RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
I
Blue Cross is a Connecticut nonprofit, nonstock corporation which, among other things, offers various service benefit contracts to its subscribers. Since 1967 Blue Cross has maintained a prescription drug program under which subscribers can obtain prescription drugs from licensed pharmacies at little or no cost to the subscriber other than the premium payment.
The prescription drug program operates through the use of two distinct types of contracts. The first contract, between Blue Cross and its individual subscribers (the “subscriber contract”), determines the level of benefits for each insured. The second contract, entitled the “Prepaid Prescription Drug Agreement by and between Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc. and Participating Pharmacy” (the “pharmacy agreement”), sets forth the terms under which a participating pharmacy will provide prescription drugs to Blue Cross’ subscribers.
Under the subscriber contract, a subscriber may obtain prescription drugs from either a participating or nonparticipating pharmacy. If the subscriber selects the former, he will receive the needed drug with no out-of-pocket expense, or in a minority of subscriber contracts, at a fee of $.75 (the “co-pay” amount). Blue Cross then reimburses the pharmacy at the rate set in the pharmacy agreement. If, on the other hand, the subscriber selects a nonparticipating pharmacy, he is required to pay the full price charged by the pharmacy. The subscriber may then obtain reimbursement from Blue Cross, although the amount of reimbursement cannot exceed the amount Blue Cross would reimburse a participating pharmacy under the pharmacy agreement. 1 From 1975 through 1979 approximately 9% of Connecticut’s population was eligible for Blue Cross prescription drug benefits. Blue Cross estimates that it accounted for approximately 9% of the prescription drug sales in Connecticut over that same period.
Under the pharmacy agreement, a participating pharmacy agrees to furnish prescription drugs to Blue Cross subscribers at no cost or at $.75 if the co-pay is applicable, and Blue Cross agrees to reimburse the pharmacy at the rates set in the pharmacy agreement. Blue Cross instituted this contract unilaterally and offered all pharmacies in Connecticut the opportunity to participate; currently all but two participate.
Prior to September 1, 1977, Blue Cross reimbursed participating pharmacies by paying them their “actual acquisition cost” (“AAC”) of each drug dispensed to a Blue Cross subscriber plus a professional fee to provide for their overhead and profit. Blue Cross relied on a pharmacy’s supply invoices to validate its AAC. This reimbursement method caused difficulties because Blue Cross found that it could not accurately verify a pharmacy’s AAC. Although the pharmacy agreement obligated pharmacies to pass on to Blue Cross the various discounts they received from their wholesalers and manufacturers when purchasing drugs, *1104 many pharmacies apparently did not. Often, a pharmacy’s invoices from its suppliers did not reflect discounts, free goods, or rebates. Consequently, the appropriate reductions to the pharmacy’s AAC could not be discovered readily in an audit.
In September, 1977, Blue Cross switched to the “maximum billable amount” (“MBA”) method of reimbursement. This method differed from the prior AAC method in that Blue Cross determined ceiling amounts for the drug element of its reimbursement rates. That is, Blue Cross placed a limit on how much it was willing to pay for any given drug. The MBA concept was designed to produce payments to pharmacies approximately equivalent to an average pharmacy’s AAC, and at the same time presumably reduce Blue Cross’ underwriting and administrative burdens. 2 Blue Cross continued to pay participating pharmacies a set professional fee to provide for overhead and profit. 3
The MBA reimbursement levels are established in one of two ways: the most frequently dispensed drugs that may be purchased directly from manufacturers are reimbursed according to Blue-Cross formulated lists; 4 all other drugs are reimbursed according to “Red Book” average wholesale price (“AWP”) rates. 5
II
Plaintiff Medical Arts Pharmacy filed this action in March, 1979, less than one week after the Supreme Court’s decision in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra. The complaint charges that the pharmacy agreements are an illegal price-fixing arrangement within the proscriptions of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. It also alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-110a et seq.
Shortly after commencement of the suit, Medical Arts Pharmacy moved for class certification. After limited class-related discovery and thorough briefing, this court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3), certified a class comprising licensed pharmacies in the State of Connecticut, who had, on or before June 30, 1980, entered into a pharmacy agreement with Blue Cross.
The action is presently before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The gist of plaintiffs’ motion is that the pharmacy agreements fix prices for prescription drugs, and, as such, are per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendant quite naturally denies that the pharmacy agreements are a per se section 1 violation and, through its cross-motion, asserts that even under a rule of reason analysis the agreements do not violate the antitrust laws. 6
*1105 III
Before proceeding directly to a discussion of the legal claims raised by these motions, it should be noted that the same issues raised here were recently considered by District Judge Peckham in
Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of California,
[1980-81]
Sausalito I & II
involved a section 1 challenge by a group of participating pharmacies against a number of insurance companies and plan administrators who underwrite and administer prescription drug plans substantially similar to the one at issue here. In
Sausalito I,
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, arguing that the pharmacy agreements were
per se
illegal under the Sherman Act. The court denied the motion, principally on the ground that the pharmacy agreements were “arrangements for the purchase of goods and services” and, hence, did not constitute a form of “price-fixing” that was
per se
unlawful.
Sausalito I
at 77,724
quoting Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra,
In Sausalito II, defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that even under a rule of reason analysis there was no basis for antitrust liability. The court agreed and granted the motion, holding that while a variety of approaches could be taken in analyzing the pharmacy agreements under the rule of reason, “[n]o matter which [is taken] . . . the conclusion that the agreements do not violate the rule of reason is inescapable.” Sausalito II at 75,-607. 7 This court concurs generally with Judge Peckham’s rulings in Sausalito I & II. However, in the absence of precedent in this district and circuit, the court believes it important to issue its own opinion as to the matters raised herein.
IV
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. A section 1 plaintiff must establish both elements: first, that defendant entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy; and second, that such was in restraint of trade.
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
Blue Cross’ initial argument that plaintiffs have failed to show a contract, combination, or conspiracy need not long detain the court. Its somewhat disingenuous attempt to characterize the pharmacy agreements as unilateral activity cannot survive even the most superficial analysis. While it may be true that Blue Cross made a unilateral offer about which it refused to bargain, it is undisputed that Blue Cross and each of the plaintiffs have entered into a bilateral contract which establishes the requisite section 1 joint action. The question, therefore, is not whether there is a contract within the purview of section 1, but whether that contract restrains trade.
Although the Sherman Act speaks of restraint of trade in absolute terms, it has long been established that section 1 proscribes only unreasonable restraints.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
It is well-established that certain types of agreements to fix prices are unlawful
per se. See, e. g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,
Plaintiffs contend that the pharmacy agreements are a form of horizontal price-fixing and, hence, per se unlawful. This characterization completely ignores the relationship of the parties. Blue Cross is neither a seller in competition with retail pharmacies, nor a manufacturer or wholesaler in competition with suppliers of pharmaceuticals. Rather, as discussed at length in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra, Blue Cross buys prescription drug products for their insureds. There has been no showing, indeed, no claim, that Blue Cross has conspired with other third-party payors who offer comparable prescription drug plans. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Blue Cross has somehow facilitated an unlawful horizontal conspiracy among participating pharmacies is similarly unpersuasive. The question, for purposes of a horizontal analysis, is whether Blue Cross has conspired with its competitors to restrain trade. The answer is that it clearly has not.
Plaintiffs assert alternatively that the agreements are
per se
illegal as a form of maximum resale price maintenance.
See Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
Other than their attempts to characterize the pharmacy agreements as horizontal price-fixing or as a form of maximum resale price maintenance, plaintiffs do not seriously contend that these agreements fall within any of the traditionally recognized per se categories. Rather, plaintiffs proceed on a far more literal tack and baldly assert that because the pharmacy agreements have an impact on price, they are necessarily unlawful per se. As has already been noted, however, this view misapprehends the proper scope of the per se rule. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra. Invocation of the per se rule is justified only when a court concludes that the restraint is “plainly anticompetitive” and lacking “any redeeming virtue.” This court is not prepared to so find on the record now before it.
The court’s conclusion that the pharmacy agreements are not
per se
unlawful is fortified by the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated admonition that “[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as
per se
violations. . . . ”
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra,
The court now considers the pharmacy agreements under the rule of reason. “Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra,
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that Blue Cross, through the pharmacy agreements, pays participating pharmacies less than cash and carry customers (i. e., nonsubscribers). 9 This, they claim, deprives them of their “normal and reasonable” profit margins. The same theme pervades the motion papers. The complaint does not set forth any specific claims of impact on competition, an essential element of a section 1 claim under a rule of reason analysis. For example, no claim has been made, or even suggested, that the prices Blue Cross pays to participating pharmacies affect prices in any other transaction. That is, there is no claim that the pharmacy agreements affect the prices participating pharmacies charge for prescription drugs provided to non-Blue Cross customers, or the price nonparticipating pharmacies charge to anyone. Similarly, there is no claim that the reimbursement rates set in the agreements affect the prices charged by pharmacies for their non-drug merchandise.
Plaintiffs have pleaded impact on competition only in the most conclusory terms. The sole allegation is that the pharmacy agreements have “fix[ed] the retail price of and, established] a market-wide fee schedule for” prescription drugs, and that those prices are “unremunerative.” While these allegations may satisfy the liberal pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, they are not sufficient standing alone to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment. In opposing summary judgment, a plaintiff may not rest on its pleadings, but must submit some probative evidence in support of its complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co.,
Plaintiffs do oppose defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but merely by stating that there are “substantial questions of fact.” None of these questions of
*1109
“fact” are material to defendant’s motion. First, plaintiffs contend that defendant is not a “purchaser.” This is not a question of fact; it is a question of law for the court. This court specifically finds that defendant is a purchaser.
See Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra,
The Supreme Court has counselled that summary judgment in antitrust litigation should be used sparingly.
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
Unquestionably Blue Cross has established itself as a strong force in the prescription drug market in Connecticut and elsewhere. It cannot, however, be penalized for using its position in the market, as it has here, to “get the best deal possible” for its subscribers absent some showing of anticompetitive conduct.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, supra,
at 84. Here, there is no substantial claim that the pharmacy agreements have any adverse impact on competitive conditions. To the contrary, the only substantial claim is that plaintiffs themselves have been restrained in the amount of reimbursement they receive for dispensing prescription drugs to Blue Cross subscribers. “The failure to make more money, however, is simply not the kind of problem which the antitrust laws address.”
Sausalito II
at 75,608. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims, even if proved, do not state a claim for relief under the antitrust laws. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the well-established principle that “the antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of
competition
not
competitors.
. . .”
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
*1110 V
Count two of the complaint alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 42-110a
et seq.
Jurisdiction for those claims arises solely because they are pendent to the federal antitrust claims. Having granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to count one of the complaint, the court hereby dismisses count two because plaintiffs have made no showing of exceptional circumstances which would warrant the court exercising its pendent jurisdiction.
See Kavit v. A. L. Stamm & Co.,
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied, defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to count one of the complaint, and count two of the complaint is dismissed.
It is So Ordered.
Notes
. Since June 1, 1980, the subscriber contract has specified that all payments for purchases from nonparticipating pharmacies would be at 100% of the reimbursement level to participating pharmacies. Prior to that date, the reimbursement level had been set at 80%. That differential arose for two reasons. First, when it initiated the program in 1967, Blue Cross could not precisely determine the actuarial cost of the new program nor the actual number of participating pharmacies. To limit its underwriting risk, it set the 80% figure, a standard insurance company practice. Second, the figure acted as an incentive to pharmacies to participate.
. Under this plan, participating pharmacies are entitled to receive the MBA even where that amount exceeds a pharmacy’s AAC. Blue Cross contends, however, and plaintiffs do not contest this point, that there is still substantial variability in the prices charged to Blue Cross by participating pharmacies. For example, affidavits submitted by Blue Cross indicate that plaintiff Medical Arts Pharmacy billed approximately 20% of its prescriptions for the period 1977 -79 at prices lower than the MBA.
. Since September 1, 1980 the professional fee has been $3.05. In establishing this fee, Blue Cross considers such factors as pharmaceutical industry data, professional fees paid under similar third-party plans, and other general economic indicators.
. Blue Cross issues three separate price lists which are appended to the pharmacy agreement. These appendix prices are based on the cost of the drug as though purchased directly from the manufacturer. Blue Cross issues separate appendices to account for the difference in the purchasing power among large, intermediate-size, and smaller pharmacies. Monthly, Blue Cross adjusts the price it will pay for drugs listed on one or more of the appendices based on changes in the prices manufacturers charge for the drugs.
. The Red Book is a trade journal published semiannually by Medical Economics Co. It contains average wholesale and/or wholesale prices for all drugs. These published AWP prices are based on the price a wholesaler charges to pharmacies. This price may go up or down as often as twice monthly. Blue Cross monitors the change through a trade magazine supplement to the Red Book called Drug Topics.
. Blue Cross also maintains that its activities are insulated from antitrust scrutiny by the “state action” doctrine first enunciated in
Parker v. Brown,
. Plaintiffs’ assertion that reimbursement in Sausalito I & II was based on AAC rather than AWP is clearly contradicted by Judge Peck-ham’s statement that the reimbursement level for the drug component “is determined by reference to average wholesale prices.” Sausalito I at 77,723; Sausalito II at 75,605.
. The
Albrecht
and
Kiefer-Stewart
holdings have been widely criticized and their continued vitality is in question.
See
Kallstrom,
Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act,
1978 Duke L.J. 645, 665-68;
cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
. To the extent plaintiffs’ complaint can be read to allege coercion, that claim was specifically disavowed by plaintiffs during the pend-ency of the class certification motion. In any event, there is a significant question in the court’s mind whether a claim of coercion can stand on the facts of this case.
Cf. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania,
Similarly, plaintiffs’ conclusory claim of a “buyer conspiracy,”
see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
[1980-2]
. Although the court does not reach the substantive issue of whether in fact the pharmacy agreements would survive a rule of reason analysis or even if such a conclusion is possible on summary judgment, it notes that other courts have considered provider agreements similar to the one
sub judice
and reached such a conclusion.
See, e. g., Webster County Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. United Mine Workers,
Similarly, on several occasions, the Justice Department has reviewed prescription drug plans substantially similar to the one at issue here and each time concluded that they did not pose antitrust problems. See Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee *1110 Schedules and the Sherman Act, supra, at 672-73. In its amicus curiae brief in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., the Justice Department stated the following:
As a general matter . . . antitrust principles would not preclude the offering of prepaid health insurance programs that use insurer-provider agreements. For example, the pleadings in this case indicate that the Pharmacy Agreements are bilateral contracts for the purchase of goods and services by Blue Shield. Blue Shield has offered to purchase drugs and pharmacy services from any pharmacy that will accept acquisition cost plus $2.00. Unless respondents could establish that some conspiracy among pharmacies is at work the Pharmacy Agreements would not amount to “price fixing.” Transactions at a set price, through a series of voluntary bilateral contracts, are not price fixing even though large numbers of sellers of services may be involved.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 10-11 (citations omitted), Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., supra.
