155 So. 309 | Ala. | 1934
Complainants seek injunctive relief against the further prosecution of damage suits by defendants in the courts of Tennessee; the collision out of which these suits arose having occurred in Alabama where defendants reside.
The equity of the bill is primarily rested upon the case of Weaver v. Ala. Great Southern R. R. Co.,
And in Folkes v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co.,
Numerous authorities upon this question are reviewed in the note to Delaware, L. W. R. R. Co. v. Ashelman, 69 A.L.R. 588, among them that of American Express Co. v. Fox,
But the granting of such injunctive relief is largely in the discretion of the court, and these observations are considered worthy of note, though not of controlling importance here.
The denial of the relief here, in our opinion, rests upon very substantial grounds. It appears that complainant McWhorter (a resident of Alabama) operates by trucks a freight line between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Gadsden, Ala., and that, as required by law, he carried personal liability insurance in the sum of $10,000; complainant Builders' Manufacturers' Mutual Casualty Company issuing the policy thereon.
Defendants insist that the negligent operation of one of McWhorter's trucks has given justification for their suits.
Complainant Builders' Manufacturers' Mutual Casualty Company, the insurer, is a nonresident corporation, and not engaged in business in this state by agent or otherwise.
The bond of the insurer was for the benefit of the general public, who might by accident come within its influence, and by express statutory provision such insurer may be subjected to direct suit by any person sustaining actionable injury protected by the bond. Gen. Acts 1927, p. 309; Gen. Acts 1931, p. 312, § 13; Hodges v. Wells,
We construe the bill as disclosing that this insurer was not subject to suit in this state for lack of necessary service. But these defendants had the right to sue McWhorter and his insurer in the same action, and to effectuate that purpose the suit was brought in Tennessee, where service was obtainable against both.
To grant the injunctive relief here prayed would result in an injustice to these defendants in denying to them the right to prosecute their suits jointly against McWhorter and the insurance company, and in practical effect deny to them in a single suit recourse against the insurer whose bond was primarily required by law for their protection. Clearly, a court of equity, in the exercise of a sound discretion, would not so extend the rule recognized in the Weaver Case, supra, as to work such an injustice.
Nor does the mere matter of inconvenience as to the trial (14 Rawle C. L. § 119), or the fact that a large number of witnesses reside in this state, rendering it necessary to take their depositions, suffice to give the bill equity. 32 Corpus Juris 117; Delaware, L. W. R. R. Co. v. Ashelman, supra.
We are well persuaded the sufficiency of the bill cannot be rested upon the theory just discussed. Nor call the bill be sustained as one to prevent a multiplicity of suits. A mere community of interest in the question of law and fact involved is not sufficient to sustain the equity of the bill upon any such theory. Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders,
But the complainant insurance company argues that the penalty of its bond is limited to $10,000, while the suits aggregate a sum largely in excess of this amount, that its liability as thus limited is in the nature of a trust, and there is therefore a community of interest in the subject-matter so as to give equity upon the theory of the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.
The case of Bradford v. National Surety Co.,
The authorities cited by complainants [among them Home Ins. Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. (C. C.) 109 F. 681; American Central Ins. Co. v. Harmon Knitting Mills (C.C.A.)
Illustrative are the two cases last cited, where the equity suits were instituted by the insured and adjustment and apportionment was sought by them, corresponding in a sense with our case of National Surety Co. v. Graves, supra, and the first-cited cases involving a matter of reformation.
These defendants are the ones primarily interested in the matter of adjustment or apportionment, rather than the insurer. 21 Corpus Juris 132, 133; National Surety Co. v. Graves, supra. But any rights they may have do not of course add any force to the equity of a bill filed by the insurer. Clearly analogous is the case of Ætna Ins. Co. v. Hann,
And speaking to the question of multiplicity of suits, the court, in the same authority, said: "There is no equity in the bill on the theory that it will prevent a multiplicity of suits. Counsel for appellants concedes that this court is irrevocably committed to the doctrine that, in order for a bill to contain equity on the sole ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, it must show a community of interest in the subject-matter of the several suits in which the several litigants are interested; that a mere community of interest in the questions of law or of fact involved is not sufficient. The mere fact that one suit in equity can be made a substitute for several actions at law is not sufficient to give equity jurisdiction for this purpose."
The bill does not bring the complainants within the influence of this recognized principle, and it is also lacking in equity upon that theory.
Lastly, it is suggested the further prosecution of these suits should be enjoined upon the theory that their trial in the courts of Tennessee would be violative of the Federal Constitution, Const. U.S. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, as imposing too great a burden upon interstate commerce, complainant McWhorter being so engaged; and counsel cite Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co.,
But the cases are readily distinguishable upon the facts, and the instant case comes within the influence of Hoffman v. State of Missouri,
We do not conceive that this suggestion needs more extended discussion.
Our conclusion is that the bill is lacking in equity upon any of the suggested theories, and that the demurrer thereto was properly sustained.
This conclusion, as a matter of course, disposes of the motion, adversely to appellants, made on submission of the cause without a consideration thereof from any other angle.
It results that the decree will be affirmed, and the motion denied.
Affirmed; motion denied.
BOULDIN, FOSTER, and KNIGHT, JJ., concur. *636