STELLIA v. YKNOT
2016 UT App 134 | 365 P.3d 699
CONCLUSION
¶ 25 Because Yknot‘s rule 60(b)(6) motion could have been brought under another section of rule 60(b)—to correct a mistake or act of inadvertence—the district court correctly ruled that rule 60(b)(6) relief was not available to Yknot and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Lena MCTEE, Appellee, v. WEBER CENTER CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Municipal Building Authority of Weber County, and Weber County, Appellants.
No. 20150327-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Filed June 30, 2016
2016 UT App 134
Linette B. Hutton, Attorney for Appellants.
C. Ryan Christensen, Attorney for Appellee.
Judge Stephen L. Roth authored this Opinion, in which Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood concurred and Judge Michele M. Christiansen concurred in the result.1
Opinion
ROTH, Judge:
¶ 1 This appeal centers on the notice of claim provision contained in the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the Immunity Act). See generally
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 At the time of her injury, McTee was an employee of the federal government, specifically the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS). McTee worked in an office that the IRS rented in the Weber Center building located in Ogden, Utah. Several Weber County departments and agencies also occupied office space in the Weber Center. Outside the Weber Center was a sign that stated, “WEBER CENTER[,] FOR LEASING INFORMATION CALL WOODBURY CORPORATION,” followed by two phone numbers, presumably the contact information for the Woodbury Corporation. Connected to the east side of the Weber Center was a parking structure for tenants and their guests.
¶ 3 On January 25, 2012, McTee took a break from work to smoke a cigarette. She exited the building, walked into the parking structure, and sat at a table located inside. Following her break, McTee began to walk back to the building, but, while still in the parking structure, she tripped and fell in a pothole located near a support pillar. As a result of the fall, McTee alleges she “suffered injuries to her lumbar spine, her left ankle, both of her knees, and a facial fracture, and incurred medical bills in excess of $100,000.”
¶ 4 While McTee apparently sought medical attention for her injuries, she made no immediate effort to specifically identify the owner of the Weber Center until approximately a month later when she was approached at work by a woman who stated, “I can‘t believe that you fell. I‘ve been asking my boss for over a year to fix those potholes.”2 Later that same day, McTee and a coworker left the building to “get lunch, and then stop by [McTee‘s] house” so that McTee could get her cell phone to take pictures of the pothole where she fell. Upon returning
¶ 5 On February 7, 2013, slightly over a year after her injury, McTee, through her counsel, submitted a notice of claim to Weber County, the Municipal Building Authority of Weber County (Weber MBA), the Ogden City Recorder, and the State of Utah. Less than a week later, McTee‘s counsel submitted a GRAMA request to the Weber Center for “any and all documents relating, regarding or referring to the control, maintenance and lease of the parking lot and/or the [Weber Center].”3 McTee‘s GRAMA request produced almost two hundred pages of documents and diagrams, which Weber County states “identify[] how, when and why the building, that is now the Weber Center, and the shopping mall that was directly across the street, were purchased, as well as identifying all parties involved.”
¶ 6 The documents consist of a series of deeds and declarations apparently meant to establish the Weber Center and its attached parking structure as part of a condominium office project. The resulting ownership and management structure is complicated. For example, the underlying land was aggregated through a series of deeds executed on March 18 and 19, 1997, that conveyed property from Third Tierra,4 OWM Company,5 and Pracvest6 to Land of OG, LLC.7 Additionally, Practical Building Company8 conveyed to Land of OG a percentage ownership in five parcels of land that are identified in the attachment to this deed as “Weber Center Descriptions.” The GRAMA request also included a deed of reconveyance between the title company and Land of OG; a settlement agreement between Ogden City, the Ogden City Redevelopment Agency, the Weber Center Condominium Association, and Weber County; and an addendum to that settlement agreement, which addressed any development, sale, or lease of the Weber Center. In addition, McTee‘s GRAMA request produced the declaration of condominium for the Weber Center, also dated March 19, 1997.9 The condominium declaration identified Weber MBA (described as “a Utah nonprofit corporation“) and Land of OG (described as “a Utah limited liability company“) as declarants. Two special warranty deeds were recorded on March 20, 1997, in which Weber MBA and Land of OG conveyed nine of the Weber Center‘s fifteen units to Weber MBA in one deed and the remaining six units to Land of OG in the other.
¶ 8 In addition to seeking information on ownership and management of the Weber Center through a GRAMA request, McTee‘s counsel also accessed the Governmental Immunity Act Database maintained by the Utah Department of Commerce11 to determine if McTee had a claim against a governmental entity. McTee‘s counsel‘s search for “weber” produced sixteen results—none of which listed the Weber Center or any of the entities identified in the condominium documents, including Weber MBA, as a governmental entity.12 His search for “weber center” produced zero results.
¶ 9 On March 13, 2014, following the GRAMA request and the search of the Immunity Act‘s database, McTee served the attorney for Woodbury Corporation and Land of OG with a summons and complaint and verified to the court that she had “complied with the requirements of [the Immunity Act].” Approximately three weeks later, McTee sent her initial discovery request, which included an interrogatory seeking “the names of any and all persons or entities who are responsible for maintaining and/or inspecting the parking structure at the Weber Center.” O. Randall Woodbury (the president of the Woodbury Corporation and manager of Land
¶ 10 McTee served her summons on the Weber Center Condominium Association, Weber MBA, and Weber County on June 18, 2014. Approximately three weeks later, Weber County filed a motion to dismiss McTee‘s suit under rules 7(c) and 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that McTee had “failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of [the Immunity Act] ... by failing to file an undertaking and filing an untimely notice of claim.” See
As I have reviewed the pleadings and considered the arguments, my best view of this case is that the notice of claim was timely filed. Since the Court, in its view, does not find it reasonable that circumstances at issue here would have alerted Mrs. McTee of the possibility of a claim against a governmental entity immediately after her injury on January 25, 2012. Even setting aside time for ameliorative convalescence, the Weber Center and its parking garage [are] populated by both public and private entities.
It is not unreasonable for this Court to consider that it could have taken nearly a month to ascertain who exactly served as the entity responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the parking garage. Therefore, the Court determines that the one-year limitations period for filing a notice of claim commenced as of February 22, 2012, and that the notice of claim filed on February 7, 2013, was timely filed.
The district court issued its written order on February 2, 2015. The court repeated in its written order that McTee‘s notice of claim was timely under section 78B-2-111 of the Utah Code because “it is not unreasonable that [McTee] might take a month or more to identify the entity responsible for maintaining the parking structure.” Weber County now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11 Weber County argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, because McTee failed to file her notice of claim within one year, as required by the Immunity Act. See
¶ 12 Generally, a four-year statute of limitations applies to the filing of a personal injury lawsuit based on negligence. See
¶ 13 Weber County argues that the district court erred in failing to dismiss McTee‘s complaint, because the Immunity Act “requires strict compliance.” Therefore, according to Weber County, “McTee must submit a notice of claim within one year ‘after the claim arises‘” and, because McTee fell on January 25, 2012, she had until January 25, 2013, to file a notice of her claim. (Emphasis in original.) (Quoting
¶ 14 We agree with McTee that the circumstances here would not put a reasonable
¶ 15 This court has stated that “[t]here are two concepts that must be considered in determining whether [a] plaintiff should have earlier discovered the facts forming the basis of her cause of action. The first is inquiry notice; the second is reasonable diligence.” Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Stated differently, “Was plaintiff on notice that she might have a cause of action ..., and, if so, was she reasonably diligent in investigating the facts surrounding her [cause of action]?” Id. The test for inquiry notice is “whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Inquiry notice occurs “when the information would lead an ordinarily prudent person to investigate the matter further.” Inquiry Notice, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass‘n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1137 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“A duty of inquiry requires the party to make inquiry and to diligently do that which the answer to the inquiry reasonably prompts. ... But ... [it] is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set straight.“).
¶ 16 Here, the term “reasonable diligence” is not defined in the Immunity Act, so we begin by looking to the plain language of the statute. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) (plurality opinion) (“In interpreting a statute, the court must look first to its plain language.“). Black‘s Law Dictionary provides a workable start, defining “diligence” as “[c]onstant application to one‘s business or duty” and “[t]he attention and care required from a person in a given situation.” Diligence, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The law dictionary then goes on to define “reasonable diligence” as “[a] fair degree of diligence expected from someone of ordinary prudence under circumstances like those at issue.” Id. Reasonable Diligence. In another context, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that “[t]o meet the reasonable diligence requirement, a plaintiff must take advantage of readily available sources of relevant information. A plaintiff who focuses on only one or two sources, while turning a blind eye to the existence of other available sources, falls short of this standard.” Jackson Constr. Co., 2004 UT 89, ¶ 20, 100 P.3d 1211. But see id. ¶ 19 (“The reasonable diligence standard does not require a plaintiff to exhaust all possibilities....” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “reasonable diligence” under the statute seems to require that a person who suffered an injury take the steps that “someone of ordinary prudence” would take to discern whether she had a claim and whether it was against a particular governmental entity. See Reasonable Diligence, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). For purposes of this analysis, we assume that McTee had enough information when she fell that someone was potentially responsible for her injury. The question then is whether she should have discovered whom she had a claim against had she exercised the “attention and care required from a person” “of ordinary prudence under circumstances like those at issue.”
¶ 17 In this case, the district court‘s ruling that McTee‘s notice of claim was timely under the Immunity Act seems primarily based
¶ 18 Moreover, the actual ownership and management of the Weber Center is complicated, and its connection to Weber County or any other local governmental entity is obscure. The nearly two hundred pages of documents produced in response to McTee‘s GRAMA request “for information regarding who owned and who was responsible” for the parking structure attached to the Weber Center consisted of various deeds, conveyances, reconveyances, settlement agreements, addendums to settlement agreements, and a declaration of condominium, all of which appear to involve various private business entities, including the Woodbury Corporation, the Weber Center Condominium Association, Land of OG, Practical Building Company, Third Tierra, OWM Company, and Pracvest. While one entity involved, Weber MBA, suggests that a local governmental entity may be involved in the Weber Center, the Weber MBA is simply one party that makes up the Condominium Association, which is itself responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the office building and parking structure where McTee‘s injury occurred. Even if McTee had immediately inquired about who owned the Weber Center, it is not obvious that the documents related to ownership and management recorded in the county‘s public records would have put her on notice that her claim was against a governmental entity generally or Weber County in particular. Rather, the documents appear to show that ownership of the condominium units that comprise the Weber Center was initially granted to Weber MBA and Land of OG and that management authority—and presumably maintenance responsibility—was eventually put in the hands of the Condominium Management Committee, which is composed of the president and secretary of the committee as well as the Condominium Association, which is identified only as “an unincorporated association of Owners” known as “The Weber Center Owners Association.” And it is unclear that ownership of the Weber Center would have been discovered by McTee if she had immediately sought out and read the declaration of condominium, because that document itself directs individuals to send any notice or communication to the Condominium Management Committee in care of Jeffrey K. Woodbury at the Woodbury Corporation, the company whose name appeared on the sign outside the building. In addition, even if McTee herself had immediately accessed the Immunity Act‘s database designed to help people “retrieve address and contact information of Governmental Entities for the purpose of delivering a notice of claim,” she would have found none of the entities mentioned in the documents later produced in response to her GRAMA request about the Weber Center‘s ownership.
¶ 19 Weber County argues that McTee‘s most direct path to the Weber Center‘s ownership information was to call the Woodbury Corporation using the number on the sign and simply ask. And perhaps had she done
¶ 20 As a final note, we do not believe, as the county argues, that the district court‘s decision here runs afoul of the well-established principle that the Immunity Act demands strict compliance. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶¶ 12, 13, 40 P.3d 632 (“[T]he Immunity Act demands strict compliance with its requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. The notice of claim provision, particularly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything less.“). The Utah Supreme Court seems to focus the concept of strict compliance on the requirement that parties adhere to “the exactness required by the Immunity Act,” id. ¶ 12, which has focused on the deadlines there set forth, see, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ¶ 22, 977 P.2d 1201 (concluding that plaintiff‘s claim was untimely because he “did not file his action within one year after the claim was either denied or deemed to be denied“); Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1998) (holding that plaintiff‘s notice of claim was timely because it was filed with the correct body of government within one year); Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (affirming the district court‘s decision to dismiss plaintiff‘s suit as time-barred because she had filed her notice of claim one day late). But there is no indication that the provisions of the Immunity Act that do not lend themselves to exact measurement, such as the determination of when a party reasonably ought to have known that her claim was against a particular governmental entity and
CONCLUSION
¶ 21 The district court appropriately concluded that McTee‘s notice of claim was timely filed under the Immunity Act. We therefore affirm the court‘s decision to deny Weber County‘s motion to dismiss.
STEPHEN L. ROTH
JUDGE
Notes
(a) Except as provided in subsection (1)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant.