| N.Y. Sup. Ct. | May 14, 1888
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff, by his purchase of the mortgaged premises, became the principal debtor. The land was subject to a mortgage given by the Dunscombs, but the plaintiff agreed to pay it as part of the purchase money. Comstock v. Drohan, 71 N.Y. 9" court="NY" date_filed="1877-10-02" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/comstock-v--drohan-3624676?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3624676">71 N. Y. 9; Fairchild v. Lynch, 99 N.Y. 359" court="NY" date_filed="1885-06-09" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/fairchild-v--lynch-3613919?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3613919">99 N. Y. 359, 2 N. E. Rep. 20. As a matter of course, when the plaintiff failed to perform his agreement, and the mortgage was foreclosed, the holder of the mortgage entered up a judgment for a deficiency against the mortgagor and the plaintiff. who was to pay it. There was no question of the regularity of the sale, and, if it did bring less than its value, no cause of action results therefrom to the owner of the fee. There is no standard of value, in the absence of fraud, other than that received by a public sale according to law. The poverty of the plaintiff, which prevented his paying his debt at or before the sale, was no defense to the action in foreclosure. No ground for equitable ruling is presented, unless an attempt is made to collect'of a principal debtor instead of a
Dykmah, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) Gross unreasonableness and oppression is a well-established ground of equitable relief against contracts. Even at law, and where no fraud is suggested, contracts are sometimes relieved against upon that ground. The old Horse-Shoe Case, cited 2 Ves. Sr. 155, where the purchaser agreed to pay one barleycorn for the first nail, two for the second, and so on, doubling for the whole thirty-two nails, is a case in point. But the ordinary tribunal for relief is equity, and bargains shown to be unconscionable are readily relieved against upon equitable terms, or wholly set aside, as justice may require. It is not necessary that fraud be shown in any other way than by the attempt to enforce a contract intrinsically unconscionable, which is sometimes said to be a species of fraud. Beyond certain limits, not always easy to define, equity will not allow one to take advantage of the necessities of others. It needs no argument to show that if a person, tied upon a railroad track, signs a contract to pay a fortune to induce a by-passer to cut the thongs that hold him in the face of death, the contract could never be enforced. In daily life such pronounced occasions will not be apt to occur, but the principle is familiar, and constantly applied, that contracts will be relieved against when so hard and oppressive as to shock the moral sense. Inequality in the condition of the contracting parties is an element that is regarded, and, where so great that the free exercise of the will is interfered with, will sometimes of itself be sufficient ground for relief. Nor is it an insuperable objection to the relief that the oppression is produced by legal measures; nor is the contract always protected if it be the judgment of a court. Tlie ancient case of Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170, was such a case, yet relief was given in equity. There a creditor had proceeded to judgment against his debtor in the island of St. Christopher, and had sold his property for a grossly inadequate price. The proceedings were regular, and no fraud or deceit was shown; yet, on the ground that the inadequacy was gross, and that the creditor seemed actuated by a desire, not so much to collect his debt, as to obtain the estate for a small sum, the court of chancery gave relief against the judgment. To use the law for purposes of oppression was regarded as a fraud upon the administration of justice. Such an application of the doctrine is familiar in our own courts. The above case, and its principle, was cited with approval in McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139" court="None" date_filed="1823-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mdonald-v-neilson-6139698?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6139698">2 Cow. 139. There the whole court of errors were agreed that a regularly obtained judgment will be relieved against in equity where there are circumstances of extraordinary hardship or great inadequacy of consideration. In that case it was said by Chief Justice Savage to be a long and well settled rule of equity to protect against that species of oppression which .is sought to be justified under forms of law. Page 170. In that case a man worth $20,001) was defendant in a judgment of $480. Execution was issued, and, after $1,200 of property had been sold for $300, defendant made a settlement to avoid further sacrifice, by which he agreed to be responsible f6r certain debts of his son owing to the judgment creditor. Chancellor Kent held these facts to show such oppression and abuse of legal proceedings .as to render the settlement invalid. A majority of the court of errors sustained the settlement, on the ground that the father was morally responsible for the son’s debts, being in possession of property of the son which should have been devoted to the payment of his debts. Were it not for that feature of the ease, the decision of the chancellor would have been affirmed. The whole court were of the opinion that the pressure was such as to render the settlement invalid, had not other equities intervened. Judge Sutherland said: “ The system of law would be lamentable that should sane