ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, CORP., Plaintiff, v. OSVALDO OSCAR FRIGER SALGUEIRO, Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 19-1690 (DRD)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
March 29, 2021
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Osvaldo Oscar Friger Salgueiro, and Friger Entertainment, Inc.‘s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket No. 22) Pursuant to
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket No. 22) Pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The instant suit arises out of an alleged infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, against the Defendants. See
Mr. Osvaldo Friger had a contractual relationship with AIC from November 2010 until October 2017. See Docket No. 23 at 5. The relationship consisted on Mr. Friger‘s “participa[tion] on various automotive review capsules of the already existing program ’Mech Tech Racing.’ ” Docket No. 22, ¶ 12. All costs related to the production of the capsules were covered by AIC. Id., ¶ 13.
One year and two months after the conclusion of the contractual relationship between the parties, Defendant Friger filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance, Caguas Superior Part “for the continuous, intentional and unauthorized use of his image, in violation of his image rights.” Docket No. 23 at 3. The Court takes judicial knowledge of the existence of state court case entitled Osvaldo Friger Salgueiro v. Mech Tech College, LLC, et al., Civil No. CG2018CV03195 (hereinafter, “State Complaint“).
According to the Amended Complaint, “[o]n or about the month of January, 2019, it came to AIC‘s officials attention that defendant, Mr. Friger and/or Friger Entertainment was publicly displaying and commercially exploiting the review capsules on Mr. Friger‘s personal youtube platform and used them to make profit, without AIC‘s consent, authorization and/or license,” namely, one (1) month after Mr. Friger filed the State Complaint. Docket No. 22, ¶ 16.
Plaintiff specifically argues that the following informative capsules “have been constantly used and commercially exploited by defendant, Osvaldo Friger and/or Friger Entertainment to make a profit with each registered view made by AIC‘s and Mech Tech‘s customers or potential customers,” namely, Lancer Evolution X (600 hp), certificate no. PA 2-170-827; Flat Black Twin
Whereas, the Defendants essentially argue that “the copyright infringement claim should be dismissed because AIC‘s allegations fail to state a claim under which relief can be granted, since the challenged videos (featuring Defendant Friger Salgueiro as the host) are being displayed and commercially exploited by AIC and/or Mech Tech (who no longer is in this case)1, not any of the Defendants, in the YouTube platform they complain about. Moreover, these videos evidently are in the public domain.” Docket No. 23 at 3. The Defendants posit that the instant suit “is nothing more but a crude attempt at forum shopping to improperly pressure Defendant Friger Salgueiro, simply because he commenced a state court case against AIC and Mech Tech in December 2018, based on the same operative facts as alleged in the Complaint and Amended
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court‘s inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. “Context based” means that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements of the cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-679 (concluding that plaintiff‘s complaint was factually insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements). First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Yet we need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or
Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679. This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under
Thus “[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief.” Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.‘” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
The First Circuit has cautioned against equating plausibility with an analysis of the likely success on the merits, affirming that the plausibility standard assumes “pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff‘s favor” even if seemingly incredible. Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep‘t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (“[T]he court may not disregard properly pled factual
However, a complaint that rests on “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like” will likely not survive a motion to dismiss. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). Similarly, unadorned factual assertions as to the elements of the cause of action are inadequate as well. Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2011). “Specific information, even if not in the form of admissible evidence, would likely be enough at [the motion to dismiss] stage; pure speculation is not.” Id. at 596; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (“To be clear, we do not reject [] bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . it is the conclusory nature of [the] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.“); see Mendez Internet Mgmt. Servs. V. Banco Santander de P.R., 621 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2010) (The Twombly and Iqbal standards require District Courts to “screen[] out rhetoric masquerading as litigation.“).
The First Circuit outlined two considerations for district courts to note when analyzing a motion to dismiss. García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013). First, a complaint modeled on Form 11 of the Appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Copyright Infringement
In order to prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, “a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of the protected work by the alleged infringer.” Mag Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Cherokee, Inc., 496 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). In turn, this second element is bifurcated. Coquico, Inc. v. Rodríguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2009). Hence, “[t]o establish copyright infringement, [AIC] must prove ‘both ownership of a valid copyright and illicit copying.’ ” Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)). However, “[c]opying another‘s work does not, however, invariably constitute copyright infringement.” Id. In order to incur in copyright infringement, “[AIC] must establish that the copying is actionable by ‘prov[ing] that the copying of the copyrighted material was so extensive that it rendered the infringing and copyrighted works ‘substantially similar.’ ” Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Codefendant Friger is displaying three (3) review capsules that are owned by AIC for personal gain as follows: “[o]n or about the month of January, 2019, it came to AIC‘s officials attention that defendant, Mr. Friger and/or Friger Entertainment was publicly displaying and commercially exploiting the review capsules on Mr. Friger‘s personal youtube platform and used them to make profit, without AIC‘s consent, authorization and/or license.” Docket No. 22, ¶ 16 (emphasis ours). Yet, the Defendants refute said allegation by producing print screens of both Mech Tech and Defendant Friger‘s YouTube Channel accounts as exhibits of their Motion to Dismiss. While the Mech Tech YouTube Channel account appears to display review capsules in which Mr. Friger appears, there are no videos related to Mech Tech in Mr. Friger‘s YouTube Channel Account. See Docket No. 23, Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. Clearly, the exhibits produced by the Defendants are central to Plaintiff‘s claim. However, the Court notes that the produced screenshots are from a date subsequent of the filing of the Complaint, therefore do not demonstrate whether Mr. Friger was publicly displaying said content at the time alleged in the Complaint, to wit, January 2019.2
On a separate note, Plaintiff‘s suit is premised on alleging an unauthorized use of the capsules for Mr. Friger‘s personal gain. Pursuant to
Notwithstanding the above stated, once the discovery phase concludes, the Defendant may renew his arguments by dispositive motions. It is at that time that the Court could effectively examine whether the allegations raised by Plaintiff are meritorious and properly supported by the evidence.
Finally, as to Codefendant, Friger Entertainment, LLC, the Court finds that the allegation set forth by Plaintiff is insufficient to raise a plausible claim for relief as to the corporation. Therefore, a dismissal is warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket No. 22) Pursuant to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of March, 2021.
S/Daniel R. Dominguez
Daniel R. Dominguez
United States District Judge
