Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. v. City of MaconMedical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. v. City of Macon
Lead Opinion
The Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. (“the Hospital”) appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Macon (“the City”) regarding the City’s obligation to pay for the treatment of 220 patients brought to the Hospital by City police officers.
In 2009, almost four years after the suit against it was filed, the City moved for summary judgment in its favor because: (1) it owed no duty under OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) because the patients at issue were not “inmates” of the City within the meaning of the statute; (2) OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) did not create a right for the Hospital to sue the City for payment for the сare of inmates; (3) the Hospital’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims failed for a variety of reasons, and (4) the Hospital neglected to provide a timely and sufficient ante litem notice for numerous patient accounts listed in its complaint, as amended.
In June 2012, nearly three years after the summary judgment motion was filed, the trial court held a hearing on it. The parties noted at the beginning of the hearing that there had been many conferences about the case and the parties intentionally suspended briefing and “let it sit since [20]09” in order “to let discovery cоntinue.” The City’s counsel stated at the beginning of the hearing that
there is an issue... in each one of these claims as to whether the person was actually in the custody of the Macon Police Department, but we’re not here about that today, Judge. So for today, I would suggest,... that we can assume that all of these people were in the custody of a Macon police officer when they arrived at the emergency room And that’s just for... purposes of today.... [I] f it were to go forward to a trial, there would be an issue in most of the claims or some of the claims as to whether these people were actually in custody. ... We’re assuming that the City has physical custody of these people when they come in. [F]or the purpose of this motion for summary judgment... the City can concede that we have these people.
Thе record shows that it is undisputed that the City “does not operate a jail or detention facility. Individuals arrested by officers of the Macon Police Department for violation of state law are delivered directly to the Sheriff of Bibb County for incarceration in the Bibb County Jail.”
Follоwing a hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order, in which it concluded that the Hospital’s claims against the City failed because OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) “imposed no duty owed by the City to the Hospital.” It also expressly provided an alternative analysis to support its grant of summary judgment to the City “[i]n the event that the above grant of summary judgment might be deemed error.” In a section of its order titled “The Hospital Failed to Meet its Burden of Proof,” the trial court stated:
Referring to the surrounding statutes, it appears that the legislature intended, at a minimum, that a person (1) be either charged or convicted of a crime, and (2) be held at a j ail or other similar, traditional detention facility. Since the plaintiff Hospital has produced no evidence as to either of these elements, this Court cannot find that any of the . . . patients were inmates. Therefore the City has carried its burden of identifying an absence of evidence in the record supporting plaintiff Hospital’s claim. The City is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Following the entry of the trial court’s order, the Hospital filed a timely notice of appeal.
In [its summary judgment] order, the Court found, inter alia, that The Medical Center had presented no evidence with respect to the following issue [ ]:
1. Whether the patients were within the physical custody of the Macon Police Department (herein “MPD”) . . . ;
Following the entry of the [summary judgment] order, . . . The Medical Center filed its Notice of Appeal. [2 ] Subsequently, on January 24, 2013, the Medical Center filed its Motion to Supplement the Record and Memorandum of Authorities in Support Thereof. [3 ] . . . After counsel for the parties conferred with each other and the Court, The Medical Center and the City are in agreement that whether the patients were in the physical custody of MPD [Macon Police Department] is a factual issue. For purposes of the City’s Motiоn for Summary Judgment only, the City conceded that the patients were in the physical custody of the MPD when the patients were treated by The Medical Center. Therefore, the issue of the physical custody of the patients was not a ground for the granting of the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment. . . . Therefоre, in summary, as a result of this Stipulation, The Medical Center is not required to supplement the record on appeal with respect to the physical custody of the patients. . . . The foregoing Stipulation is hereby made the Order of this Court.
Nine days after the entry of the stipulation, thе Hospital amended its notice of appeal to list only certain pleadings and transcripts to be included in the record on appeal.
After the docketing of this appeal, the Hospital filed a second motion to supрlement the record to include “289 deposition exhibits and five sets of discovery responses.” In its order denying this motion,
too late to add into the record evidence that was not produced to the Court during the three years in which this motion was pending, or during the three months between the еvidentiary hearing on this motion and the Court’s order. To ask the Court of Appeals to consider evidence that the Hospital would have produced if it fully appreciated its burden, and to reverse this Court’s decision based on that evidence, is to ask the Court of Appeals to exercise original jurisdiction in this case rather than sit as a court of review.
1. In related enumerations of error, the Hospital asserts that the trial court erred when it concluded that the patients at issue were not “inmates” under OCGA § 42-5-2 (a), and that this Code section did not create а duty for the City to pay for medical treatment of those in its physical custody. Nowhere in its brief on appeal, however, does the Hospital assert that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in the City’s favor on the alternative ground that the Hospital failed to submit any evidence demоnstrating that the patients at issue had been charged or convicted of a crime to qualify them as “inmates” under OCGA
2. In its remaining enumeration of error, the Hospital contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in the City’s favor, because it “completely failed to address [its] independent quasi-contract claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.” Based upon our review of the trial court’s order, we agree that it failed to consider these claims. The order discusses only the three causes of action raised in the Hospital’s original complaint, and it appears to have overlooked the additional theories of recovery raised for the first time in the Hospital’s amended complaint. While the viability of the Hospital’s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims was raised in the parties’ summary judgment briefs below, we decline to address these grounds on appeal because they were not ruled upon by the trial court. See City of Gainesville v. Dodd,
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.
Notes
While the trial court also concludеd that the City was not responsible for paying for medical examinations of sexual assault victims, the Hospital does not assert any error on appeal with regard to this portion of the trial court’s order.
In its original notice of appeal, the Hospital asked that the сlerk of the trial court “omit nothing from the record” and include all transcripts of evidence and proceedings.
The record before us does not include this motion.
The amended notice of appeal states that its purpose “is to reduce the scope of the filings to be included in the record on appeаl in light of the parties’ Stipulation and Order, which was entered on March 6, 2013, to limit by agreement the factual issues relating to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
The trial court directed the clerk of court to supplement the record to include this order and transmit it to this court.
This Code sectiоn provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be the responsibility of the governmental unit, subdivision, or agency having the physical custody of an inmate to maintain the inmate, furnishing him food, clothing, and any needed medical and hospital attention.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 42-5-2 (a). The trial court noted that this Code sеction does not define “inmate” and looked to other Code sections (OCGA §§ 42-4-50, 42-4-70, and 42-5-55) to conclude that the definition of inmate is limited “to those persons who have been at least charged with or convicted of a crime.”
We do not address the trial court’s conclusion that OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) does not create a duty for the City to pay the Hospital for the medical treatment of those in its physical custody. By its terms, OCGA § 42-5-2 (a) applies only to “inmates” in the physical custody of a governmental entity, and as explained above, the Hospital has not enumerated аs error the trial court’s finding that it failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence showing that the patients at issue qualify as “inmates” under this Code section.
We further note that the record before us is incomplete based upon the Hospital’s decision to amend its notice of appeal to list only the items to be included by the clerk based upon a stipulation and order that the trial court entered after the notice of appeal was filed. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter this order after the notice of appeal was filed. It is clear under Georgia law that “the filing of the notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas and deprives the trial court of the power to affect the judgment appealed, so that subsequent proceedings purporting to supplement, amend, alter or modify the judgment, whether pursuant to statutory or inherent power, are without effect.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lowe v. Center Neurology Assocs.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in Division 2.1 concur in the judgment in Division 1, but I do not agree with all that is said in that Division.
I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the Hospital failed to “attack” the “alternative ground” that there was no evidence that the patients “had been charged or convicted of a crime” and that they therefore could not qualify as “inmates.” As the majority acknowledges, the Hospital’s brief does enumerate as error the finding that the patients were nоt inmates. And the Hospital does argue that the fact that the patients would have been incarcerated but for their medical needs qualifies them as “inmates.” That argument, in my view, is an attack
But the Hospital does not support the factual foundation of that argument with citations tо the record. It is not our role to cull the record for the parties. Pruitt v. State,
I recognize that in its appellаte brief the City “concedes that the patients at issue in this case would have been delivered over to the Sheriff of Bibb County for incarceration but for the fact that they required medical treatment.” But the City also fails to cite to the record. And the trial court made findings to the contrary.