Meadows v. Lands' End IncMeadows v. Lands' End Inc
THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiff Madison Meadows and defendant Lands’ End’s response to the Court’s order to show cause on the issue of standing, Dkt. 39, and on Lands’ End’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 30.
This is a putative class action against retailer Lands’ End for violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA). On May 4, 2025, Meadows visited Lands’ End’s website and purchased a dress and swimsuit for 30% off the stated regular price. Dkt. 22 at 18. The retailer advertised that the discount would no longer be available after May 7, 2025. Id. On May 16, 2025, Lands’ End sent Meadows a promotional email with the subject line,
Meadows sued Lands’ End in Pierce County Superior Court, alleging that the national retailer falsely promoted its products as discounted on its website and in emails when the advertised prices were regularly available. Dkt. 22 at 3. She asserted claims under the CPA and CEMA, and for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, quasi-contract/unjust enrichment, and intentional and negligent misrepresentation.
Lands’ End timely removed the action to this Court, asserting both diversity and Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) jurisdiction. Dkt. 1 at 2. It then moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Meadows failed to plead her fraud-based claims with specificity, failed to allege an actual injury, and that her CEMA claim was preempted by federal law. Dkt. 30 at 19. It also moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Meadows lacked Article III standing because she did not allege a concrete personal injury from the email subject lines. Id. at 18.
Meadows responded that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement did not apply to her claims, but that even if it did, she had adequately alleged “the who, what, when, where, and how” of Lands’ End misconduct. Dkt. 33 at 10 (quoting Kempf v. Fullbeauty Brands Operations, LLC, No. C25-1141 TSZ, 2026 WL 395677, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2026)). She further contended that she had standing to bring her CEMA claim, arguing that recipients of false or misleading emails suffer “‘lost productivity and resources, annoyance, consumption of valuable digital storage space and financial costs’
Because standing implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court ordered the parties to show cause why this case should not be stayed pending the resolution of Montes v. Penney Opco, LLC, Nos. 25-8045, 26-241 (9th Cir.), an appeal of Judge Rice’s Order1 dismissing similar CEMA claims for lack of standing.
Meadows opposes a stay and now asks the Court to remand, arguing that Lands’ End has not met its burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 41. She contends that a stay would cause a lengthy delay, citing data showing that Ninth Circuit civil appeals take an average of 13.8 months. Id. at 5. She also argues that a stay would increase the risk of the destruction of evidence, particularly given the volume of electronically stored information involved in this case. She asserts that a stay would not promote judicial economy because the Montes appeal will not resolve any merits disputes in this case. Meadows also voluntarily withdraws her non-CEMA/CPA claims to “streamline” the litigation. Dkt. 40 at 2.
Lands’ End asks the Court to dismiss the case or, alternatively, to stay the case pending the Ninth Circuit’s Montes decision. Dkt. 42. It argues that the claims in Montes are “squarely aligned” with those presented here and that the Ninth Circuit’s decision will resolve any questions regarding standing and preemption. Id. at 4. It argues that a stay
I. DISCUSSION
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). This power includes staying an action “pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Levya v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–864 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979)). To determine whether a stay is appropriate, “the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55)). Among those competing interests are (1) the possible damage which may result from granting a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward; and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and
The Landis factors support a stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Montes. This case is still in the early stages of litigation. Discovery has not yet commenced, and a class has not been certified. See Dkt. 44. The trial date will not be set until after the Court’s ruling on class certification. Id. Meadows fails to show how she, or other class members, will be harmed by a relatively short delay in the adjudication of her claims.
Furthermore, Montes is directly on-point and will be dispositive on the threshold Article III jurisdictional question. Courts in this district have been split on the issue of standing for CEMA claims. See Dkt. 39. Proceeding with litigation in the face of inconsistent rulings risks wasting judicial resources and may result in unnecessary and duplicative proceedings. Numerous courts have acknowledged this inefficiency and stayed identical CEMA actions pending Montes. See, e.g., Stephen Liss et al., v. Skechers USA Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05861-DGE, Dkt. 78 (W.D. Wash.); Devivo v. Sheex Inc., No. 3:25-cv-05807-DGE, Dkt. 62 (W.D. Wash.); Shahpur, et al. v. Ulta Salon, No. 25-cv-00284-RLP, Dkt. 86 (E.D. Wash.); Repperger v. Ulta Salon, No. 25-cv-00526-RLP, Dkt. 59 (E.D. Wash.); Talley v. Everlane, No. C26-0007-KKE, Dkt. 28 (W.D. Wash.); Harrington et al. v. Vineyard Vines LLC, No. 2:25-cv-01115-TSZ, Dkt. 64 (W.D.
II. ORDER
For the above reasons, this matter is STAYED pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of Montes. Lands’ End motion to dismiss, Dkt. 30, is DENIED without prejudice to re-file following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, as applicable. The parties shall submit a joint status report within 14 days of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of September, 2026.
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
United States District Judge