46 Conn. 417 | Conn. | 1878
The first question presented by the record is, did the commissioners properly reject the appellant’s claim for the amount due on the lost note ?
It appears from the finding of the Superior Court that the appellant, among other claims, presented to the commissioners a claim for $10,000 for money loaned to, and paid out for, Theodore H. Mead in his life time, at his request at various times. The appellees claimed that the lost note was not embraced in this last claim, and objected to the evidence in relation to it. The commissioners rejected the evidence and disallowed the claim. We assume this to be so, as no other reason appears for the rejection of the claim. It does not appear that any suggestion even was made by the appellees that the claim was not an honest one, and they only insist before us that it was not properly presented, and,that therefore no evidence was admissible to prove it.
We think that this objection is entirely too technical, and ought not to prevail to defeat a just and equitable demand against the estate of the decedent. No more stringent rule as to certainty and particularity should be applied to a claim
The second question presented upon the record is, in substance, whether the transactions between the appellant and Theodore H. Mead, relating to the loans subsequent to the giving of the deed, were fraudulent as against creditors. Was the deed of Jabez Mead to the appellant void as against subsequent creditors of Theodore Mead? We do not understand that the appellees claim that the deed from Theodore Mead to Jabez Mead was void as against the creditors of Theodore, but they admit that this deed, in connection with the agreement between Theodore and J abez Mead of August 2d, 1873, was good and valid as a mortgage to the extent of securing Jabez for his endorsement of the $1,000 note described in the agreement. This deed, though absolute on its face, was clearly a mortgage, and Jabez, upon being discharged from his liability as endorser by the payment of the note by Theodore, would have been bound to reconvey the land to Theodore. The legal title to the land vested in Jabez, and remained in him until he conveyed the premises to Thomas A. Mead, the appellant. This conveyance was made by Jabez with Theodore’s consent, not for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of Theodore, but for the purpose of securing the appellant for the debt which Theodore then owed him, in addition to the note which Jabez had endorsed and which the appellant paid before the last deed was given. Was the deed of Jabez to Thomas A. fraudulent against the then creditors of Theodore? We think it was not. The
The Superior Court is advised that Jabez Mead’s deed is security for all the advances made upon it by the appellant, according to the terms of the agreement between him and Theodore Mead; that is, that the court should allow as secured claims the amount due the appellant from Theodore Mead at the time the deed was given, Jabez Mead’s note and interest, and the amount of loans made after the deed was given.
Mechanics’ liens are entirely creatures of the statute, and unless perfected according to its provisions they are inoperative. At the time the appellant paid the claims no legal liens had been placed upon the property, and none were afterwards so placed. These claims are allowable against the estate, but not as secured claims, and the Superior Court is so advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; except Park, C. J., and Loomis, J., who dissented with regard to the allowance of the $1,000 note under the form in which the claim was presented.