242 Conn. 152 | Conn. | 1997
Opinion
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that the
The relevant, undisputed facts are as follows. Pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-178,
The department then held a public hearing on the application, at which the plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson submitted requests to be afforded party status in the proceedings because Access’ proposed services “would be in direct competition with those services provided by [them].” The hearing officer denied the requests for party status, but did grant both the plaintiff and Dan-bury-Nelson intervenor status. After hearings at which the plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson participated, the department granted Access’ application.
The plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson appealed from that decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 19a-180 (c) and 4-183 (a).
The trial court found that the interests of the plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson in the department’s decision derive solely from the fact that they are existing ambulance companies in the area where Access would be operating. The court found, therefore, that “[t]he injury that [the plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson] would suffer as a result of the decision would be to their business interests — their profits would suffer because of increased competition for nonemergency ambulance business in the area.” The court concluded that, because § 19a-180 (a) requires the department, in reviewing an application, to determine only the public necessity for such services, and does not require the department to consider the effects on competition, the interests of the plaintiff and Danbury-Nelson were not at stake in the
An appeal from an administrative decision of the department is governed by § 19a-180 (c) and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189. Section 19a-180 (c) provides: “Any person or emergency medical service organization aggrieved by an act or decision of the Office of Emergency Medical Services regarding certification or licensure may appeal in the manner provided by [the UAPA].”
“Pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal. Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 65, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved. Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 729,573 A.2d 736 (1990); Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). . . . Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168, 172, 592 A.2d 386 (1991).
“The test for aggrievement long recognized by this court is set forth in our decision in State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 524 A.2d 636 (1987). There we stated that [t]he fundamental test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest, such
The second prong of the aggrievement test requires the plaintiff to “demonstrate that its asserted interest has been specially and injuriously affected in a way that is cognizable by law. See State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, supra, 203 Conn. 300-301.” United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept, of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 343. “[I]n considering whether a plaintiffs interest has been injuriously affected by [an administrative decision], we have looked to whether ‘the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [its] complaint.’ . . . Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 523, 111 S. Ct. 913, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1125 (1991), citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 883, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L.
“Standing concerns the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. [Assn., of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970)]; Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139, 285 A.2d 318 (1971); Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981). . . . State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 113, 445 A.2d 304 (1982); Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, supra, 175 Conn. 483; see New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 126, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993) (applying zone of interests analysis); State v. Pierson, 208 Conn. 683, 687, 546 A.2d 268 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016, 109 S. Ct. 1131, 103 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1989) (standing merely requires the party to make allegations of a colorable claim of injury to an interest which is arguably protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee); see also New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 702, 345 A.2d 563 (1974) ([i]t is now settled that standing to maintain an action in the federal courts requires proof of injury in fact to an interest within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the federal statute in question).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 345.
The plaintiff claims that it is aggrieved by the department’s decision to grant Access a license to provide ambulance services in violation of § 19a-180 (a) because the competition that results from the decision diminishes the value of the plaintiffs previously exclusive
In this case, the trial court, after reviewing those two cases, concluded that, because § 19a-180 (a) does not require the department to consider the effect on existing
In Light Rigging Co., we considered “General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 16-286 [which required] the [department of public utility control] to consider ‘the existing motor transportation facilities and the effect upon them of granting such certificate, [and] the public need for the service the applicant proposes to render’ when determining whether to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity.” (Emphasis added.) Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 219 Conn. 176. In Light Rigging Co., the plaintiff trucking companies had standing, not because the department of public utility control was required to consider the public need for the proposed services, but, rather, because their competitive interests were protected by the statute. Id., 177.
In United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 346, we concluded that § 16-331 (b), (d) and (h) “are meant to protect the public at large and not the interests of individual competitors.” “[T]he legislature has demon
Section 19a-180 (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate any ambulance service, rescue service or management service without either a license or a certificate issued by the Office of Emergency Medical Services. ... A certificate shall be issued to any volunteer or municipal ambulance service which shows proof satisfactory to the commissioner that it meets the minimum standards of the commissioner in the areas of training, equipment and personnel. . . . Upon determination by the Office of Emergency Medical Services that an applicant is financially responsible, properly certified and otherwise qualified to operate a commercial ambulance service, the Office of Emergency Medical Services shall issue a license effective for one year to such applicant. . . .” Section 19a-180, by its language, requires the department to issue a license to a qualified applicant without consideration of the effects on competition. We conclude that § 19a-180 requires the department primarily “to protect the public at large and not the interests of individual competitors”; United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 346; in its decisions whether to grant licenses and certificates.
In Light Rigging Co., we did find a legislative intent to protect the existing competitive position of truckers carrying goods. In United Cable Television Services Corp., we found no such intent for cable television companies providing programming to the community at large. In this case, concerning the transportation of patients requiring ambulance services, sometimes in emergency and life-threatening circumstances, it is very clear that the legislature did not intend to protect the competitive advantage or monopoly of an existing service provider, but, rather, the legislature sought to protect the welfare of those in the community in need of those services.
The plaintiff further argues that other language in § 19a-180 (a) indicates that the legislature intended for
The plaintiff points out that § 19a-180-7 (d)
The plaintiff also argues that § 19a-180 (c) expressly authorizes it to appeal from the department’s decision because that section provides that an “emergency medical service organization” may appeal. This argument is unavailing. Following the plaintiffs logic would remove the requirement that emergency medical organizations must be aggrieved by a decision of the department.
The plaintiff further contends that not allowing it to appeal would leave every decision of the department to grant new certificates and licenses free from judicial review and that the legislature could not have intended such a result. The legislature, however, entrusted the department with the role of establishing and maintaining a system of ambulance services to serve a vital and supremely important public need. Our decision does not conflict with the goals of the legislature.
We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The named plaintiff was formerly known as Ace Ambulance Service, Inc.
The department of public health and addiction services was replaced by the department of public health on July 1, 1995. Public Acts 1995, No. 95-257, §§ 12, 21, 58.
Although the named plaintiff was joined in its appeal to the Superior Court by Danbury-Nelson, it prosecutes this appeal alone. We will, therefore, refer to the named plaintiff as the plaintiff throughout this opinion.
General Statutes § 19a-178 provides: “There shall be established within the Department of Public Health an Office of Emergency Medical Services. The office shall be responsible for (a) the licensure or certification of the following: (1) Ambulance operations, ambulance drivers, emergency medical technicians, and communications personnel; (2) emergency room facilities and communications facilities and (3) transportation equipment, including land, sea and air vehicles used for transportation of patients to emergency facilities; (b) periodic inspections of life saving equipment, of emergency facilities and of emergency transportation vehicles to insure that state standards are maintained; and (c) perform such other duties and functions as are assigned to said office by the Commissioner of Public Health.” Because
General Statutes § 19a-180 (a) provides: “No person shall operate any ambulance service, rescue service or management service without either a license or a certificate issued by the Office of Emergency Medical Services. No person shall operate a commercial ambulance or commercial rescue service or a management service without a license issued by the Office of Emergency Medical Services. A certificate shall be issued to any volunteer or municipal ambulance service which shows proof satisfactory to the commissioner lhat it meets the minimum standards of the commissioner in the areas of training, equipment and personnel. Applicants for a license shall use the forms prescribed by the Office of Emergency Medical Services and shall submit such application to the Office of Emergency Medical Services accompanied by an annual fee of one hundred dollars. In considering requests for approval of permits for new or expanded emergency medical services in any region, the Office of Emergency Medical Services shall consult with the emergency medical services council of such region and shall hold a public hearing to determine the necessity for such services. Written notice of such hearing shall be given to current providers in the geographic region where such new or expanded services would be implemented, provided that any volunteer ambulance service which elects not to levy charges for services rendered under this chapter shall be exempt from the provisions concerning requests for approval of permits for new or expanded emergency medical services, set forth above. Each applicant for licensure shall furnish proof of financial responsibility which the office deems sufficient to satisfy any claim. The Commissioner of Public Health shall establish by regulation satisfactory kinds of coverage and limits of insurance for each applicant for either licensure or certification, provided until such time as such regulations are promulgated the following shall be the required limits for licensure: (1) For damages by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, one person on account of any accident, at least five hundred thousand dollars, and more than one person on account of any accident, at least one million dollars, (2) for damage to property at least fifty thousand dollars and (3) for malpractice in the care of one passenger at least two hundred fifty thousand dollars, and for more than one passenger at least five hundred thousand dollars. In lieu of Ihe foregoing, a single limit of liability shall be allowed as follows: (A) For damages by reason of personal
General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides: “A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the filing of such an appeal.”
At oral argument, the plaintiffs counsel stated that the only other service in the area was Danbury-Nelson.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 16-286 provides: “In determining whether or not such a certificate shall be granted, the department of public utility control shall take into consideration the existing motor transportation facilities and the effect upon them of granting such certificate, the public need for the service the applicant proposes to render, the suitability of the applicant, or the suitability of the management if the applicant is a corpora-lion, the financial responsibility of the applicant, the ability of the applicant efficiently to perform the service for which authority is requested, the condition of and effect upon the highways involved and the safety of the public using such highways. The department shall take into consideration such recommendations as to motor transportation facilities, or highways, or the effect of granting such certificate upon either of them, or the safety of the public using such highways, as the commissioner of transportation may submit to it in writing within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing thereon. No such certificate shall be denied solely on the ground that there is an existing rail or motor service. When it appears that no motor common carrier service is being supplied over the route or routes applied for, public convenience and necessity shall be presumed to require operation of such service.”
General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 16-331 provides in relevant part: “(b) In determining whether a new certificate shall be issued or an existing certificate transferred, the department of public utility control shall only take into consideration the suitability of the applicant or, if the applicant
“(d) (1) An initial certificate issued prior to June 1, 1988, shall grant a franchise for fifteen years, provided that for certificates issued prior to January 1, 1975, the initial franchise term shall be deemed to end for four such companies each year, starting in 1989, in order of those companies having the highest gross revenues under chapter 211 or 212a during the calendar year ending December 31, 1982. An initial, renewal or transfer certificate issued on or after June 1, 1988, shall grant a franchise for a term of not less than five years and not more than ten years, except that under special circumstances, as described in subdivision (2), a franchise may be granted for a term of more than ten years but not more than fifteen years. The department shall have the discretion to determine the appropriate length of a franchise term, initial, renewal or transfer, and in making its decision shall consider the following without limitation: (A) The operator’s past performance in terms of meeting the needs of the cable-related community; (B) the operator’s past performance in terms of complying with the material terms of the existing franchise; (C) the operator’s compliance with department regulations and the general statutes; (D) the ability of the operator’s management to properly operate the franchise; (E) the operator’s effectiveness in dealing with consumer requests, complaints and billing questions or disputes; (F) the operator’s effectiveness in dealing with the advisory council; (G) the quality and diversity of the operator’s programming; (H) the quality of the operator’s community access programming, including
“(2) Under special circumstances, the department in its discretion, may issue, renew or transfer a franchise for a term of not more than fifteen years if the franchisee has committed itself, as outlined in the franchise agreement, to provide or maintain technologically advanced equipment, facilities and systems, as determined by the department, to enhance and promote technologically advanced educational programming, including the programming specified in subsection (b) of section 10-4e, and to comply with specific quality of service standards, including, but not limited to, the time between installation and repair following a subscriber request, the response time to consumer complaints and the quality of the operator’s customer service policies and practices.
“(h) Each applicant for a certificate shall finance the reasonable costs of a community needs assessment, conducted by an independent consultant and developed jointly by the department, the Office of Consumer Counsel, the local advisory council and the applicant, which assessment shall analyze a community’s future cable-related needs and, if applicable, shall provide the department with assistance in analyzing an operator’s past performance as defined in subsection (d) of section 16-3332. The department shall supervise the assessment and provide the independent consultant with the date upon which the assessment, shall be completed and filed with the depart ment. Such community needs assessment shall be conducted in lieu of the requirement in subdivision (12) of subsection (c) of section 16-333-39 of the regulations of Connecticut state agencies. . . .’’
General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 16-331 (i) provides: “Each certificate of public convenience and necessity for a franchise issued pursuant to this
The cable television company, however, did allege a legally protected interest under § 16-331 (i), which prohibits more favorable terms for new competitors. United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 355.
Section 19a-180-7 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: "In determining whether a need for a new or expanded emergency
“(a) The population to be served by the proposed service;
“(b) The geographic area to be served by the proposed service;
“(c) The volume of calls for the previous 12 months within such areas;
“(d) The impact of the proposed service on existing services in the area;
“(e) The potential improvement in service in the area including cost effectiveness and response times;
“(f) The location of the proposed principal and branch places of business in relation to health facilities and other providers;
“(g) The need for special services, if applicable; and
“(h) The recommendation of the any applicable regional council.”