183 A.D.2d 86 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1992
OPINION OF THE COURT
The common law of this State has long required a husband to support his wife in conformity with his means, and to provide her with such "necessaries” as food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Under the common-law doctrine of necessaries, a husband is thus liable to third parties who furnish his wife with goods or services which fall within the scope of the rule. On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the common-law doctrine of necessaries violates the Equal Protection Clause because, while it makes a husband responsible for certain goods and services provided to his wife, it does not impose a similar obligation upon her. For the reasons which follow, we find that as traditionally formulated, the necessaries doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause, and that its unconstitutionality should be remedied by extending the common-law rule to both spouses. We further hold that it is the spouse who received the necessary goods or services who should be primarily liable for payment. A creditor seeking to recover a debt against the nondebtor spouse retains the burden of demonstrating that necessaries were furnished on the nondebtor spouse’s credit, and that the nondebtor spouse has the ability to satisfy the debt.
I
The record in the instant case is sparse, and the relevant facts can be briefly stated. The plaintiff, Medical Business Associates, Inc., is a domestic corporation which, through its agents and employees, allegedly provided medical treatment to Paul Steiner and his wife Jane over a six-year period. In March 1988 the plaintiff commenced the instant action against Paul Steiner seeking to recover the sum of $1,007.93 for medical services rendered to his wife from November 4, 1981 to September 25, 1987. Shortly after the commencement of the action, the plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to add Jane Steiner as a defendant, and to include a second cause of action demanding judgment against both defendants
One year later, by notice of motion dated September 28, 1989, the plaintiff corporation moved for summary judgment against both defendants. In a supporting affirmation, the plaintiffs attorney summarized the procedural history of the litigation, and urged the court to hold Paul and Jane Steiner both jointly and individually liable for all medical services provided to them. Although the attorney acknowledged that at common law, a wife ordinarily would not be liable for medical services provided to her husband, he contended that, in view of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and statutory amendments equalizing support responsibilities between men and women in New York, the common-law obligation to furnish necessaries should be enforced against a wife in the same manner as it is enforced against a husband. The plaintiffs attorney urged that Jane Steiner was therefore under a duty to provide reasonable necessaries, including medical care, to her husband, and could raise no viable defense to this action. In support of summary judgment, the plaintiff also submitted the affidavits of two employees which indicated that a balance of $932.93 remained due for unspecified medical services rendered to Jane Steiner, and that a balance of $5,093.38 remained due for unspecified medical services rendered to Paul Steiner.
The defendants countered by requesting that summary judgment dismissing the complaint be granted in their favor. In opposition to the plaintiffs motion and in support of their cross application, the defendants relied primarily upon a
In a decision and order dated December 29, 1989, the Supreme Court (Miller, J.) denied both the plaintiff’s motion and the defendants’ cross application for summary judgment, but held that the necessaries doctrine should be expanded to impose liability upon wives for necessaries furnished to their husbands. In reaching its determination, the Supreme Court relied primarily upon the reasoning of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v Frey (152 AD2d 73), which held that imposing a reciprocal duty upon each spouse to furnish the other with necessaries comported with the modern view that marriage is an economic partnership and was consistent with the policy underlying this State’s gender-neutral support laws. The Supreme Court concluded that "so long as the necessaries doctrine exists, it must be extended to require reciprocal obligations of wives. It is only logical that the partnership be called upon to reimburse those third parties who have provided necessary services to one of the spouses”. The court noted, however, that a trial was still required because the plaintiff had failed to submit proof concerning the nature and value of the services claimed, and because application of the necessaries doctrine requires proof that the services rendered to each spouse were furnished in reliance on the credit of the other spouse, as well as proof as to each spouse’s financial status and ability to pay the bill for the other, if required.
On appeal from the denial of their cross application for summary judgment, Paul and Jane Steiner continue to maintain that the common-law doctrine of necessaries should be abolished because it is unconstitutional, and that neither the husband nor the wife should be held liable for medical expenses incurred by the other spouse. The plaintiff corporation agrees that the necessaries doctrine in its historical form is unconstitutional, but contends that the unconstitutionality of the common-law rule should be remedied by expanding it to
II
At early common law, a husband and wife were regarded as one legal entity, and a married woman had no right to own property or to control her financial affairs (see, Bennett v Bennett, 116 NY 584, 591; North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v Harris, 319 NC 347, 354 SE2d 471; Condore v Prince George’s County, 289 Md 516, 425 A2d 1011, 1013; Hulse v Warren, 777 SW2d 319, 321 [Mo]). Since the married woman was considered legally incapable of owning property and incurring debts independent of her husband, the common law recognized that the husband had a duty to support his wife and to provide for her necessary expenses (see, Cromwell v Benjamin, 41 Barb 558; Garlock v Garlock, 279 NY 337; North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v Harris, supra). In return for her husband’s support, the wife had a corresponding duty to provide domestic services for the comfort, care, and well being of her family, and consortium to her husband (see, North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v Harris, supra; Hulse v Warren, supra; Schilling v Bedford County Mem. Hosp., 225 Va 539, 303 SE2d 905). A corollary of the husband’s obligation of support was the common-law doctrine of necessaries, which imposed liability on the husband to third parties who provided essential goods and services, including medical care and treatment, to his wife and children (see, Cromwell v Benjamin, supra; Matter of Burt, 254 App Div 584; Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v Frey, supra; see generally, 47 NY Jur 2d, Domestic Relations, § 662). Because the basis of liability for expenses incurred by the wife was the husband’s presumed failure to provide adequate support (see, Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v Estate of Baum, 84 NJ 137, 417 A2d 1003, 1005), the necessaries doctrine served, in the words of one commentator, as a "protective remedy for the hapless wife and children facing economic abandonment by the husband” (Williams, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Application as a Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L Rev 661 [1990]).
Although this allocation of marital rights and responsibilities developed during a period in history when married women were under legal disabilities which prevented them from managing their own financial affairs, the enactment across the Nation of "Married Women’s Acts” which empow
Ill
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the common-law necessaries doctrine retained its vitality into the twentieth century based upon the concept of the wife as the dependent spouse and caretaker of the family, and the husband as sole wage earner. It has been widely recognized, however, that the traditional common-law rule, whereby the husband was solely responsible for his family’s necessities, is "an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society” (Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v Estate of Baum, supra, 84 NJ 137, 147, 417 A2d 1003, 1008; Smith v Hernandez, 794 P2d 772, 773 [Okla]). In modern America, "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas” (Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7, 14-15). Thus, in Orr v Orr (440 US 268, 279-280), the Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection grounds,
IV
Having concluded that the necessaries rule does not accord with the Equal Protection Clause, we turn next to the issue of whether the doctrine should be abolished in its entirety, as the defendants urge, or whether the doctrine should be expanded by applying it equally to husbands and wives, as the plaintiff contends. Abrogation of the doctrine was the remedy chosen by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Condore v Prince George’s County (289 Md 516, 425 A2d 1011, supra). In Condore, Prince George’s County sued a widow to recover the unpaid portion of her late husband’s hospital bill. Although the Condore court acknowledged that expansion of the necessaries doctrine to impose liability upon wives would satisfy the
However, in most jurisdictions where the constitutionality of the necessaries doctrine has been considered, the courts have determined that it should be expanded to apply both to husbands and wives. In the leading case of Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v Estate of Baum (84 NJ 137, 151, 417 A2d 1003, 1010, supra), the Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that since " 'marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways * * * is akin to a partnership’ ”, both spouses should be liable for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse. In reaching its decision to expand the necessaries doctrine to achieve "the mutual sharing of * * * obligations by husbands and wives”, the court observed that "[i]n a viable marriage, the marital partners
More recently, in Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v Frey (152 AD2d 73, supra), the Appellate Division, Third Department, adopted Judge Hancock’s view that the necessaries doctrine should be expanded to impose a reciprocal duty on both spouses. In reaching its decision, the court stressed that "great changes have been made in the status of the married woman” since the formation of the doctrine, and that expansion would comport with New York’s gender-neutral support laws (Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v Frey, supra, at 75). We agree with the Third Department that the necessaries rule should be extended to impose a reciprocal duty upon the married couple for the necessary expenses incurred by either spouse. The necessaries doctrine originally evolved as a safeguard to ensure that the essential needs of a dependent wife and children were provided for, and at the heart of this common-law rule "is a concern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the individual members thereof’ (Sharpe Furniture v Buckstaff, 99 Wis 2d 114, 117, 299 NW2d
V
Although jurisdictions throughout the country have modified the necessaries doctrine to apply equally to both spouses, we are mindful that expansion of the common-law rule has been criticized because such an approach renders the husband and wife jointly and severally liable for the necessary expenses of either spouse. This joint and several approach to extending the doctrine of necessaries has been termed "equality with a vengeance” because it results in the exposure of the property of one spouse for a debt incurred by the other spouse, thereby affording a creditor the same benefits as if both spouses had agreed to liability (see, Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v Estate of Baum, supra, at 149, at 1009; Condore v Prince George’s County, supra, at 529, at 1017). Moreover, as one commentator has observed, "[t]his approach takes into account neither which spouse incurred the debt nor the financial resources of each spouse. The creditor can proceed directly against the nondebtor spouse, regardless of that spouse’s financial situation * * * Because the joint and several approach does not consider whether one spouse needs support from the other, the doctrine of necessaries has been reduced to nothing more than a creditor’s remedy” (Moxley, North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v Harris: North Carolina Adopts a Gender-Neutral Approach to the Doctrine of Necessaries, 66 NC L Rev 1241, 1250-1251 [1988]).
Consequently, in several of the jurisdictions which have
Before concluding our discussion, we emphasize that liability under the doctrine of necessaries has never been automatic, and that our extension of the rule to wives should not be construed as an elimination of the traditional restrictions on a spouse’s liability which existed at common law. Accordingly, as the Appellate Division, Third Department, pointed out in Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v Frey (supra) a creditor seeking to recover for necessaries retains the burden
Mangano, P. J., Harwood and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
. Although the court granted the plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint, it noted that all claims for services provided more than six years prior to the commencement of the action were time barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations.
. In 1983, the Supreme Court of Virginia also concluded that the necessaries doctrine was unconstitutional and should be abolished (see, Schilling v Bedford County Mem. Hosp., 225 Va 539, 303 SE2d 905, supra). Although the Schilling court acknowledged that courts in other jurisdictions had adopted the view that the necessaries doctrine should be extended to include wives rather than abolished, the court concluded that "this task, if advisable, is better left to the General Assembly” (Schilling v Bedford County Mem. Hosp., 225 Va 539, 544, 303 SE2d 905, 908, supra). In response to the Schilling decision, the General Assembly subsequently amended Virginia Code Annotated § 55-37 to expressly provide that "[t]he doctrine of necessaries as it existed at common law shall apply equally to both spouses”. Other States, including Connecticut and Illinois, have addressed the issue by enacting statutes which make both spouses jointly liable for family expenses, including reasonable and necessary medical care (see, Conn Gen Stat § 46b-37; Ill Ann Stat, ch 40, ¶ 1015).
. Florida, unlike all the other States which have addressed the constitutionality of the necessaries doctrine, has opted to retain the common-law rule unmodified. In Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics v Smith (497 So 2d 644), the Florida Supreme Court rejected the petitioner hospital’s argument that a wife was responsible for medical services provided to her husband before his death, deferring modification of the common-law doctrine to the Legislature. While the Shands court agreed that it was an anachronism to hold the husband responsible for necessaries of the wife without imposing a reciprocal duty upon her, it concluded that the petitioner hospital had no standing to make an equal protection argument regarding the husband’s unilateral duty of support under the common law. The court thus did not reach the issue of whether the common-law doctrine violated constitutional mandates. Although, as previously noted, several other States have similarly concluded that expansion of the necessaries doctrine is a question best left to the Legislature, only Florida has retained the common-law rule as historically formulated pending legislative review (see, Williams, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Application as a Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L Rev 661, 666).