Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v. Kirkland
913 N.Y.S.2d 296
N.Y. App. Div.
2010
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In the Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. et al., Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, v GALEN D. KIRKLAND et al., Respondents, and NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

December 14, 2010

913 NYS2d 296

Proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated September 30, 2008, which adopted the recommendation and findings of an administrative law judge dated June 17, 2008, made after a hearing, finding that the complainant, Beverly Johnson, was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her sex in violation of Executive Law § 296, and awarded the complainant the sum of $80,000, plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the determination, in compensatory damages for mental anguish and humiliation, and cross petition by the New York State Division of Human Rights pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to enforce the determination.

Adjudged that the petition is granted and the cross petition is denied, with costs, the determination is annulled, and the administrative complaint is dismissed.

The complainant, a former employee of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. (hereinafter MEA), alleged that, over a period of months in 2005, her supervisor, Frank Martinez, made repeated unwelcome and abusive sexual advances towards her, and that those advances were so severe that she was forced to request a transfer to another department. She testified that Martinez constantly offered her alcohol, asked for kisses, told her that he loved her, and found ways to touch her arms, shoulders, legs, and hair. Although she repeatedly asked him to stop, she testified that “[e]very single day it was something.” She further testified that he asked her out for drinks “countless” times, called her cell phone “constantly,” and even called her at home. She indicated that she felt like a “slave” and a “hostage” and that, as a result, she eventually requested a transfer to another division. On September 18, 2006, the complainant filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the DHR).

After a hearing, and upon the recommendation and findings of an administrative law judge, the Commissioner of the DHR (hereinafter the Commissioner) found that the complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex in violation of Executive Law § 296, determined that MEA was liable pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (1) because it acquiesced in and condoned the discriminatory conduct, and found that Martinez was personally liable pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6)

Although there is evidence in the record that the complainant was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances that altered the condition of the workplace (see ), we find that the Commissioner improperly imposed liability on MEA.

Under the Executive Law, “[a]n employer cannot be held liable for an employee‘s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it” ( [internal quotation marks omitted]; see ; ). Although an employer‘s calculated inaction in response to discriminatory conduct may, as readily as affirmative conduct, indicate condonation (see ), condonation “contemplates a knowing, after-the-fact forgiveness or acceptance of an offense” (). Therefore, only after an employer knows or should have known of the improper conduct can it undertake or fail to undertake action which may be construed as condoning the improper conduct (see ; ). It is axiomatic that a complaint must allege wrongful conduct as of the date it is filed. Here, the Commissioner‘s finding was based only upon MEA‘s actions subsequent to the filing of the formal administrative complaint. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that MEA was put on notice of Martinez‘s alleged sexual harassment before the complaint with the DHR was filed (see ; ). Therefore, it was impossible for MEA to have simultaneously been put on notice of improper sexual conduct and at the same time been guilty for failing to undertake a sufficient investigation into that conduct.

The DHR‘s contention that the failure to have a policy regarding sexual harassment constitutes condonation is unpersuasive in light of the fact that condonation requires knowledge of the improper conduct. No authority suggests that merely failing to have a sexual harassment policy is substantial evidence to support a finding that the employer condoned the sexual harassment.

We also find that the Commissioner improperly imposed liability on Martinez. Martinez cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting a violation of Executive Law § 296 (1), since there was no cognizable legal basis for holding MEA liable thereunder (see ; ). Moreover, Martinez cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting his own violation of the Human Rights Law (see ; ; ; ).

The petitioners’ remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Balkin and Roman, JJ., concur.