139 A. 848 | Pa. | 1927
Argued October 5, 1927. On the trial of an appeal by the defendant school district, from an award of damages by a jury of view, plaintiff recovered a verdict, and defendant now appeals from the judgment entered on it.
At the trial, plaintiff was permitted to ask a builder, called by her as a witness, what was the replacement value of the house and garage on plaintiff's property at the time it was taken. This evidence was admitted "for the single purpose of corroborating . . . . . . the witnesses who have testified as to their estimate on the buildings on this property in order to determine the market value placed on the property by them." Whether or not this was proper, is the only question necessary to be considered by us; the assignment which objects to the trial judge's reference to the evidence in his charge to the *254 jury, is of no moment, if the testimony was properly admitted.
No other evidence is as unsatisfactory as that necessarily received in this class of cases. Courts and juries are given, by the witnesses, matters of opinion only, the accuracy of which is far more difficult to test than are disputed questions of fact. An endeavor to minimize this uncertainty, may excuse the error which appears in the ruling now complained of, and in the single case supposed to sustain it, but it is error notwithstanding. Even those who are but slightly conversant with the subject, know that, where the building being valued is in a neighborhood which has run down, or where it was erected by an owner for his home, or where it is so located on a large lot as to hinder the proper development of the property after the character of the neighborhood has changed, the replacement value of such house will always be greater than the value of the building as part of the property in its entirety; indeed it may be, and sometimes is, in excess of the market value of the property, including the building. Curiously enough, we have on this record two illustrations of the truth of the above. Plaintiff's husband testified that "you couldn't replace [plaintiff's] property for $75,000 . . . . . . [but] the market value was between $40,000 and $45,000." It also appeared that a neighboring property, on which an expensive home had been built, could not be sold until the building was torn down. It is clear, therefore, that evidence of the replacement value of plaintiff's buildings should not have been received, unless the circumstances were so peculiar as to render it absolutely essential, in the interest of justice, to require its admission. We know of no circumstance which could justify it; certainly none appears on this record.
The case was improperly tried throughout, but in a respect for which the parties, and not the court below, were responsible. The witnesses on each side were *255
asked, in chief, not only the market value of the property in its entirety, at the time of the taking, but also how they made up that value; and each gave the value of the land, the house, and the garage, as separate items, the sum of the three being the amount alleged by the witness to be the market value of the property. This was improper. Witnesses may testify as to that which tends to give value to a property, including buildings or anything else on or under it, which a proposed purchaser would probably consider in determining whether or not he would buy it; but the testimony, in chief at least, must be limited to the property in its entirety, as it was at the time of the taking: Searle v. Lackawanna, etc., R. R. Co.,
After an expert witness has been examined and cross-examined as to his competency, and has, in addition, been so interrogated as to show fully the extent of his knowledge regarding the value of the property taken, in order that the jury may be able to determine what weight shall be given to his testimony, the only other questions in chief should be as to his opinion of the value of the property, in its entirety, before and after the taking. The cross-examination may, of course, cover a wider field. "In fact, any and everypertinent question may be put to him on cross-examination which will *256
enable the jury to place a fair estimate upon his testimony as to the damages sustained by the plaintiff": Davis v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
The question objected to in the present case having been propounded in chief, and not in cross-examination or re-direct examination, our inquiry is, does the fact that defendant did not object to evidence showing the actual value of the buildings at the time of the taking, as distinguished from the value of the property in its entirety, justify further evidence in chief as to the replacement value of those buildings? If it had been *257 shown that there was a fixed relation between the two kinds of value, possibly evidence as to the replacement value would have been admissible by way of corroboration; but there was no such evidence, and, as we have shown, there was no such relation. It is clear, therefore, that the question should not have been allowed.
Savings Trust Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and a venire facias de novo is awarded.