Dеfendant Steve McQueen was identified by his cousin and convicted by a jury as the killer of a man who had been missing for a year. He appeals, arguing that he was improperly dеtained before trial and that the trial court admitted evidence and instructed the jury incorrectly. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
We have jurisdiction over this direct apрeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const, art. VII, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).
Background
On April 3, 1996, the State charged Defendant with the murder of Jacob Lumpkin. Lumpkin hаd disappeared approximately one year earlier and had last been seen with Defendant and Defendant’s cousin, Jimmy McQueen. The police had questionеd Defendant and his cousin several .times about Lumpkin’s disappearance, and each time they had denied any knowledge of Lumpkin’s whereabouts. But in March of 1996, Jimmy McQueen had admitted that Defendant killed Lumpkin and that both men had transported the victim’s body to a drainage ditch just outside Knox, Indiana. Jimmy led police to the ditch and police recоvered the body. An autopsy determined that the cause of death had been multiple gunshot wounds to the head. At a jury trial conducted in December, 1996, Defendant was convicted of Murder. 1 The trial court subsequently sentenced him to serve 60 years in the Department of Corrections. 2
I
Defendant first contends that he was improperly detained before trial. Specifically, he argues that the failure to release him after more than six months in jail without trial violated Ind.Crim.Rule 4(A) as well as the state constitutional prohibition against treating prisoners with “unnecessary rigor.” We disagree.
A
Indiana Criminal Rule 4 exists to aid in implementing an accused’s right to speedy trial, as provided in the constitutions of both Indiana and the United States.
Joyner v. State,
B
Defendant next contеnds that the delay of more than six months without trial violated his rights as guaranteed by Article I, § 15, of the Indiana Constitution. That section provides that “[n]o .person arrested, or confined in jаil, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.” As for an explanation of how the delay in this case—apparently caused by a number of continuances—resulted in “unnecessary rigor,” Defendant suggests that “[tjhis seldom-construed provision applies by virtue of the fact that confinement in jail is, by its nature, rigorous, and by virtue of the clear expression of Criminal Rulе 4(A) that imprisonment after six months without a trail is forbidden and clearly unnecessary.” (Appellant’s Bf. at 24). We disagree.
Under the reasoning offered by Defendant, any violation of Crim.R. 4(A) would likely constitute “unnecessary rigor,” violating Article I, § 15. Article I, § 15 is not a catch-all provision applicable to every adverse condition accompanying confinеment. Rather, it serves to prohibit extreme instances of mistreatment and abuse. As we have stated previously:
Cases recognizing violations of Article 1, Section 15 involve situatiоns where a prisoner was tortured, had a tooth knocked out, was repeatedly beaten, kicked and struck with a blackjack and beaten with a rubber hose while he was stretched across a table, Kokenes v. State,213 Ind. 476 ,13 N.E.2d 524 (1938), where a prisoner was beaten with police officer’s fists in both eyes, cut on the top of his head, and beaten with a rubber hose on the hеad and ears, Bonahoon v. State,203 Ind. 51 ,178 N.E. 570 (1931), and where a prisoner was severely injured after being shot by police during a protest, Roberts v. State,159 Ind.App. 456 ,307 N.E.2d 501 (1974).
Ratliff v. Cohn,
II
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed beсause the trial court admitted into evidence photographs of the victim’s skeletal remains. He contends the pictures were irrelevant because the partiеs stipulated that the skeletal remains found in a ditch in Starke County were those of Jake Lumpkin and that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to the head. Even if they were rеlevant, he argues, their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value and they should have been excluded.
The admission of photographic evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion.
Amburgey v. State,
Although the identity of the remains recovered by poliсe and the cause of death were stipulated by the parties, the precise nature of the injuries suffered by the victim were not. The photographs at issue here were admitted in conjunction with expert testimony to explain the nature and location of the victim’s wounds, as well as to describe other evidence obtained from the exрert’s examination of the remains. Such information served to illustrate the testimony of the State’s expert. While we agree that courts must be cautious of inflammatory and cumulаtive evidence, we are not persuaded that the photographs at issue were so prejudicial as to influence the jury improperly. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.
Ill
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by giving the jury an instruction on accessory liability. Becausе he was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime, Defendant argues that this instruction contradicted the State’s theory of the case and was both cоnfusing and misleading. We disagree.
Under the relevant statutory provision,
5
there is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of a principal and that of an accomplice.
Marshall v. State,
At trial, evidence was presented showing that the victim was last seen with Defendant and his cousin, Jimmy McQueen. While Defendant was fingered by Jimmy McQueen as the actual killer, this testimony might have been self-serving. With evidence supporting the inference that either of the McQueens сould have been the actual killer with the other aiding in the crime, we find the trial court justified in giving an instruction on accessory liability.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
. Defendant was also charged and convicted on a second count of auto theft. See Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2.5 (1993). On this count, Defendant was sentenced to one and one-half years in the Department of Corrections to be executed and served concurrently with count one.
. Criminal Rule 4(A) states, in relevant part: Defendant in Jail. No defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a trial, for a pеriod in aggregate embracing more than six (6) months from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (whichever is later); except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because оf congestion of the court calendar.... Any defendant so detained shall be released on his own recognizance at the conclusion of the six-month period aforesaid and may be held to answer a criminal charge against him within the limitations provided for in subsection (C) of this rule.
. Under Criminal Rule 4(C) a defendant, whether jailed or released, will be disсharged if not brought to trial within one year after arrest or charge, excluding delays attributable to the defendant and certain circumstances of court congestion. Ind.Crim.Rule 4(C); Joyner, 678 N.E.2d at 392.
. Ind.Code § 35-41-2-4 (1993) (providing that a person "who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense”).