McWilliams v. Pike County Probation OfficeMcWilliams v. Pike County Probation Office
Before the court is a report and recommendation (“R&R“) from Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson with respect to the above matter. (Doc. 44). The R&R concerns two motions: 1) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Pike County Probation Office, Pike County District Attorney‘s Office, and Pike County (“Pike County Defendants“); and 2) a motion for a preliminary injunction against prosecution filed by Plaintiff Michael Paul McWilliams on behalf of himself and his son, C.J.M. For the reasons set forth, the R&R will be adopted in part. The Pike County Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted, but McWilliams will be afforded leave to amend his own claims. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against prosecution will be denied.
This action was filed by McWilliams on behalf of himself and his son, C.J.M. McWilliams is pro se.
C.J.M. is 17 years old. He was enrolled at the Delaware Valley High School (“DVHS“) in Matamoras, Pike County, Pennsylvania. According to McWilliams, C.J.M. suffered terrible abuse and neglect as the result of being a dependent child, including sexual abuse and abandonment. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 104). C.J.M. receives special education services and has an individualized education plan (“IEP“) and behavioral improvement plan (“BIP“). Id. ¶ 106.
According to the allegations, McWilliams enrolled C.J.M. at Delaware Valley on April 9, 2025. Id. ¶ 16. On April 30, 2025, C.J.M. was involved in a physical confrontation with a DVHS staff member and a school police officer. Id. ¶¶ 48-81; Doc. 1-4, PI. Ex. 3). McWilliams alleges that the DVHS staff member instigated the incident, antagonized C.J.M., and ignored the IEP and BIP. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 107, 112).
The above incident led to juvenile court proceedings. (Doc. 1-7, PI. Ex. 6). C.J.M. is accused of committing delinquent acts including aggravated assault, resisting law enforcement, terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and criminal mischief. Id.
McWilliams‘s complaint asserts that the Pike County Probation Office violated C.J.M.‘s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. ¶¶ 194-204. He asserts claims on C.J.M.‘s behalf against the Pike County Defendants under
In this action, McWilliams intends to represent C.J.M. He seeks money damages on his and C.J.M.‘s behalf. He also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Clerk of Court assigned this matter to the undersigned prior to service of the complaint and summons on the Pike County Defendants. On August 14, 2025, the court granted McWilliams‘s request for an extension of time to serve the complaint. (Doc. 10). A portion of that order provided:
McWilliams proceeds in this action pro se. The caption of the complaint lists CJM as a co-plaintiff in this action. McWilliams is CJM‘s father. In the federal courts, “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 1654 . However, a nonlawyer parent is not entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal court. Osei-Afriyie by Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991). Consequently, to the extent that McWilliams attempts to bring any claims on behalf of CJM in the complaint, he cannot represent CJM pro se. See id. at 882-83. The extension for service will also afford McWilliams an opportunity to secure counsel for CJM‘s interests in this litigation.
The court reiterated this statement of law in an order dated November 5, 2025. (Doc. 17).
Separately, McWilliams moves for a preliminary injunction to prevent “Defendant Pike County District Attorney‘s Office, in their official capacities, from criminally prosecuting or taking other adverse actions against the Plaintiffs under Section 17.2 of the Educator Discipline Act, Act of December 12, 1973 (P.L. 397, No. 141), as amended December 18, 2013 (P.L. 1205, No. 120),
Pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act,
Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff‘s federal claims under
Standard of Review
In disposing of objections to a magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report against which objections are made.
I. Pike County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Pike County Defendants raise at least five grounds for dismissal in their motion, including McWilliams‘s standing to pursue claims on behalf of C.J.M.. (Doc. 25, Br. in Supp.). As indicated above, the court issued several orders advising McWilliams that he could not represent C.J.M. (Docs. 10, 14). It is appropriate to pick up where those orders left off.
A. McWilliams‘s Standing to Represent C.J.M.
Under Third Circuit precedent, “a non-lawyer appearing pro se [is] not entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal court[.]” Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882. That is, “[t]he right to counsel belongs to the children, and...the parent cannot waive this right[.]” Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883.
In recommending dismissal of the complaint, the R&R identified McWilliams‘s representation of C.J.M. as one of “several legal obstacles” faced by the plaintiffs in pursuing federal civil rights claims against the Pike County Defendants. (Doc. 44 at 8-10).
McWilliams objections are noted. His arguments, however, do not justify the court carving out an exception to the rule stated in Osei-Afriyie as to the claims asserted against Pike County Defendants.
McWilliams alleges the County Defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA“) and the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA“)...and these violations of IDEA and the ADA were the result of the causes of action specified in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See: (ECF DK No. 1), ¶¶s 125-149 and 194-237. See alleged violations of CJM‘S IV, V, VI, and XIV Constitutional Amendment Rights, Police Misconduct, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, Discrimination, and violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . It is important to note: the alleged violations of the ADA and IDEA were the result of the aforementioned causes of action. In other words: the causes of action specified in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is the mechanism by which the County Defendants denied CJM‘s right to a “free appropriate public education,”20 U. S. C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) . See: Winkelman. However, the mechanism of how does not diminish the underlying outcome; i.e., a violation of IDEA and the ADA. In the instant,42 U.S.C. § 1983 is simply the legal mechanism to redress how the County Defendants allegedly violated IDEA and is not meant to replace the gravamen of the instant Complaint which remains a violation of IDEA.
Id. (as argued).
Even when liberally construed, however, McWilliams‘s complaint on behalf of C.J.M. does not assert ADA and IDEA claims against the Pike County Defendants. That is, in the complaint, McWilliams organized his claims into
McWilliams also objects with an alternative textualist argument. He contends that C.J.M.‘s Section 1983 claims are his “own.” (Doc. 45-1 at 10) (citing
In Raskin, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Raskin does not favor McWilliams representing his child in Section 1983 litigation. Even if it were binding on this court, under Raskin, C.J.M.‘s Section 1983 claims belong to C.J.M. and C.J.M. alone.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‘s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Focusing on the portion relevant here, Section 1983 makes the violation of constitutional rights redressable ”to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
Separately, federal law provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”
Read together, to the extent that C.J.M. is owed redress by the Pike County Defendants for violation of his constitutional rights, he is the party allegedly injured and only he may plead and conduct his own case personally or by counsel.3 Id.
The court therefore considers C.J.M. to be an unrepresented party. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”
There are practical hurdles to appointing counsel. The court cannot force a lawyer to represent C.J.M. in this action and there is no guarantee that a pro bono lawyer will respond to inquires for pro bono appointment in this case. Furthermore, according to the exhibits attached to the complaint, C.J.M. will turn 18 years old in approximately four months. C.J.M. is only a short time away from being able to secure counsel of his own choosing. Alternatively, C.J.M. will soon be able to represent himself in any Section 1983 action under
As a result of this ruling, only McWilliams‘s personal Section 1983 claims against the Pike County Defendants remain. McWilliams‘s complaint refers to C.J.M. being detained as a deprivation of his property. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 216-17). The court will liberally construe McWilliams‘s allegations as asserting a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of his liberty interests in the custody, care, and management of C.J.M. See Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
Aside from standing, the Pike County Defendants also moved to dismiss McWilliams‘s complaint on several other grounds. The court will consider those arguments in conjunction with McWilliams‘s remaining claim.
B. Claims Against Pike County District Attorney‘s Office and Pike County Probation Office
The Pike County Defendants assert that the county probation office and district attorney‘s office are not separate legal entities capable of being sued under Section 1983.
“To state a Section 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
As for the county probation office, the Pike County Defendants assert that this office is not a “person” under Section 1983 and would otherwise be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the Commonwealth. The court agrees. Numerous district courts have held that county probation departments are not “persons” for the purposes of Section 1983 liability, including in prior decisions issued by the undersigned. Builder v. Norton, No. 3:25-CV-2389, 2026 WL 1963040, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2026); Davenport v. Cumberland Cnty. Pub. Def., No. 3:21-CV-84, 2021 WL 4699203, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2021); Pittman v. Middlesex Cnty. Prob. Dep‘t, No. CV 14-1568 (FLW), 2017 WL 1129592, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2017); Love v. DCP Cnty. Determint Prison, No.
McWilliams objects to Magistrate Judge Carlson‘s similar conclusion. He argues that his requests for prospective and injunctive relief should keep the county probation office and the county district attorney‘s office in this case. In support, he refers the court to his motion for a preliminary injunction and a decision issued by the Honorable Karen Marston in Doe v. Schorn, 711 F. Supp. 3d 375 (E.D. Pa. 2024), app. dismissed as moot sub nom. Pepper v. Att‘y Gen. Pennsylvania, No. 24-1261, 2024 WL 5102861 (3d Cir. Dec. 13, 2024).5
To the extent that McWilliams attempts to mimic the Doe plaintiff in this litigation, his efforts fall short. There are several distinctions between this case and Doe worth noting in this section of the analysis. First and foremost, the Doe plaintiff sued the district attorney of the relevant county in her official capacity. Id. at 382. He also initiated an action under Section 1983 arguing that a provision of
C. Claims Against Pike County
The moving defendants also argue that McWilliams fails to establish the prerequisites of a municipal liability claim against Pike County under Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). That is, defendants contend that McWilliams does not identify a policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional violation. See id. at 694 (“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government‘s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.“).
From his opposition papers and objections to the R&R, the court construes McWilliams‘s claim against Pike County as a Section 1983 failure-to-train claim arising from a single incident—his son‘s juvenile proceedings. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated that single-incident failure-to-train claims are “vanishingly rare” and may proceed in only “unusual” and “extreme” cases. Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 162 F.4th 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n.10 (1989); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63-64 (2011); Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, 130 F.4th 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2025)).
In his objections to the R&R, McWilliams contends that he has unearthed a wide array of alleged misconduct by Pike County judges, an assistant district attorney, a probation officer, and a member of law enforcement, as well as a number of purported conflicts of interest. According to McWilliams, these were facts that he did not have at the time of filing his complaint.
Notably, McWilliams also requests leave to amend. “[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment...when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, the court is uncertain whether McWilliams will be able allege cognizable and plausible claims against Pike County for municipal liability under Section 1983, but the appropriate disposition involves giving him an opportunity to replead.
II. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Returning to a discussion of Doe, McWilliams has also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the Pike County Defendants. (Doc. 28). He seeks to enjoin his prosecution under
The Pike County Defendants oppose the motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 32). The R&R recommends denial of the motion. (Doc. 44). McWilliams objects. (Doc. 45-1 at 5-7). After review, the motion will be denied.
As to the first consideration, likelihood of success on the merits, it would be premature to consider McWilliams‘s motion for injunctive relief under the circumstances. In addition to the deficiencies noted above, McWilliams has not challenged the statute in his complaint as being violative of his First Amendment rights. This creates a host of issues, including a situation where the merits of such a claim will never reach trial. McWilliams‘s request for injunctive relief trips on the first hurdle.
As for the second consideration, irreparable harm, McWilliams has also not alleged standing to challenge the statute as applied to him. In Doe, the plaintiff alleged that he wished “to publicize the nature of his misconduct complaint, disclose the Department [of Education]‘s letter dismissing that complaint, and criticize the Department‘s refusal to take further action.” 711 F. Supp. 3d at 393. McWilliams‘s averments in his motion are not similar by the nature of his use of qualifying language.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court will enter a mixed decision. McWilliams‘s objections to the R&R will be sustained in part and overruled in part. The R&R will be adopted in part and not adopted in part. That is, the Pike County Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted, but McWilliams will be afforded leave to file an amended complaint raising Section 1983 claims he wishes to pursue on his own behalf. The claims asserted by McWilliams on behalf of C.J.M. will be dismissed without prejudice. McWilliams‘s motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied. An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:
JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY
United States District Court
8/5/26