final decision’ for purposes of this Act is the decision to approve or deny an application,
or take other actions permitted under this Act, at the time and dаte of the meeting that such action is scheduled by the Board. The staff of the State Board shall prepare a written copy of the final decision and the State Board shall approve a final copy for inclusion in the formal record.” Id.
The Board contends that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs did not utilizе this administrative avenue available to them,” i.e., requesting from the Board a “written decision,” “they should not now be heard to criticize the Board for not providing what they chose not to seek.”
¶ 22 If the Board interprets section 12(11) as depriving a party of the right to a written decision if the party does not requеst one from the Board, section 12(11) conflicts with section 11 of the Planning Act (
¶ 23 Without such written findings by the agency, we cannot comply with section 3-110 of the Administrative Review Law (
¶ 24 “[I]f the requirement of findings means anything, it must compel administrative agencies adequately to articulate the bases of their action, showing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Schwartz, supra, at 460. The grounds of the administrative decision must be ” ‘adequately sustained,’ ” that is, by a reasoned explanation. Reinhardt, 61 Ill. 2d at 103 (quoting Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94). “The necessity for administrative agencies to provide a statement of reasons *** is a fundamental principle of administrative law.” Brooks v. Atomic Energy Comm‘n, 476 F.2d 924, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Due process requires the administrative decisonmaker to “state the reasons fоr his determination.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). See Schwartz, supra, at 463 (“Our system may thus be moving toward a more general requirement for reasoned administrative decisions.“).
¶ 25 The Board cites some cases holding the boilerplate “substantial compliance” language to be sufficient for purposes of
¶ 26 We decline to supply a theoretical justification of the Board‘s decision, even at the invitation of the Board‘s attorneys. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962). In supplying such a justification, we effectively would be making factual findings and judgment calls that the Board alone should make, attributing them to the Board in a speculative way (e.g., “the Board could have found,” “the Board might have reasonably decided“). See Illinois Campaign for Political Reform v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 382 Ill. App. 3d 51, 64 (2008); Ocean Hideaway Condominium Ass‘n v. Boardwalk Plaza Venture, 515 A.2d 485, 490 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
¶ 27 The better course is to have the Board issue a reasoned opinion so as to mаke possible a meaningful judicial review. We provide reasons for our decisions, a salutary practice that not only helps the public to have confidence in what we do but also guards against arbitrariness. “Requiring articulation of the reasoning process evokes care on the part of the decider.” Schwartz, supra, at 456. Likewise, the Board should provide reasons for its decisions. Therefore, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), we vacate the circuit court‘s judgment and remand this case to the Board with directions that the Board provide, in writing, a reasoned explanation for its decision in this case, complete with “findings and conclusions.”
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit court‘s judgment and remand this case with directions.
¶ 30 Vacated and remanded with directions.